4. Moldova
The vulnerabilities that Russia exploits to exert negative influence in Moldova are generally well known in the country. The Kremlin’s use of information warfare is targeted, intelligible and comprehensive. Its vectors of influence encompass a variety of forms and actors: identity politics invoking the ‘Russian world’ narrative and Soviet nostalgia;85 politicized promotion of the concept of ‘compatriots’ (involving national minorities and ethnic Russians); language use;86 appeals to supporters of unification with Romania and anti-Romanian movements alike; instrumentalization of separatism and the frozen conflict in Transnistria;87 and overall anti-Western sentiment. All of this further undermines Moldovans’ already low trust in institutions and contributes to the state’s ongoing legitimacy crisis.88
In Moldova, the ‘Russosphere’ accounts for about 50 per cent of the population – broken down into a share of about 20 per cent for the Russian minority and its affiliates, and 30 per cent for pro-Russians including members of the Gagauz (5 per cent) and Ukrainian minorities (7 per cent).89
Pre-existing vulnerabilities to external influence are manifest in the strong linkages between politics, the media and the Moldovan Orthodox Church. These linkages render Moldovans a ‘captive audience’ for Russia’s propaganda, and have thereby allowed the Kremlin to invest fewer financial resources in information warfare since 2014, when the war in Ukraine took priority. Moldova’s vulnerabilities are compounded by the fact that the current leadership, in the hands of Vlad Plahotniuc and his Democratic Party, is not presenting Russian influence as a potential threat to sovereignty. Conversely, the Russian challenge is politically instrumentalized by the current political leadership, members of which use it to promote their personal agendas. There is also a large discrepancy between the level of response from CSOs and the (much weaker) response from the authorities. With the latter not construing Russia as a threat to Moldova’s sovereignty, an increasingly endangered civil society has little scope for meaningful resistance.
A. Key vulnerabilities and responses
1. The political sphere in a captured state
Weak institutions, endemic corruption, a high concentration of power and the presence of entrenched vested interests provide Russian propagandists with an abundance of pressure points to exploit in Moldova. Under the current, nominally pro-European leadership, the state has been captured by a political elite whose members rank among the most culpable in terms of allowing themselves to be influenced by Russia. Politicians across the board exploit the narrative shaped by Russia, and internal political propaganda is often aligned with the Kremlin’s influence. In that sense, as one observer has noted, ‘the level of Russian influence is proportional with the level of corruption in Moldova’.90
This story of pro-Russian alignment is especially true for President Igor Dodon and members of his Party of Socialists, who are the mainstay of Russian political influence in the country. During the November 2016 presidential election, Dodon ran a clearly pro-Russia campaign (for example, calling for closer relations with Moscow and the EAEU, and the recognition of Crimea as part of Russia), met with President Putin and Patriarch Kirill (which considerably boosted the candidate’s image and popularity), and used Putin’s image in his campaign adverts. Dodon also had the support of Metropolitan Vladimir, the head of the Moldovan Orthodox Church. There is a symbiotic relationship of sorts between the Democratic and Socialist parties: the Democrats legitimize themselves by proclaiming their European orientation and defining themselves in opposition to the Socialists, who in turn use the Democrats as a convenient ‘public enemy’ to win support for their own pro-Russia agenda.
Locally generated political propaganda has increased social disunity, which is amplified by Russia. Identity politics and political competition remain defined along the pro-EU/pro-Russia divide. Polarization further extends to ethnic and religious minorities, values, language, territory and nationality. Politicians meticulously instrumentalize this divide in order to increase social polarization for their own political purposes and vested interests. This is nothing less than a diversion strategy on the part of the ruling elite, offering a relatable and easily accessible narrative for the population. Russian propaganda magnifies existing anxieties and further undermines social cohesion in the context of a highly fragmented national identity. Keeping society in such a split state serves the interests of both the domestic elite and the Kremlin. Russian propaganda also fuels populism and undermines public trust in democracy and the West.
Response
The state has no willingness to implement positive change in respect of Russian influence in the country, as Moscow’s agenda is presented not as a problem per se but as part of a wider political narrative in which different vested interests are pitted against each other. It could even be argued that Russia’s malign influence provides a politically expedient smokescreen that allows Moldova’s leadership to divert the attention of the international community from domestic governance failings and limited reforms.91 In preparation for the February 2019 parliamentary elections, the leadership is actively promoting a supposedly ‘pro-EU’ image, and thus its ‘fight’ against the Russian threat. In this context, it is notable that the leadership adapts its strategy in accordance with its assessment of donor sentiment – for instance, a too openly pro-Russia stance would diminish Western assistance. For now, the leadership’s balancing of outward messages favours the Kremlin because the status quo prevails.
Civil society and CSOs are almost entirely unable to address the nexus between Russian propaganda and its exploitation for political ends within Moldova, as the power differential between civil society and the regime is too vast. There is a clear understanding among CSOs that addressing the ‘Russian problem’ cannot be done without tackling the source of the problem: corruption and state capture. At the same time, the government is increasing its pressure on, and scrutiny of, CSOs. It wants them to be service providers, not advocates of change. The state is also actively seeking to replace genuine NGOs with pro-Dodon/pro-Russia and pro-Plahotniuc GONGOs in order to discredit civil society actions and dilute their work.92 Finally, the authorities continue to seek to discredit civil society through mud-slinging campaigns and defamation supported by state-owned media, state-backed opinion-makers and political parties.93
2. Disinformation and propaganda in the media sphere
Eighty-five per cent of Moldovans take their information from TV,94 and 57 per cent consider it as their main source of information; about 40 per cent consider it the most trustworthy source of information.95 The media sphere is highly permeable to Russian propaganda. Indeed, Russia effectively ‘owns’ much of this space, dominating TV programming with rebroadcast Russian content and accounting for a large share of infotainment and social media content. Two of the six TV channels owned by Plahotniuc (PrimeTV and STS) rebroadcast Russian programming, mostly from Perviy Kanal, NTV and Rossia 1.96 According to a survey earlier this year, up to 70 per cent of Moldovans follow the news on Russian mass-media outlets.97 Russian TV generally has higher production quality, which leaves little room for Moldovan or even Romanian programmes to compete. In this sense, Russia has effected a ‘media occupation’98 of Moldova’s informational space, especially since few alternative outlets exist.
The media sphere is highly permeable to Russian propaganda. Indeed, Russia effectively ‘owns’ much of this space, dominating TV programming with rebroadcast Russian content and accounting for a large share of infotainment and social media content.
Trust in Russian media has been broadly stable, while trust in national media is declining sharply every year. For Russian media, the level of trust was 55.5 per cent in 2013, 54 per cent in 2015 and 50 per cent in May 2018. In contrast, the public’s confidence in national media has plummeted, from 62.5 per cent of those surveyed in 2013 to 42.5 per cent in 2015; confidence was at 40 per cent in May this year.99
Russian trolls and pro-Russia groups are very active on social media accessed by Moldovans, with an especially strong presence on the Russian social networks Odnoklassniki and VKontakte. Not only do such groups have tens of thousands of followers, but they deliver a clear pro-Kremlin message. A study this year showed that the main pro-Russian narratives focus on glorification of the Soviet past, promotion of the ‘Russian world’ concept and compatriot policy, and classic anti-Western rants.100 Also, the local offshoot of Russia’s Sputnik state-owned news agency accounted for 12.5 per cent of internet traffic and audience in Moldova in October 2017.101
Russia’s negative influence in Moldova works through a well-known narrative: fostering a personality cult for President Putin and promoting an anti-Western, therefore pro-Kremlin, agenda.102 This is highly influential in terms of public opinion because it articulates a message that is easily accessible, readily internalized, and emotionally relevant to many Moldovans. Russian propaganda also reinforces the pro-EU/pro-Russia divide and polarizes society even further.
Response
For the political reasons mentioned above, there is little or no willingness on the part of Moldova’s leadership to counter Russian propaganda. This reluctance is also partly explained by the fact that media owners in the country are not investing in the development of original content.103 The media sphere is monopolized by Plahotniuc and Dodon, and media ownership lacks transparency. Moreover, it is widely understood that Plahotniuc personally controls the Audiovisual Coordination Council and owns most of the advertising companies working in the media sphere. The oligarchic nature of the media space creates favourable conditions for the dissemination of malign Russian information, especially since there is no system for the protection of information security in Moldova.
In December 2017, the parliament passed an ‘anti-propaganda law’ banning the rebroadcast of Russian news, analysis, and politics and military programmes on Moldovan TV channels.104 However, the law, which represents the main attempt to date to address the ‘Russian problem’, was little more than a token gesture designed to placate the international community and increase US and EU support for Plahotniuc. Although the amount of Russian content on TV has diminished, the law has many shortcomings.105 In particular, it does not apply to the print media and internet, nor does it address the rebroadcasting of Russian talk shows and infotainment. If anything, the law puts more pressure on smaller TV channels: it restricts free speech, and can be used selectively to increase the market share of oligarchic media by harassing smaller outlets and driving them into bankruptcy.
In this environment, CSOs working on countering Russian influence in the media and social media spheres mostly focus on monitoring the media landscape, fact-checking, debunking fake news, providing training in media literacy, and seeking to combat information manipulation. Several ‘bright spots’ can be found in initiatives financed by Western donors (see Box 3).106 However, these projects suffer from critical limitations and constraints, notably a lack of resources and overdependence on Western assistance.107
Box 3: Bright spot – StopFals!
Managed by the Association for Independent Press (API), the StopFals!108 online platform was created in late 2015 under the aegis of the Independent Journalism Centre (CJI) and the Association of Independent Television Journalism of Moldova (ATVJI). It is supported by USAID. The platform works on the same basis as StopFake109 in Ukraine, and focuses on fact-checking and exposing fake news. StopFals! does not, however, primarily address Russian information warfare and propaganda in Moldova, but rather centres on internal politics – this limits its ability to counter the Russian narrative and raise awareness on the issue.110
3. Winning hearts and minds through the Russian Orthodox Church
The Moldovan Orthodox Church, which is subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church, is an active vector for Russian influence and propaganda in Moldova. It accounts for 80 per cent of religious believers and is the most trusted institution in the country, with opinion polling indicating that 70 per cent of respondents consider it trustworthy.111 The Moldovan Orthodox Church is highly influential, and shapes the hearts and minds of the population along anti-Western lines. It stokes popular fears, notably among the elderly and rural populations, and promotes an anti-EU, anti-West narrative of traditional values that resonates well throughout society.112 Furthermore, the Church openly supports President Dodon. The Church authorities in Transnistria are openly pro-Russia.
This ‘weaponization of religion’, so to speak, serves Russia’s interest.113 The anti-West narrative of the Moldovan Orthodox Church seeks to defend the same values that the Kremlin promotes: for example, negative attitudes towards LGBT and minority rights. Social issues in Russia also affect Moldova directly through Church outreach. This was the case, for instance, with the debate around the decriminalization of domestic violence in Russia; the same issue was debated in Moldovan churches and the Moldovan media.
Response
Addressing the information vulnerabilities associated with the political role of the Orthodox Church in Moldova is complicated by the fact that the Church itself is manifestly off-limits to criticism – because of both its political power and the weight of popular opinion. Politicians are unable to interfere in religious matters.
For civil society as a whole, denouncing the Church would mean losing credibility and risk alienating the population. Nonetheless, at the local level CSOs find it feasible, without attracting undue pushback, to reach out to young, pro-European and more liberal priests to promote a more progressive voice within the Church. Even if successful, however, this would not directly target Russian propaganda itself.
Figure 3: Drivers of Russian influence in Moldova, and state/civil society responses
B. Opportunities to strengthen resilience
In helping CSOs fight Russian information manipulation, Western donors face the risk of being presented as ‘foreign agents of influence’ in the Russian media in Moldova. Furthermore, efforts to build civil society resilience can be expected to encounter administrative resistance from the political leadership. This is unsurprising – offering citizens the tools to challenge Russian propaganda will inevitably also help them to challenge Moldovan governmental propaganda. This dilemma limits the options for increasing resilience and donor assistance. It is also a mistake to assume that Moldovan civil society will automatically become more resilient against Russian propaganda if democratic reforms are effected. Change will not happen overnight, and there has to be a long-term agenda. This also relates to the question of popular trust in institutions and social cohesion at the grassroots level.
Efforts to build resilience against Russian influence are likely to be most effective if they start with building ‘cognitive resilience’ by providing support to media literacy projects and efforts to combat fake news. Only media literacy, critical thinking and systematic fact-checking will help citizens rethink Russian narratives. This implies that existing projects to debunk fake news could usefully be strengthened and scaled up, so that they reach the widest possible audience. It also implies the need to support training for journalists, in order to give them the tools to fact-check systematically. Several such projects are currently supported by donors, but need to be scaled up. Fact-checking and ‘myth-busting’ activities should further concentrate on exposing the cracks in Russia’s narrative towards Moldova.
To have the best chances of success, donor assistance for media literacy projects, critical thinking and fact-checking courses will need to start in high schools and universities. This will require reform of the education sector, to make tuition in these areas not only systematic but mandatory. Focusing on the younger generation through social media will be paramount. Outreach in rural areas is also vital, particularly in Transnistria and Gagauzia, as well as in the Russian language. For instance, any Romanian-language CSOs in Moldova running projects in Russian-speaking communities will fail to be inclusive if they do not offer programmes and activities in Russian.
Another opportunity to strengthen resilience is in the media sphere. The effects of Russian propaganda are amplified by the fact that Russian TV programmes typically have higher production quality than Moldovan ones. Investing in high-quality content and high-quality alternative media production is necessary to counter Russian media influence, and to respond to people’s concerns and demands for information. To support this, donors will need to promote capacity-building in independent media coverage and production of alternative content by local CSOs and NGOs. Such projects should take the following factors into consideration:
- Independence. Media projects will need to be carried out through CSOs and independent outlets, in order to avoid sending mixed signals that donors are supporting corrupt state-owned media.
- Training. Media projects will have to include training on production of high-quality alternative content.
- Diversity. Focusing on social advertising and infotainment – especially through social media – is paramount, as both channels are very popular.
- Inclusivity. Media production would benefit from promoting inclusivity in respect of language and minorities.
One opportunity to build resilience at the level of civil society could involve using the Western-based diaspora as a spearhead to counter Russian influence and propaganda. The Moldovan diaspora consists of a disunited mass of more than 1 million people. Although expatriate Moldovans are not very active politically, and not focused on a common goal, diaspora groups have recently been increasing their political outreach. Several Western-based groups emerged after the 2015 ‘stolen billion’ scandal.114 The number of registered voters in the diaspora doubled for the 2016 presidential election, with expatriate groups coalescing around a campaign to mobilize young voters (‘Adopt a Vote’). Voters in the diaspora (excluding those in Russia) overwhelmingly voted for the pro-Western candidate Maia Sandu.
The Western-based, pro-European diaspora is a critical amplifier of progressive thinking. As such, it offers the potential, ahead of the February 2019 parliamentary elections, to act as a positive source of influence to counter Russian propaganda. Donor support and encouragement for diaspora-based projects, especially projects associated with expatriates in the West, offer a potentially effective route to countering Russian disinformation. Donor support for expatriate Moldovan thought leaders who convey a strong pro-reform message could also have traction. Such approaches could introduce an alternative narrative for civil society, thereby acting as positive agents for change.
In light of this, perhaps unsurprisingly, the authorities are seeking to restrict political representation for the diaspora. The new electoral law passed in 2017115 gives nominally equal representation in parliament to expatriates in the West and Russia, but in so doing increases the numerical strength of the Russian diaspora.116 The new law also prevents the diaspora from financing political parties abroad. Furthermore, the Moldovan Diaspora Bureau, used by the government to officially represent the diaspora in front of donors, is heavily politicized.
The communication strategies of Western donors are weak in Moldova. Very often, credit for successful implementation of grassroots Western projects is taken by local politicians or by Russia. Russian GONGOs, through the Orthodox Church and people-to-people contacts, also claim ownership of projects implemented by Western donors, especially in rural regions and especially in Gagauzia and Transnistria. For instance, local authorities in the latter two regions have been trying – so far unsuccessfully – to remove publicity and advertising requirements for Western donor projects.
As state institutions are likely to remain weak in the near future, and captive to vested interests, building civil society resilience needs to start from the bottom. This means at the local level within CSOs and community-based organizations, as well as in the media sphere. Providing citizens with tools to improve their critical thinking and fact-checking will not only afford them an opportunity to rethink the Russian narrative, but will also allow them to see through state-engineered propaganda and disinformation. Donors’ assistance and local capacity-building for such projects, especially in the country’s regions, are therefore paramount to strengthening resilience from the ground up.