4. The Resource Economy and the Development Challenge
Mauritania’s political challenges and social complexity should be understood in the context of its economic model and the development issues with which it wrestles. All Sahelian countries present a contrast between an export sector based largely on industrial minerals or hydrocarbons extraction and a fragile rural economy built around smallholder agriculture and pastoralism that is routinely exposed to the risk of drought and vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Everywhere there is steady migration to the major cities, but in most countries of the region the majority of the population remains in rural areas. However, since independence the shift in population from widespread reliance on nomadic pastoralism to an urban life has been much greater in Mauritania. The share of the population that is reliant on arable agriculture is much smaller than in other G5 countries. Although Mauritania’s population is growing less rapidly than in neighbouring West African states, the country is nevertheless in urgent need of new sources of livelihood, particularly for young people, and the pastoral economy – a key source of rural livelihoods – is under severe pressure.21
Agriculture is not a significant source of export income, although there is a growing market for gum arabic harvested from acacia trees, and agriculture has been developed on a large commercial scale in the lower reaches of the Senegal River valley around the town of Rosso.22 By contrast, the export of mineral resources has played a major role in the economy since the early post-independence era. For many years iron ore has been a mainstay of export earnings. In recent years copper and gold have also made an important contribution, supplemented with small volumes of oil. The development of the GTA gas field, shared with Senegal, will also establish Mauritania as a major hydrocarbons producer. Catches from the country’s rich offshore fishing waters, harvested mainly by foreign commercial vessels under agreements with the EU and other partners, also contribute to export earnings. The industrial sector is small, but commerce and services are significant, particularly in Nouakchott. Moreover, in a number of sub-Saharan countries, the Mauritanian diaspora plays a significant role in the trading economy.
The fact that the balance of economic activity is somewhat different from that in other Sahelian countries has political and social consequences: farmers exercise less political weight and few members of the governing elite come from such a background. Rural communities face the same challenges of food security and pressure on land, water and vegetation resources found elsewhere in the Sahel, and nomadic traditions remain a powerful cultural influence, but government policy on public services and economic development must reckon with the reality that a large share of the population now depends on urban livelihoods. Encouraged by the prospect of increased resource revenues from the GTA discovery, the government has developed a new strategy designed to accelerate growth and broaden its positive impact in a society marked by contrasts in income and opportunity. The government has now introduced a Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Shared Prosperity (SCAPP) for 2016–2030, to replace the previous development strategy (the Strategic Framework for Fighting Poverty – CSLP) that had been introduced early this century.23
Mining rebound and gas opportunities
The foundation of the industrial economy is the extractives sector, dominated by the production of iron ore – mined by the parastatal Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière de Mauritanie (SNIM) at Zouérate – and gold, produced by Canada’s Kinross at Tasiast. Moreover, Mauritanian Copper Mines, a subsidiary of Canada’s First Quantum Minerals, extracts copper at Akjoujt. These operations are islands of heavy industrial activity in the north, equipped with modern infrastructure and employs 9,000 relatively well-paid skilled personnel, including many from other regions. The 2014 slump in world mineral prices put the extractives sector under pressure, with painful consequences for Mauritania’s balance of payments and fiscal revenues; SNIM management even announced that the company would not fully honour a pay agreement with its workforce, a stance that provoked complaints and strike action. The problems at SNIM put severe pressure on government finances, because the company had accounted for up to one-third of the state’s revenue and had also been tapped for occasional extra-budgetary contributions to capital investment projects. Yet, although it was under strain, SNIM decided not to abandon its strategy of long-term investment in expanding production capacity;24 and 2017 brought an upturn in the global metals market, which eased pressure on the mining sector and restored favourable conditions for growth.25 With the construction of the new Guelb processing plant, set to boost annual output by 4 million tonnes, SNIM aims to establish Mauritania as one of the world’s top five producers of iron ore. Meanwhile, Kinross is also investing $900 million in expansion at Tasiast.
The GTA offshore gas project, which is led by BP,26 is set to further diversify Mauritania’s export and fiscal revenue base. The field sits astride the maritime boundary with Senegal and, while most production will be shipped to international markets from a floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant, both countries will be offered the chance to take gas direct from the field to meet domestic demand for power generation or other purposes. The Inter-governmental Cooperation Agreement,27 initially c0nfirmed during a visit to Nouakchott by Senegal’s President Macky Sall in February 2018,28 established the key principles for development of the field and how its resources will be shared and for settlement of any disputes. Final signature of the inter-governmental accord on 21 December 2018 paved the way for BP’s immediate confirmation of the Final Investment Decision to go ahead with this $1 billion project. The development of GTA will mark an important upturn in the fortunes of the Mauritanian offshore – after earlier disappointments when output from the first oil finds fell far short of initial hopes, generating little revenue. These setbacks were compounded in 2014 when the Islamic Development Bank chose to hold back from approving finance for a power project that would have been fuelled from the Banda offshore gas deposit. Further encouragement came in December 2018, with Total’s announcement that it had signed exploration and production contracts for two further offshore blocks, in addition to the three that it already operates in the Mauritanian offshore.29
However, in December 2018, the government had yet to articulate a comprehensive strategy for the role that the re-emergent hydrocarbons sector might play in the economy. The GTA project, with a floating LNG plant and relatively little onshore activity, offers few obvious local employment and business opportunities. Senegal has set out an ambitious strategy for becoming a regional source of expertise and professional services for the hydrocarbons sector, whereas Mauritania has yet to outline a vision for the industry, beyond the contribution that this new-found resource will make to exports, energy supply and revenue for the state.
That said, this could represent a valuable opportunity to diversify economic activity and open new areas of skilled employment for the country’s growing youth population. For its part, the mining industry, which is a major employer at all levels of skill and management responsibility, has fostered a cadre of local expertise in specialist engineering and other related disciplines, despite occasional tensions with Kinross over the number of expatriate staff. The past three years have also seen the government overhaul higher education in technical subjects to cater for the needs of the extractives sector and to develop a flow of entrepreneurial technical talent into the wider economy.
Fisheries: a new national priority
The government has taken a strong stance on the development of fisheries to diversify the economy and stimulate employment.30 With its nomadic and agricultural roots, Mauritanian society traditionally ignored the opportunities offered by its offshore waters, which include some of the Atlantic’s richest fisheries. The one notable exception is the Imraguen community, north of Nouakchott, famous for the use of traditional artisanal techniques, even relying on dolphins to chase the catch near to the shore. But today many Mauritanians work as crew on foreign-owned industrial fishing vessels operating out of the northern port city of Nouadhibou. The industrial deepwater fishing sector is an important source of employment and export earnings, with vessels from Europe, China, Russia and South Korea all present. European boats are particularly active, under multi-year fisheries agreements with the European Union that are renegotiated on a rolling basis; these seek to manage deepwater stocks sustainably and to promote the growth of the local fish-processing sector and act as a quality standard benchmark for agreements reached with other fisheries partners.
Meanwhile, the fishing of inshore waters has been largely left to Senegalese canoes, many based at Nouakchott and effectively sub-leasing licences issued to Mauritanian businesspeople. But in 2012 the government decided to radically change its policy and to embark on the development of the inshore fishing sector, eventually ceasing the renewal of licences in 2015. The authorities allowed the old arrangement to continue on an informal basis through 2016, but from January 2017 they enforced a new policy of ‘Mauritanization’, ordering some 3,000 Senegalese boats to leave. The government had built a new inshore fishing port at Tanit and established a naval academy to train young men for a career in a new homegrown modern inshore industry.
The government presented its new policy as part of an overall strategy to diversify Mauritania’s business and employment opportunities.31 The change of policy stirred widespread anger in Senegal, but without any legal basis on which to challenge Mauritania’s new approach, the Senegalese government publicly played the issue down, in the interest of wider bilateral relations – and despite widespread anger among its own electorate. However, the small size of Mauritania’s own inshore fishing community and the availability of Senegalese keen to fill the gap paved the way for pragmatic compromise: Senegalese canoes were allowed to resume operating from Nouakchott beach on an informal basis32 and then finally, in July 2018, the two countries signed a new fishing agreement under which 400 licences would be issued to 400 Senegalese boats.
Social challenges
Mauritania’s population is rising by 2.9 per cent a year and 31 per cent are aged between 10 and 24, while only 3 per cent are aged 65 or more.33 Jobs therefore have to be a priority, but the wider development challenge is also considerable. The IMF estimates that about 31 per cent of the population still live in poverty.34 At $1,137 in 2017, average GDP per capita is above the figure for Mali ($827) and not far behind that of Senegal ($1,329), but it is well below the figures for Morocco ($3,007) and Algeria ($4,055).35 Social indicators are hardly encouraging for a country whose leaders long had aspirations to see themselves as part of Arab North Africa rather than sub-Saharan Africa. For example, at 34 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2017, the neonatal mortality rate is more than double that of Morocco (14 deaths) but also lags far behind that of Senegal (21), Cameroon (26) and even Burkina Faso (24).36 According to the UN, only 26 per cent of boys and 27 per cent of girls enrol in secondary school, well below the averages for West and Central Africa (39 per cent for boys and 33 per cent for girls), although there has been significant progress in recent years.37
Such indicators reflect the development challenges as well as the questions of social inequality raised by Haratine campaigners. This is the background to the calls from the IMF for Mauritania to shift more public spending towards key social priorities.38 The government has demonstrated a capacity to tackle specific social challenges when it takes the trouble to develop a methodical and detailed strategy. A good example is secondary and higher education where, since 2014, the administration has sought to develop an approach better tailored towards the needs of a developing economy, encouraging a shift among secondary-level students towards technical and science subjects. The government has also made serious efforts to strengthen the provision of higher education: up to now the load has been carried mainly by Nouakchott’s twin arts and science universities, which were merged in 2016, and three higher-level technical institutions that have been amalgamated into a single École Supérieure Polytechnique. At the latter, before moving on to specialist study, all students now start by following a core first-year curriculum than includes not only technical subjects but also a strong element of business studies.39
In a drive to raise standards at the École Supérieure Polytechnique, partnerships have been developed with elite institutions in France, Morocco and Tunisia. There has also been an effort to decentralize higher education, with the establishment of specialist institutions in Rosso (agriculture) and Aleg (public works), as well as an institution specializing in information technology, fisheries and marine science in Nouadhibou, a key fishing port also earmarked for the development of a business ‘free zone’ outside Mauritania’s formal customs frontier. Although delayed, a sister institution for the study of mining is promised for Zouérate – the hub for iron ore production – while President Abdelaziz has also promised a new university for the historic and remote oasis town of Tidjikja. There is also a well-established Islamic theology university in Ayoûn el Atroûs in the southeast.
Fragilities of the southern Sahelian belt
While economic activity across the deserts of northern and central Mauritania is often concentrated in isolated urban centres, conditions are quite different in the south, which forms part of the Sahelian pastoral and agricultural belt, where many people live in farming villages, much as their counterparts do in Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. But in southern regions, such as Gorgol, the Sahelian agro-pastoralist economy was severely impacted by a major drought in 2017, when many areas saw an almost total failure of the June–September annual rains.40 In the immediate floodplains alongside the Gorgol and Senegal rivers, farmers were able to continue irrigating their fields, producing a good rice crop. But on even slightly higher ground set back from the riverbeds, it was almost impossible to produce significant cereal volumes; the plants hardly grew, so there was not even much post-harvest vegetation remaining for animal forage. By January 2018, biomass levels were unusually low, and many areas of potential grazing land were completely bare of vegetation.
The crisis had multiple impacts, which affected households unevenly. Those fortunate enough to have floodplain fields continued to produce at least some crops, while deep boreholes or local dams sustained dry-season production of cereals and vegetables. But villages in the more elevated drier sandy or clay soil areas were left desperately short of food and income. Local commerce suffered from the premature departure of Peul nomadic herders, who normally spend a large part of their seasonal livestock migration cycle in Gorgol but had to leave early to search for grazing over the border in Senegal. Locals say that pressure on resources was exacerbated by a longer-term influx of pastoralist families who had abandoned regions further north whose viability as grazing areas had been eroded by climate change.41 By contrast, the 2018 rainy season was good and produced extensive fresh biomass growth, permitting animals to graze areas that had been devoid of nutrition for many months.42
Yet, while the improved 2018 weather conditions eased the immediate pressure on southern farming communities, the fundamental underlying challenge remains: in the Sahelian climate, the total or substantial failure of the main annual rains – falling between late June and early September – can be a frequent occurrence. Some areas may be seriously affected in two or three successive years and at the very least it is sensible to assume that the main rains are likely to fail at least every second or third year. This assumption has to be built into policies to monitor the risks of potential crisis, to deliver food security, to sustain an essential core of agricultural and pastoralist activity, and thus to maintain the basic viability and living standards of rural communities.
The Mauritanian government has sought to address these long-term vulnerabilities. However, the widespread view among development and food-security specialists is that the effectiveness of Mauritania’s national systems for monitoring crisis risk and sustaining community resilience lags significantly behind those in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – the generally acknowledged leaders among Sahelian countries in managing food security and crisis early warning.43
To help the poor, the government operates a network of official shops (EMEL) that sell essentials at slightly subsidized prices. But the savings are small and the queues at the shops in times of need are often so long that many of the poorest prefer to work as paid labourers for more secure families, to earn some cash and then buy food on the commercial market rather than wait for many hours to get wares from EMEL that are only marginally subsidized.44
These problems arise against a background of generalized resentment among many segments of the southern Afro-Mauritanian population towards perceived neglect by central government45 and the largely Maure ruling elite. There is a feeling that the government does not really understand or prioritize smallholder agriculture, which provides the main livelihood for the minority population of the far south.
This relates to the realities of political voice and influence. In other Sahelian states, such as Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger, smallholder farming households represent a majority of the population and a powerful electoral constituency, which means that their governments have to treat rural development and food security as a key political and socio-economic priority. But in Mauritania, a higher proportion of the population lives in urban areas, and the southern agrarian communities represent a relatively weaker political constituency. President Abdelaziz has complained that farmers fail to repay their loans; while southerners feel that the government could improve access to credit, so that they could invest in tools and infrastructure such as irrigation pumps from Europe.
Some also feel that the government could enhance food-security early warning systems and ensure that communities in crisis receive assistance. In June 2018, the head of an alliance of human rights groups accused the government of failing to engage with donors to ensure that populations hit by drought did not face famine and compared its performance unfavourably with that of the authorities in other drought-affected countries. Mauritania belongs to the Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel, the regional organization through which Sahelian countries operate a harmonized system for the oversight of national drought and food-security monitoring systems and collate data on a regional basis. However, the Mauritanian system for food-security management is viewed by development specialists as less politically participative and less based on careful data monitoring than those in Burkina, Faso, Mali and Niger.46 This is an issue of concern at times when food insecurity remains a recurrent risk in much of the Sahel.47
Political sensitivities complicate the task of making objective judgments about the social and economic conditions of southern communities. Moreover, there is some overlap but no direct correlation between the discrimination faced by many Haratine, across the country and the condition of rural development systems in the largely Afro-Mauritanian agricultural far south.
Identity politics also come into play. During the early post-independence years Afro-Mauritanians played a big role in public administration and key services, because many had benefitted from access to the francophone education system during the colonial era. But as the leadership of the independent state grew more self-confident and steadily asserted the Arab dimension of national identity, Afro-Mauritanians felt increasingly marginalized, particularly after Arabic became the language of education and government. This left them at a significant disadvantage compared with Maure fellow citizens whose indigenous language is Hassaniya Arabic. A sense of resentment was heightened by the Taya regime’s brutal 1989 crackdown, when tens of thousands of Afro-Mauritanians were expelled to Senegal. Many later returned, particularly during the brief presidency of Abdallahi, who prioritized a government response to their grievances. Yet today many Afro-Mauritanians continue to face great difficulty in securing titles to land or even getting registered as citizens with full identity documentation and the right to vote. Land rights are a sensitive issue, especially in a context where investors from outside the local community have invested in the development of big commercial farms in parts of the fertile Senegal valley floodplain around Rosso.
21 Author interviews, Sahel development specialists, Nouakchott, Dakar and, Ouagadougou, January–February 2018; discussions at meeting of Food Crisis Prevention Network, Paris, April 2018, ‘Summary of Conclusions’, https://www.oecd.org/site/rpca/meetings/RPCA2018_RELEVE_EN.pdf (accessed 16 Jan. 2019).
22 Author interviews, representatives of NGOs, development partners and regional organizations, Dakar, Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, Paris, Brussels 2017–18.
23 Le calame (2018), ‘Le gouvernement approuve la loi d’orientation de la SCAPP’ [‘The government approves the framework law for the SCAPP’], http://lecalame.info/?q=node/6696 (accessed 15 Feb. 2019); IMF (2018), ‘Letter of Intent from Finance Minister El Moctar Djay and Central Bank Governor Abdel Aziz Dahi to Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF’, 9 May 2018, https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2018/mrt/050918.pdf (accessed 16 Jan. 2019); Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2018), ‘Document de Développement Economique’, 9 May 2018, https://www.imf.org/fr/search#q=Mauritanie&sort=relevancy (accessed on 5 Feb 2019).
24 Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière de Mauritanie (SNIM) (2016), ‘Mauritanides 2016: La SNIM poursuivra ses investissements’ [Mauritanides 2016: SNIM will continue its investments], 18 October 2016, http://www.snim.com/index.php/news-a-media/news/151-mauritanides-2016-la-snim-poursuivra-ses-investissements.html (accessed 16 Jan. 2019).
25 SNIM (2017), ‘Statutory auditor and independent auditor’s report on the consolidated financial statements’, http://www.snim.com/images/rapports/etats_financiers2016_anglais.pdf (accessed 16 Jan. 2019).
26 BP (2016), ‘BP agrees deal with Kosmos Energy to partner on world-class discoveries in Mauritania and Senegal and cooperate on future exploration’.
27 Author interviews, fishing sector sources, development and diplomatic observers, Dakar and Nouakchott, 2018.
28 Maillard, M. (2018), ‘Le Sénégal et la Mauritanie signent un accord d’exploitation de l’un des plus vastes gisements de gaz d’Afrique de l’Ouest [Senegal and Mauritania sign exploitation agreement for one of the largest gas deposits in West Africa], Le Monde, 9 February 2018, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/02/09/le-senegal-et-la-maur… (accessed 16 Jan. 2019).
29 Total (2018),‘Total se renforce dans l’exploration en Mauritanie’ [Total strengthens in exploration in Mauritania], statement , 12 December 2018, https://www.total.com/fr/medias/actualite/communiques/total-se-renforce-dans-lexploration-en-mauritanie (accessed 15 Feb. 2019).
30 Ministry of Fisheries, Mauritania (undated), ‘Stratégie de Gestion et de Développement Durables du Secteur des Pêches et de l’Economie maritime: Plan d’actions 2015–2019’ [Management and Sustainable Development Strategy for the Fisheries Sector and the Maritime Economy: Action Plans 2015–2019], http://www.peches.gov.mr/IMG/pdf/plan_d_actions_strategie_mpem_2015-2019.pdf (accessed 16 Jan. 2019).
31 Author interviews, government, Nouakchott, 2018.
32 Field research, Nouakchott beach, October 2018.
33 United Nations Population Fund (2018), State of World Population 2018.
34 IMF (2017), ‘Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Three-Year Arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility’, press release, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/12/13/Islamic-Republic-of-Mauritania-Three-Year-Arrangement-under-the-Extended-Credit-Facility-45465 (accessed 15 Feb. 2019).
35 World Bank (2019), World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?view=chart (accessed 5 Feb. 2019).
36 World Bank (2019), World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.NMRT?view=chart (accessed 5 Feb. 2019).
37 United Nations Population Fund (2018), State of World Population 2018.
38 IMF (2018), ‘Statement by IMF Deputy Managing Director Mitsuhiro Furasawa at the Conclusion of a Visit to Mauritania’, 16 February 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/02/20/pr1858-statement-by-imf-dmd-mitsuhiro-furusawa-at-the-conclusion-of-a-visit-to-mauritania (accessed 16 Jan. 2019).
39 Author interview, Nouakchott, January 2018.
40 Field research and interviews, rural communities, southern Mauritania, January 2018.
41 Author interviews, southern Mauritanian communities, January 2018, and Sahel development partners, in Ouagadougou, Dakar, Paris, Brussels and Nouakchott, January–February, July and October 2018; documentation and interviews, meeting of Food Crisis Prevention Network, Paris, April 2018.
42 Field research, north of Nouakchott, October 2018.
43 Author interviews, Sahel food security and development specialists, Sahel development partners, in Ouagadougou, Dakar, Paris, Brussels, Niamey, Bamako and Nouakchott, 2012–18.
44 Author interviews, villagers, rural Mauritania, 2018.
45 Author interviews and a community forum, rural Mauritania, 2018.
46 Author interviews, Sahel food security and development specialists, Sahel development partners, in Ouagadougou, Dakar, Paris, Brussels, Niamey, Bamako and Nouakchott, 2012–18.
47 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2018), ‘Sahel et Afrique de l’Ouest – Analyse régionale du Cadre Harmonisé juin-août 2018 (projetée)’ [‘Sahel and West Africa – Regional Analysis of the Harmonized Framework, Juin-August 2018 (projection)], http://www.fao.org/emergencies/ressources/cartes/detail/fr/c/1114394/ (accessed 16 Jan. 2019).