Belarus’s geography makes the country a potential useful tool for Russian military strategy (Figure 1). This geographical position is further enhanced by Belarus’s developed transport infrastructure, which enables it to function as a logistical hub for potential Russian threats. As a result, Belarus’s neighbours most exposed to Russian pressure – Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia – have been reinforcing their borders with the country, through measures such as the deployment of landmines, the construction of defensive lines and the building of physical barriers.
If Russia sought direct confrontation with NATO, one often cited, if unlikely, scenario involves an offensive through the Suwałki corridor, a strategically sensitive area shared by Poland and Lithuania, situated between the Belarusian border and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Using the corridor could allow Moscow to isolate the Baltic states to the north from their Eastern European neighbours (or, as the Kremlin might put it, to ‘deblockade’ Kaliningrad). An interviewee for this paper notes another scenario, stating that if ‘Russia launched drones and missiles from the Belarusian–Lithuanian border as intensively as in Ukraine, the Kremlin could quickly and at minimal cost inflict damage no one wants to imagine’.
In its broader confrontation with the West, the Kremlin views Belarus not only as an instrument of pressure, but also as a geopolitical prize.
In its broader confrontation with the West, the Kremlin views Belarus not only as an instrument of pressure, but also as a geopolitical prize. Consequently, Russia allocates vastly greater resources to its policy on Belarus than the West does to its own. Equally importantly, for Russian president Vladimir Putin, Belarusians – like Ukrainians – are part of a ‘triune nation’. This means that Belarus is embedded within the Kremlin’s constructed notion of its own security. Belarus’s proximity to Russia’s core territories also encourages the Russian belief that, in order to feel secure, it must keep Belarus within its orbit. The principal mechanisms for doing so are political and military integration.
Under these conditions, the Lukashenka regime has only limited room for manoeuvre, though it still retains some latitude in determining its position within the Russian sphere of influence.
Belarus’s own priorities in foreign and security policy
Despite the country’s formal status as a close ally of the Kremlin, Belarus’s foreign policy under Lukashenka has never been fully aligned with that of Russia. Lukashenka was willing to engage in conflict with the West during the Russian presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and Dmitry Medvedev, yet sought to normalize relations with Western countries after Putin annexed Crimea in 2014. During that period, it was difficult to find a single example of a threat emanating from Belarusian territory towards the West or Ukraine. This distancing shows that Belarus has more agency than its geopolitical position and formal relations with Russia may imply.
Belarus’s foreign policy is now tilted catastrophically towards Moscow. This movement is the result of the convergence between Russia’s confrontational stance with the West and the Lukashenka regime’s own recent conflict with Western governments over his regime’s crackdown on domestic opposition following the 2020 presidential election.
The use of Belarusian territory in the war against Ukraine since 2022 has not only demonstrated Minsk’s dependence on Moscow but has deepened it. This dependency is evident across all spheres, including the economic and military domains, which now encompasses the potential deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on its territory – something Lukashenka himself had long desired as a safeguard against a perceived threat of foreign invasion. Belarus’s military command-and-control systems have become increasingly integrated with those of Russia, and the Belarusian defence industry continues to serve the needs of the Russian army. Belarus’s economic dependence on Russia, meanwhile, has reached a critical level, with two-thirds of its exports now going to the Russian market.
These dependencies erode Belarusian sovereignty further, but they also help sustain economic growth rates surpassing those of some EU member states, making it harder for those in Belarus who are favourable to the West to make their case.
The catastrophic turn in Belarus’s foreign policy towards Russia first emerged after the 2020 presidential election, the results of which both internal opponents of Lukashenka and international observers stated were falsified. Domestic repression and the regime’s subsequent foreign policy actions led to a sharp deterioration in relations with the West and to the imposition of sanctions by Western states. Broader sanctions were imposed once Minsk began to take actions that undermined regional security, as evidenced by the forced landing in Belarus of a flight carrying an opposition activist, the use of irregular migration as a tool against neighbouring NATO countries, and the facilitation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
At present, two main approaches to Belarus prevail in the West. US president Trump has reversed his predecessor’s policy and begun to explore opportunities for dialogue with the Lukashenka regime. Meanwhile, the EU still considers such engagement inadvisable.
With current EU policy not bringing positive results, nor likely to do so in the foreseeable future, the US approach is becoming an option for European politicians to consider – especially if the US is willing to take leadership and responsibility for the outcome. The EU’s stance is more significant in the long term, as Europe’s proximity as a market and the wider set of economic tools at its disposal give the EU the potential for leverage and could allow a stronger influence on Belarusian policy than the US. Indeed, the EU was Belarus’s second largest economic partner after Russia until 2022.
The US approach assumes that Belarusian foreign policy is less dependent on Russia than it might first appear, and that Belarus could be encouraged to become more independent based on Lukashenka’s recent steps. Even amid the limited contact between Western (particularly European) governments and the regime since 2022, Minsk has sought to demonstrate an awareness of Western concerns – at least rhetorically. For example, the Zapad-2025 joint military exercise between Belarus and Russia emphasized transparency, was held away from NATO borders, involved a reduced number of troops, and, surprisingly, welcomed US observers. In November, in response to a US request, Lukashenka released and deported 31 Ukrainian prisoners held in Belarus – some of whom had worked against Russian military interests on Belarusian territory, as indicated by the fact that they were personally met by the then head of Ukrainian military intelligence. It is difficult to imagine that this release was the Kremlin’s idea.
There is a willingness among Belarusian elites to expand their room for manoeuvre and to reduce, or at least stall, the growth of Russian influence. Those who seek to promote such ideas are usually described as the ‘pro-Belarus’ faction within the system. Previously, it was easier for the West to engage with this faction as it had a clear leader – Uladzimir Makei, Belarus’s foreign minister, who died in November 2022. Nevertheless, the regime’s recent actions, including resistance in some spheres to Belarus–Russia integration, indicate that few of its representatives are keen on becoming even more dependent.
