Making water use in global trade more sustainable

The challenge to improve supply-chain resilience and water security in the context of geopolitical change

Research paper

Published 14 May 2026

ISBN: 978 1 78413 679 6

Image — A vegetation enhancement and dust mitigation project at Salton Sea lakebed, California, an area believed to hold one of the world’s largest reserves of lithium, worth an estimated $500 billion. Photo credit: Copyright © Mario Tama/Getty Images

Aerial shot of Salton Sea lakebed, California

Leslie Morris-Iveson

Senior Research Fellow, Environment and Society Centre

Joe Ray

Head of Water, CDP

Richard King

Senior Research Fellow, Environment and Society Centre

Laura Kelly

Director, Shaping Sustainable Markets, IIED

Water can be thought of as the ‘forgotten input’ in global trade. Although water is critical to the production and transport of manufactured goods, and to the extraction, processing and transport of commodities, the link between trade and water use is seldom sufficiently reflected in policy, legislation or corporate supply-chain decisions. The hidden water dependencies embedded in trade and production systems mean that water impacts are often all but invisible to markets, a problem that merely further encourages unsustainable water use.

This research paper takes a pragmatic look at what measures are needed to improve sustainable water use in supply chains, taking particular account of today’s geopolitical fragmentation – a trend that complicates prospects for multilateral cooperation. The paper outlines how thinking on supply-chain security needs to take explicit account of the concept of ‘virtual water’ trade, and sets out 10 recommendations for governments, producers, traders, investors and civil society organizations. As businesses and governments continue to reorganize supplier relationships, in part to reduce costs and boost longer-term supply-chain security, we argue that physical water scarcity and water degradation challenges must not be overlooked.

DOI: 10.55317/9781784136796

02 The ‘virtual water’ trade conundrum – how local and remote agendas collide

Companies that trade internationally seldom consider the true cost or impacts of water use when deciding where to locate production. Until this practice changes, markets will continue to rely disproportionately on imports from water-stressed regions insufficiently equipped to support water-intensive agriculture or manufacturing.

Prioritizing between competing water uses often presents difficult trade-offs for policymakers and corporate decision-makers in today’s globalized trading system, as supply-chain efficiency and financial considerations may be at odds with imperatives to support environmental sustainability, community resilience and social justice. Should a factory or farm producing water-intensive goods or crops for export, for example, operate in an arid location that suffers from major water stresses? (Or indeed, in a location with abundant water resources but where that water is best allocated to other purposes, even if these uses are less profitable?) How will the investment in question affect the local water resource balance (i.e. its natural renewal) and ecology, even if the operation promises to generate substantial export revenues? Will the investment lead to competing needs for water, and detract from a public duty to ensure access to water and sanitation for local populations?

These are the sorts of questions that should underpin any assessment of the impacts of water use in international supply chains. The challenge is all the greater because water is often undervalued – or its use not accounted for at all – by policymakers and corporate planners. This affects the accuracy of the assumptions on which governments and commercial actors base their trade planning and policy. Water can be thought of as the ‘forgotten input’ in global trade. Despite water being a critical input in the production, processing and delivery of almost all traded commodities and goods, from crops to textiles to critical minerals, the true costs of water use are not adequately reflected in supply-chain policies.

Water can be thought of as the ‘forgotten input’ in global trade. Despite water being a critical input in the production, processing and delivery of almost all traded commodities and goods, from crops to textiles to critical minerals, the true costs of water use are not adequately reflected in supply-chain policies.

This, of course, encourages unsustainable practices. A failure by policymakers and markets to price in invisible costs and impacts can lead governments and investors to prefer investments that are detrimental to local environments and communities. Supply-chain sourcing decisions may prioritize financial motivations (such as the availability of low-cost labour and transport infrastructure), regulatory arbitrage, or geopolitical calculations relating to resource security or the choice of a preferred trade partner. Consequently, significant water-dependent production often occurs in regions where water access and availability are poor, where appropriate infrastructure is lacking, where urban populations are growing and compete for limited water supplies, and where water governance and regulatory oversight can be insufficient.

Governments must consider many competing pressures when determining whether to allow new production facilities in areas experiencing (or at risk of) water stress. Policymakers may prioritize the pursuit of economic growth, or they may support other political or social priorities (e.g. ensuring the supply of water for households). But while wider metrics that include sustainability and equitability might be desirable, the reality is that water use in today’s globalized trading system tends to reflect – and perpetuate – structural imbalances in countries’ political power, economic power and natural endowments. This means that virtual water flows – i.e. flows occurring as a result of trade – often increase to countries that already have relatively sufficient water supplies but enjoy the financial and technical resources to manage water risks. At the same time, water-related stresses often increase for countries less able to manage such risks.

The irony is that this outcome occurs despite trade’s theoretical potential to allow for a more balanced use of global water resources by enabling water-scarce countries to access water-intensive products from water-plentiful regions – and for both parties to profit from the exchange. The concept of fair water footprints (described in Chapter 1) marks an attempt to address such imbalances by promoting the equitable and sustainable redistribution of virtual water.

Box 2. Case study – drought impact, water allocation and semiconductor production in Taiwan

In 2021, amid the worst drought Taiwan had experienced in more than half a century, the island’s government faced a dilemma as it sought to balance competing demands for water. Officials had to decide where to impose the strictest water-saving measures: on households, the agricultural sector, or the island’s high-value, export-oriented technology manufacturing industries. In the event, the government elected, among other measures, to halt agricultural irrigation.17 This decision affected over one-fifth of irrigated land, but it permitted semiconductor manufacturing to continue (although that sector also faced certain water restrictions in relation to the drought).18

This example of water allocation at the government level exemplifies how high-value sectors can impact sectors deemed less strategically significant when water is underpriced or not priced at all.

Taiwan’s decision arguably merits special attention because of the internationally strategic importance of its semiconductor sector, the risks to which have the potential to cause cascading economic impacts around the world. Taiwan produces over 90 per cent of the world’s advanced semiconductors.19 This market dominance creates global dependencies and presents material risks to consumer countries in the event of Taiwan’s semiconductor exports being disrupted.

Drought risk will remain significant for the sector – and thus for global technology supply chains – both because semiconductor manufacturing is water-intensive, due to the high consumption of ultrapure water (UPW) required to maintain extreme purity levels in manufacturing; and because the island’s hydrological balance relies on seasonal typhoons to replenish groundwater. These weather patterns are becoming more unpredictable and intense as the climate changes.20 Future droughts in Taiwan could affect production of high-end semiconductors, leading to global shortages of components and to price hikes in a range of in-demand technologies, from smartphones to data centre servers used in artificial intelligence (AI) applications.

While context-dependent water distribution (e.g. involving allocation plans, permitting and enforcement) is crucial – alongside reducing water consumption, treating wastewater and augmenting existing water sources – for managing Taiwan’s water risks, there also needs to be more strategic governance of growth in activities associated with high levels of water stress.

The climate- and water-related risks that Taiwan faces could exacerbate the geopolitical risks that relate to its semiconductor manufacturing. The latter risks are acute, given that shifting tariff policies and heightened risk of military conflict with China are factors relevant to the supply of chips to markets such as the US.21 Disruption of Taiwanese semiconductor production would destabilize the global economy.22 To prepare for such an eventuality, the US is taking measures to reduce external dependencies.23 In recent years, for example, in a move also intended to revitalize domestic manufacturing, the US has reshored certain elements of water-intensive high-tech manufacturing to hubs in Arizona and southeast Texas.24 The bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act included investment into high-value semiconductor manufacturing and AI infrastructure.25 However, many of the apparent target locations for such investment face water scarcity themselves, potentially pitting local communities against industry.

Models of geoeconomic decision-making and virtual water use

Given transnational dependencies and the potential impacts on distant communities, effective water stewardship and supply-chain action require international-level governance. Countries benefiting from water resources beyond their national borders have the opportunity to adopt more sustainable models of cooperation with external partners. Whether they choose to do so in practice is another matter. Figure 1 presents three indicative models of how governments sometimes approach foreign relations to achieve water security goals, and outlines the factors that shape these choices.

The models range from (1) a relatively straightforward (and less politicized) reliance on importing water-intensive products, to (2) an emphasis on foreign direct investment (FDI) or other investments, to (3) aggressively securitized resource nationalism. In reality, many countries will combine approaches and vary their strategy over time (e.g. there can be tendencies of securitization in all models). Yet as the figure shows, many of the tactics countries currently employ are likely to cause geopolitical tensions and/or contribute to water uses that are unsustainable in aggregate.

Figure 1. Potential geopolitical models of virtual water trade

— Source: Developed and elaborated by authors, based initially on Roth, D. and Warner, J. (2025), ‘The sound of silence: the politics of virtual water policies’, World Development, Vol. 196, December 2025, 107180, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X25002669.

At the more depoliticized end of the spectrum, where virtual water trade dynamics are directly applied in national policies, countries can choose to externalize their water scarcity and pollution impacts, and protect national water security, by capitalizing on water-intensive food imports; this in turn enables the countries to focus instead on exporting goods that make more strategic sense in terms of their natural assets and climate. For example, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has long relied on food imports to overcome water scarcity resulting from dry climates and challenging hydrogeology – in effect, some MENA countries treat imports as an outsourced supply of virtual water creating what is sometimes termed a ‘second Nile’.26

Ensuring the sustainability and resilience of agricultural trade (the biggest drain on water resources) is becoming a pressing national security concern for an increasing number of countries.27 Relying on virtual water imports has become more widespread in countries with large populations and substantial food security concerns. In China, this has become a de facto national water-saving strategy, as illustrated by the nature of some foreign investments and resource projects associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).28 Although the BRI was not explicitly developed by the Chinese government with water saving in mind, it can nonetheless be seen as part of a framework through which China seeks to achieve long-term ‘hydro-stability’ using domestic, regional and global interventions and infrastructure investments.29

China is not alone in seeking to shore up its virtual water supplies through FDI in other countries. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are increasingly developing partnerships in the form of land acquisitions and/or FDI projects in Africa;30 this activity is a growing factor in virtual water flows globally. For the arid GCC countries, these partnerships provide a vehicle for securing land overseas and extracting resources from it.31 It is also a means to develop productive trade relationships with countries that can provide low production costs and abundant land and water resources, enabling Gulf markets to access agricultural products32 and minerals that are unavailable domestically.33

At the most securitized end of the spectrum, there has recently been evidence of increasingly aggressive national positioning – notably by the US – around resource access and land acquisition.

At the most securitized end of the spectrum (see Figure 1), there has recently been evidence of increasingly aggressive national positioning – notably by the US – around resource access and land acquisition. This trend, though not yet explicitly water-directed, has potentially negative implications for cooperative resource management and could undermine efforts to optimize virtual water trade for sustainability and water security. Skyrocketing demand for rare earths and other minerals appears to have been one of the drivers for this shift in US foreign policy, as seen in the recent US threats to take over Greenland.34 The Danish territory’s own water reserves could also become a focus of geopolitical contestation. Water is increasingly viewed as a strategic resource, as climate change and rising demand put pressure on valuable water resources.35 Investors are looking with interest to the vast water reserves located in Greenland; it is estimated that these sources could account for 10 per cent of global freshwater reserves.36 Greenland itself has recognized the strategic potential of its water reserves as an asset to capitalize on.37

As countries respond to pressures affecting their water security, for example by diversifying their imports, they are developing new relationships through bilateral trade agreements. Yet while this sort of diversification may boost countries’ short-term resilience, it also risks increasing resource competition and undermining collective efforts to ensure fair and equitable access to water. A reduction in the resilience of food supply chains and trading relationships is increasingly a strategic risk, especially for countries with significant food import dependencies.

While the approaches outlined above and in Figure 1 are, at a country level, often rational responses reflecting calculations of short-term national self-interest, they are problematic for the global collective good. Nationally focused strategies are often insufficient for, or even undermine, effective management of water as a common global resource. Policies intended to help countries diversify their virtual water supplies and guard against risky external dependencies may at some point result in fierce competition with other countries for productive land and associated water resources, especially as such assets are likely over time to be required to produce ever more food. The demand for freshwater – and competition for control of the territory on which freshwater resources are located – will potentially lead to an acute water supply ‘crunch’ in which water scarcity drives geopolitical tension.38

The answer, we argue, is for countries to work together (see Chapters 3 and 4), but there is currently no clear framework for collective action to ensure virtual water is managed sustainably. A number of barriers exist to closer common alignment on sustainable water management. Exporter countries can be reluctant to impose environmental regulations or enforcement measures on businesses crucial to export earnings, fearing that companies will relocate to jurisdictions with more lax environmental standards.39 At the same time, even if importing countries have an interest in addressing the environmental and social impacts of water use in producer countries, they may lack the authority to do anything about it.40

The following sections outline how the dynamics of virtual water trade are evolving in two key areas of geopolitical interest: national food security, dependent on (often water-intensive) agricultural production abroad; and advanced electronics, dependent on global exploration for critical minerals. Policy conversations on these topics are taking place in a context in which countries, companies and international organizations are grappling with the tensions associated with resource security, the climate crisis, and shifting geopolitical and geo-economic conditions.

Sector spotlight: food security and virtual water

Food systems are the dominant users of water resources, accounting for around 70 per cent of global freshwater withdrawals.41 International trade in food and agricultural products effectively transfers vast volumes of virtual water from producer countries to consumer markets. The water footprints of foreign-supplied food are largely invisible to end consumers, however.

Figure 2. Virtual water flows in international agricultural trade, by income classification

— Source: Calculated from Stockholm Environment Institute York and the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (2026), ‘The Global Environmental Impacts of Consumption (GEIC) Indicator’, https://commodityfootprints.earth.

To illustrate the asymmetries in the flows of virtual water in global agricultural trade, 81 per cent of so-called ‘blue water’42 embedded in this trade is associated with consumption in upper-middle-income and high-income countries.43 Virtual water flows from lower-middle-income countries to high-income countries are particularly significant (Figure 2). Consumption in the 19 countries of the G20 is responsible for 55 per cent of the blue water embedded in all international trade involving agricultural commodities.44

These dynamics are both exacerbating water stress in producer regions and creating significant geopolitical and supply-chain risks. Although producer countries benefit by receiving income from export crops, they are also negatively affected by water pollution, diversion and depletion, all of which reduce societal resilience to the climate and biodiversity crises. This is by no means limited to developing countries. In Spain, for example, more intense and frequent heatwaves and water shortages are affecting the stability of the agribusiness sector, with knock-on consequences for Spain’s trading partners – as was illustrated by empty supermarket shelves in the UK following a 2022–23 Spanish drought.45 In some countries, an increase in agricultural exports has driven deforestation, contributing to increased flooding and erosion.46

These environmental factors are interacting with turbulent geoeconomic dynamics – including export restrictions, supply-chain fragmentation and the use of tariffs. Increasing protectionism can restrict the flow of food products to international markets at the same time as droughts, floods and competition for water reduce harvests and worsen food security. Export restrictions in response to societal or political pressure to improve local food security can push up international prices, as was seen in many countries when food-price inflation surged owing to concerns around grain supplies following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.47 Similar inflationary and supply issues are beginning to be realized as the US and Israeli conflict with Iran disrupts shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, triggering a global fertilizer crisis.

Such crises tend to deepen global inequalities, while creating conditions for political upheaval and broader geopolitical tension as countries with greater fiscal capacity potentially wield their economic influence and soft (or even hard) power to exploit other countries’ natural resources, including water.

Sector spotlight: critical minerals, advanced electronics and virtual water

As developments in the artificial intelligence (AI) sector progress rapidly, there is growing scrutiny of virtual water’s role in advanced electronics. The direct operational water use of data centres has attracted attention, as it visibly affects and creates tensions with local communities and nearby industrial and agricultural water users.48 However, advanced electronics of all kinds also carry significant indirect globalized water footprints from water use in the supply chain. A wide range of products – consumer electronics, advanced weapons systems, electric vehicles (EVs), green technology infrastructure – are all reliant on, and pollutive of, water at various stages of raw-material extraction and manufacturing.

Multiple water-intensive supply-chain stages often leave significant per-product water footprints in the electronics sector. Supply chains in this sector are characterized by their complexity, as they can involve hundreds of regionally clustered suppliers – each using and degrading water in their own operations as well as inheriting the water use in upstream extraction, processing and fabrication stages. Such supply chains can start with water-intensive mining for critical raw materials in arid, potentially water-stressed countries or regions (such as parts of the US, Australia, South Africa and India).49 Sixteen per cent of critical mineral deposits and mines are located in highly water-stressed areas.50 Lithium – used in both EV batteries and solar panels – is particularly water-intensive. Over half of the global reserves of lithium are found in South America’s ‘lithium triangle’, a region experiencing severe water stress.51 Impacts from mining operations can include contamination from hazardous materials, for example through acidic mine drainage or stored tailings (waste material) that leach into groundwater due to improper treatment.52

Mining operations can threaten local needs, including basic access to water and sanitation. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which has the world’s largest reserves of cobalt53 but where basic water and sanitation access is low, poor water quality around mining sites has sometimes led to higher prevalence of disease including diarrhoea, hepatitis and cholera.54 (Cobalt is essential to many industrial processes, and to production of batteries for the green transition.) Mining operations in the DRC have sometimes contaminated groundwater and soil, affecting the supply of clean water for local populations.55

The centrality of these industries to the global economy creates potentially significant supply-chain dependencies and geopolitical tensions around the geographic concentration of resource extraction and processing capabilities. The US’s aggressive statements in early 2026 in relation to Greenland are one such example, and may have been motivated by a desire to access the Danish territory’s abundant critical minerals as a counter to China’s status as the majority supplier of the world’s rare earth minerals.56

The semiconductor sector (see also Box 2) illustrates some of these challenges. High volumes of water are used in advanced electronics manufacturing, due to the need for ultrapure water (UPW) to ensure high manufacturing standards. Given massive global demand for sophisticated semiconductors, we can expect the electronics sector’s consumption of water generally, and UPW specifically, to increase further in the future.

Water use by data centres is also a concern. Over 40 per cent of such facilities are projected to face high or extremely high water stress between 2030 and 2040.57 Moreover, with investment in AI skyrocketing, the global number of data centres in operation, planned or under construction is rising dramatically.

While security of water supply may not currently be a significant factor in the geopolitical jockeying of countries to control electronics supply chains, the sector’s high consumption of water, the geographic concentration of resources and processing capacities, and the growing climate change impacts and water stressors associated with electronics manufacturing suggest that sustainable water use deserves to be a more central consideration throughout the value chain. The water-intensive stages of critical-mineral and semiconductor supply chains are intersecting with strategic competition over technological leadership, industrial resilience and raw-material security. As countries adjust their geo-economic strategies and diversify or onshore water-intensive production, water risk – hitherto often underacknowledged – will become an increasingly important factor shaping national resilience and global economic stability. This linkage between industrial policy, resource security and geopolitical fragmentation is examined further in Chapter 3.

Zhong, R. and Chien, A. C. (2021), ‘Drought in Taiwan Pits Chip Makers Against Farmers’, New York Times, 8 April 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/08/technology/taiwan-drought-tsmc-semiconductors.html.
Ibid.; United Nations University (2022), The Taiwan Drought, UNU-EHS Technical Report,  https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/unu:9027/TR_220830_TaiwanDrought.pdf.
International Trade Administration (2025), ‘Taiwan – Semiconductors including chip design for AI’, Country Commercial Guide, 1 December 2025, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/taiwan-semiconductors- including-chip-design-ai.
British Geological Survey (2023), ‘Groundwater in Taiwan under a changing environment’, blog post, 15 December 2023, https://www.bgs.ac.uk/news/groundwater-in-taiwan-under-a-changing-environment.
Mickle, T. (2026), ‘The Looming Taiwan Chip Disaster That Silicon Valley Has Long Ignored’, New York Times, 24 February 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/24/technology/taiwan-china-chips-silicon-valley-tsmc.html.
Ibid.
Roy, D. (2024), The CHIPS Act: How US Microchip Factories Could Reshape the Economy, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 25 April 2024, https://www.cfr.org/articles/chips-act-how-us-microchip-factories- could-reshape-economy.
Ibid.; and Siripurapu, A. and Berman, N. (2023), ‘Is Industrial Policy Making a Comeback?’, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 September 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/industrial-policy-making-comeback.
US Congress (2022), H.R.4346 – CHIPS and Science Act, 117th Congress, Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346.
Roth, D. and Warner, J. (2025), ‘The sound of silence: the politics of virtual water policies’, World Development, Vol. 196, December 2025, 107180, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X25002669.
King (2025), The water footprints of global food and agriculture trade.
Ganeshpandian, P. (2024), ‘Dams, hegemony and beyond: China’s hydro-stability in the evolving world order’, Discover Global Society, Vol. 2, Article 9, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44282-024-00036-w.
Ibid.
Procopio, M. and Čok, C. (2025), Diversification nations: The Gulf way to engage with Africa, Policy Brief, Berlin: European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/publication/diversification-nations-the-gulf-way-to-engage- with-africa; Munyati, C. (2024), ‘A new economic partnership is emerging between Africa and the Gulf states’, World Economic Forum, 28 April 2024, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/04/africa-gcc-gulf-economy- partnership-emerging.
Procopio and Čok (2025), Diversification nations.
Khumalo, E. (2025), ‘The Race for Africa’s Farmland: Investment, Food Security, and Geopolitics’, FurtherAfrica, 12 August 2025, https://furtherafrica.com/2025/08/12/the-race-for-africas-farmland-investment-food-security- and-geopolitics.
Procopio and Čok (2025), Diversification nations.
Schwartz, M. and Baskaran, G. (2026), Greenland, Rare Earths, and Arctic Security, Analysis, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 January 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/greenland-rare- earths-and-arctic-security.
Lockwood, T. (2026), ‘Greenland’s freshwater reserves seen as ‘frozen capital’ as water becomes a national security issue’, CNBC, 20 January 2026, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/20/greenland-freshwater-reserves- national-security-capital.html.
Government of Greenland (2020), Greenlandic Ice and Water – A Legal Framework, https://govwater.gl/emner/groenlandsk-vand?sc_lang=en.
Ibid.
For a parallel with land-use pressures, see King, R. et al. (2023), The emerging global crisis of land use: How rising competition for land threatens international and environmental stability, and how the risks can be mitigated, Chatham House Report, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/ 11/emerging-global-crisis-land-use.
Gustafsson, M., Schilling-Vacaflor, A. and Pahl-Wostl, C. (2024), ‘Governing transnational water and climate risks in global supply chains’, Earth System Governance, Vol. 21, No. 100217, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg. 2024.100217.
Ibid.
A recent study has revealed a less clear contribution of irrigation to water withdrawal, indicating that the figure could vary more widely than previously estimated and could be in the region of 45–90 per cent: Puy, A. et al. (2025), ‘Widely cited global irrigation statistics lack empirical support’, PNAS Nexus, Vol. 4, No. 11, pgaf323, https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/4/11/pgaf323/8320029.
The term ‘blue water’ refers to surface and groundwater stores and flows (springs, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, aquifers). Groundwater includes both renewable and fossil resources, the latter of which are not replenished by the hydrological cycle; this means that fossil water extraction results in a permanent depletion of that resource. King (2025), The water footprints of global food and agriculture trade.
An estimated 40 per cent of this blue water embedded in trade for consumption in richer countries comes from low-income and lower-middle-income countries, and 41 per cent from trade between countries classified as upper-middle-income and high-income. Some 80 per cent of ‘green water’ – essentially, soil moisture – embedded in global agricultural trade is associated with consumption in the richer cohort of countries, and 20 per cent results from consumption in the two lower-income categories. 2023 values, calculated from Stockholm Environment Institute York and the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (2026), ‘The Global Environmental Impacts of Consumption (GEIC) Indicator’, https://commodityfootprints.earth.
An estimated 25 per cent is transferred from non-G20 countries, and 30 per cent is from trade between G20 countries, not including EU and African Union countries without direct sovereign G20 membership. For green water, 60 per cent of trade-embedded water flows are associated with consumption in G20 countries, and 40 per cent of flows are for consumption in non-G20 countries. 2023 values, calculated from: Stockholm Environment Institute York and the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (2026), ‘The Global Environmental Impacts of Consumption (GEIC) Indicator’.
Díaz, S. (2023), ‘The challenge for Spain’s agrifood sector of remaining competitive in the face of adverse conditions’, CaixaBank Research, 18 October 2023, https://www.caixabankresearch.com/en/sectoral-analysis/agrifood/challenge-spains-agrifood-sector-remaining-competitive-face-adverse.
UN-REDD (2024), ‘Forest loss and agricultural expansion: a point of no return for ecosystems and rainfall patterns’, 17 December 2024, https://www.un-redd.org/post/forest-loss-and-agricultural-expansion-point- no-return-ecosystems-and-rainfall-patterns.
Russell, R. (2022), Price Wars: How Chaotic Markets are Creating a Chaotic World, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Direct water use in this case refers to water use within a data centre, i.e. water consumed on site such as for cooling.
Luo, T. and Kölbel, J. (2024), ‘More Critical Minerals Mining Could Strain Water Supplies in Stressed Regions’, World Resources Institute, 10 January 2024, https://www.wri.org/insights/critical-minerals-mining-water-impacts.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
International Trade Administration (2026), ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo – Mining and Minerals’, Country Commercial Guide, 20 February 2026, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/democratic- republic-congo-mining-and-minerals.
Ahadi Irenge, C. et al. (2023), ‘Participative epidemiology and prevention pathway of health risks associated with artisanal mines in Luhihi area, DR Congo’, BMC Public Health, Vol. 23, No. 121, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-023-15020-3.
Kamara, J. and Bumba, S. (2025), ‘Protecting Miners’ Health in Democratic Republic of Congo’, Think Global Health, 10 February 2025, https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/protecting-miners-health-democratic-republic-congo.
GlobalData (2025), ‘China currently controls over 69% of global rare earth production’, Mining Technology, 18 January 2025, https://www.mining-technology.com/analyst-comment/china-global-rare-earth-production; and Schwartz and Baskaran (2026), Greenland, Rare Earths, and Arctic Security.
Lepawsky, J. (2024), ‘Climate change induced water stress and future semiconductor supply chain risk’, iScience, Vol. 27, No. 2, 108791, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2024.108791.

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