The Oslo approach, 1993 to 2000
The Oslo agreement of 1993 (‘Oslo I’) set out a process that was explicitly incremental.1 It established a ‘Palestinian interim Self-Governing Authority’ for a ‘transitional period not exceeding five years’ (authors’ italics). It listed the issues central to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians: Jerusalem, refugees, Jewish settlements, security and borders. It stipulated that negotiations on these issues were to take place during the transitional period. But the shape of any eventual permanent settlement was not defined, even in the broadest outline; nor was the process for achieving this objective set out in detail. An end to the occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state were not mentioned, although they may have been understood by many to be the inevitable outcome of the negotiations.
Despite an incremental approach, the Oslo I agreement made it clear that the aim of the process was the achievement of ‘a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement’. Moreover, it set out a timetable for the negotiations to achieve that goal. These were to start no later than the beginning of the third year of the transitional (or interim) period, and to conclude with a permanent settlement (also referred to as a permanent-status agreement) within the five-year limit of that period.
The Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement of 1995 (‘Oslo II’) marked the end of the first stage of negotiations. It was a much more significant agreement than Oslo I in terms of changes on the ground. It built on some changes that had already taken place, most notably the establishment of the PLO-based Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza and Jericho. However, Oslo II did not tackle (and was not intended to tackle) the core issues.
Leadership was a crucial factor in the early success and then semi-stagnation of the Oslo process. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and the PA’s President Yasser Arafat seemed committed to continuing with the process, despite their strong reservations about it and lack of trust in one another. Nevertheless, it is unclear how committed both men were to meeting each other’s minimum requirements for a peace deal, and whether they could, with the passage of time, have built enough trust to achieve a permanent-status agreement. The lesson here is that trust between leaders may be highly desirable, but is not absolutely essential if the leaders on both sides desire progress.
Leadership was a crucial factor in the early success and then semi-stagnation of the Oslo process
It does not necessarily follow from the progress made by Rabin and Arafat that a measure of trust is never an essential condition if Israeli and Palestinian leaders are to make the concessions required for a final, comprehensive deal. But the assassination of Rabin in 1995 meant that the proposition of trust being critical to such a deal was never put to the test.
Rabin’s assassination led eventually to the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister in 1996. Netanyahu did not share Rabin’s commitment to the peace process, or to the two-state solution perceived by many as its likely eventual outcome. It took intervention from the US administration to enable even small steps forward (in the form of the Hebron and Wye agreements) during Netanyahu’s premiership.
More than one lesson could be drawn from this post-Rabin period in which the Oslo approach was followed. One is that, in such circumstances, a third party can play a valuable ‘holding’ role to prevent the process from collapsing until circumstances change. Another possible lesson is that if a third party wishes to produce significant progress, it needs to involve itself much more actively than the Bill Clinton administration did.
During the premierships of both Rabin and Netanyahu, lack of confidence on each side in the sincerity of the other, combined with the incremental approach of Oslo and its deliberate vagueness, led both Israel and the Palestinians to continue with policies that undermined mutual trust still further. Israel continued with the ‘creation of facts’, particularly the building and expansion of settlements. Meanwhile, the Palestinians did not act as vigorously as they could have done to suppress armed struggle, including terrorism (Arafat seemed to see violence as a source of potential pressure on Israel). The Palestinians also failed to reform the PA, a system both politically and economically dysfunctional.
One of the lessons that emerges from this experience is that leaders cannot expect to reach agreements and implement them successfully if they play a double game. Rather, they need to develop a partnership that is based on a shared desire to achieve a win-win outcome, and that can withstand hostility from sections of the public on both sides. Practical measures that show understanding of the other side’s concerns can help to create the necessary sense of common purpose.
In the event, however, the impact of the confidence-destroying developments during the Oslo years heavily outweighed the benefits of the confidence-building measures for which the process provided. On the Israeli side, incrementalism gave politicians opposed to the Oslo process the opportunity in effect to promote their agendas and to organize themselves to win the next election. Meanwhile, the Oslo process’s supporters in government felt compelled to devote much of their efforts to domestic constituency management rather than to peacebuilding. All this suggests another lesson: that a necessary (albeit insufficient) condition for the success of an incremental approach is firm and continuous management, with the proactive support of third parties if required. However, such management inevitably consumes a great deal of energy on the part of all concerned, energy that would be better spent on negotiations. This suggests that closing a deal promptly and presenting it to the public on both sides may work better than negotiating over an extended period. (As we will see in respect of the Camp David summit, however, a crucial factor with either approach is how well it is handled: even a single summit requires thorough preparation and judicious management of the event itself.)
While it ultimately failed, the incrementalism built into the Oslo process was designed, with the best of intentions, to overcome the initial lack of trust not just between the leaders but also between the two peoples. Ordinary Israelis and Palestinians had been traumatized by decades of conflict and bloodshed, and had been indoctrinated by their respective leaders’ discourses of demonization and dehumanization of the other. The psychology and history of the two peoples constrained the ability of their leaders to mobilize a critical mass of support for the concessions required to achieve peace.
As already noted, Oslo II was supposed to have been superseded by a permanent-status agreement. However, this never happened, and what should have been a temporary situation has therefore been allowed to persist indefinitely. One of the most pernicious consequences of this state of affairs, from the point of view of prospects for a permanent peace, has been what is sometimes termed the ‘outsourcing of the occupation’, in which the PA takes responsibility for protecting Israel’s security as well as its own.2
While the Oslo process did not achieve its ultimate goal, its initial years showed what can be achieved if political will exists
This is a situation with which Israel has been able to live, at relatively low political cost to its leaders. The international community has also seemed able to manage this admittedly uncomfortable status quo with a combination of rhetoric and financial assistance for the Palestinians. However, the situation has perpetuated the asymmetric nature of the conflict, which makes fruitful negotiations extremely difficult. Unless the international community is ready to introduce a system of incentives and disincentives that encourage both sides to move continuously and consistently down the path towards peace, and that deter those acts which hinder peace, reaching an agreement will be virtually impossible.
While the Oslo process did not achieve its ultimate goal, its initial years showed what can be achieved if political will exists. In a short time, Israel and the PLO moved from a state of hostility to one of mutual recognition, with dialogue on all levels, security cooperation, an active pro-peace civil society on both sides, economic development (however flawed) for the Palestinians, and the positive involvement of the international community.
1 For the text, see Yale Law School (2008), ‘Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement: 1993’, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/isrplo.asp. For a discussion of Oslo and incrementalism, see Mitchell, G. J. and Sachar, A. (2017), A Path to Peace, Simon & Schuster, pp. 69–70.
2 Gordon, N. (2008), ‘Outsourcing the Occupation’, chapter in Israel’s Occupation, University of California Press, http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1525/california/9780520255302.003.0008.