The failure of Belarus to maintain its role as a buffer between Russia and the West after 2020 is explained differently by each side. The Lukashenka regime blames the West (and Ukraine), claiming that they provoked the conflict by supporting democratic protests against his regime and imposing sanctions. From the Western perspective, however, the scale of falsifications and repression following the 2020 presidential election was so severe that political dialogue with the regime became impossible.
Even during the relatively stable years between 2014 and 2020, relations between Minsk and the West faced an obvious constraint in the absence of systemic change. Despite its efforts to present itself as a neutral state, Belarus showed no clear intention of moving out of Russia’s sphere of influence. For example, the Eurasian Economic Union was launched by Russia during that time and Belarus chose to join it, as it did all of Russia’s other post-Soviet integration projects. Domestically, there were no significant pro-democracy or pro-market reforms, and there was little reason given to anticipate any in the future.
To some extent, certain aspects of Belarus’s quasi-neutrality were compatible with Russia’s interests. The Kremlin responded favourably to Minsk as a venue for negotiations, as a flight connector between Moscow and Kyiv, or Moscow and Tbilisi, and as a mediator in economic dealings between Russia and the West. While Lukashenka refused to meet the Kremlin’s heightened military demands of Belarus, his regime tried to make itself useful in other ways and profit from it in the process. None of this clashed with Western interests, yet it still created a sense among Western policymakers that something was amiss.
But a certain degree of Belarusian independence still exists, as Lukashenka continues to govern the country and the armed forces remain under his control. More significantly, Belarusian interests differ from Russia’s in one simple way: the Kremlin does not fear war, while Lukashenka does. This small measure of sovereignty means that neutrality remains an option for Belarus, despite the appearance of it being a Russian asset.
After 24 February 2022, it no longer seems plausible to view Belarus as a fully sovereign state from the perspective of military planning. Russia’s assault against Ukraine and its interference in neighbouring Eastern European countries mean that the West has to continue to regard Belarus as a potential ‘balcony’ from which Russia could launch an attack on Eastern Europe and the wider West. However, to consign Belarus to that role permanently would mean, in effect, strengthening Russia’s position and thereby implicitly increasing the security risks to the West from the Kremlin’s use of Belarusian territory.
The risks of allowing Belarus to become a strategic ‘balcony’ for Russia vs the opportunities of re-engagement
The potential risks of allowing Belarus to become further entrenched in the role of Russian asset are clear:
- Use of Belarusian territory, airspace, infrastructure and armed forces for military operations against Ukraine and Western countries;
- Expansion of Russia’s military presence in Belarus aimed at stretching the resources of Ukraine and NATO, as well as reinforcing perceptions of Russia as a significant military power in the region;
- Employment of Belarus in ‘grey zone’ operations;
- Use of Belarus’s economic potential to support Russia’s war effort; and
- Advocacy and promotion of Kremlin positions in international forums.
For some Western states, there is also a limited upside to this scenario, in that the perception of threat emanating from Belarusian territory encourages the consolidation and mobilization of resources for NATO’s defence and deterrence in border states – something that might have been less likely in the absence of a clear security challenge.
The opportunities for re-engagement and for encouraging Belarus to become more neutral are equally clear:
- Limiting Russia’s ability to use Belarus as a platform for aggression against neighbouring states, thereby reducing the risks outlined above;
- Enabling Minsk to provide ‘good offices’ in mediation and conflict resolution, particularly on Ukraine; and
- Easing of political repression and a degree of normalization internally.
It is still necessary to acknowledge the risks, most obviously including the possibility that Belarusian neutrality may prove deceptive. The West and Ukraine could still face the consequences of a Russian ‘balcony’, while working under the assumption that Belarus will act as a genuine buffer. But the benefits of pursuing such a policy far outweigh this risk.
