The story so far
2015 saw a historic victory for the APC. Formed in 2013 as an amalgamation of three large, mostly regional, parties and rebels from the then governing PDP,1 the APC overturned 16 years of PDP dominance. The success of the party was largely attributable to its national spread and a number of high-profile defections from the PDP. The 2015 elections marked a turning point in Nigeria’s political journey since the return to civilian rule in 1999. This was the first time an opposition party had won both the presidential election and a majority in the legislative and gubernatorial polls. It was also the first time that an incumbent president had been defeated.
The APC, led by former general Muhammadu Buhari, who had previously headed a military government in 1983–85, entered office with an ambitious list of pledges to the electorate. These centred on fighting corruption, combating insecurity, improving public services and creating social welfare programmes. With the exception of large swathes of the South South and South East,2 the APC could boast widespread support across the country. But it was not long before public frustration with Buhari’s new government began to mount. The new president took several months to name his cabinet, and he left many other key government positions unfilled. The economy entered recession, largely as a result of low world oil prices, reduced oil production, and the government’s slow policy response and illiberal economic policies. The naira plummeted as the Central Bank of Nigeria imposed foreign exchange controls to avoid devaluation, and food prices shot up as the effects of protectionist trade policies hit consumers.
Security also deteriorated, with the Centre for Democracy and Development’s ‘Buharimeter’ monitoring project reporting that more than 800 people died as a result of insurgency-fuelled violence in the northeast during Buhari’s first 100 days in office.3 Although the president would later claim some victories over the weakening Boko Haram insurgency, a potentially more deadly expansion in land- and resource-based clashes between farmers and pastoralists was devastating parts of the Middle Belt region of central Nigeria. In the southern half of the country, Niger Delta militants threatened a fresh wave of violent attacks against oil infrastructure, and there was a revival of Biafra separatist movements. In addition to the challenge of multiple conflicts, a series of overseas visits by the president to address an undisclosed health issue helped create a fertile environment in which an internal party conflict then festered.
Despite the speculation over his health and criticism of his presidential style, Buhari remains very popular in some parts of the country and within factions of his party, and he has declared his interest in running for a second consecutive term in 2019. If he wins and then serves another full term, he will be in his early 80s by the end of his tenure, and it is likely that his time in office will again be disrupted by further medical treatment overseas and internal party disputes.
The PDP is not faring much better as regards party unity. Instead of focusing on repairing its image, which has been tarnished by decades of corruption, the party prefers to criticize the APC’s failings without offering alternative policy approaches. Despite this, the PDP gained significant mass in July 2018 after numerous senators and federal representatives defected to it from the APC. The PDP is certainly not short of prominent figures hoping to win the party’s presidential nomination: several sitting and former governors and a former vice-president have joined the crowded primary field.
In all, 29 states will also hold governorship elections in February 2019; seven others remain ‘off-cycle’ for different reasons. Of these contests, 20 involve sitting governors (12 of whom are members of the APC, the other eight being from the PDP). Incumbent governors running for a second term have significant advantages over their opponents because they are able to dominate state party structures, leverage powerful patronage networks, and use state funds to bolster their campaign. The other nine state governorships that will be contested next year (Borno, Gombe, Imo, Kwara, Nasarawa, Ogun, Oyo, Yobe and Zamfara) have term-limited incumbents who cannot run again, setting the scene for more competitive party primaries and governorship elections in those states.
These elections matter because state governors collectively exercise more influence over the country’s overall stability, economic prosperity and social welfare than do federal-level officials. They sit at the top of the political food chain in their respective states, each of which has a population, an economic profile and a budget on a par with some small or medium-sized countries. The result of the contest to replace the term-limited governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, will be especially important, given the enormous conflict-related and socio-economic challenges facing that state. Will Borno voters be given the opportunity to elect someone with the skills and vision to confront these problems, or will Shettima be tempted to designate a less capable – but more politically pliable – ‘godson’ as his successor?
1 Five political groupings united to form the APC: the southwest-oriented Action Congress of Nigeria; the northeast-focused All Nigeria People’s Party; the northern-based Congress for Progressive Change; numerous PDP defectors (including five governors, hundreds of legislators and a former vice-president); and a faction of the southeast-oriented All Progressives Grand Alliance.
2 Nigeria’s 36 states and Federal Capital Territory of Abuja are divided into six ‘geo-political zones’: South South, South East, South West, North Central, North East, North West. The South South zone consists of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers states.
3 Buharimeter (2015), Delivering On Campaign Promises: The First 100 Days Report, Centre for Democracy and Development, p. 6, http://www.buharimeter.ng/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/4.pdf (accessed 9 July 2018).