Conclusions: implications for the UK’s policy towards Russia
This paper opened with the proposition that the poisoning of Sergey and Yulia Skripal (and, subsequently, of DS Nick Bailey, Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley) was not just a brazen violation of UK sovereignty. It was also a UK policy failure. Following the murder of Aleksandr Litvinenko in 2006, the UK government failed to deter another life-threatening attack on UK nationals: Russia saw the UK as lacking purpose and resolve, primarily because its firm rhetoric was not matched by its actions. The UK government’s response to the Salisbury attack has been far more robust than was the case in 2007, but its words and deeds are still not synchronized. That is a recipe for trouble.
The UK government could close the gap by imposing a cost on the material interests of Russia’s leaders, or those linked to them. Such an approach would incorporate two elements:
- Once the UK has left the EU, giving serious consideration to use the 2018 SAML Act to impose targeted restrictive measures on Russia – or any other state – should it murder, or attempt to murder, UK nationals in future. If it did use the Act, the UK should urge its partners to adopt similar measures – multilateral sanctions would have more impact than unilateral sanctions – but it should be prepared to act without the EU if necessary.
- In the meantime, redoubled efforts to make supervision of the UK’s financial sector and DNFBPs more effective. This would prioritize addressing deficiencies highlighted by the forthcoming FATF mutual evaluation report. It would involve support for improved governance in the UK overseas territories. Crucially, it would be adequately resourced. As well as imposing a material cost on Russia’s leadership elite, more effective financial sector supervision would strengthen the resilience of UK institutions against the corrupting effects of illicit capital inflows. It would also reduce the reputational harm arising from a supervisory performance that leaves the UK open to damaging charges of double standards and weakens its influence abroad.
These steps would better align the UK government’s post-Salisbury rhetoric and actions. As a result, its Russia policy would be more coherent and more compelling.
‘Managed confrontation’, as this approach might be termed, is less equivocal than the UK government’s present policy towards Russia appears to be. A policy of managed confrontation draws a sharper line between the interests of the UK and those of Russia. It proceeds from the reality that the bilateral relationship is fundamentally adversarial, as the Litvinenko and Salisbury attacks have shown. It acknowledges that, again as the Litvinenko and Salisbury attacks show, the basis for more cooperative relations, let alone ‘partnership’, does not exist – and is most unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. It judges that the UK will more credibly deter further attacks on its citizens by putting financial and supervisory instruments at the centre of its Russia policy. Moreover, in rejecting efforts to compartmentalize political and economic dimensions of the bilateral relationship, the policy outlined here recognizes that it is untenable to view the Russian state as a geopolitical problem and a direct threat to certain UK nationals while actively facilitating the enrichment of some of that state’s elites.
A policy of managed confrontation towards Russia would require from UK policymakers:
- Patience and steadiness. Much of what needs to be done involves the methodical strengthening of the UK’s institutions and the incremental improvement of its global reputation. These tasks will take time; there will be few rapid, newsworthy achievements – the quick-win ‘deliverables’ that ministers and their advisers prize. There have to be concerns about the UK government’s attention span, particularly given the domestic and foreign pressures caused by Brexit. Meanwhile, Russia will undertake plenty of attempts at noisy intimidation. The UK must hold its nerve.
- Greater clarity. Despite ministers’ tough talk, important aspects of the UK government’s post-Salisbury Russia policy are widely perceived as being ambiguous and hesitant. Judging by public statements, the government’s stance on UWOs and Investor visas seems vague. And it is far from clear that the government intends to use ‘non-traditional’ national security tools such as financial and supervisory policy as vigorously and as imaginatively as it could.86
- A related point: careful use of language. There have been occasions when UK ministers have resorted to intemperate language when talking about Russia.87 Offensive and provocative, such outbursts betray a lack of gravitas that demeans both the individual making the remarks and the UK. Russia poses a long-term, high-stakes challenge. The UK needs leaders who will defend and promote the national interest with sober determination.
- Maintaining channels of communication with Russia at senior official level; and, where possible, at the political level. The UK government should not seek ‘engagement’ for its own sake. But, notwithstanding the dire state of relations, following the Salisbury attack, it still has every interest in ensuring that it uses opportunities for the difficult and frank exchanges of views necessary to clarify differences, to explore areas where cooperation may be feasible (although these are few), and to reduce the risk of miscalculation, misperception and accident.
- Self-reflection. At times, the UK makes life harder for itself by not living up to the legal and ethical benchmarks that it advocates. It need not swallow Russian accusations of double standards, which themselves are deeply hypocritical; nor should it permit examples of its leadership to be disparaged. The UK government should instead acknowledge that it could do certain important things differently and better – and that it would serve the country’s interests more effectively if it did.
86 See Bullough, O. (2018), ‘Forget the pledges to act – London is still a haven for dirty Russian money’, The Guardian, 30 September 2018 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/30/forget-pledges-to-act-london-still-haven-for-dirty-russian-money (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
87 Two recent examples, both in March 2018, being Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson’s remark that ‘Russia should go away and shut up’, and the parallel that Boris Johnson, then Foreign Secretary, appeared to draw between Russia’s hosting of the 2018 football World Cup and Nazi Germany’s hosting of the 1936 Olympic Games.