Russian retaliation
Another objection is that imposing sanctions on Russia would trigger retaliation. Russia would indeed retaliate,82 but it is important to think through the form that this would plausibly take. One suggestion, often made, is that there would be renewed pressure on BP and Shell, which during the last two decades have weathered several rounds of rough treatment from their Russian associates and Russia’s state agencies. This would hardly be risk-free for Russia, however, as it would harm the operations of these companies’ partners, Rosneft and Gazprom, two of the biggest generators of revenue for the Russian state and major sources of rent and patronage for the political leadership. Alternatively, Russia might impose counter-sanctions on UK exporters. If it did, UK companies would suffer. Yet Russia is not a critical export market for the UK: in 2017 it accounted for less than 1 per cent of total UK exports of goods and services.83 A third possibility is that retaliation would be asymmetric, perhaps involving cyberattacks. This cannot be ruled out either but is a long-standing threat;84 the UK would face it in any case.
Again, corporate interests should not be allowed to trump the responsibility of the UK’s government to reduce the threat posed to its citizens by the Russian state (or any other state). Ultimately, the question is whether the UK authorities really are determined to offer leadership and affirm the primacy of the national interest. In this respect, Chancellor Merkel of Germany offers an instructive lesson. In 2017 trade in goods between Russia and Germany stood at $49.9 billion, almost four times as great as trade in goods between Russia and the UK ($12.7 billion). German exports of goods to Russia came to $24.2 billion, nearly six times more than UK exports of goods to Russia ($4.1 billion).85 Given the scale of their country’s trade with Russia, German business interests opposed to EU sanctions are more vocal and more influential than their UK counterparts. Yet Merkel has been firm, insisting that Germany support the maintenance of restrictive measures on Russia.
82 On 4 June 2018 Putin signed into law an act giving the president the power to impose a variety of economic and political counter-sanctions on countries that introduced restrictive measures against Russia.
84 See footnote 35.