Abbas and Olmert at Annapolis and after
The Bush administration convened an Israeli–Palestinian peace conference at Annapolis in the US in November 2007. In a joint statement issued at the conference, PA President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel committed themselves to implementing their obligations under the Roadmap ‘until they reach a peace treaty’.15
The two leaders continued their talks privately thereafter, with their last meeting taking place on 16 September 2008. By the time of that final meeting, the two leaders had (according to Olmert’s memoirs) agreed on a number of key principles regarding security, Jerusalem, refugees and border adjustments with land swaps. (Abbas confirmed most of Olmert’s account in an interview.16)
One lesson that can be drawn from the Olmert–Abbas talks is that negotiations need a process in which both parties know exactly what they are being offered or asked to accept
Olmert’s offer to Abbas during their final encounter seems to have been the most far-reaching ever made by an Israeli prime minister to a Palestinian leader. It was not, however, good enough (or at least not clear enough), as far as Abbas was concerned. In an interview in November 2015, Abbas admitted that he had not accepted Olmert’s offer. He made it clear, however, that what he had objected to was not a peace deal per se, but the way in which the process was conducted – specifically, that he was asked to agree to Olmert’s sketch map of borders without being allowed to take away a copy to study.17 One lesson that can be drawn from the Olmert–Abbas talks is that negotiations need a process in which both parties know exactly what they are being offered or asked to accept. (This also applied to Camp David 2000.) Another is that this process can be usefully supported or facilitated by a third party (which the US did not do after Annapolis).
While Abbas’s concerns about what he was being asked to accept – and the way in which he was being asked to do so – may have been understandable, he may also have been anxious about the potential consequences for his own position. For one thing, the talks were opposed by Hamas and other militant groups. Abbas may have felt that an agreement with Olmert would scupper any chances of securing the eventual participation of Hamas in a reconciliation government. Equally, he may have feared that rivals within his own Fatah movement would challenge his leadership by exploiting the concessions he would have had to make to reach an agreement with Olmert. And he probably also feared that Olmert, then under investigation for corruption, would not remain for long as prime minister and hence would not be able to lead the implementation of any agreement reached.
As far as a potential third-party role was concerned, both leaders appear to have hoped that, as their talks continued, the Bush administration would come forward with bridging proposals. If that was the case, they did not convey this hope to the US with sufficient urgency. Little was to be expected from the US administration by September 2008, as it was in its final months, but Olmert or Abbas (or both) could have asked for help much sooner. Two lessons for third parties may be drawn from the Olmert–Abbas negotiations. First, if the sides feel they need third-party intervention, they should make this clear to the third party or parties in question in good time. Second, the third parties should be proactive and spot when their intervention might be needed.
Eventually, the Olmert–Abbas negotiations were brought to an end by external circumstances: the Gaza war of 2008–09 and Olmert’s resignation. (Olmert remained in office until March 2009, but was clearly a lame duck once he had announced his resignation in July 2008.) Israeli elections in early 2009 brought Netanyahu in again as prime minister, but he rejected the idea of renewing negotiations at the point where they had left off. Moreover, Netanyahu took several months to endorse the concept of a Palestinian state; and when he did so, he made it clear that a ‘fundamental prerequisite’ would be Palestinian recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.18
15 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007), ‘The Annapolis Conference’, 27 November 2007, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/history/pages/the%20annapolis%20conference%2027-nov-2007.aspx.
16 Bronner, E. (2011), ‘Olmert Memoir Cites Near Deal for Mideast Peace’, New York Times, 27 January 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/middleeast/28mideast.html.
17 i24NEWS (2015), ‘Abbas says he rejected Olmert peace offer in 2008 over unseen map’, 19 November 2015, https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/92894-151119-abbas-says-he-rejected-olmert-peace-offer-in-2008-over-unseen-map.
18 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009), ‘Address by PM Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan University’, 14 June 2009, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/Address_PM_Netanyahu_Bar-Ilan_University_14-Jun-2009.aspx.