The Camp David approach, 2000
Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1999–2001) was unwilling to continue the incrementalism of the Oslo process. Instead he sought an all-or-nothing negotiation with President Arafat, by means of a single summit with US mediation.3 The drawbacks of an incremental approach were by now evident, and Barak’s confident, ‘can do’ personality in any case disposed him to look for a quick win, even if the agreement so reached was likely to be imperfect. (Some of those involved in the Oslo process appear to have believed that, with time, a ‘perfect’ peace deal could have been reached.) In addition, Barak’s governmental coalition was crumbling and he needed a success in order to prevent its collapse. (Akram Hanieh, one of Arafat’s closest advisers, recalled that this was a constant refrain from President Clinton’s team at Camp David.4)
However, despite the general merits of a comprehensive approach, it did not succeed at Camp David. There were several reasons for this.
For one thing, Arafat did not share Barak’s enthusiasm for the process, feeling it to be rushed and fearing a trap.5 President Clinton did what he could to reassure Arafat, but Barak himself did nothing to this end. Moreover, Barak had already undermined what confidence Arafat might have had in him by trying first for an agreement with Syria, only turning to the Palestinian track when it was clear that no such agreement was going to materialize. In these circumstances, Arafat came to Camp David in a defensive state of mind and unwilling to offer proposals himself. He also had little faith in the US, the sole third party involved in the negotiation. One conclusion that can be drawn from the US determination to press ahead in these circumstances is that a negotiation in which one party is participating with great reluctance is unlikely to produce an agreement.
For his part, Barak also had little trust in Arafat. Indeed, part of the attraction for Barak of the comprehensive approach may have been that it did not seem to rely on trust. But even if trust was not absolutely necessary, a minimum level of rapport or personal chemistry is always a vital commodity in such delicate negotiations; this was entirely lacking between the two men, who barely met at all at Camp David.
Another major problem with the negotiations at Camp David (and afterwards) was the absence of clear ‘red lines’ on specific issues
Another major problem with the negotiations at Camp David (and afterwards) was the absence of clear ‘red lines’ on specific issues. Barak’s readiness to go well beyond his initial negotiating positions invited Arafat to assume that there was likely to be a better offer, and hence to refrain from accepting whatever the current offer was. The lesson from this failure in communications is that strategic red lines should be very clear – and that if they are not, mediators should ensure that they are made clear (the US failed to do this at Camp David).
There was, however, a fundamental failure on Arafat’s part as well: he could have tested Barak’s proposals by offering counterproposals of his own, but chose not to do so. This was most probably because Arafat feared that the strength of opposition to any agreement on issues as sensitive as Jerusalem and refugees would lead to his having to suppress resistance from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) – in other words, he feared that it would lead to a Palestinian civil war.6 Arafat may also have feared for his own life. (Hanieh recalls Arafat’s rhetorical question to Clinton: ‘Do you want to attend my funeral?’7)
Arafat might also have been bolder at Camp David had he received encouragement from his fellow Arab leaders, especially regarding permanent-status proposals for Jerusalem. But he received no such encouragement. (Hanieh is clear that the US team contacted Arab leaders only belatedly, and that those who responded tended to support Arafat’s refusal to compromise.8) Clinton could have helped construct the ‘tight international envelope’ that leading Israeli negotiator Shlomo Ben-Ami believed could have provided the necessary support; however, for whatever reason, Clinton did not do so. This experience suggests that while regional leaders may be able to play a valuable supporting role in Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, they may need encouragement and mobilization in advance.
After Camp David, Arafat’s standing among the Palestinian public grew, with 68 per cent of Palestinians polled believing that his position at the summit (i.e. not accepting Barak’s ‘offer’) was ‘just right’.9 Without any countervailing support for compromise from fellow Arab leaders or from the rest of the international community, this must have inclined Arafat to refrain from considering further concessions.
Barak appears to have been serious about getting to a permanent-status agreement at Camp David and was prepared to make what he called a ‘generous offer’ to get it. However, he did not manage to convince the other parties in his coalition that his proposals were sound. Without sufficient backing from his own government, his position was easily undermined by events such as Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and the outbreak of the Second Intifada.
Timing is crucial: had a deal been reached at Camp David, there would have been time to begin implementation with Clinton’s support
All the same, negotiations continued, leading to the landmark ‘Clinton Parameters’ of December 2000, with further progress made at Taba in Egypt in January 2001. But against a backdrop of violence, and with President Clinton’s term ending and Barak clearly about to lose elections, the prospects of clinching a deal were negligible.
A lesson here is that leaders who fail to maintain a critical mass of support for their negotiating position cannot bring peace talks to a successful conclusion. Another lesson is that timing is crucial: had a deal been reached at Camp David – something that would have required a much more forthcoming and proactive stance on Arafat’s part, and greater clarity on Barak’s – there would have been time to begin implementation with Clinton’s support.
One damaging feature of the aftermath of the Camp David summit was Barak’s determination (in which Clinton acquiesced) that Arafat should get the blame for the summit’s failure. Once this narrative had gained traction, the notion that there was ‘no Palestinian partner for peace’ enabled Sharon, Barak’s successor, and later Netanyahu to avoid substantive negotiations. A lesson from this experience is that leaders sincerely seeking peace should refrain from demonizing the other party, and should always leave room for a return to the negotiating table. Third parties should recognize when counterproductive posturing is taking place and do their best to discourage it.
3 Malley, R. and Agha, H. (2001), ‘Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors’, New York Review of Books, 9 August 2001, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2001/08/09/camp-david-the-tragedy-of-errors/.
4 Hanieh, A. (2001), ‘The Camp David Papers’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter 2001), p. 81, http://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/jps-articles/jps.2001.30.2.75.pdf.
5 Ibid; and Malley and Agha (2001), ‘Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors’.
6 Ben-Ami, S. (2005), Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: the Israeli-Arab Tragedy, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 280.
7 Hanieh (2001), ‘The Camp David Papers’.
8 Ibid.
9 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (2000), ‘Joint Palestinian–Israeli Public Opinion Poll 1 – July 2000’, http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/461.