2. Straddling the Maghreb and West Africa
Mauritania’s location between the Maghreb and West Africa is reflected in its history, social make-up, natural environment, patterns of settlement and economic life. The sand and gravel of the Sahara Desert blend into the scattered scrub, sparse grazing and carefully tended plots of Sahelian subsistence farmers. Moorish Arab and sub-Saharan African cultures meet and overlap. Political influences, diplomatic networks and trading ties extend north and south. Historic caravan routes connected oases northwards and to the south, to both the Maghreb and the Niger and Senegal river valleys. Today the coastal highway is an axis for Moroccan trade with Senegal, while the east–west ‘Route de l’Espoir’ links the capital, Nouakchott, to Mali and Burkina Faso. This diversity of cultural and socio-economic connections is reflected in the framework of Mauritania’s regional partnerships.
More broadly, the country’s international relations are structured around three key axes: the Arab world, West Africa and the wider continent, and the West (particularly France and the European Union).
Arab orientation
Mauritania’s relationships with the Arab world and its Maghreb neighbours are important, but in some respects complex and awkward to manage. Mauritania was a founder member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, which reflects ties developed during the colonial era, when it was ruled as part of French West Africa. Yet the Arab dimension of the country’s identity has remained hugely important. Successive regimes have sought to affirm it through membership of the Arab League, which it joined in 1973, and the cultivation of links with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which are important sources of development assistance. (Most recently, Mauritania hosted the Arab League summit for the first time in 2016.)
In the late 1980s, Arab nationalist thinkers in the Ba’athist and Nasserist tradition were increasingly influential in shaping the outlook of the authoritarian regime of President Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, who was in power from 1984 to 2005. This led to Mauritania joining other North African states in forming the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1989. The enduring rift between Morocco and Algeria repeatedly frustrated hopes that the AMU might evolve into an integrated regional economic block, but despite this the Taya regime opted to pull out of ECOWAS in 2000 and to focus on the union. However, relationships with Arab countries have been complicated by several factors. During the Gulf War that followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Mauritania opted to support the former, which risked alienating the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. And, in 1999, Taya established diplomatic relations with Israel, a position that may not initially have been hugely controversial but became progressively more awkward as the deadlock in the Israeli–Palestinian dispute deepened. In 2009, just months after taking power, Abdelaziz suspended these diplomatic relations and within weeks the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott had closed.
Mauritania’s management of relations with its Maghreb neighbours, Morocco and Algeria, has also proved delicate, largely because these two countries hold conflicting positions over Western Sahara. When Spain abandoned colonial rule of the territory in 1975, Mauritania took up Morocco’s invitation to take over the southern third of Western Sahara, with which it has a long frontier. But it soon struggled to cope with attacks by the Polisario Front independence movement and was forced to agree a peace settlement with the group and abandon its occupation in 1979. Two years later Mauritania went on to recognize the Front Polisario’s Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. But Morocco was not prepared to cede to the independence movement, opting instead to take over the areas that Mauritania had abandoned. This affair has complicated the two countries’ relationship ever since. They maintain functional working ties, and travellers and trade move fairly freely across Mauritania’s northwest border with the Moroccan-ruled Saharan territory. But for several years Morocco allowed Mohamed Ould Bouamatou, a prominent businessman and opponent of the Abdelaziz regime, to reside in Rabat and relations remain prickly. Mauritania’s relations with Algeria are easier but also distant. It was only in August 2018 that the two countries opened an official border crossing on their frontier in the Sahara Desert.
The Arab world, particularly the Gulf states, is a diplomatic priority and a valuable source of development funding for Mauritania. Although for many Arab countries, Mauritania is a distant and marginal player. However, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Kuwait take a more positive view, in part because of respect for Mauritania’s desert traditions and Islamic scholarship. The Saudis and Emiratis have also been keen to align themselves with the G5 Sahel states’ fight against jihadist terrorism, pledging €100 million and €30 million, respectively, for the G5 joint military force.5 Despite a spat over old debts, the Emir of Kuwait attended the 2016 Arab summit in Nouakchott, while the UAE is funding a raft of projects, including a new military academy in Nouakchott for the G5 Sahel countries. The Saudi axis has become particularly important for President Abdelaziz, particularly since the accession of King Salman in 2015. The Kingdom appreciated Abdelaziz’s public offer of troops to help ease the strain imposed by the war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen – even though it seems the troops were not, ultimately, despatched, because of domestic Mauritanian unease over this alliance. Abdelaziz has been a supportive ally for Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman in recent controversies – breaking relations with Qatar, endorsing Riyadh’s tough response to Canadian government concern over the harsh treatment of the blogger Raif Badawi and backing the Saudi defensive stance after the October 2018 killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. As a gesture of thanks, Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman visited Nouakchott in December 2018, signing new development accords; and in January 2019 parliament authorized an agreement on cooperation with Riyadh in fighting terrorism, organized crime and trafficking.
Although ties with Arab countries are highly valued, they can be difficult to manage. The Mauritanian opposition has criticized the government security accord with Saudi Arabia, because of the latter’s poor record on human rights. Meanwhile, trade with Morocco is important but the political relationship is fractious.
West African reconnection
It is against this background that, over recent years, President Abdelaziz has undertaken a strategic rethink, placing a renewed focus on West African partnerships. The Maghreb connection is not being abandoned, but links with the Sahel and ECOWAS are increasingly the priority. Among senior advisers to the current government, the Taya regime’s decision to focus on the Maghreb is widely seen as a mistake. Faced with the relative stagnation of the AMU, Abdelaziz has sought to reinvigorate relations with West African neighbours. He was the prime mover in the formation of the G5 Sahel grouping (bringing together Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) in 2014 and then in 2017 the government negotiated re-entry into the trading and economic structures of ECOWAS.6
Mauritania is now attached to two regions, albeit with constraints on the roles it plays in both. Looking north, this is more a consequence of the AMU’s chronic paralysis, although the often-testy nature of the relationship with Morocco is an additional complicating factor. By contrast, the extent of integration to the south and east has been a matter of proactive strategic choice by Abdelaziz.
The government hopes that integration with West African economies will bolster trade flows along the Route de l’Espoir – the highway from the coast to the remote southeast – and establish Nouakchott as a trade gateway for Mali and even Burkina Faso. Full integration into the ECOWAS economic space will bring a gradual harmonization of Mauritania’s tariff regime with that of the bloc, reducing the costs and delays entailed in formal cross-border trade. This could boost exports of dates and fish, and the regional role of Nouakchott as a gateway port for landlocked regions of the Sahel.7 Until now, the differences in tariffs and trade rules have incentivized informal trade, smuggling and corruption, which can be sources of revenue for militant groups. Participation in the ECOWAS trade regime should both boost economic activity and employment in general and encourage more traders to operate on a transparent formal basis.
This new policy is also explicitly linked to the government’s belief that it is necessary to tackle the poverty, unemployment and social frustrations that fuel the appeal of extremist ideology and jihadist recruitment across the Sahel. The southeast is one of Mauritania’s most isolated and disadvantaged regions, and it neighbours the highly unstable and violent central regions of Mali. The government hopes that increased trade flows along the Route de l’Espoir will stimulate local commerce and employment through legitimate channels and reduce the scope for smuggling and corruption in border regions.
But although President Abdelaziz opted to pursue re-entry into the trading and economic structures of ECOWAS, he chose to hold back from a return to full membership for two reasons.
This enabled him to keep Mauritania out of the provision for the free movement of citizens across the ECOWAS region and allowed the government to continue to regulate migration to and from West African neighbours through agreements with individual countries. Mauritania has an accord with Senegal for the free movement of the nationals of both states,8 but it does not extend this right to people from most other West African nations. (Citizens of Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Mali and Niger can enter Mauritania without a visa – but only if they have a passport.)
Moreover, full membership of ECOWAS would also have brought Mauritania within the scope of the organization’s declared agenda for consolidating multiparty democracy across West Africa, which includes a degree of peer scrutiny and the acceptance of mediation by fellow member states at times of tension or crisis. For the Nouakchott regime, domestic political developments are a purely internal sovereign matter. By opting out of full ECOWAS membership, therefore, Abdelaziz left himself a degree of flexibility to choose his country’s path, which is not so readily available to his West African counterparts. As Mauritania remains outside the political structures of ECOWAS, and the bloc’s commitment to the consolidation of democratic structures, the regime is not exposed to pressure from its West African neighbours over internal governance matters. In Togo, an ECOWAS member, the bloc has attempted to mediate a compromise agreement between government and the opposition on the terms of constitutional reform. By contrast, in Mauritania the evolution of politics and the constitutional framework has been a purely domestic affair, and that has favoured the president, as the dominant actor in setting the political agenda.
Mauritania fully participates in the G5 – a structure that does not engage with the internal political conditions of member states. Its creation was primarily motivated by the need to develop a more coordinated regional approach to tackling jihadist terrorist groups and trafficking gangs across the Sahel, and its initial declared priority was the promotion of regional economic projects to tackle the social pressures that risk fuelling youth disenchantment and the appeal of radical ideology. Subsequently, the creation of a coordinated security response has since moved to the top of the agenda, with the creation of a 5,000-strong joint military force in 2017–18;9 and in late 2018 the G5 opened a military staff college in Nouakchott. But in December 2018 renewed attention was also given to development, with donors gathering in Nouakchott to pledge €2.4 billion for some 40 priority regional projects distributed across the G5 countries.10
Mauritania is also strengthening its engagement with Africa as a whole, which has been positively received. This may reassure the regime that its re-orientation towards the sub-Saharan world is worthwhile. When Mauritania hosted the Arab League summit in 2016, only six out of the 22 heads of state attended. This reminded the country that it is viewed as peripheral by much of the Arab world. By contrast, Africa has proved to be fruitful diplomatic terrain. Abdelaziz was elected to the rotating chairmanship of the African Union for 2014, while 24 heads of state and five heads of government came to Nouakchott in July 2018 for the organization’s summit, the first to be hosted by Mauritania. The response to Abdelaziz’s African overtures from the rest of the continent could strengthen the priority that the government accords to engagement with the sub-Saharan world.
However, relationships with Mauritania’s closest West African neighbours – Mali and Senegal – are complex and have been marked by periods of severe tension and mistrust, even in the recent past. This is despite the fact that they collaborate closely, particularly in the Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), which manages water and hydroelectric resources in the Senegal River basin and also includes Guinea as a member. Moreover, Mauritania and Senegal are collaborating closely in setting up a framework for the development of the GTA gas field, which sits astride their maritime border.11 The development of the G5 Sahel framework since 2014 has also helped to build a fresh relationship of trust with other states in the region, particularly Mali.
Causes of tension in cross-border relations have often related to Mauritania’s complex ethnic and social make-up as well as the distribution of wealth and power within the country – and how these factors are viewed by governments and publics in West African countries. Mistrust and resentment were exacerbated by the Taya regime’s decision in 1989 to expel thousands of Afro-Mauritanians to Mali and Senegal. Although many were later allowed to return, they faced difficulties in regaining land and citizenship rights and this fostered a profoundly negative perception of Mauritania’s ruling elite among many West Africans. Underlying suspicion has continued to influence attitudes towards Mauritania, even concerning more recent, essentially unrelated bilateral issues.
For example, when the United Nations peacekeeping force in Mali was seeking troop contributions in 2013, Mauritania’s offer was rejected because the Malian government did not trust its troops. Some even suspected that Nouakchott had reached a tacit understanding with jihadist groups to turn a blind eye to the movement of their fighters, providing Mauritania’s territory was not attacked. But mistrust is present on both sides and the Mauritanian military has sometimes felt that joint anti-terrorism operations suffer from a lack of commitment from its Malian counterpart.
While relations with Senegal have been complicated by the consequences of the 1989 expulsions and more recently by Mauritania’s treatment of Senegalese fishermen (see below), ties between the two countries run deep. President Abdelaziz, for instance, was born in Senegal, and he and President Macky Sall have made strenuous efforts to contain the impact of underlying popular mistrust and to focus on the pragmatic negotiation of issues such as fishing rights and the development of the GTA gas deposit.
Western partnerships
In the West, France is Mauritania’s main diplomatic and security partner, training the air force and strongly supporting the G5 joint military force. Mauritania has been pushing for this force to be funded on a long-term basis, a view shared by President Emmanuel Macron.12 (The United States also provides military aid.) However, political relations remain cautious, reflecting French uncertainty over the constitutional and political choices that lie ahead for the country. Macron visited Nouakchott in July 2018 for a tactfully timed meeting with G5 leaders in the margins of the African Union summit. A purely bilateral visit could have provoked accusations that he was signalling support for Abdelaziz and the government in the run-up to the September elections and the 2019 presidential election.
Mauritania’s mineral and hydrocarbon resources have attracted Canadian and British investment partners – and the UK is upgrading its hitherto slender diplomatic representation in Nouakchott to a full status embassy. Meanwhile, China has become a major buyer of Mauritanian iron ore. Although the country’s rich fisheries have drawn a wide range of operators, including those from China and Russia, the central foundation of industrial fishing activity remains the fisheries agreement with the EU, which is renegotiated and renewed on a rolling basis.13 Mauritania’s waters are critically important for Spanish boats in particular, while the government uses the agreement as a benchmark for labour conditions and rules on fish-stocks conservation across the industry. Meanwhile, the EU institutions as well as member states such as Germany and France, are key providers of development assistance. The importance of relations with the EU has been further reinforced by the latter’s strong support for the development of the G5.
5 Author interviews, Nouakchott and other Sahel capitals, Paris and Brussels, 2017–18.
6 Permanent Secretariat of the G5 Sahel (2014), ‘Sommet extraordinaire des Chefs d’Etat du G5 Sahel, le 19 décembre 2014, Nouakchott, Mauritanie’, [Extraordinary Summit of Heads of States of the G5 Sahel, 19 December 2014, Nouakchott, Mauritania], https://www.g5sahel.org/index.php/documentations/publications/75-sommet-extraordinaire-des-chefs-d-etat-du-g5-sahel-le-19-decembre-2014-nouakchott-mauritanie (accessed 15 Jan. 2019).
7 Author interviews, Nouakchott, 2018; field research on West African trade liberalization, 2015 and 2017.
8 Author interviews, Senegalese travellers and traders, northern Senegal, 2018.
9 Permanent Secretariat of the G5 Sahel (2017), ‘Résolution relative à la création d’une force conjointe du G5 Sahel’ [Resolution relating to the creation of joint force of the G5 Sahel], 6 February 2017, https://www.g5sahel.org/index.php/documentations/publications/1129-resolution (accessed 15 Jan. 2019).
10 Franceinfo (2018), ‘Le G5 Sahel promet 2,4 milliards d’euros d’aides pour endiguer les violences djihadistes’ [G5 Sahel – €2.4 billion to curb jihadist violence], https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/politique-africaine/g5-sahel-2-4-milliards-d-euros-pour-endiguer-les-violences-djihadistes-grace-au-developpement_3089053.html (accessed 14 Mar. 2019).
11 Author interviews, government officials, Mauritania and Senegal, 2018, and private-sector energy sources 2017 and 2018.
12 United Nations Security Council (2017), ‘Pour appuyer la Force conjointe des États du G5 Sahel, le Conseil de sécurité propose un accord technique avec l’ONU et l’Union européenne, via la MINUSMA’, [To support the joint force of the states of theG5 Sahel, the Security Council proposes a technical agreement with the UN and the EU, via MINUSMA], 8 December 2017, https://www.un.org/press/fr/2017/cs13112.doc.htm (accessed 15 Jan. 2019); Author interviews, French officials, analysts, expert media Paris, 2017–18.
13 European Commission (2017), ‘Rapport de la Réunion annuelle du Comité Scientifique Conjoint relatif à l’Accord de pêche signé entre la République islamique de Mauritanie et l’Union européenne’ [Report of the annual meeting of the scientific committee on the fisheries agreement between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the European Union], https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/report-jsc-mauritania-2017-10_fr.pdf (accessed 15 Jan. 2019); European Commission (undated), ‘Mauritania: Fisheries partnership agreement’, https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/mauritania (accessed 15 Jan. 2019).