1. Introduction
Mauritania stands at the threshold of a crucial political change. In November 2018, President Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz clearly and publicly confirmed his intention to stand down at the end of his second elected term of office – in mid-2019 – as the constitution requires. This had been in doubt, amid widespread speculation that he might attempt to change the rules and seek a further five-year mandate. The current regime has selected the defence minister, Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mohamed Ahmed Ould Ghazouani, to be its candidate in the 2019 presidential election.
The prospect of electing a new head of state is a major test for the political and governing system over which Abdelaziz has presided in a highly personalized manner for a decade. Abdelaziz has led a pluralistic political system in which opposition parties and independent civil society operate openly, although his government’s human rights record has flaws. The country’s media are subjected to some regime pressure but retain substantial freedom. Within government, ministers have a fair degree of latitude to manage technical policy issues.
However, key decisions have been concentrated in the hands of Abdelaziz and his closest confidants; he has made the crucial strategic choices in foreign and regional policy, security and political development. His departure will therefore pose a real leadership challenge in the exercise of power and his successor will have a large space to fill. Beyond his second term, Abdelaziz has declared an intention to remain in the country, active in politics, and has said he could even stand for the presidency again in future. This raises the possibility that he may remain a powerful influence behind the formal authority of the next president – who will almost certainly be his close confidant and chosen successor, Ghazouani.
Even so, when Abdelaziz stands down, this will be a moment of powerful symbolism. It will align Mauritania with the norm of democratic alternation in office that is now prevalent in West Africa and place the country among the small minority of Arab states where such constitutional transfers of power take place. The country’s democratic record is certainly not flawless, and conditions have tightened since the regime’s more tolerant early years. Strident critics have sometimes been met with a bullying and repressive state response and the international community has identified cases of politically motivated detention. Furthermore, opponents to the regime complain that the management of elections is far from impartial. Even so, Mauritania can be described as a pluralistic polity, where a range of views is openly expressed and candidates of the ruling Union Pour la République (UPR) party are open to democratic electoral challenge, and occasional defeat.
Abdelaziz’s model of power has had to adjust to severe economic circumstances over the past four years, following the slump in world prices for iron ore and gold, the country’s key mineral exports. Real GDP growth sank to just 0.4 per cent in 2015 before recovering the next year to 1.8 per cent, which, with a population rising by 2.9 per cent a year, meant a contraction in per capita economic output.1 By tightening up public sector procurement and the hiring of public servants, Abdelaziz has managed to navigate this situation. The regime appears to have sustained its political base among much of the Maure population, a significant proportion of rural Haratines, and even among some rural Afro-Mauritanians, despite their sense of grievance over perceived neglect or discrimination.2 However, big issues lie ahead.
The social and political context in which choices must be made is a complex one, and no path ahead is obvious or straightforward. The actions of political leaders and wider society during this critical period could have large and far-reaching consequences in setting the course for the country’s evolution.
Domestic policy choices are also linked to the evolution of Mauritania’s relationships with its neighbours – the country bridges and blends sub-Saharan and Maghreb identities.
Gradually Mauritania is reshaping its role in the economic and security contexts of West and North Africa. Relationships with Morocco and Algeria will always be essential and important, albeit sometimes tense. The bigger strategic question, however, is to what extent should Mauritania pursue full regional integration with its West African neighbours, with whom the country is already deepening its partnerships.
Food security and rural development are big challenges, and there is evidence that Mauritania could learn from the more effective policies of other Sahel countries that are actually poorer.3 Agriculture is linked to the hugely sensitive questions of land tenure in the south of the country and the citizenship status of the southern Afro-Mauritanian population. Strategic decisions over economic development cannot be long postponed. Production is due to start at the Grand Tortue Ahmeyin (GTA) gas field in 2022, or soon after,4 but the government has yet to outline a clear vision for the use of the revenues this will produce or the spin-off opportunities the project could generate. Development strategy is also at a possible turning point. After agreeing a new three-year programme of support, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has lobbied strongly for a shift in public expenditure towards infrastructure and social priorities, particularly education.
The combination of increased revenues and external pressure for a rebalancing of expenditure priorities may also create the conditions for a rethink of the response to difficult social and economic questions. In particular, extra resources may allow the government to make progress in tackling persistent allegations of discrimination and neglect from sections of the population, while also continuing to cater for its traditional constituency of supporters. Elections for newly created regional councils were held in September 2018 and these bodies could become a vehicle for defusing grievances at the local level – if they are granted meaningful freedom of action and significant budgets of their own, which is far from certain. But, if deprived of serious authority and resources, the new councils could prove to be no more than a vehicle for political and network patronage rather than a genuine attempt at decentralization.
The path of Mauritania’s political and economic development, and its foreign policy, will therefore be hugely influenced by the government’s decisions over the next five years. This period will test the strength and the adaptability of the regime to maintain authority and the smooth operation of government amid an evolving political environment, in which some minor pro-government parties are carving out greater factional autonomy while the opposition is broadening its parliamentary base. The coming months will also be a test for the opposition, to prepare for the presidential election and its aftermath, given the near certainty of victory for the government candidate, Ghazouani. In deciding to end their longstanding boycott of elections under the current regime and to take part in the September 2018 legislative, local and regional polls, the more radical opposition parties have shown that they can adapt to changing political times. But the various elements of the opposition now must work out how to make the most of the minority roles that they have secured in the National Assembly as well as in regional and municipal councils – and how to develop a coherent campaign programme to underpin a worthwhile challenge in the 2019 presidential contest.