Sanctions
The legal basis for a policy of sanctions would be the 2018 Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering (SAML) Act, designed for use after the UK has left the EU.58 Until then, with narrow exceptions, the UK lacks an independent sanctioning capability. This explains Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt’s call on 21 August for the EU to match the US in imposing new restrictive measures on Russia in retaliation for the Salisbury attack.59 In the meantime, the UK government should emphasize that, once the UK has ceased to be an EU member, it will seriously consider using the SAML Act to strike against Russia (or any other state) if it attacks UK nationals.
In the event that it did use this legislation, UK sanctions against Russia would supplement the existing EU measures in place since 2014, which the UK government has pledged to maintain after Brexit. The objective – which it would be important to state clearly – would be punitive, underscoring the UK’s refusal to tolerate life-threatening attacks on its citizens. Sanctions would be targeted, with individuals and entities designated according to clear criteria.60 Effective targeting presupposes appropriate interdepartmental intelligence and analytical capabilities. This would require a significant long-term investment, drawing on expertise available in government, and supplemented by data and insights from allied governments, the private sector and non-government organizations – supporting the ‘stronger partnerships across government and with the private and third sectors’ by which the UK government’s March 2018 National Security Capability Review sets great store.61
On its own, the UK cannot match the impact of US or EU sanctions. It should urge its partners to follow suit, although, realistically, the chances of persuading the EU to do so would be slim, barring a further breakdown in EU–Russian relations. Given the seriousness of the matter, however, if necessary the UK should be prepared to act without the EU. One implication is that, in terms of sanctions policy towards Russia, this would start to align the UK more closely with the US.
58 ‘Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]’, https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-public-bill-office/2017-19/compared-bills/Sanctions-and-Anti-Money-Laundering-bill-tracked-changes.pdf (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
59 BBC News (2018), ‘Jeremy Hunt wants “malign” Russia to face tougher sanctions’, 21 August 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-45250069 (accessed 21 Oct. 2018). As required by the 1991 Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act, on 9 August 2018 the US government announced that it would restrict imports of certain sensitive technologies from Russia because of the Salisbury attack. The measures took effect on 22 August. The Act mandates further sanctions if, within 90 days, Russia does not certify that it has ceased the use of chemical weapons and allowed on-site inspections.
60 For thinking about factors that might be used for Russia designations, see Åslund, A. et al. (2017), ‘How to Identify the Kremlin Ruling Elite and its Agents: Criteria for the US Administration’s “Kremlin Report”’, Atlantic Council, 13 November 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-to-identify-the-kremlin-ruling-elite-and-its-agents (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
61 HM Government (2018), National Security Capability Review: Including the second annual report on implementation of the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p.10, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).