The UK’s response to the March 2018 Salisbury attack: ‘this appalling act against our country’
The UK government’s response to the attack on the Skripals was markedly different. In a statement to the House of Commons on 12 March, Prime Minister Theresa May26 said that it was ‘highly likely’ that Russia was responsible: Russia had produced the nerve agent in question (part of a group of nerve agents termed Novichok), and was still capable of doing so; it had a record of state-sponsored assassinations abroad; and it viewed some Russian defectors as legitimate targets. It followed that there were two plausible explanations. Either this was a direct act by Russia against the UK; or the Russian state had lost control of the nerve agent and had allowed it to fall into the hands of others. The Russian ambassador to the UK had been summoned to the Foreign Office to explain which version was correct and thus account for how the nerve agent could have been deployed in Salisbury against the Skripals. He had also been informed that Russia must provide ‘full and complete’ disclosure of its Novichok programme to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Should there be no credible response from the Russian government by a deadline of 13 March, the UK would conclude that the attack amounted to ‘an unlawful use of force by the Russian state against the United Kingdom’.27
Updating the House of Commons on 14 March, in the absence of the demanded credible explanation from the Russian government, May stated that there was ‘no alternative conclusion other than that the Russian state was culpable’ for the attempt on the lives of the Skripals, ‘and for threatening the lives of other British citizens in Salisbury’ – ‘this appalling act against our country’. She then announced reprisals that went appreciably further than the UK’s underwhelming response to the Litvinenko murder.28
First, the UK expelled 23 diplomats believed to be intelligence officers from Russia’s embassy in London, nearly four times as many as it had thrown out in 2007. This action was reinforced when, in late March, in solidarity with the UK, 26 countries announced the expulsions of more than 120 suspected intelligence officers from Russia’s embassies on their territories. NATO expelled seven officials from Russia’s mission at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels.29 Bulgaria, Luxemburg and the EU recalled their ambassadors from Moscow for consultations. Russia’s overseas intelligence networks will almost certainly have been damaged for years. From the UK government’s perspective, the coordination with its allies over these large-scale expulsions was a highly effective piece of diplomatic lobbying.30
Second, the UK was prepared to incur damage to political relations with Russia. Unlike in 2007, retaliatory measures were not followed by a ministerial visit to Moscow. This time, May announced the suspension of high-level bilateral contacts, including withdrawing its invitation to Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov to visit the UK (the reciprocal to a visit to Moscow by the then Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, in December 2017). Additionally, neither ministers nor members of the royal family would attend the 2018 football World Cup in Russia. In other words, hostile Russian actions guaranteed that relations would be poorer for the foreseeable future. This time, unlike in 2007, the UK made no attempt to soften retaliation with the language of cooperation, although May did say that it was not in the UK’s national interest to break off all bilateral dialogue.31
Third, the UK made use of various law enforcement instruments. May announced that the government would introduce new legislation to strengthen national defences, including ‘a targeted power to detain those suspected of hostile state activity at the UK border’ (at that time permitted only with regard to terrorism). It would invoke existing powers to monitor visitors possibly engaged in activity threatening UK security. These included checks on private flights, customs and freight, as well as the freezing of Russian state assets if there was evidence that these were being used to threaten the life and property of UK nationals and residents.32 Media reports followed of more stringent checks for travellers to the UK on Russian-owned private jets,33 and the inspection of an Aeroflot aircraft by customs officials at Heathrow airport.34
Notably, too, May’s 14 March statement to the House of Commons included an implied warning to Russia not to use its cyber capabilities against the UK, asserting that the UK would make use of ‘a range of tools from across the full breadth of [its] national security apparatus’ against threats of ‘hostile state activity’.35
The UK authorities later stepped up public pressure on Russia, revealing detailed material from the forensic investigation into the Salisbury attack. On 5 September the UK police laid out evidence identifying two Russians suspected of carrying out the attack against the Skripals.36 The same day, May informed the House of Commons that the government had concluded that the men in question were officers in Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU. ‘This was not a rogue operation,’ she said. ‘It was almost certainly also approved outside the GRU at a senior level of the Russian state.’37 The Crown Prosecution Service had concluded that it had sufficient evidence to bring charges against the two men for the attack on the Skripals. A European arrest warrant had been obtained in respect of the two suspects, and the UK would be seeking an Interpol ‘Red Notice’, although Russia’s repeated refusals to allow its nationals to stand trial overseas suggested that any formal request for their extradition would be ‘futile’. The men were also confirmed as the prime suspects in the case of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley.38 The next day, the UK briefed a special meeting of the UN Security Council.39
In important ways, therefore, the UK government’s response to the attack on the Skripals was far stronger than its reactions to the Litvinenko murder and the subsequent inquiry report. Yet its impulse to shield commercial interests from the crisis engulfing the bilateral relationship was still apparent. Implemented almost exclusively along political, diplomatic and law enforcement channels, the measures adopted after the Salisbury attack were essentially a sterner version of what was tried in 2007 – broadly ‘deterrence by denial’ (making it more difficult to conduct future hostile attacks on UK soil). There was minimal resort to ‘deterrence by punishment’ (i.e. imposing a cost to discourage future unacceptable activities) beyond symbolic steps such as suspending high-level bilateral contacts and not sending ministers or members of the royal family to the World Cup.40
As a result, in several areas the UK government’s post-Salisbury policy has appeared ill-defined. A case in point is the Investor visa scheme. The then Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, told MPs on 28 March that her department was looking at how Russians who had secured Investor visas had acquired their wealth.41 Subsequently, it was reported that Roman Abramovich, probably the best-known Russian resident in the UK, was encountering delays in renewing his Tier I visa, prompting speculation that he had fallen foul of new, tougher procedures.42 (He eventually withdrew his application and was granted Israeli citizenship at the end of May.) The Observer newspaper, citing Home Office sources, reported on 9 September that ministers considered that further restrictions on Investor visas might be needed. According to one source, an internal review of Tier I visas was under way, extending back to 2008, implying that the review encompassed more than 3,000 cases, including Investor visas granted to over 700 Russians. The same source said that ‘further changes to the Tier I scheme had not been ruled out, ‘in order to ensure that it continues to work in the national interest’.43 As of late October, however, the Home Office had not indicated what conclusions – if any – its review had drawn. In the absence of any formal announcement, it is unclear whether policy on this issue has changed.
Another example where the government’s position has seemed unclear is the issue of ‘unexplained wealth orders’ (UWOs). An innovation under the 2017 Criminal Finances Act, UWOs require an investigated person to account for the sources of their assets.44 The first order was served in February 2018. (Following the removal of reporting restrictions in October, it was revealed that the subject of the order was Zamira Hajiyeva, the wife of the former chairman of the International Bank of Azerbaijan.)45 An impact assessment from early 2017, prior to the entry into force of the legislation, had anticipated that UWOs would be used in 20 cases per year.46 In June 2018, however, a National Crime Agency official was reported as suggesting that a more ambitious policy might be in the offing, indicating that ‘between 120 and 140’ people were under investigation for possible UWO applications. Other officials were reported to have indicated that ‘a very significant portion’ of this group was ‘Russian or Russian-related’, and that a ‘step change’ in the use of orders was to be expected.47 Again, however, as of late October 2018, the direction of policy was not clear.
The UK government has also appeared hesitant about accelerating work to tighten financial sector supervision. When pressed on this matter in the House of Commons on 14 March, May conveyed little sense of urgency. She confirmed that the government had been ‘taking a number of measures in relation to financial activities’ in the UK overseas territories and crown dependencies; and that it would bring forward the introduction of a public register of beneficiaries of overseas companies owning property in the UK in 2021 – an initiative promised by Cameron back in 2013.48 Revealingly, however, it took a cross-party backbench initiative in the House of Commons at the end of April to force the government to amend the draft Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill to require Britain’s overseas territories to introduce public registers of beneficial ownership by the end of 2020.49
Meanwhile, in what was clearly bad timing for the UK government, the day after May announced the UK’s response to the Salisbury attack, Russia’s state-owned gas company Gazprom launched a €750 million eurobond in London. UK investors were among those competing for the issue, which was reported as being heavily oversubscribed. The following day, the Russian authorities floated a $4 billion sovereign eurobond. This issue, too, was oversubscribed, with UK investors comprising almost half the buyers. Both times the lead manager (the ‘bookrunner’) was VTB Capital, a subsidiary of VTB, a Russian state-owned bank subject to US and EU sanctions (although VTB capital itself was not a designated entity under EU sanctions).50 Rightly or wrongly, for some observers the message was clear: despite events in Salisbury, the UK still put commerce first. ‘Business as usual?’, tweeted the Russian embassy in London after the Gazprom eurobond issue.51
26 May had become Prime Minister in July 2016.
27 Hansard, 12 March 2018.
28 Hansard, 14 March 2018.
29 Associated Press via VOA (2018), ‘List of Countries and Others Expelling Russian Diplomats’, 28 March 2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/list-countries-others-expelling-russian-diplomats/4320638.html (accessed 13 Oct. 2018). Latvia also blacklisted the Russian representative of a Russian company.
30 In another example of diplomatic coordination aimed partly against Russia, in June the G7 established a Rapid Response Mechanism ‘to strengthen our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response’. See G7 2018 Charlevoix website (2018), ‘Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracy From Foreign Threats’, 14 June 2018, https://g7.gc.ca/en/official-documents/charlevoix-commitment-defending-democracy-from-foreign-threats/ (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
31 Hansard, 14 March 2018.
32 Ibid.
33 Elliott, F. (2018), ‘Private jet searches will give Russian oligarchs a hostile reception’, The Times, 21 March 2018, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/private-jet-searches-will-give-oligarchs-a-hostile-reception-mbpmbhtc2 (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
34 BBC News (2018), ‘Spy poisoning: UK plays down Russia complaint at plane search’, 31 March 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43606085 (accessed 13 Oct. 2018). In addition, on 14 March the prime minister announced that the government would sponsor an amendment to the draft Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill to allow for restrictive measures against those responsible for human-rights violations.
35 Hansard, 14 March 2018. May had already issued a warning to this effect in November 2017. Buchan, L. (2017), ‘Theresa May warns Russia over election meddling and vows to protect UK’, Independent, 13 November 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-russia-election-meddling-warning-cyber-warfare-latest-uk-a8053161.html (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
36 BBC News (2018), ‘Salisbury Novichok poisoning: Russian nationals named as suspects’, 5 September 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-45421445 (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
37 Hansard, 5 September 2018.
38 Ibid.
39 This was part of a wider attempt, coordinated with other Western governments, to expose subversive activity by the GRU. On 6 September, the UK, US, France, Germany and Canada issued a statement expressing confidence in the UK assessment that the Salisbury attack had been carried out by GRU operatives. In July and October 2018 the US Department of Justice announced indictments for a total of 19 suspected GRU officers accused of computer hacking and other crimes. And in October 2018 the authorities in the Netherlands published detailed material on four alleged GRU officers whom they accused of attempting to hack the computer networks of the OPCW.
40 Gould-Davies, N. (2018), ‘Britain’s Response to the Salisbury Attack: A Net Assessment’, Chatham House Expert Comment, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 27 March 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/britain-s-response-salisbury-attack-net-assessment (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
41 Wright, R. (2018), ‘Britain to review wealthy Russians’ visas’, Financial Times, 28 March 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/4bafade6-3290-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498 (accessed 21 Oct. 2018).
42 Carroll, O. (2018), ‘Why is Russia so nervous about the visa status of Roman Abramovich?’, Independent, 22 May 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/roman-abramovich-uk-russia-visa-chelsea-kremlin-putin-a8364136.html (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
43 Doward, J. (2018), ‘Wealthy Russians in Britain face new visa crackdown after Salisbury’, Observer, 9 September 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/09/home-office-review-wealthy-russian-investor-visas (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
44 Home Office (2018), ‘Circular 003/2018: unexplained wealth orders’, 1 February 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-0032018-criminal-finances-act-unexplained-wealth-orders/circular-0032018-unexplained-wealth-orders#points-of-interest (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
45 Thompson, B. (2018), ‘Azerbaijan bank chair’s wife named as target of unexplained wealth order’, Financial Times, 10 October 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/45fecc14-cc6a-11e8-9fe5-24ad351828ab (accessed 17 Oct. 2018).
46 Home Office (2017), ‘Criminal Finances Bill – Unexplained Wealth Orders: Impact Assessment HO2060’, 10 January 2017, https://www.parliament.uk/documents/impact-assessments/IA17-001D.pdf (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
47 Kerbaj, R., and Shipman, T. (2018), ‘The UK National Crime Agency “dirty money” probe targets Russian oligarchs’, Sunday Times, 3 June 2018, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/national-crime-agency-dirty-money-probe-targets-russian-oligarchs-n09sp2b7w (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
48 Hansard, 14 March 2018.
49 Sabbagh, D. (2018), ‘“Dirty Money”: U-turn as Tories back plans to make tax havens transparent’, Guardian, 1 May 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/01/uk-to-introduce-public-ownership-registers-for-overseas-territories (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
50 See House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2018), Moscow’s Gold: Russian Corruption in the UK, Eight Report of Session 2017-2019, p. 9, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/932/932.pdf (accessed 13 Oct. 2018).
51 Russian Embassy, UK (@RussianEmbassy) (2018), ‘Successeful [sic] @GazpromEN bonds sales in London with demand three times higher than the placing (€750 mln). Business as usual?’, tweet, 15 March 2018, https://twitter.com/RussianEmbassy/status/974296493355126785 (accessed 22 October 2018); cited in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2018), Moscow’s Gold.