3. The Final JCPOA
The objective of the JCPOA was to increase Iran’s breakout time from a few months to one year, and to constrain Iran’s pathways to developing nuclear weapons. The final agreement, accepted by the UNSC on 20 July 2015 when it adopted Resolution 2231, placed constraints on Iran’s enrichment and heavy-water reactor programmes. The JCPOA also included enhanced monitoring provisions designed to detect Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons using either declared or covert facilities.
The JCPOA obligated Iran to reduce the number of centrifuges operating at its Natanz facility from 19,000 to 5,060. These restrictions will be lifted in 2025. Uranium enrichment at the Fordow facility has been banned for 15 years, and mandated reductions in centrifuge cascades limit the facility to operating no more than 1,044 machines. Moreover, only research and development activities are permitted at Fordow. By committing to the Additional Protocol and the comprehensive safeguards agreement, Iran also agreed to rigorous IAEA access and oversight of its nuclear facilities. To address and answer questions regarding the possible military dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear programme, Iran signed the ‘Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues’ agreement with the IAEA.21 Although many critics considered the PMD issue not to have been adequately resolved, negotiators agreed that preventing a future nuclear weapons programme was more important than resolving questions about the past.
The JCPOA obligated Iran to reduce the number of centrifuges operating at its Natanz facility from 19,000 to 5,060. These restrictions will be lifted in 2025.
On 16 January 2016 (also known as Implementation Day), Iran, having implemented the commitments delineated in the JCPOA, was declared in full compliance with the deal. This allowed for nuclear sanctions to be lifted and IAEA inspections to be institutionalized.22 As part of the agreement, Iran consented to the redesign of its Arak reactor to guard against future production of weapons-grade plutonium. It also agreed to export spent fuel from all its reactors.
The IAEA is tasked with monitoring Iran’s adherence to the JCPOA, and does so through the use of verification technologies. An important aspect of the monitoring and oversight arrangements is that Iran has accepted to abide by the Additional Protocol: as such, Iran consents to IAEA inspectors visiting any nuclear site deemed dubious. Iran’s parliament must ratify the Additional Protocol by 2023. Until ratification, the JCPOA gives the Iranian authorities 24 days to grant inspectors access, if requested. Should Iran refuse to abide by this process, the case would be brought before the JCPOA’s Joint Commission, which would discuss and decide upon next steps. These could include the referral of Iran to the UNSC and the reapplication of nuclear sanctions.23
Despite these verification methods, criticism of the deal from within the US Congress and US partners in the region proved challenging for the Obama administration. The US critique centred on the time limits enshrined in the deal, their early expiration, and the limits of the IAEA inspections regime. Israel and Saudi Arabia also found fault with the deal, specifically with its failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile programme or constrain Iranian support for proxy groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen – all of which have received varying degrees of Iranian financial and military assistance.24
Opposition in the US Congress to the deal prevented President Obama from giving the JCPOA treaty status – a process that would have required the support of two-thirds of the Senate. In an attempt to hold the Obama administration accountable for Iranian compliance, in 2015 the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) was passed. This required the president to confirm Iranian compliance every three months, a stipulation that ultimately rendered the deal vulnerable to domestic US political pressures.25 As described below, criticisms of the JCPOA have continue to reverberate under the Trump administration.
Conservative politicians in Iran were also unhappy with the JCPOA. Although they had reined in their reservations at the behest of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, during the negotiations, once the deal was concluded they became more vocal in their opposition to it.26 Fearing the deal would lead to greater US interference in Iranian affairs, conservatives argued that the deal compromised Iranian sovereignty and independence. Despite these critiques, the deal received parliamentary approval and Khamenei’s cautious endorsement.
Regional challenges
The signing of the JCPOA also met with disapproval from Gulf Arab state leaders and Israel. They had long argued that any solution to the crisis must take into account pressing regional issues, and that failure to do so would further empower Iran and increase its influence across the region. Gulf Arab leaders believed that the deal would encourage Tehran to further support non-state actors, to the detriment of Arab state interests. Although a number of key events in the early part of the decade, including the post-2011 Arab uprisings, the Syrian war and the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), predated the signing of the JCPOA, they accentuated the fears that many states in the region harboured about Iran’s growing influence.
Obama’s response to the Arab uprisings in 2011 had already unnerved some Gulf Arab leaders, who regarded his equivocation on whether or not to stand beside the US’s long-term ally, the then Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, as bordering on betrayal. As a result, they quickly lost confidence in the Obama administration, questioning its likely commitment to their own security in the event that they faced domestic or external threats. The Obama administration’s non-committal position over the fate of Mubarak and his regime brought into question the very nature of the US security settlement in the Gulf.
At the same time, and as the uprising in Syria turned into armed conflict (following the regime’s brutal response to popular protests), Gulf Arab leaders expected Obama not only to enforce his ‘red line’ on the use of chemical weapons but also to help unseat President Bashar al-Assad. The Gulf Arab states were disappointed on both counts, and again – though the circumstances were different to those in Egypt – believed that the US was proving an unreliable security partner.
While Russia’s decisive entry into the Syria war in September 2015, in support of the crumbling Assad regime, was viewed with deep suspicion among many states in the region, Gulf Arab leaders quietly admired the willingness of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to stand by an ally. As such, they drew parallels between the respective commitments of Obama and Putin to the security of allies, and came to admire the Putin in this respect.
At the same time, the rise and territorial advancement of ISIS in both Iraq and Syria posed a challenge to the region’s leadership, most notably in the so-called Sunni Arab states.27 ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s claim to have re-established the caliphate in 2014 (with Mosul as its capital) posed a direct threat to the legitimacy of both republican and monarchical Arab leaders.
The combination of the Arab uprisings and the emergence of ISIS exposed a crisis of governance not only in Iraq and Syria, but also in other states in the region. It led to the counter-revolution driven by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Responding to Obama’s call to stop ‘free-riding’ on US power, both states began to play a much more assertive role in countering political Islam in the ‘Arab Spring countries’ and Iranian influence.
Although Russia played an instrumental role in preventing the defeat of the Assad regime, Iran also spent significant political and military capital shoring up its allies and, at the same time, embedding itself through business networks and proxies deep into the Syrian environment. The US, Israel and the Arab states saw this as inimical to their interests, and as part of a broader goal on the part of the Iranian leadership to establish a ‘land bridge’ from Tehran to the Mediterranean.
Set against this backdrop, the Obama administration’s exclusive focus on restraining Iran’s nuclear programme rather than seeking to design a comprehensive deal was viewed with deep concern by states in the region. The US’s move was considered one that would provide a strong economic boost to the Iranian government and allow Tehran to pursue its regional policy with new vigour. Moreover, the proposed deal did not address the pressing concerns of the Arab states, which were more focused on Iran’s ballistic missile capability and presence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.
Of course, the view of the counter-revolutionary states (i.e. Saudi Arabia and the UAE) was informed by two assumptions that were largely incorrect: first, that the US pivot to Asia meant a disengagement from the Middle East, and from the Gulf in particular; and second, that US military support would no longer be guaranteed in the event that the security of these states was threatened. Yet during the Obama years, the US had in fact led the anti-ISIS coalition (which brought together 80 countries, worked closely with local allies in Iraq and Syria, and eventually defeated the organization in March 2019). The US has also continued to provide significant military assistance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in their war against Houthi forces in Yemen. The Trump administration has been unequivocal in its support of its Gulf Arab allies in Yemen, in spite of growing concern within Congress about the nature of the conflict.28
Given the context, it is hardly surprising that the leaders of the newly aligned regional states – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Israel and, at a pinch, Egypt – welcomed Trump’s election pledge to ‘tear up the nuclear deal’. They were even more enthusiastic when he kept his promise and did just that in May 2018. Trump’s embrace of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel seemed to signal – at least in the early days of his presidency – that the new US administration would not only prioritize destroying in perpetuity Iran’s capability to develop nuclear capacity, but would also bring an end to Iran’s ability to project power into neighbouring Arab states and curtail or disable its ballistic missile programme.
Specific concerns with the deal
Four particular aspects of the JCPOA have drawn significant scrutiny from critics of the deal, and were flagged repeatedly by the policymakers and analysts interviewed for this paper: (i) the ‘sunset’ provisions, (ii) the inspections regime, (iii) Iran’s ballistic missile programme and (iv) its regional activities.29
Sunset provisions
The expiry dates of key nuclear provisions have been the subject of much condemnation. Under the JCPOA, limits on the number of advanced centrifuges will be gradually relaxed in 2024; restrictions on centrifuge production will be lifted in 2026; constraints on Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium will last until 2030. Enhanced IAEA monitoring is expected to remain in place until 2040, and Iran’s implementation of the Additional Protocol has no end date.30 Critics are concerned that, as elements of the deal expire and given Iran’s history of opacity, the country will resume its programme and once again reduce its breakout time.
Box 2: Sunset provisions of the JCPOA
2020 Arms embargo expiration.
2023 Transition day:
- UN ballistic missile sanctions to be lifted.
- Iranian ratification of Additional Protocol.
2024 Iran permitted to use up to 30 advanced centrifuges in test cascades, and to manufacture IR-6 and IR-8 advanced centrifuges.
2025 Termination day:
- UNSCR 2231 expires and UNSC closes the Iran nuclear file.
- EU to lift remaining sanctions.
2026 R&D enrichment limits lifted.
2030 Most nuclear restrictions expire. End of physical restraints on enrichment.
2036 End of IAEA monitoring of centrifuge production.
2040 End of IAEA monitoring of uranium production.
No expiry Implementation of Additional Protocol and NPT compliance.
Inspections regime
While the JCPOA stipulates a rigorous inspections regime that includes access to declared nuclear facilities, the monitoring process has been criticized over its inadequate provisions for access to undeclared sites. Should a request be made, Iran has up to 24 days to allow inspectors to visit a site. Detractors argue that such a period provides Iran with enough time to clean up any evidence of sensitive activity – although experts note that radioactive particles are very difficult to erase. Critics also fail to note that in the absence of the JCPOA there would be no time limit for responding to an IAEA access request. A secondary concern has emerged over Section T, regarding activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear weapon. Included in the list of activities are (a) the use of computer models for simulating a nuclear bomb; and (b) the design of multi-point explosive detonation systems. What is missing is a process for the IAEA to verify whether such activities are occurring.31
Ballistic missiles
The size and composition of Iran’s arsenal of missiles are regarded by many states in the Middle East as a threat to regional security. Conversely, Iran sees its indigenous missile programme as essential to its national security and as an effective tool of deterrence in the absence of a conventional military. This position was informed by its experience during the Iran–Iraq war, when Iran saw its regional neighbours and many Western countries support Iraq, and by the constraints on its air force and naval capabilities as a result of sanctions. Iran used its missiles during the Iran–Iraq war, and most recently has done so against non-state actors such as ISIS in Syria.
While Iran does not possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs, which have a range of over 2,900 miles), it does have 13 types of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, as well as cruise missiles. Some of these missiles are deemed intrinsically capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Iran’s development of a space launch vehicle (SLV) is also causing concern, owing to the belief that progress on this technology could lead to ICBM capability.32 In October 2017 Ali Jafari, the then commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated that Iran’s missiles were ‘sufficient for now’.33 He and others in Iran have publicly referenced Ali Khamenei’s edict that Iran has no need for a missile with a range beyond 2,000 km. Iran has thus far not tested missiles beyond this range, but this has not placated concerns in certain quarters about Iran’s future intentions.
During the JCPOA negotiations, Iran rejected attempts to include constraints on ballistic missiles. UNSCR 2231 stipulated limitations on Iran’s ballistic missile programme, to be lifted in 2023. Yet Iran has rejected these constraints and has repeatedly tested missiles, including a medium-range missile in January 2017 and another in July 2019. Iran contends that these missiles are not designed to deliver nuclear weapons and are therefore not bound by UNSCR 2231 restrictions.
Iran has become a regional missile proliferator, supplying Hezbollah, PMU forces in Iraq and the Assad regime in Syria not only with a range of missiles and rockets but also with technology and missile production capability. Iran has also been providing Yemen’s Houthi rebels with short-range missiles and local technological capability. The proliferation of these missiles in effect adds to Iran’s wider arsenal, allowing non-state actors to deter attacks or retaliate on Iran’s behalf.
Regional issues
In the JCPOA-related nomenclature, the term ‘regional issues’ refers to Iran’s influence on the other side of the Gulf. Iran has always sought to project its influence across the Gulf and beyond, but many commentators assert that the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 enabled Tehran to exploit the ensuing insurgency and extend its networks from Iraq towards the Mediterranean. Indeed, in 2004 Jordan’s King Abdullah II warned of an Iranian Shia ‘crescent’ that would encompass not only the littoral Gulf monarchies but also Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.34
There is little doubt that Iran has capitalized on the political and security chaos that followed the 2003 Iraq war, has positioned itself deep within the Syria conflict by aligning itself with the Assad regime, and has continued to work closely with, and give guidance to, Lebanese Hezbollah.35 Iran has also assisted the Houthis and their allies in consolidating political and territorial gains following their capture in September 2014 of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa.36 Ever since then, Iran – including through its alliance with Hezbollah – has supported the Houthis in their struggle against the Saudi- and UAE-backed government of Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi.37
Iran has developed a role and capability that no other state in the region can compete with. It is a spoiler and asymmetrical actor par excellence.
Although many commentators attribute Iran’s influence across the region to its constitutionally mandated goal since 1979 to export its revolution, and to the immediate consequences of the US-led wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, historically Tehran has sought to project its power irrespective of the target involved. The Shah had been implicated in supporting the Kurdish insurgencies in Iraq during the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, Iran’s seizure of Abu Musa and the Tunb Islands in 1971, at the moment of the UK’s departure from the Gulf,38 and the Shah’s pursuit of a nuclear programme39 were symptomatic of geopolitics that persist today.
Contemporary Iran has been presented with a number of opportunities to extend its influence across the Gulf and into the Levant, and it has proven adept at capitalizing on these. Iran has developed a role and capability that no other state in the region can compete with. It is a spoiler and asymmetrical actor par excellence. Whereas states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt have sought to dominate the landscape, primarily partnering with US-led Western powers, Iran has invested its energies in the politics of defiance. By doing so, it has developed a model of intervention or, more accurately, interference that has proven highly effective.40
As early as 1977–78, Iranian revolutionary factions had begun to invest their energies in Lebanon. Rivalries played out between Khomeinist and other factions, notably that of Mostafa Chamran, who was closely involved in building up the Lebanese Amal movement. Iran’s cultivation of Hezbollah in Lebanon since the Israeli invasion in 198241 has ensured Tehran a predominant role in Lebanese politics and has also allowed it to pose a direct and substantive threat to Israeli security. This threat has given the Iranian leadership an edge over Arab leaderships. It allows Iran to claim legitimacy as the only regional state actively resisting Israel’s right to exist, and supporting Palestinian groups such as Hamas, PIJ and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC).42
In this context, the 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 200643 appeared to earn Tehran the respect of the erroneously termed ‘Arab street’.44 Iran appeared willing to engage directly in conflict with Israel, even as most Arab leaders distanced themselves from the events and resisted calling for a ceasefire. Although difficult to verify, a common assertion from Damascus and Tehran at the time was that most Arab leaders had already lost the respect of ‘the street’ following their ‘weak’ responses to Israel’s punitive reprisal over the 2002 intifada. By 2006, therefore, the Iranian leadership was riding high in public opinion polls. In many ways, it had eclipsed the Arab leaders, especially the monarchies that had positioned themselves as defenders of Islam and the Palestinian cause. Nevertheless, there is little real evidence to support this hypothesis, which many analysts attribute more to the messaging of Damascus and Tehran than to a strong factual basis. It did, however, contribute towards the impression of Iran being a strong state able to project its power across the region.
The support provided by Iran to Palestinian resistance groups – sometimes in concert with Syria, and at other times in opposition to Damascus – gave it another point of access into a regional issue. This assistance was both military and financial in nature. In the case of Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian cause, Iran has managed to embed itself closely with allies rooted in each theatre, and this has given it significant leverage over local politics. Iran has become a dominant external influence in Lebanon and Syria. In respect of Palestinian agendas, Iran has an opportunity to spoil or undermine any initiative that might challenge its own interests.
Iran has also embedded itself deeply into the political, military, social and economic fabric of Iraq. As many analysts contend, Iran has been the main beneficiary of the US-led war in Iraq, as the conflict has helped transform the relationship between Iran and Iraq from one of rivalry to one of cooperation. Tehran has become a major powerbroker in Iraq, investing in the country’s political, military and economic structures both through direct interventions and through the sponsorship of proxies. Although Iraqi nationalism may be undergoing a renaissance and sectarian distinctions are diminishing in importance, Iran’s influence over the PMU45 was clear during the conflict with ISIS.46 Iran’s support of the PMU, in concert with the anti-ISIS coalition, helped defeat ISIS in Iraq. Of course, Iran’s relationship with Iraq is complex and multifaceted, its relationship with the US even more so. The US and Iran have both competed and cooperated with each other, at times pursuing common goals even when neither government would admit to doing so.47
Unlike its relationship with Al-Qaeda, which could be characterized as a ‘marriage of convenience’48 marked by cooperation with intervals of tension,49 Iran was threatened by the rise of ISIS at its doorstep. Iran initially downplayed the threat of ISIS. But as the group made increasing territorial gains, Tehran became more involved in efforts to repel ISIS forces. Finally, Iran engaged more actively in the conflict as ISIS advanced close to Iranian borders.50
As with the country’s interventions in Iraq and Lebanon, Iran’s presence in Syria is best described as strategic. The relationship between Damascus and Tehran predates the 1979 revolution, but it took on greater importance following the Iran–Iraq war. It was no great surprise, therefore, that Tehran was willing to make a significant investment in shoring up the current regime (not Assad individually) in spite of facing punishing sanctions for doing so. Iran’s strategy since its intervention in Syria in 2011 has amounted to expanding a forward base from which to deter and threaten Israel, absorbing the costs of doing so (which have included Israeli airstrikes against key assets in Syria), and accommodating Russia’s obstructive role in the conflict. In a recent paper on Syria’s ‘transactional state’,51 Lina Khatib and Lina Sinjab give further detail of Iran’s strategy. They illustrate how Tehran has not only backed local militias aligned with the Assad regime, but has used its own IRGC forces and foreign militias to retake rebel-controlled areas. Moreover, Iran has focused on building alliances and implanting loyalists in areas that it sees as strategic for its long-term presence in Syria. Of course, the deployment of this model in Syria is only the latest iteration of an approach that Iran has used effectively in Lebanon, Iraq and now Yemen.
In contrast to Syria, Yemen is of little strategic importance to Iran and has served more as a base from which to frustrate Saudi Arabia. Following a number of developments – the uprisings in 2011, the failure of the national dialogue to address the grievances of the population at large, and the seizure of Sanaa by the Houthis and their allies – Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, spotted an opportunity to draw Saudi Arabia into conflict. For Iran, the conflict in Yemen is a low-cost war requiring minimal investment on its part. Tehran allows Hezbollah to provide training, logistics and advisers, and permits the transfer to the Houthi alliance of missile technologies to threaten Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iran’s strategic interests lie elsewhere, but it has exploited Saudi Arabia’s geographic and military vulnerability and has embroiled the kingdom in a conflict from which it will be difficult to extract itself. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has lost considerable support in many Western capitals following its intervention in Yemen, thus increasing the political cost of its actions.
Not only in Yemen but also to a very large degree across the region, Iran’s approach to projecting power has been relatively low-cost, certainly compared to the investments the Gulf Arab states have made in their allies. Although the financial costs to Iran of supplying crude oil to Syria from the 1980s to 2013 have been considerable – as have those of military intervention in Syria and of providing financial support to Hezbollah’s operations outside Lebanon – Iran has been far more effective than its competitors at building durable partnerships with groups with which it finds common cause. The embedding of Iranian forces and loyal local and regional allies, such as Hezbollah and the Iraqi PMU, extends from military to economic to religious spheres.
Not only in Yemen but also to a very large degree across the region, Iran’s approach to projecting power has been relatively low-cost, certainly compared to the investments the Gulf Arab states have made in their allies.
Although it is common to characterize Iran’s ‘proxies’ as sectarian partners or co-religionists, only in some cases is this an accurate description. Tehran’s approach to cultivating allies is based more on pragmatism than on faith. In most cases it is incorrect to simply describe groups supported by Iran as its proxies, or to characterize the relationship as determined purely by Tehran. For the most part, the relationship between each actor and Iran is one of train and equip rather than command and control.
Given the above landscape, where competition between Iran and the Gulf Arab states (mostly Saudi Arabia) is intense, it is unsurprising that regional issues should dominate the concerns of most Arab leaders in the region. Similarly, Iran’s ability – often characterized as malign – to influence events in so many Middle Eastern countries is of major concern to international powers.
The common refrain from opponents, and indeed some supporters, of the JCPOA is that it focuses solely on the nuclear issue. In doing so, the argument goes, the JCPOA further enables Iran to extend and embed its influence across the region. Of course, Tehran’s riposte to this assessment centres on its need to develop strategic depth in the pursuit of critical objectives: to prevent itself from being drawn into a further punishing conflict like the eight-year Iran–Iraq war; to keep Israel from beginning an aerial-led campaign against Iranian assets and cities; and to evict the superpowers (specifically, the US) from the region.
21 Kerr, P. K. (2019), Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, Report, Congressional Research Service,
July 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40094.pdf (accessed 23 Jul. 2019).
22 Ibid.
23 BBC (2019), ‘Iran nuclear deal: Key details’, 11 June 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33521655? (accessed 8 Sep. 2019).
24 Katzman (2019), Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies.
25 Katzman, K., Kerr, P. K. and Heitshusen, P. (2018), U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, CRS Report, Congressional Research Service, May 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44942.pdf (accessed 23 Jul. 2019).
26 Karami, A. (2015), ‘Former Iran deal negotiator slams concessions in nuclear deal’, Al-Monitor, 8 September 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/originals/2015/09/jalili-jcpoa-nuclear-concessions.html (accessed 7 Sep. 2019).
27 Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE and Egypt.
28 Notwithstanding the Trump administration’s cooperative position, it was actually the Obama administration that had originally approved support to the Saudis and the Emiratis when the Yemen war officially began in 2015.
29 Fitzpatrick, M. (2019), Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, Adelphi Series, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, January 2019.
30 Kerr (2019), Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations.
31 Ibid.
32 Einhorn, R. and Vann Diepen, V. H. (2019), Constraining Iran’s Missile Capabilities, Report, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2019.
33 Al Jazeera (2017), ‘Iran: No need to extend 2,000km ballistic missile range’, 31 October 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/iran-extend-2000km-ballistic-missile-range-171031135651513.html (accessed 25 Aug. 2019).
34 Balanche, F. (2018), From the Iranian Corridor to the Shia Crescent, Hoover Institution Essay, Stanford: Hoover Institution, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balanche_iraniancorridor_pdf.pdf (accessed 26 Jul. 2019).
35 Karam, J. (2018), ‘Iran Pays Hizbullah $700 Million a Year, US Official Says’, Al-Monitor, 5 June 2018, https://www.thenational.ae/world/the-americas/iran-pays-Hizbullah-700-million-a-year-us-official-says-1.737347 (accessed 26 Jul. 2019).
36 BBC News (2014), ‘How Yemen’s capital Sanaa was seized by Houthi rebels’, 27 September 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-29380668 (accessed 26 Jul. 2019).
37 Al-Ashwal, A. (2019), ‘Houthis taking battle to Saudis with upgraded weapons cache’, Al-Monitor, 8 July 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/yemen-houthis-drone-attacks-saudi-arabia-uae-iran.html#ixzz5ulS6U7AV (accessed 26 Jul. 2019).
38 GlobalSecurity.org (undated), ‘Abu Musa Island’, https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/abu-musa.htm (accessed 27 Jul. 2019).
39 NTI (2018), ‘Iran: Nuclear’, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/ (accessed 27 Jul. 2019).
40 An alternative school of analysis argues that Iranian influence is limited and faces significant pushback from a variety of players. According to this interpretation, Iran’s proxies have distinct agendas and are not always ready, willing or able to do its bidding.
41 MEMRI TV (2012), ‘Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: We Have Received Moral, Political, and Material Support from Iran since 1982’, 6 February 2012, https://www.memri.org/tv/hizbullah-secretary-general-hassan-nasrallah-we-have-received-moral-political-and-material (accessed 27 Jul. 2019).
42 Asharq Al-Awsat (2019), ‘Palestinian Officials: Iran Greatest Player in Stoking Division’, 18 February 2019, https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1596586/palestinian-officials-iran-greatest-player-stoking-division (accessed 27 Jul. 2019).
43 Eisenkot, G. (2019), ‘Thirteen Years Since the Hezbollah-Israel War’, 8 July 2019, The Washington Institute, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/thirteen-years-since-the-hezbollah-israel-war (accessed 27 Jul. 2019).
44 A term popularized at the time by New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman.
45 The main PMU forces include: the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Kataib al-Imam Ali and Kataib Jund al-Imam. See Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A. (2017), The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future, Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_63_Mansour_PMF_Final_Web.pdf (accessed 27 Jul. 2019).
46 Mansour, R. (2019), ‘Reining in Iraq’s Paramilitaries Will Just Make Them Stronger’, Foreign Policy, 9 July 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/
2019/07/09/reining-in-iraqs-paramilitaries-will-just-make-them-stronger/ (accessed 27 Jul. 2019).
47 For a detailed analysis of Iran’s confrontation and cooperation with the US, see Knights, M. (2019), ‘Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups’, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 12, No. 7, https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq-new-special-groups/ (accessed 26 Jul. 2019).
48 Moghadam, A. (2017), ‘Marriage of Convenience: The Evolution of Iran and al-Qa`ida’s Tactical Cooperation’, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 10, No. 4, https://ctc.usma.edu/marriage-of-convenience-the-evolution-of-iran-and-al-qaidas-tactical-cooperation/ (accessed 28 Jul. 2019).
49 Nada, G. and Rowan, M. (2018), ‘Part 2: Pro-Iran Militias in Iraq’, Wilson Center, 27 April 2018, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/part-2-pro-iran-militias-iraq (accessed 26 Jul. 2019).
50 Esfandiary, D. and Tabatabai, A. (2015), ‘Iran’s ISIS policy’, International Affairs, 91: 1, pp. 1–15, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_publication_docs/INTA91_1_01_Esfandiary_Tabatabai.pdf (accessed 28 Jul. 2019).
51 Khatib, L. and Sinjab, L. (2018), Syria’s Transactional State: How the Conflict Changed the Syrian State’s Exercise of Power, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-10-10-syrias-transactional-state-khatib-sinjab.pdf (accessed 26 Jul. 2019).