5. Personalized Power and Politics in the Abdelaziz Era
The onus for making key strategic choices about Mauritania’s future currently lies with President Abdelaziz and those closest to him. There is a strong perception among the public that it is he who takes the big decisions rather than government, the ruling UPR party or the state as a whole.
This in part reflects the history of his rise to power. Abdelaziz was a key player in the 2005 military putsch officially led by his cousin and fellow officer, Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, which brought an end to Taya’s dictatorship. Vall then oversaw the holding of genuinely democratic elections in 2007, in which Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi was elected president. Yet, in 2008, Abdelaziz led another putsch to take power himself. The following year he secured a measure of constitutional legitimacy by getting himself elected president. But although the contest was formally pluralistic – with a range of prominent politicians taking part – it was in fact tightly managed and effectively confirmed the dominance that Abdelaziz had established during the interlude of unconstitutional rule since his putsch. He was re-elected in 2014 in a contest boycotted by much of the conventional opposition establishment, leaving the controversial anti-slavery campaigner Biram Dah Abeid as his main challenger
The manner in which Abdelaziz acquired power and wields authority has strongly shaped a public perception of his rule as highly personalized, if restrained in style and in no way lavish. It can appear inscrutable and hard to read, although close collaborators also stress his pragmatism and readiness to listen.48
The aftermath of the 2009 election saw the emergence of a deep tactical split within the opposition, as it sought to work out the most effective way to sustain a meaningful challenge to the regime. Many opponents chose to boycott constitutional politics in protest at what they regarded as an illegitimate presidency. But others concluded that there was nothing to be gained through the strategy of the ‘empty chair’, particularly as Abdelaziz clearly benefitted from the support or at least the acquiescence of Mauritania’s key international partners in both the West and the Arab world. Groups such as the Alliance Populaire Progressiste (APP) and the moderate Islamist party Tawassoul, while criticizing the administration, opted to work within the constitutional system in the hope that they could advance their agendas more effectively through the elected institutions. The APP leader, Messaoud Ould Boukheir – who had come second in the presidential 2009 election – became speaker of the lower house of parliament, the National Assembly, and a respected source of advice to government, while some APP parliamentarians gained a reputation for reformist activism. The 2013 legislative election saw Tawassoul secure 16 seats, becoming the largest opposition force in parliament and in the same year’s municipal elections it established a useful foothold in local politics and administration.
But other groups, notably the Regroupement des Forces Démocratiques (RFD), led by Ahmed Ould Daddah, the half-brother of Mauritania’s first president, felt that participation in the constitutional system had become pointless. They disputed the legitimacy of Abdelaziz and the measures he had introduced and formed the broad Coordination de l’Opposition Démocratique (COD) alliance, later succeeded by the even more broadly based Front National pour la Démocratie et l’Unité (FNDU), which also encompassed elements of civil society.
Most members of the opposition alliance – with the exception of Tawassoul – were initially committed to a boycott of constitutional elected politics. But while this stance did mobilize some public support, it of course also reduced the prospects for a strong election performance by opposition candidates or parties, including the chance to mount joint challenges to the government in second round run-off contests. The ineffectiveness of boycott tactics was confirmed in 2017 when Abdelaziz put forward controversial constitutional changes (see below), easily secured endorsement for these measures in a referendum and implemented them instantly. This provoked an opposition rethink and the advocates of electoral participation convinced their more sceptical allies to abandon the boycott. This change of heart was also the result of a government threat to dissolve parties that continued to boycott elections.
Strong presidency
With the opposition hobbled, Abdelaziz was able to ignore those who criticized his legitimacy and set the governing agenda, almost untrammelled by domestic political constraints. Power became concentrated in the presidency but formally expressed through the structures of a multiparty constitutional state. This has produced a paradox. Plural political debate and party activity – as well as a broadly free, lively and critical media – sit alongside an unchallenged assertion of executive authority by the president. The tone of the government’s self-presentation has been based on competence and delivery rather than on public debate.
Nowhere has the regime played the card of effective government more strongly than in its response to the serious threat posed by jihadist terrorism. As noted above, in 2005 the Algeria-based Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (later rebranded as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) attacked the small Lemgheity army garrison in the remote northeast, and other attacks followed. Abdelaziz sought to justify his 2008 seizure of power with the need for a more assertive and methodical strategy to tackle the terrorist threat. There has since been a sustained drive to strengthen the military, with the creation of the specially trained Groupements spéciaux d’intervention, and investment in training and extra resources, including aerial assets. The authorities have used force when necessary; for example, they sent troops to hunt down militants in the Wagadou forest across the border with Mali (with the latter’s consent). The strategy has been flexible and multi-layered. The reinforcement of the military, intelligence and border surveillance has been complemented by a strategy to win ‘hearts and minds’, with Islamic scholars tasked with convincing jailed militants that terrorist violence is in fact un-Islamic, and the development of new settlements, infrastructure and administration in remote areas, to provide services and generate legitimate employment.
But while ultimate authority is concentrated in the presidency, Abdelaziz does not take all decisions himself. Ministers take the technical lead on their areas of responsibility and are accessible and open to discussion with international partners and sectoral interest groups, exploring policy options and articulating specific agendas for thematic action. The overhaul of technical higher education is a good example of this reformist managerial pragmatism. However, most ministers are barely political actors in their own right. The inner circle of the leadership remains opaque and key decisions flow from the top. The presidential administration cannot be accused of fostering a cult of personality – Abdelaziz is reticent and low-key in style – but it generates a strong sense of vertical authority. Critics allege that power and influence has become increasingly concentrated within the president’s tribe, the Ouled Bousbah, and even more tightly among his own family and closest associates. Personality rifts within this inner circle can generate powerful ripples; in August and September 2017 various independent voices in public life were subjected to official questioning over any dealings with the businessman Mohamed Ould Bouamatou, a cousin and former close ally turned critic of Abdelaziz, who now lives in Spain.
The military has for decades been one of the most important elements of the country’s political power structure. It was the powerbase of the Taya regime, the engineer of the 2005 putsch and the foundation of Abdelaziz’s seizure of power in 2008. Indeed, since 1978 the country has been led by career soldiers, with the exception of Abdellahi in 2007–08. The military was the vehicle for Abdelaziz’s career and it became a huge influence on his personal outlook and leadership style as well as a crucial source of support for his regime. This makes it a key player in shaping the country’s political evolution during this new period of transition. While it does not play a formalized political role, the views of the military remain key and some factions within it opposed calls for a constitutional change to facilitate a third term for Abdelaziz.
For some time, former chief of staff – and now defence minister – Ghazouani has been viewed as a potential successor to the president, particularly after the Abdelaziz confirmed his decision to comply with the constitution and stand down in 2019. On 29 January 2019, a government spokesman announced on Twitter that Ghazouani would be the regime candidate in the 2019 presidential contest.49 Discreet in manner and a modernizer who has sought to promote the role of women in the military, Ghazouani has for many years been one of Abdelaziz’s most trusted confidants; early in their military careers, the two men were trained together at the Meknès military academy in Morocco. A measure of the confidence that Abdelaziz places in Ghazouani came in 2012, after the head of state was wounded in a shooting incident: the chief of staff acted as de facto interim ruler while Abdelaziz was recuperating in France. The president clearly sees Ghazouani as the best man to continue the political, economic and security strategy that he has developed over recent years, and as the man whom he can trust to protect the current framework of power and the interests of the foundations upon which the regime is based.
Over the past 10 years there has been a strong sense of a state machine and a country waiting on the decisions of Abdelaziz, who gives little away about his thinking until big decisions are announced. He takes this strong personal lead even on technical policy issues, such as the construction of Nouakchott’s new airport, the creation of the G5 Sahel regional grouping, the change in policy on inshore fishing or the mobilization of last-minute funding to build a conference centre for the July 2018 African Union summit. His top-down style of leadership has been most powerfully demonstrated over the past three years in measures that affect incarnations of the nation – the constitutional changes concerning political institutions as well as the national flag and anthem, and the reform of the currency. But, of course, this poses questions about the future nature of leadership power, after Abdelaziz stands down in 2019.
Changing the constitution
In 2017, the government announced plans for constitutional reform to remove many of the counterbalances to the power of the president and the UPR. It proposed the abolition of the Senate, the High Islamic Council and the High Court of Justice. Their disappearance would be offset by the creation of new Regional Councils, but it was unclear how and when these would be chosen or whether they would have legal powers or financial resources that could offset the greater concentration of power caused by the Senate’s abolition. There were questions as to whether the Regional Councils would be pawns of regime patronage and vehicles for the installation of local notables in roles with little autonomous power, or whether they could eventually become a meaningful vehicle for expressing and addressing local issues and grievances. The proposed constitutional reforms also included changes to the national flag and to the national anthem. While symbolic, this was an issue that the government knew would command wide public attention and could stir a degree of popular emotion.
Prior to the unveiling of the package, President Abdelaziz had invited opposition parties to engage in dialogue on politics and constitutional change, but most had boycotted the talks because they felt that the government was not really interested in hearing their views. The process was notable only for an announcement from Abdelaziz that he would not be seeking a further term of office, a statement his opponents did not regard as definitive. Still the dialogue was a shrewd move, because the government at least demonstrated a nominal willingness to listen to the views of others before announcing its constitutional plans.
The requirement that constitutional measures must be adopted by two-thirds majorities in the National Assembly and the Senate was easily secured by the government in the former, where the UPR and its allies held 108 seats and the opposition 37 (until the September 2018 election). The Senate proved much more recalcitrant, even though the government was also strongly placed there. Faced with the prospect of being made redundant, 33 of the 56 senators – including many government supporters – rejected the reforms. Abdelaziz then announced that he would seek to get the measures approved by referendum. Four past chairmen of the bar declared that under the constitution even a referendum would fail to provide the required authority for change and that a two-thirds vote in the Senate would still be required. But the government brushed aside their views and sought to mobilize alternative legal advice in support of its claim that approval for the changes in a referendum would free it from the need to seek senate consent.
The government pressed forward with the referendum on 5 August 2017, after making only one concession, dropping the plan to abolish the High Court. Believing that the authorities would rig the vote count, the opposition campaigned for a boycott in the hope of undermining the legitimacy of the inevitable ‘yes’ vote. On one occasion the security forces beat up prominent opposition figures who were leading an unauthorized protest march. The boycott had little effect. The electoral commission announced that, on a turnout of 53.75 per cent, 85.6 per cent of voters had approved the government measures, although notably Nouakchott’s Sebkha district, populated mainly by Afro-Mauritanians, was reported to have voted ‘no’. The government treated the referendum result as authorization for the implementation of the constitutional changes. It immediately locked the Senate building so that disputatious members of the upper house could not get in to stage a symbolic sitting protest.
The adoption of the modified flag and national anthem was an equally symbolic demonstration of Abdelaziz’s political authority. With effect from the annual Independence Day festivities on 28 November 2017, it became illegal to fly the old flag. A further powerful symbol was the reform of the national currency that took effect at the start of 2018. The ouguiya was redenominated at a rate of 10:1 and new high-tech plastic banknotes were issued, with old notes allowed to circulate for a limited transition period. (In abbreviated form, the new currency is now referred to as the MRU – in contrast to the former usage, UM.) There was a clear rationale for the reform in the need to reduce the scope for fraud and counterfeiting. However, the new currency was introduced with only a few weeks’ notice, in a move that demonstrated the president’s decisive control over policy and capacity to rapidly implement the changes that he prioritizes.
The constitutional measures and the way that they were driven through have sent a powerful message. While most citizens may not have been clear about the Senate’s role, its abolition bluntly demonstrated Abdelaziz’s capacity to set the rules of the political game. His changes have produced a four-tier pyramid of elected offices governing Mauritania. At the summit is the powerful presidency, while the legislature now consists of a single chamber – the National Assembly; there are six new regional councils, while local administration is in the hands of 219 municipalities.
The size of the National Assembly has expanded from 147 seats to 157, to reflect increasing population in some areas. Some 40 members are elected on a proportional representation national list basis, while 113 are elected from geographical constituencies, varying from one to 18 deputies, depending on their population size. The elected parliamentarians then appoint four additional members, to represent the diaspora, in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. The six new Regional Councils were elected for the first time in September 2018;50 but it remains to be seen whether they are granted significant financial resources and administrative powers. Formally, they are mandated ‘to promote economic, social, cultural and scientific development’, a rather vague mandate that could mean wide responsibilities or almost no authority at all. The local elections also took place in September: the UPR secured control of 162 municipalities, but there were significant victories for its rivals. In Nouadhibou victory went to El Karama, a party created by El Ghassem Bellalli, the popular mayor of this northern port city, in alliance with Tawassoul. And in October, in re-run second round elections for two Nouakchott municipalities, the UPR secured a slim victory in El-Mina but was narrowly defeated in Arafat by an opposition coalition of the UFP, HATEM, Tawassoul and the Pacte National pour la Démocratie et le Développement (ADIL).
Looking to the political agenda ahead
Dominant across the political scene, President Abdelaziz and those around him have nevertheless had to confront a major choice over the course of 2018: would he step aside when his term expires in 2019 or would he seek to amend or scrap the term limit, so that he could remain in power for a further five years?
Abdelaziz had initially indicated that he had no intention of continuing in office, effectively recognizing the constitutional term limit. However, the assertiveness with which he drove through contentious constitutional changes in 2017 raised widespread doubts about whether he really would be prepared to relinquish office when his second elected term ended in mid-2019. And there was also some speculation that his thinking might have been influenced by the loss of his son Ahmed – seen by some as a potential successor – in a car crash in 2015. Although the president made statements indicating that he would comply with the constitutional term limit, his comments fell short of a categoric commitment. And he chose not to rebut calls from political supporters, and even religious allies, arguing that he should remain in power for the good of the country.
Across the political class, in both government and opposition, and among independent observers in Nouakchott, genuine uncertainty over the president’s true intentions persisted throughout most of 2018. Some Nouakchott sources even claimed that, in a private gathering, some senior military figures had openly expressed opposition to a third term. On the other hand, particularly in the early weeks of 2018, there was a widespread assumption that he would eventually push through a further constitutional amendment and stand for a third elected term in 2019.
Certainly, Abdelaziz did not look like a man preparing to retire from power. His 2017 abolition of the Senate had removed the most recalcitrant source of formal opposition to further constitutional change. And the government’s most prominent critic in the upper house, Mohamed Ould Ghadda – who had been leading a probe into government contract procedures – was arrested soon after the 2017 referendum and charged with corruption. His initial six-month jail term was later extended by an additional six months, although he was eventually released. Meanwhile, other senators as well as journalists and trade unionists were left free but under judicial control in what they claim was a politically motivated procedure; some said that they had been questioned over whether they had any links to the exiled businessman Mohamed Ould Bouamatou, who was also the target of accusations.51 Then, in the run-up to the September 2018 elections, the anti-slavery activist Biram Dah Abeid was arrested too. (Abeid was finally tried on 31 December 2018 and sentenced to a six-month prison term – but was immediately released, because of the time already served in detention; furthermore, the journalist withdrew his complaint.)
The significance of the 2018 elections
The September 2018 legislative, municipal and regional elections could have been an awkward moment, as President Abdelaziz’s brusque abolition of the Senate a year earlier had stirred widespread anger in sections of the political class. Moreover, opponents of the government have learned the lesson of their past differences over tactics: from late 2017 onwards, a wide range of opposition leaders met regularly to coordinate strategy. Yet, ultimately, the September 2018 elections served to provide further confirmation of the dominance of the head of state and the ruling UPR party. In retrospect, this was a prelude to his announcement in late November 2018 that he would not seek to stand for a third successive term of elected office.
Little by little, the groups that favoured participation in elections, such as the APP, Tawassoul and elements of the FNDU – an alliance expanded from around the old COD coalition – began to win the tactical debate. Moreover, the case for participating in the elections was strengthened when the government warned that parties that refused to do so would be threatened with dissolution. In April 2018, the FNDU confirmed that it would take part – and it shrewdly opted not to publicly doubt Abdelaziz’s readiness to comply with the term limit, choosing instead to congratulate him on his promise to do so. The RFD and its leader Ahmed Ould Daddah, who are allied to the FNDU, also opted to abandon their longstanding electoral boycott. Meanwhile, Biram Dah Abeid allied his Initiative de Résurgence Anti-esclavagiste movement with the Sawab party, which springs from the Ba’athist tradition of Arab nationalism and had hitherto shown little interest in Haratine concerns; but this alliance of opposites proved its worth, securing Abeid’s election to the National Assembly.
The UPR prepared for the strengthened opposition challenge by embarking on a mass recruitment drive. Although the ruling party is divided by internal rivalries and clan allegiances, it was still in a strong position, and clearly benefitting from the tacit goodwill of the state machine. The government rejected any suggestion that international election observers should be invited on a major scale. The opposition tried to organize grassroots monitoring of the vote but lacked experience of doing this on a comprehensive nationwide scale and it complained that its efforts were impeded by the authorities, while Mauritania’s international partners seemed reluctant to exert serious pressure over the issue. In any case, the opposition was still very far from representing a coherent alternative government: secular opposition parties were allied with Tawassoul in the campaign to promote greater democratization and a challenge to the UPR, but they remained deeply uncomfortable with its underlying identity as an avowedly religious political movement and were wary of what its long-term aims might be.
Following the constitutional changes, the legislative, regional and municipal elections were held in September 2018 and the more hard-line opposition parties that had boycotted polls in 2009 and 2013 did take part, coordinating their efforts closely with allies who were already engaged in electoral politics. The governing UPR won 67 of the 131 seats decided in the first round and all 22 seats that went to a second ballot, while the ‘committed’ opposition won 27 seats in the National Assembly. Previously limited to a contingent of 16 Tawassoul members, the parliamentary opposition is now much larger and diverse: there are 14 Tawassoul members and 13 others from a spectrum of secular opposition groups, many under the umbrella of the FNDU alliance (which also includes non-political civil society groups). The Union des Forces de Progrès (led by the respected veteran progressive Mohamed Ould Maouloud), the RFD and Sawab won three seats each. ADIL gained two, while the Alliance pour la Justice et la Démocratie/Mouvement pour la Rénovation, and one independent also each gained a seat. Most of the remaining seats went to parties allied with the government, while ‘soft’ opposition parties that often support the government won a few.
Opposition politicians regarded the 2018 elections as a step forward in Mauritania’s political evolution, with the establishment of a larger and more diverse opposition parliamentary presence. But they were privately disappointed: although they had never expected to win a legislative majority, they had hoped to gain a larger bloc of seats, by using the two-round voting system to present a united front or single candidate in run-off races.
In part, opponents blamed the September 2018 results on government manipulation of the vote and efforts to prevent effective independent monitoring. But they also concede that they had been preoccupied mainly with tactical considerations and the internal debate over whether to abandon the boycott. Consequently, their fragmented approach to the legislative polls failed to offer the voters a coherent alternative to the ruling UPR. Some senior opponents now accept that they have much work to do over the months ahead, to develop the shared reform agenda required to underpin any serious challenge in the 2019 presidential election.52 The likelihood of an opposition victory in that contest is remote, but a solid performance could put pressure on the government to take greater account of opposition concerns.
While the government won control of all the newly created Regional Councils, the local elections gave some comfort to the opposition, notably with the victory in Arafat. Moreover, some government allies have also carved out distinct political identities, with El-Karama governing Nouadhibou, while the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès, led by the social affairs minister, Naha Mint Hamdi Ould Mouknass, has six National Assembly seats and some municipal and regional council seats.
A clear message from Abdelaziz
On 20 November 2018, President Abdelaziz travelled to Oualata, a historic oasis on the fringes of the Sahara Desert, to inaugurate the 2018 edition of Mauritania’s Ancient Towns Cultural Festival. After many months of speculation and uncertainty over his true intentions, he addressed the question of the third term explicitly and in plain words. Noting that he had heard both the calls from his supporters anxious to retain power and those who advocate term limits, he stated: ‘I am there to respect the Constitution and to ensure that it is respected. No, I will not stand again, because I will comply with the Constitution and the Constitution states that I cannot stand again after two terms of office.’53
While the statement did not appear to exclude any effort to alter the term limits, to allow a third term candidacy, senior government sources were categoric in their insistence that this did represent a clear and firm decision by Abdelaziz to stand down at the conclusion of his second term in 2019. Those who know the president well insisted that he would not change his mind.
But this will not mean a departure from the circles of power and political influence. Abdelaziz made plain his determination to remain a major political actor and, potentially, to seek a return to the presidency once he has completed the period out of office that the constitution requires: ‘I will remain in Mauritania and will continue to be active in politics. I am here and I am not leaving the country. I will continue the same path. As soon as the constitution allows me to stand again I will do so. So, if I cannot stand again for a third term, I can stand afterwards; the Constitution does not bar me from standing again later.’54
A range of factors may have influenced this decision after so many months of uncertainty about his intentions. Personal and tribal patronage networks are an important factor in Mauritania, as in many countries, and there is no doubt that some supporters of the regime would prefer to see Abdelaziz prolong his stay in power. But the president and other senior figures have also been aware of the risks that such a course of action might carry, particularly in a regional context in which attitudes towards longevity in power are evolving.
In the Maghreb both Morocco and Tunisia have seen changes of governing power in recent years – even if this has not been the case in Algeria – while among Mauritania’s West African neighbours two-term limits are almost universally the norm and recent years have seen the downfall of the region’s two remaining long-term strongmen: in Burkina Faso the army refused to shield Blaise Compaoré from a popular uprising in 2014 and he was driven out after 27 years in power, while in Gambia President Yahya Jammeh, defeated in the 2016 election, was finally cajoled into departing for exile – in part through mediation by Abdelaziz himself. In Mauritania, even some government sympathizers had begun to argue that the president should comply with the term limit and stand down in 2019.
Moreover, the route to a respected retirement from the presidency lay open: Abdelaziz originally seized power through a putsch but has mostly governed with moderation and his record in containing the threat of terrorism and providing a stable security environment is widely appreciated among the public. Despite occasional infringements of full freedom of expression and some politically motivated detentions, he has presided over a relatively pluralistic and free political system. Corruption is a serious problem but the government has improved public services and invested in essential infrastructure. The economy is recovering from the 2014 downturn in iron ore and gold prices.55 Meanwhile, some senior opposition figures indicated their readiness to consent to a graceful retirement for the head of state. His declaration of a wish to remain heavily involved in politics does not necessarily alter these dynamics: for a number of domestic opponents, and for Mauritania’s West African neighbours and its European allies, the mere fact that the incumbent head of state declared an intention to stand down in compliance with term limits, represents an important consolidation of fundamental principles of constitutional governance, and thus a reinforcement of the country’s underlying stability.
48 Author interviews, Nouakchott and Europe, 2018.
49 BBC News (2019), ‘En Mauritanie, le président Abdel Aziz a son “dauphin”’, 31 January 2019, https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-47080513 9accessed 14 Mar. 2019).
50 Four councils cover mainly rural regions, each composed of several governorates: Hodh el Gharbi and Hodh el Charqui; Assaba, Tagant and Guidimaka; Gorgol, Brakna and Trarza; and Tiris Zemmour, Adrar Inchiri. There are two regions based on the main cities: one covers the governorate of Nouadhibou, the northern port city; the other encompasses the capital and its surroundings, replacing the old Communauté urbaine de Nouakchott, whose council had often been under opposition control.
51 RFI (2017), ‘Mauritanie: série d’interpellations dans le milieu de la presse’ [‘Mauritania: series of arrests in press circles’], 26 August 2017: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170826-mauritanie-interpellations-journalistes-presse-interrogatoire-repression-censure
52 Author interviews, Nouakchott, 2018.
53 RFI (2018), ‘Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz: “ Non, je ne me représenterai pas ” pour un 3e mandat’ [‘Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz: “No I will not stand again” for a third term’], http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20181121-mauritanie-ould-abdel-aziz-presidentientielle-constitution-pas-candidat-misnuma-ter (accessed 27 Nov. 2018)
54 Ibid.
55 IMF (2018), ‘IMF Executive Board Completes First Review of the Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania’, 29 May 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/05/29/pr18199-mauritania-imf-executive-board-completes-first-review-of-the-arrangement-ecf (accessed 16 Jan. 2019).