2. Ukraine
Ukraine can be viewed as a political ‘laboratory’ in which Russia has tested a variety of subversion measures, and at the same time as an example of resilience against foreign aggression. For decades, the Kremlin has sought to use its influence to deter Ukraine’s Westernization and integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Russia has adapted its toolbox of destabilization techniques – from trade blockades to vicious disinformation – to developments inside Ukraine.
Prior to the 2013–14 ‘Euromaidan’ protest movement – in which Ukrainians took to the streets following the suspension of a planned association agreement with the EU – Russia had actively sought to exploit Ukraine’s political, cultural and economic conditions in the pursuit of its own interests. Specific weaknesses targeted by Moscow included Ukraine’s non-consolidated and ambivalent national identity, its economic dependence on the Russian market and, most importantly, its exposure to Russia as its only energy supplier. Moreover, Russia had a dominant position in Ukraine’s information space, and deployed Russian government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) in efforts to fracture the country, undermine support for the national leadership, and promote a pro-Russia orientation in policymaking on economic integration and foreign affairs.10
Since 2014, many of these levers of Russian influence have weakened. This partly reflects the consolidation of Ukrainian identity in response to the conflict. It is also a consequence of policy actions that have included anti-corruption reforms in the gas sector, the sanctioning of Russian GONGOs, and the reorientation of Ukraine’s trade towards the EU and other markets. However, there remain vulnerabilities affecting Ukraine’s resilience to foreign influence. The top three are: high insecurity, stemming from the Russia-fuelled conflict in the eastern region of Donbas; the turbulence associated with Ukraine’s predatory and fractured political environment (creating the risk of further internal destabilization); and susceptibility to Russian disinformation (aggravated by weak information security). These problems obstruct Ukraine’s transition towards more sustainable national development and civic self-expression.
A. Key vulnerabilities and responses
1. Insecurity and the conflict in Donbas
The operation by Russian special forces, in coordination with various paramilitary groups, to occupy parts of eastern Ukraine started right after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Since then, the conflict has persisted at various levels of intensity. Around 50 per cent of Donbas is occupied by pro-Russia separatist groups or their allies, with the major cities of Donetsk and Luhansk remaining outside Ukrainian government control.
Low-intensity conflict continues, with the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and civilians suffering fatal casualties on a regular basis. As noted above, the conflict has displaced around 1.5 million people internally, adding serious pressure on an already fragile social infrastructure. The conflict has led to a collapse in Ukraine’s GDP of almost 25 per cent, and the loss of access to critically important coal reserves. Ukraine has lost control of nearly 500 kilometres of its border with Russia – leaving a gaping hole for the transit of arms and munitions, as well as for coal smuggling and other criminal activities.
Beyond the human and economic losses, the conflict’s impact on Ukraine’s resilience as a state has been mixed. On the one hand, it has helped to rally Ukrainians around the idea of nationhood and has catalysed the process of national identity-building. Over 68 per cent of Ukrainians say they are proud to be citizens of Ukraine.11 The conflict has also created solidarity among citizens who – despite economic hardship of their own – have provided donations and support to the UAF, volunteers and displaced persons.
In recent months, three high-profile killings in the centre of Kyiv – of a leading journalist, a former member of Russia’s parliament and a senior intelligence official – have sown further doubts about the state’s capacity to protect citizens.
On the other hand, a significant majority of society lives in a state of insecurity.12 Ukrainians are highly concerned over the war in the east, the security of the country overall and high crime rates.13 Many social interactions reflect a zero-sum approach, involving a focus on survival, suspicion of diversity, paternalism, a sense of victimization and deep-seated fear of change. Smuggling, trafficking in small arms and drugs, and the diffusion of weapons to government-controlled parts of the country contribute to the sense of insecurity. In recent months, three high-profile killings in the centre of Kyiv – of a leading journalist, a former member of Russia’s parliament and a senior intelligence official – have sown further doubts about the state’s capacity to protect citizens. These events and trends have further diminished trust in public institutions.
The continuation of the conflict in the east, with no clear prospect for a viable resolution, is increasing social stress and social/political polarization. It has deepened existing societal divides and is creating new ones, with the main clashes occurring between liberal/progressive and conservative/‘patriotic’ groups. The conflict’s polarizing effect has been reflected in varying popular attitudes towards a possible resolution, depending in part on residents’ proximity to the fighting. In Donbas, 59 per cent of respondents to a 2015 poll said they were ready for ‘any compromise’ with the leaders of the separatist Luhansk and Donetsk ‘People’s Republics’, whereas in central Ukraine the number was only 17 per cent.14
The deadlock in the Minsk Process for resolving the conflict, and the stalling of international talks about modalities for an international peacekeeping mission, has contributed to Ukrainians’ frustrations with their current leadership. Russia, aiming to reinforce this sentiment and spread division, misleadingly promotes a narrative of the conflict as a ‘war of oligarchs’ in which President Petro Poroshenko supposedly has a personal interest in sustaining hostilities. The terms of reference used in the mobilization of Ukraine’s Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) at the start of the conflict – in effect, to provide a makeshift legal framework for hostilities with an irregular enemy and mercenaries – have contributed to societal uncertainty while presenting operational/policy challenges in respect of an ambiguously defined aggressor. Military coordination has been hampered by the lack of a unified command structure and inadequate rules of engagement. It took almost four years for Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, to pass legislation formally defining Russia as an aggressor state and reconstituting the ATO within a single chain of command under the Ministry of Defence.15
Social cohesion is at risk due to high levels of displacement, poor integration of the displaced, and weak re-assimilation of ATO veterans into civilian life. Displaced persons struggle acutely with inadequate access to housing, healthcare, social benefits and pensions, and also suffer a lack of redress for violations of property rights.16 After more than four years of conflict, more than 300,000 Ukrainian solders have taken part in military operations in the east. Many return with post-traumatic stress disorder and face difficulties re-entering civilian life. Employment is the most problematic issue for ATO veterans, who are consequently susceptible to recruitment by dubious political protest campaigns or radicalized nationalist groups.
Response
To date, the state’s response to its vulnerabilities around security and the conflict in Donbas has mainly focused on strengthening Ukrainian defence capabilities and enhancing the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). The UAF are undergoing substantial reform, with an emphasis on building a professional army and future interoperability with NATO forces. The SBU has become more effective against covert operations and small-scale terrorist groups in government-controlled territories. In 2016, its counter-intelligence efforts identified 599 Ukrainian citizens suspected of working as agents of foreign powers. The agency has confiscated over 61,000 units of ammunition.17
In 2016, the government established a Ministry of Temporary Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons; it is also in the process of setting up a Ministry for Veterans. A weak political mandate, low capacity and insufficient funding prevent the former from being effective. Delivery of services and improvements in infrastructure at crossing points along the line of contact are often impeded by failures in governance, especially at the regional level. Due to the state’s loss of control over parts of Donbas and Luhansk oblasts, the legal jurisdiction for some land and state assets remains in limbo.
Resilience is undermined by the lack of a clear national strategy for conflict resolution. Citizens claim they do not have enough information about the government’s vision for resolving the conflict. This creates fertile ground for disinformation and manipulation of public opinion. The situation is complicated by the presence of competing reintegration strategies for the occupied territories: the official one approved by the cabinet of ministers;18 and a separate strategy promoted by the minister of interior, Arsen Avakov.19
At the non-state level, active citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) focus on providing support to displaced persons and assistance to the front line, as well as on the development of more democratic local governance in the east. Groups such as Krym SOS, Legal Hundred, Vostok SOS and the Centre of Employment of New People provide counselling on housing, employment, pensions, medical help and inheritances. Fifty-six per cent of such CSOs rely on funding from Western donors, while only 16 per cent receive private donations from domestic sources. A significant majority of the groups are new, having emerged since the start of the conflict.20
Several independent think-tanks are researching the situation in the occupied territories and discussing possible reintegration strategies. The Centre for Research of Donbas Social Perspective, Factory of Donbas Thought, Kalmius Group and the Donetsk Institute of Information, among others, are key groups working on the issue. Similarly, the online newspaper Euromaidan Press runs a major international campaign (Let My People Go) for the release of more than 80 Ukrainian political prisoners in Russia.
Box 1: Bright spot – community centres in Ukrainian regions
New community centres in the cities of the east – such as Teplytsia in Sloviansk, Khalabuda in Mariupol, Lampova in Pokrovsk, Free UA in Kramatorsk and Space Friends in Kostyantynivka – have emerged thanks to assistance from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). These independent spaces provide a platform for active citizens at the grassroots level to network and collaborate. The tools that have been found to work best in promoting cohesion and resilience are people-to-people exchanges among various regions; inclusive open-air cultural events; and the provision of financial support to local grassroots community projects, conditional on their effectiveness. By creating new cultural events, setting up independent community centres and developing innovative exhibitions in local museums – all offering a cultural product relevant to Donbas communities – these initiatives demonstrate that change is possible, even in such a complex environment. More importantly, they have created a new dynamic involving initiatives from non-state and non-oligarchic sources, in an arrangement that benefits the wider community.
2. An opaque political culture
Ukraine’s corrupt political system and ineffective governance form another area of state vulnerability. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, what can be described as a ‘limited-access’ political order took shape, in which different institutions were captured by newly formed proto-capitalist business groups.21 In order to preserve their financial interests, these groups had to ‘acquire’ control of media outlets and political parties at the national and regional levels. They also had to maintain access to pliant judges at all levels of the judiciary, and cultivate links to the security services and the Prosecutor General’s Office. The groups were diverse in their political alignment and agendas: some had a clear pro-Russia agenda and lobbied for Ukraine’s integration into the EAEU; some pushed for neutrality and a ‘special Ukrainian way’; and some declared support for integration with the EU.
This system was – and, to a significant extent, still is – fuelled by cash flows from high-level political corruption. This undermined real accountability and allowed the protection of monopolies established by well-connected financial groups. Elites from across the political spectrum benefited from the system. They included members of groups loyal to Russia that promoted the Kremlin’s message in the political space.
Since the Euromaidan movement of 2013–14, Ukraine has started to dismantle this system. Although much of the inherited political infrastructure remains in place,22 the space that previously existed for divergent geopolitical agendas has been constrained. Ukrainian society at large has consolidated its choice of pro-European alignment, and the country’s association agreement with the EU (including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, or DCFTA) has come into effect. More than 57 per cent of Ukrainians say they support EU integration,23 and 47 per cent say NATO membership would guarantee Ukraine’s security.24 This means that overtly pro-Russia parties now have little chance to compete in the political space nationwide. Instead, they are relegated to deploying other tactics, such as supporting a de facto surrender to Russian interests through the promotion of peace at any price, disingenuously advocating compromise, and promoting a narrative that the West will not help Ukraine to regain lost territory and rebuild its economy.
The 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections will offer ample scope for Russian operations to seek to influence the political process, and will be another test of Ukraine’s resilience. Russia will aim to recapture de facto control of a substantial segment of the political spectrum, potentially exploiting election gains by parties loyal to Moscow with the aim of creating a fractured parliament. Such an outcome could result in an incapacitated parliament unable to produce a viable governing coalition. It could even herald the creation of a government of national unity promoting the Russian agenda of federalization, as well as special status for the Russian language and for Donbas. This could deepen the conflict and further polarize society. Russia will also aim to undermine the legitimacy of Ukraine’s election process by staging cyberattacks on electoral infrastructure.
Of other specific risks relating to the elections, the most significant concern collapsing support for pro-European parties, low trust in all parties across the political spectrum, and disengagement of citizens from politics. For example, support for the Narodny Front of the former prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, has plummeted from 23 per cent in 2014 to about 1 per cent in 2018. With no viable liberal-democratic alternative to the current transitional leadership on the horizon, and with huge public demand for ‘new faces’, the political playing field remains wide open to manipulation of various kinds.
The pre-electoral narratives of the pro-Russia parties are already exploiting promises of peace with Russia, as well as closer economic relations with the EAEU. They are appealing to nostalgia for Soviet stability and greatness, and seeking to nurture Euro-scepticism. These parties also provide platforms in Ukraine for foreign anti-EU nationalist parties, such as Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland.25 For an electorate dissatisfied with Kyiv’s policies, Opposition Block and For Life have emerged as the leading contenders to secure substantial shares of the vote. In July, Viktor Medvedchuk, an oligarch widely acknowledged as Russia’s frontman in Ukraine, joined For Life, which is led by Vadym Rabinovych and Nestor Shufrych.
Lack of accountability makes it easier for political interests to advance covert agendas. Medvedchuk has substantially boosted his presence in the public space in advance of the 2019 elections, and is actively accumulating media resources.26 When a Swiss holding acquired the major news channel 112 TV in April 2018, an independent investigation showed that the end beneficiary was a German citizen who runs a second-hand-car business in a small provincial town in central Germany. The management team appointed after the acquisition has strong links to Medvedchuk, and his presence on this channel has substantially increased.27 The national regulator did not initiate any investigation or query with regard to this ownership.
In Ukraine’s regions, Vladislav Surkov, a special adviser to Vladimir Putin and the coordinator of separatist groups in Donbas, has used Russia-linked groups to extend support to local parties that advocate more local autonomy. This is encouraging what might be described as ‘centrifugal’ forces in Ukrainian politics, designed to weaken Kyiv’s hold on the country as a whole. The political parties involved include New State (a rebranded Communist Party), Zakarpattia Kraj, Odesa Porto-Franco, Socialist Zaporizhzhia, Bessarabska Republic Budjak, and the Galicia Party in Lviv oblast.28
In addition, Russia supports political disruptors who can help create the kind of ‘managed chaos’ proposed by Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.29 The disruptors include the former president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, and Nadia Savchenko, a former volunteer pilot turned Ukrainian politician. Saakashvili was invited by President Poroshenko to share Georgian experience in anti-corruption reform, and his last position in Ukraine was as governor of Odesa oblast. Saakashvili’s alleged links to Serhiy Kurchenko – who now lives in Moscow and was widely known as a frontman for financial deals of the former Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych – are under investigation in Ukraine. In February 2018, Saakashvili was extradited to Poland after illegally crossing the border. Meanwhile, Savchenko – who started disruptive activity in Ukraine after her release from almost two years of imprisonment in Russia – is under arrest in Ukraine with her alleged co-conspirators for plotting a bombing inside the parliament in Kyiv.
The disruptive activities of both Saakashvili and Savchenko aim to mobilize radical segments of the electorate, especially ATO veterans, and include demands for the impeachment of President Poroshenko. Vladimir Ruban, one of Savchenko’s alleged co-conspirators and a former active member of Medvedchuk’s movement, has referred to their main goals in Ukraine as creating internal destabilization and political chaos.30
Fringe radicals and ‘weaponization’ of ethnic minorities
Military conflict and economic and social hardship have enabled the spread of radical groups in Ukrainian society, and have rendered them more visible. Some groups, such as Sich (C14)31 and Trident, have been in operation since 2003, while others, such as National Corps and Karpathian Sich, are newly formed from members of voluntary battalions fighting in the east.
These groups are not large (for example, National Corps claims 1,000 members), and have hardly any chance of winning seats in parliament. However, they are well positioned to recruit from among more than 300,000 ATO veterans, many of whom are disillusioned with mainstream parties and suffer economic hardship. The radical groups also target young people and host various so-called ‘patriotic’ summer camps. Their actions could disrupt future elections, increase popular feelings of insecurity, and inspire violent attacks on left-wing, liberal, feminist and LGBT activists, human-rights defenders, and ethnic and religious minorities. Such attacks are already increasing.32
The existence of radical groups also helps sustain the narrative, promoted by Russia via its state media channels and private ‘troll factories’, of Ukraine as a ‘fascist, neo-Nazi’ state. Russia also uses EU-based right-wing groups to exert influence in Ukraine. Two members of the neo-fascist Polish Falanga organization came to Uzhgorod to attack the Hungarian cultural centre in February. The leader of the anti-US, anti-Semitic and ultra-Catholic group, Bartosh Beker, visited the Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ in 2014 and has links to Russia.33
Military conflict and economic and social hardship have enabled the spread of radical groups in Ukrainian society, and have rendered them more visible.
Ukraine is a pluralistic, multi-ethnic polity with Hungarian, Bulgarian, Polish, Romanian, Azeri, Greek and Russian minorities. Some of these, in particular the Hungarian minority, reside in compact settlements. For example, Zakarpattia oblast has 59 schools in which Hungarian is the language of instruction, and 79 in which Romanian is the language of instruction. The integration of the Hungarian minority into the Ukrainian cultural and educational space is abysmal. In 2016, 42 per cent of graduates from Hungarian-language high schools did not take a Ukrainian-language graduate examination; and among those who did, most did not pass.34 Students from these schools typically either go abroad to study or struggle to develop careers in Ukraine. In contrast, the Romanian and Polish communities score much higher in Ukrainian-language knowledge.
Despite a lack of visible conflict between ethnic minorities, the levels of declared tolerance for other groups remain low. Around half of Ukrainians polled (46 per cent) say they do not trust people of another nationality, and a similar share (49 per cent) do not trust people of another religion.35 This makes it easier to stir tensions and conflicts between different groups. For example, individuals supported by Russia have instigated tensions between Ukrainian activists and the Azeri community in Odesa; their provocations have been amplified by Russian propaganda channels.36
Response
Political reform is long overdue in Ukraine. It partially started after 2014 in respect of political party financing, most prominently with the introduction of state funding for parties that enter parliament and the obligatory reporting of party expenses to the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption. This allowed for more civic oversight of party financing.
The high volume of corrupt cash flows in politics, and the privileged access of some politicians to TV stations owned by powerful business groups, distorts the electoral system. According to some reputable sources, campaigning to be elected mayor in the smallest oblast-level city costs the equivalent of around $2 million.37 The new electoral code, approved at its first reading by the parliament in November 2017, proposes open party lists that allow voters to rate candidates, but it does not address the issues around TV advertising for candidates. Currently, over 4,000 amendments have been proposed to the draft law.
The new Law on National Security, adopted in June 2018, also allows for better civic and parliamentary oversight of the security sector. Opening up the security sector to more scrutiny is key to fighting corruption and malpractice, as well as to improving the sector’s efficiency.
Decentralization and nationwide reform of local governance have begun, with one result being improved rules on transparency and accountability for the newly amalgamated local communities. These administrative units have been created from settlements, rural areas and cities of district-level significance. Public opinion polls already reveal higher levels of satisfaction with local authorities. In one recent survey, residents of the cities gave substantially higher approval rates to mayors than to the president of Ukraine. Similarly, many believe that their city is moving in the right direction, and Ukraine in the wrong direction.38
The integration of minorities into Ukrainian cultural and political space is weak. A new law on education, approved in September 2017, attempts to address this issue. It permits study in minority languages only at pre-school and elementary-school levels. Starting from middle school, the language of instruction must be Ukrainian, with the exception of a few subjects, which can be taught in the relevant minority language. The Hungarian government has reacted harshly to the new legislation, and Hungarian schools and cultural organizations in Ukraine have also opposed it. In protest, Hungary has blocked meetings of the Ukraine–NATO Commission several times in 2018.
The state response to violence by radical groups has been mixed. The SBU monitors inter-ethnic crime and the activities of xenophobic groups, and members of some groups have been arrested. Those detained include members of Torpedo, an organized crime group linked to former parliamentarians from the Party of Regions (the party of former president Yanukovych) who have fled to Russia. Torpedo was targeting Jewish, Polish and Hungarian cultural sites.39
At the same time, some other groups are tolerated or even supported. Hate crimes with xenophobic motives are often classified as simple hooliganism by law enforcement. Human rights advocates report such cases to the Ministry of Interior and the Prosecutor General’s Office, but often receive pro forma responses or none. Even more striking than the impunity enjoyed by some radical groups is that those responsible for crimes against Roma have received state funding under a programme for the ‘patriotic education of youth’. The Ministry of Youth and Sport provided funding to the C14 and Golossivska Kryivka groups, both founded by the nationalist Svodoba Party, to organize summer youth camps.40
Ukrainian authorities have substantially limited the space for Russian quasi-state actors to influence domestic politics. As part of the ‘de-communization’ effort, the Communist Party was banned in 2015. And in April 2017, 460 organizations – comprising Russian commercial entities, state TV channels, military companies, and various Russia-funded GONGOs and groups linked to separatists in the east and Crimea – were sanctioned.41 Nonetheless, Russia continues to destabilize Ukraine by recruiting individuals throughout the country.
The non-state sector is pushing for deeper political and law enforcement reforms. Groups such as Opora, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, and Centre UA monitor party financing and advocate the establishment of a new electoral code with open party lists. Civic media organizations, such as Hromadske TV and Euromaidan Press, report on and monitor violence by radical groups.
3. The media space: disinformation and disillusionment
The Ukrainian information space remains fragile. It is characterized by the presence of strong vested interests represented by privately owned TV stations, a high share of paid content, a proliferation of pro-Russia narratives, and poor-quality journalism. The penetration of Russian disinformation remains high, especially via social media and media outlets owned by Ukraine’s oligarchs, whose interests stand to be undermined by ongoing and proposed reforms.
Over 80 per cent of Ukrainians take their news from national TV. Citizens trust Ukrainian media sources more if there are conflicting news stories. However, only 27 per cent say that Ukrainian media provide trustworthy information about events in the country and the conflict in the east.42 Residents of some cities, such as Odesa and Kherson, strongly disapprove of the Ukrainian media.43
Pro-Russia narratives abound on private TV channels owned by Russia-friendly anti-government groups – in particular, NewsOne, 112 TV and Inter. Their producers design popular shows and infotainment that exploit nostalgia for the Soviet era and sustain a Russian view of the Soviet legacy and historical narratives. For instance, Inter’s promotion of the Russian ‘Bezsmertny Polk’ movement aims to copy the Russian way of commemorating the Second World War. The movement started in Russia in 2012, with the aim of publicly glorifying veterans and promoting the role of Russia in saving Europe from fascism. Inter’s TV shows increase popular mistrust of the Ukrainian leadership, and create a feeling of confusion and chaos.
Certain parts of the population are especially susceptible to Russian propaganda. They include people who have more traditional and conservative values, believe that neither Russia nor the West will help Ukraine to overcome the crisis, and believe that there is no Russian propaganda.44 According to experts, Russian propaganda owes its effectiveness to the fact that it is backed by substantial resources, exploits a lack of critical thinking on the part of key audiences, and offers superficially convincing content.45
Russia promotes narratives of despair with the aim of extinguishing hope in Ukrainian reforms. Its media agenda focuses on demanding the impeachment of President Poroshenko, insisting on the responsibility of Ukraine’s leaders for starting the war, presenting Ukraine as a failed state, and portraying the EU as a collapsing bloc. As a result, 54 per cent of Ukrainians in the east say they ‘do not know who started the war in the east’.46 Disinformation and manipulated news nurture pessimism. A recent survey shows a substantial drop in optimism in the south and east of the country in 2017 compared to 2016.47
Russia promotes narratives of despair with the aim of extinguishing hope in Ukrainian reforms.
Ukrainian cyberspace is particularly targeted and remains vulnerable. The SBU recorded more than 200 cyberattacks in 2016, targeting the diplomatic service, critical infrastructure and law enforcement agencies. Their intensity continues and culminated with the major ‘not-Petya’ attack in June 2017, which has been attributed to the Russian military. This attack targeted mainly Ukrainian state and private organizations, but also international companies.48
Fake news about Ukraine is also actively propagated by Russia in the West, for example in connection with key international events. Ahead of a meeting of President Poroshenko with the head of the EU’s Political and Security Committee in June 2018, Russia-affiliated trolls flooded social media with disinformation about the supposed plans of the UAF to shoot down the EU helicopter and blame it on the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic. This fake news in Russian, English and German reached more than 600,000 people on Twitter.49
Social media remains the main space for spreading disinformation. Almost a quarter of Ukrainians receive news about the country and work events from social networks. After the banning of Russian social networks in 2017, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki lost about half of their audience in Ukraine, but bots and Kremlin-funded groups migrated to Facebook, which is now the most popular social platform, with 35 per cent of Ukrainians using it. Pro-Russia bots are targeting not only Russian speakers but also nationalist and ‘patriotic’ groups. The bots increasingly use Google Translate to post content in Ukrainian.
Response
Overall, Ukraine’s resilience to disinformation is strengthening.50 The state is taking steps to improve information security and counter disinformation. Most notably, the sanctioning of Russia’s major state TV channels and banning of its social media, as well as the withdrawal of accreditation for Russian state media at Ukrainian government agencies, have led to a substantial drop in the audience for Russian disinformation. However, such restrictive measures should be the method of last resort; there is a danger that continuing such a policy could present a real threat to internet freedom in Ukraine. Ukrainian media organizations are concerned about a new draft law that allows websites to be blocked at the discretion of state investigators or prosecutors, without a court decision.
The reform to create a new public broadcaster, Suspilne TV, started in 2016. However, the channel is still underfunded and needs substantial investment in technological modernization, as well as deep organizational reform of its overinflated personnel structure. It also has a small viewership, with its reach nationwide measured in single digits as a percentage of the media market.
The Law on Transparency of Media Ownership was introduced in 2015. This was a very important step, since most Ukrainians do not know who owns the major TV channels. Information published under the new law exposes the complex, often offshore structures of most media companies – structures designed to protect ownership rights and disguise end beneficiaries. The new law is also positive for media reform in that it prevents Russia from owning media in Ukraine and exposes the political influence underpinning media ownership.
The Ministry of Information has been tasked with restoring the transmission of broadcast programming to the occupied territories. The Army FM station was set up to provide news to the UAF and residents near the line of contact. The ministry has installed three new TV towers and more than 100 transmitters, and has provided satellite transmission to the occupied territories. The effectiveness of these efforts is hard to access, since there are no reliable public opinion data from the region.
Right after the start of the conflict, non-state actors led the fight against Russian disinformation. New groups, often created by media and PR professionals, undertook the task of debunking fake stories and providing information domestically and to the West. Groups such as StopFake, the Ukraine Crisis Media Centre (UCMC), Inform Resist, Inform Napal, Ukraine World, Euromaidan Press, Hromadske TV and Hromadske Radio are the leaders in the sector. StopFake alone has uncovered more than 1,000 fake news items about Ukraine, and has trained 10,000 media professionals in fact-checking.51
The cooperation between civic media organizations and the state was quite strong at the start of the conflict. Many experts from the private sector entered government agencies to assist with strategic communications. Unfortunately, many of them resigned for various reasons in 2016. One early initiative was at the Ministry of Defence, in partnership with the UCMC. Law enforcement agencies also cooperated with Cyber Alliance and Rukh8 in monitoring the internet and preventing cyberattacks.
Civil society is very active in developing media literacy programmes. More than 15 programmes are currently in operation.52 Citizens support the idea of media literacy; however, only a quarter of them are ready to take such courses.53
Figure 1 represents the impact of the drivers of Russian influence and of state and civil society responses in Ukraine, using a scale from 0 to 5, with 5 representing the greatest impact.
Figure 1: Drivers of Russian influence in Ukraine, and state/civil society responses
— Source: Based on interviews with experts in the target countries. The chart maps levels of various vulnerabilities to Russian influence as perceived by the experts, on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 = ‘non-existent’, 1 = ‘minimal’, 2 = ‘moderate’, 3 = ‘substantial’, 4 = ‘critical’ and 5 = ‘most prevalent’. State and civil society responses are rated on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 = ‘no response’, 1 = ‘minimal response’, 2 = ‘mild response’, 3 = ‘moderate effort’, 4 = ‘substantial effort’ and 5 = ‘high-level effective effort’.
Figure 1: Drivers of Russian influence in Ukraine, and state/civil society responses
B. Opportunities to strengthen resilience
Strengthening and sustaining the resilience of Ukrainian society to Russian influence is a long-term project. A resilient society should have strong adaptive qualities that enable it to cope with uncertainty and nurture the capacity for self-renewal.
One key opportunity to strengthen resilience derives from the wide popular support for the country’s democratic identity. Over 86 per cent of Ukrainians say that it is important to have a ‘fully functional democracy’.54 Democratic identity is also expressed in growing activism, support to the charitable sector, and the development of various tools of local democracy. Ukrainian civil society is evolving so that it can adapt to new realities and various challenges. The sector could be an even stronger source of state resilience if aided in a sustainable and strategic way.
At the national level, Ukraine’s leadership has announced a reform master plan for reconstituting the country. Progress is slow, but things are moving in the right direction. Accountable and effective governance is still far from a reality, but one of the most important reforms, that of public administration, has started. A new cohort of officials was hired to lead strategic planning units, and new state secretaries have entered the system. If sustained, this reform has the potential to gradually change the image of public institutions and revive trust in the state. It also presents an opportunity to develop a truly inclusive policymaking process.
Another opportunity to improve governance lies in decentralization. The 750 or so recently amalgamated communities already function according to new rules on accountability. Local council members are democratically elected, and tasked with managing communities in close cooperation with citizens. These communities are developing various informal engagement events. They are also using e-petitions to launch local initiatives, holding public hearings, and practicing ‘participatory budgeting’ (in which public consultation feeds into budget decision-making). All these tools of local democracy give citizens a voice and enable conflicting positions to be addressed in a more civil and democratic way.
A resilient society should have strong adaptive qualities that enable it to cope with uncertainty and nurture the capacity for self-renewal.
The most challenging issues concern the military operation in Donbas, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Several opportunities exist for mitigating vulnerabilities related to the conflict. High mobility across the line of contact creates an opportunity to launch work on various ‘soft power’ projects that could help with the reintegration of temporarily occupied and annexed territories into Ukraine proper in the future. A recent report noted the openness of citizens to finding a compromise in order to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine and reconcile residents in the occupied Donbas with those in the rest of the country.55
Social activities and associations among communities of displaced people and military veterans provide opportunities to reach out to vulnerable groups. There are over 1,200 new veterans’ associations and many groups supporting displaced persons. Such groups provide services, often offer legal aid, and advocate policies related to social support and integration of veterans and internally displaced persons into the workforce. This presents an opportunity for social service reform, entailing higher-quality support for vulnerable groups and more outsourcing to the non-profit sector. Already this year, after pressure from veterans’ associations, the Ministry of Social Policy for the first time ran a competitive tender process for non-profit organizations of veterans. It has awarded UAH 19 million ($692,000)56 to 80 such organizations.
10 Lutsevych, O. (2016), Agents of the Russian World, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-04-14-agents-russian-world-lutsevych.pdf.
11 Ukrainian News (2016), ‘Bilsh nizh 30 per cent opitanykh ukraintsiv boiat-sia zhyty po susidstvu z tsiganamy, – opytuvannaia’ [More than 30% of polled Ukrainians are afraid to live next to the gypsies], 7 June 2016, https://ukranews.com/ua/news/432767-bilsh-nizh-30-opytanykh-ukrainciv-boyatsya-zhyty-po-susidstvu-z-cyganamy-opytuvannya.
12 Nestor Group (2015), ‘Pryntsypy sotsialnoi vzaiemodii v umovakh zahrozhenosti bezpeky, stalosti bezpetky ta stalosty rozvytku’ [Principles of social cooperation in the conditions of threatened insecurity, sustainable security and sustainable development], https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=http://nestorgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ProMova_presentation_FinalFinal-1.pdf.
13 Ukrainskaya Pravda (2018), ‘Naimenshe ukraintsiv turbuie rosiiska mova ta vidnosyny z YeS’ [Ukrainians are least concerned about Russian language and relations with the EU], 4 July 2018, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2018/07/4/7185308/.
14 Democratic Initiative Foundation (2015), ‘Stavlennia naselennia do podii na Donbasi: tsina myru I shliakhy podolannia konfliktu’ [Attitude of the population towards the conflict in Donbas: The price of peace and ways to overcome conflict], 13 November 2015, https://dif.org.ua/article/stavlennya-naselennya-do-podiy-na-donbasi-tsina-miru-i-shlyakhi-podolannya-konfliktu.
15 Ukrainskaya Pravda (2018), ‘Rada ukhvalyla zakon pro reintegratsiiu Donbasu’ [The Rada passed a law on the reintegration of Donbas], 18 January 2018, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2018/01/18/7168749/.
16 Kuznetsova, I., Mikheieva, O., Gulyieva, G., Dragneva, R. and Mykhnenko, V. (2018), The Social Consequences of Population Displacement in Ukraine: The Risks of Marginalization and Social Exclusion, Policy Brief, Birmingham: University of Birmingham, https://zenodo.org/record/1217838#.W1YZS359hE5.
17 Sluzhba Bespeky Ukrainy (2016), ‘Resultaty okremykh napryamkiv roboty Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy’ [Results of the separate directions of the work of the Security Service of Ukraine], 23 December 2016, https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/news/1/category/2/view/2474#.zp9sE2B0.dpbs.
18 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2017), Pro zatverdzhennya planu zakhodiv, spryamovanykh na realizatsiyu deyakykh zasad derzhavnoi vnutrishnoi polityky shchodo okremykh raioniv Donetskoi ta Luhanskoi oblastei, de organy derzhavnoy vlady tymchasovo ne zdiisniuiut svoi povnovazhennya [Approval of the plan of measures aimed at the implementation of certain principles of the state internal policies for certain districts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, where the state authorities temporarily do not exercise their powers], Ministerial Order, 11 January 2017, https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/npas/249657353.
19 Avakov, A. (2018), ‘Strategy of restoration of the integrity of Ukraine and de-occupation of the Donbass: ‘Small Steps Mechanism’’, avakov.com, 7 June 2018, https://avakov.com/strategy-of-restoration-of-the-integrity-of-ukraine-and-de-occupation-of-the-donbass-small-steps-mechanism.html.
20 Kuznetsova, I. and Mikheieva, O. (2018), NGO Representatives’ View of the Social Consequences of Forced Displacement in Ukraine, Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research, March 2018, https://zenodo.org/record/1247928#.WzpA2X59hE5.
21 North, D., Wallis J. J. and Weingast, B. (2009), Violence and Social Orders, Cambridge University Press.
22 Lough, J. (2017), ‘Anti-corruption Reforms’ chapter, in Ash et al. (2017), The Struggle For Ukraine, https://reader.chathamhouse.org/struggle-for-ukraine#anti-corruption-reforms.
23 Uriadovyi Portal (2017), ‘Ukraina zatsikavlena v takykh rishenniakh samitu Skhidnoho partnerstva, yaki buly b vzaiemovyhidnymy yak dlia krain-partneriv, tak i dlia Yevrosoiuzu – Ivanna Klympush-Tsyntsadze’ [Ukraine is interested in Eastern Partnership summit decisions, which would be mutually beneficial both for partner countries and for the European Union – Ivanna Klimpush-Tsintsadze], 18 November 2017, https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/news/250435478.
24 Democratic Initiative Foundation (2017), ‘Gromadska dumka naselennia Ukrainy pro NATO’ [Public opinion towards NATO in Ukraine], 5 July 2017, https://dif.org.ua/article/gromadska-dumka-naselennya-ukraini-pro-nato.
25 Segodnya (2015), ‘Iz evropeiskogo vybora nye stoit delat’ mif – politolog’ [Do not make a myth from the European Elections – Political Scientist], 7 July 2015, https://www.segodnya.ua/politics/iz-evropeyskogo-vybora-ne-stoit-delat-mif-politolog-629744.html.
26 ‘Medvedchuk podbiraet dlya Putina novogo presidenta Ukrainy’ [Medvedchuk selects for Putin a new president of Ukraine], YouTube, 2 July 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BXFyhPQGoVs.
27 Radio Svoboda (2018), ‘Khto kupyv telekanal 112 Ukraina?’ [Who bought the 112 Ukraine Channel?], 20 September 2018, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/schemes/29439621.html.
28 Unian (2017), ‘Rossia finansuye stvorennya v Ukraini politichnikh partii – SBU’ [Russia finances the creation of political parties in Ukraine], 21 February 2017, https://www.unian.ua/politics/1788556-rosiya-finansue-stvorennya-v-ukrajini-politichnih-partiy-sbu-audiozapisi.html.
29 GaldvRed (2018), ‘Delo Savchenko-Rubana: vyyasnilos’, kto stoit za ‘khaosom, kotoryi nuzhno poseyat’ khaos v Ukraine’’ [The case of Savchenko-Ruban: It turned out that who stands behind the ‘chaos in Ukraine’], 25 March 2018, http://glavred.info/politika/delo-savchenko-rubana-vyyasnilos-kto-stoit-za-haosom-kotoryy-nuzhno-poseyat-haos-v-ukraine-496699.html.
30 BBC Ukraina (2018), ‘Sprava Savchenko: hranaty, seks i zvynuvachennia Lutsenka’ [Case of Savchenko: grenades, sex and accusations of Lutsenko], 22 March 2018, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-43498330.
31 Shtohrin, I. (2018), ‘‘S14’. Natsionalisty-radikali chy neonatsysty?’ [‘S14’. Radical-Nationalists or neo-Nazis?], Radio Svoboda, 19 March 2018, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/29109819.html.
32 Likhachev, V. (2018), Far-right Extremism as a Threat to Ukrainian Democracy, Nations in Transit Brief, Washington, DC: Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/far-right-extremism-threat-ukrainian-democracy.
33 Babakova, O. (2018), ‘Polska falanha Putina: khto stoit za pidpalom spilky uhortsiv v Uzhhorodi’ [Putin’s Polish Phalanx: Who is behind the burning of Hungarian associations in Uzhhorod], Evropeiska Pravda, 1 March 2018, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2018/03/1/7078237/.
34 Zog, O. and Kulchynskii, R. (2017), ‘Ne rozumiiut. Ukrainski uhortsi ta rumuny u shkolakh praktichno ne vyvchaiut ukrainsku’ [They do not understand: Ukrainian-Hungarians and Ukrainian-Romanians practically do not study Ukrainian in schools], Teksti.Org.Ua, 23 November 2017, http://texty.org.ua/pg/article/editorial/read/81080/Ne_rozumijut_Ukrajinski_ugorci_ta_rumuny_u.
35 ZN.UA (2017), ‘Ukraintsi ne duzhe tolerantni naibilshe nenavydiat narkomaniv, alkoholikiv i homoseksualiv’ [Ukrainians are not very tolerant and most hate drug addicts, alcoholics and homosexuality], 12 April 2017, https://dt.ua/UKRAINE/ukrayinci-ne-duzhe-tolerantni-i-naybilshe-nenavidyat-narkomaniv-alkogolikiv-i-gomoseksualiv-239488_.html.
36 Inform Napalm (2017), ‘SurkovLeaks (part 3): analiz perepiski pervogo zamestitelya Surkova Inala Ardzinby’ [SurkovLeaks (part 3): Analysis of the correspondence of Surkov’s first deputy Inal Ardzinba], 2 November 2017, https://informnapalm.org/29702-surkovleaks-part3/.
37 Author’s interview in Ukraine, July 2018.
38 International Republican Institute (2018), ‘Ukraine Poll Shows Rising Economic Optimism, Continuing Satisfaction on Local Level’, http://www.iri.org/resource/ukraine-poll-shows-rising-economic-optimism-continuing-satisfaction-local-level.
39 Shandra, A. (2017), ‘Ukraine’s law enforcers bust gang plotting to blow up Hungarian monuments’, Euromaidan Press, 3 October 2017, http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/10/03/ukraine-claims-it-detained-gang-plotting-to-exacerbate-ukrainian-hungarian-tenstions/.
40 More, A. and Pyrlik, H. (2018), ‘Derzhava finansuie radikalnikh natsionalistiv: yak ‘C14’ otrimala maizhe pivmiliona?’ [State is financing radical nationalist: how C14 received almost half a million], Hromadske Radio, 13 June 2018.
41 Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy [Decree of the President of Ukraine] (2017), ‘Pro rishennia Rady natsionalnoi besneky i oborony Ukrainy vid 28 kvitnia 2017 roku ‘Pro zastosuvannia personalnykh spetsialnykh ekonomichnykh ta inshykh obmezhuvalnykh zakhodiv (sanktsii)’ [On the decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine dated April 28, 2017 ‘On the application of personal special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions)’], 28 April 2017, http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1332017-21850.
42 Media Sapiens (2017), ‘Yak rosiiska propahanda vplyvaie na suspilnu dumku v Ukraini’ [How Russian propaganda influences public opinion in Ukraine], 13 February 2017, http://ms.detector.media/mediaprosvita/research/yak_rosiyska_propaganda_vplivae_na_suspilnu_dumku_v_ukraini_doslidzhennya/.
43 International Republican Institute (2018), ‘Fourth Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey 20 January – 10 February 2018’, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-3-22_ukraine_poll.pdf.
44 Interview with National Democratic Institute representatives in Kyiv.
45 Media Sapiens (2017), ‘Yak rosiiska propahanda vplyvaie na suspilnu dumku v Ukraini’.
46 Grushetsky, A., Kruglashov, A., Lygachova, N., Paniotto, V., Petrenko, G. and Shutov, R. (2018), Protydiia Rosiiskii propagandi ta mediagramotnist:resultaty vseukrainskoho opytuvannia gromadskoi dumky [Countering Russian Propaganda and Media Literacy: National Public Opinion Poll], Detector Media, p. 39, March 2018, https://detector.media/doc/images/news/archive/2016/136017/DM_KMIS_engl__WEB-2.pdf.
47 National Democratic Institute (2017), ‘Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine’s Democratic Transition: Nationwide Survey with six local oversamples, July 2017’, https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-research-opportunities-and-challenges-facing-ukraine-s-democratic-transition.
48 Ng, A. (2018), ‘US: Russia’s NotPetya the most destructive cyberattack ever’, cnet.com, 15 February 2018, https://www.cnet.com/news/uk-said-russia-is-behind-destructive-2017-cyberattack-in-ukraine/.
49 EU vs Disinfo (2018), ‘Dehumanizing disinformation as a weapon of the information war’, 28 June 2018, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/dehumanizing-disinformation-as-a-weapon-of-the-information-war/.
50 Ukrainian Prism (2018), Disinformation Resilience in Central and Eastern Europe, http://prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DRI_CEE_2018.pdf.
51 Yurkova, O. (2018), ‘Inside the Fight against Russia’s Fake News Empire’, Ted Talks, 10 April 2018, https://www.ted.com/talks/olga_yurkova_inside_the_fight_against_russia_s_fake_news_empire#t-299646.
52 See, for instance, ‘15 Top Ukrainian Media Literacy Projects’, https://medium.com/@postinformation/.
53 Grushetsky et al. (2018), Protydiia Rosiiskii propagandi ta mediagramotnist:resultaty vseukrainskoho opytuvannia gromadskoi dumky.
54 National Democratic Institute (2016), ‘Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine’s Democratic Transition: Nationwide Survey with eight local oversamples, November – December 2016’, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine per cent20Research per cent20December per cent202016 per cent20web per cent20 per cent282 per cent29.pdf.
55 Kalmiuska Grupa (2018), ‘Kalmiuska grupa predstavyla resultaty doslidzhennia pro zv’iazky z myrnymy meshkantsiamy okupovanoho Donbasu: zberehty ne mozhna vtratyty’ [The ‘Kalmius group’ presented the results of the study ‘Relations with civilians of the occupied Donbas’], 13 April 2018, https://www.kalmiusgroup.org/2018/04/blog-post_13.html.
56 Exchange rate of UAH 1:US$0.0364 as of 18 October 2018, at https://uk.reuters.com/business/currencies.