The US military operation to remove President Nicolás Maduro in early 2026 has raised expectations of an improvement in the Venezuelan economy. However, success relies on improving the legal system. Without the broad-based rule of law, the economy will not be able to grow at the rates expected by many Venezuelans, nor generate the employment and prosperity many are undoubtedly hoping for after 80 per cent of GDP was wiped out between 2014 and 2021.
The rule of law is essential to realization of the Trump administration’s three-stage plan for post-Maduro change in Venezuela. This plan, though light on detail, nominally envisages an initial period of stabilization, to be followed by recovery and reconciliation, and ultimately by transition (a term not fully defined by the Trump administration).,
The rule of law is essential to realization of the Trump administration’s three-stage plan for post-Maduro change in Venezuela.
The pressure to deliver effective reform that benefits a wide range of citizens and economic constituencies is illustrated by recent protests in Caracas and across the country demanding wage increases; without rapid improvement in governance and living standards, expressions of popular discontent will likely grow. The resulting social tensions will discourage investment and economic growth.
A professional and independent judicial and security system is also key to the other declared objective of the Trump administration: addressing transnational crime, drug trafficking and corruption. Venezuela is a major transhipment point for cocaine – with 10–13 per cent of global cocaine production estimated to pass through the country – and also has an entrenched illicit economy around other activities such as illegal gold mining and money laundering. Addressing corruption, crime and violence in the country is important not just for Venezuelans, but also for the prospects of efforts by the US and the international community to crack down on transnational criminal networks. That will require putting in place an efficacious, independent system of rule of law.
Reforms of Venezuela’s hydrocarbons law were approved by the National Assembly in February 2026, but these changes – along with more recent mining regulations – have fallen short of the expectations of investors and legal experts. The hydrocarbons law, in particular, grants wide latitude for government discretion over royalty rates and government issuance of licences for exploration and production. This latitude risks corruption and favouritism in policy decisions.
But beyond these individual cases, limiting and giving priority to reforms in the extractive sector while ignoring reforms in other essential areas risks further enabling and sustaining a rentier economy that excludes large segments of the wider Venezuelan economy and society.
In human rights, the advances have been similarly weak. The former Maduro government’s repressive security, judicial and prosecutorial apparatus remains in place, as do many of the officials involved in it. According to Amnesty International, between 500 and 600 political prisoners remained in detention in late May 2026; moreover, an amnesty law that had been passed by the pro-government National Assembly in February was informally suspended by the interim president in late April.
