Getting to a New Iran Deal | 4. Possible Iran Deal Scenarios

Against this contextual backdrop, the authors sought to test out the viability of a grand bargain that would address the demands laid out by US Secretary of State Pompeo. We conducted interviews that asked respondents across 10 countries52 for their views on the likely preconditions required for a negotiation between the Trump administration and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and whether such a negotiation might be feasible in practice. The findings below are drawn from our candid, off-the-record discussions with experts.

Respondents overwhelmingly felt that Washington’s policy of ‘maximum pressure’ towards Iran was not meeting the stated objective of bringing Iran back to the negotiating table. Specifically, only 16 per cent of respondents thought a grand bargain with Iran viable. The rest were divided as to what was achievable. Some 32 per cent thought an improved ‘JCPOA+’ scenario (often referred to as a JCPOA 2.0) was possible, while 23 per cent saw separate deals respectively targeting nuclear, ballistic and regional issues as the only realistic solution to tensions. Twenty-seven percent of respondents did not consider any diplomatic outcome possible. Among a majority of interviewees, the 2020 general election in the US was repeatedly cited as the most important timing-related variable. Analysts suggested that the outcome of the election could portend or block the possibility of new negotiations.

Figure 1: Most frequently mentioned expected scenario, by country

— *For none of the surveyed countries was this scenario the most frequently mentioned. Source: Chatham House interviews.

Scenario 1: The ‘grand bargain’

Among our interviewees, only 16 per cent thought a grand bargain was still viable. Interestingly, these respondents were primarily American and Iranian. They indicated that – based on the key limitations of the JCPOA, namely that wider issues such as ballistic missiles, regional dynamics and sanctions relief remained unresolved – the current stand-off could only be settled with an overarching agreement between Tehran and Washington. One US respondent captured this by stating, ‘Everyone else is just along for the ride.’53 Another stated that ‘President Trump’s instinct is to go big, similar to North Korea’.54

Respondents who supported this solution could not outline the precise details of what one Iranian interviewee described as ‘a most complicated settlement’, but a number did suggest that the US language around Pompeo’s 12 demands demonstrated that flexible solutions could be found for many of the issues. One US interviewee suggested that this new deal could be ‘a version of the 2003 grand bargain offer’.55 Regarding the nuclear framework, respondents thought that sunset clauses could be extended and that additional access to military sites could be provided. The issue of PMD could be dealt with by codifying Khamenei’s fatwa against nuclear weapons into law, and ratification of the Additional Protocol would be immediate. This solution would not resolve the issue of PMD but would endeavour to build greater trust and accountability to prevent future nuclear developments. A 2,000-km range limit on missiles could be agreed. Missile proliferation would be addressed within the regional context.

Solutions could be negotiated on areas of common interest, such as stability in Afghanistan and Iraq, where there are shared goals and fewer challenges. In respect of Yemen, it should be possible to convince Iran to withdraw support for the Houthis because ‘it is not in our security complex’,56 according to one Iranian respondent. Regarding Syria, Russia could be called upon to convene a wider peace dialogue that would include the US. As offered in a 2003 deal, which Iran relayed through the Swiss embassy in Tehran, Iranian support for Hezbollah could be converted from a military relationship to a political one. On the issue of Israel, without providing formal political recognition, Iran could establish a ‘no conventional military first strike’ policy. Such a deal, as described by an American respondent, would envision a ‘security guarantee from the US in exchange for Iran pulling back from their [sic] broader efforts to create alternative government structures around the region’.57

One area where respondents repeatedly struggled to identify a solution concerned the demand that Iran return to zero uranium enrichment. Almost all respondents considered it almost impossible to address this issue, given that the JCPOA had already permitted Iran’s domestic enrichment programme. One American interviewee said that it ‘would be hard for Iran to forgo something it already had’,58 while another acknowledged the domestic sensitivities around Iran’s NPT rights.59 Israeli interviewees also recognized that zero enrichment would be difficult, with the majority of respondents conceding that this was an unrealistic demand. One interviewee stated: ‘Israelis had to be convinced that an Iranian bomb would not happen.’60 The key here, in the eyes of US respondents, would be for negotiators to find ‘workarounds’ that prevented Iran from ‘becoming another North Korea’.61

Another challenge for a grand bargain would be developing an effective monitoring and verification mechanism. As one respondent stated, ‘Enforcement or implementation would require [a] huge strategic shift and would be needed because Iran would have a tremendous incentive to cheat.’62

Figure 2: In general, is a grand bargain realistic under the right circumstances?

Most of these respondents indicated that only the US had the influence and power to provide Iran with the security guarantees and comprehensive sanctions relief necessary for a larger compromise deal. One Iranian interviewee stated that ‘for Iran to become a normal international actor, it would have to normalize its relations with the US’.63 Moreover, only the US could placate the anxieties of Israel and the Arab Gulf states and provide the latter with the necessary security guarantees that they too would seek from a wider agreement.

For these respondents, Europe, caught between both sides, would not be particularly relevant to the dialogue. Interviewees also indicated that Russia and China, fearing the consequences of a US–Iran rapprochement, would not wish a grand bargain to come to fruition and would obstruct a wider deal between Tehran and Washington.

Challenges in Washington

Beyond the small cohort of respondents who saw a grand bargain as a potential outcome of Trump’s Iran strategy, most interviewees provided a range of explanations for the lack of policy success to date and listed many reasons why a grand bargain was not achievable. Divisions and competition within the Trump administration over Iran policy were mentioned as among the principal reasons for the limited results. While President Trump has clearly stated his desire for a deal with Iran, including offering to meet President Rouhani without preconditions, respondents pointed to the seemingly different objectives and contradictory messaging from within the administration. Specifically, they highlighted the fact that the positions of John Bolton, at the time the US National Security Advisor, and Secretary of State Pompeo had more ideological undertones and potentially destabilizing objectives compared with Trump’s more transactional agenda. Respondents also noted a lack of coordination between the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies. A number of interviewees, including Americans from both ends of the US political spectrum, expressed concern that Bolton and Pompeo would try to undermine any discussion with Iran. This lack of government unity is one among many factors to have deterred Iran from investing in negotiations with the US administration, which is perceived as divided and disorganized.

The lack of government unity is one among many factors to have deterred Iran from investing in negotiations with the US administration, which is perceived as divided and disorganized.

Another issue limiting the likelihood of a grand bargain is the zero-sum approach articulated in Pompeo’s 12 demands. This list was referred to by a number of interviewees as a set of ‘negotiating positions’. Indeed, there is an international consensus that many of the issues on the list deserve attention. However, the method and manner of its delivery – and the US’s repeated public hammering of Iran – have created much ill will in Tehran. Alongside the imposition of renewed sanctions and the revocation of oil waivers in May 2019, the US government has not provided any opening or ‘off ramps’ that would provide a path to new negotiations. Despite the impact of sanctions, which have restricted economic growth and inflicted pain on the Iranian government and population, Tehran has yet to change its behaviour in the region or concede to any of the US’s demands. In fact, months of regional tensions offer proof that Iran’s calculus has not altered. Interviewees largely concurred that a US policy of maximum pressure without enticements or sweeteners makes it very difficult for Iran to find any face-saving solutions, necessary for new negotiations to begin. Iranian leaders have echoed this sentiment repeatedly, stating that only with the removal of sanctions can Iran return to the negotiating table.

Our respondents further indicated that the Trump administration has yet to consider what Iran would seek in any future negotiation. Its demands could include the obvious need for sanctions relief and access to the US financial system (including US dollar liquidity), but would likely extend to calls for security guarantees, wider regional nuclear agreements, concessions on regional ballistic missile programmes, a further drawdown of US forces, and a goal of conventional military parity between Iran and the Gulf Arab states. Thinking through Tehran’s likely demands and non-negotiable ‘red lines’ is a necessary precondition to policy development and implementation. Instead of weighing these options, the Trump administration appears to have mistakenly assumed that Tehran seeks the restoration of full diplomatic ties and the return of US businesses to Iran – a move that most Iran experts don’t see as viable, especially while the country’s deeply anti-American supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, remains in power.

Figure 3: Most important barriers for a grand bargain, summed across all interviews

This lack of understanding of Tehran’s calculations and decision-making is further evidenced in the Trump administration’s over-reliance on sanctions rather than on a basket of policy tools to pressure and engage Iran. As suggested by respondents, the US’s current policy has been predicated on the belief that Iran’s decision to negotiate with the Obama administration in 2012 was solely due to the economic pain caused by the oil embargo and Iran’s suspension from the SWIFT international payments system. In reality, respondents in the 10 countries repeatedly identified the shift in the US position on enrichment as the determining factor in opening the door to negotiations. Between 2003 and 2013, the US moved from an initial position of not tolerating any enrichment to one codified in the JCPOA as allowing Iran to enrich uranium up to a 3.67 per cent concentration for 15 years. Many analysts believed that for negotiations to restart, the Trump administration would have to make a similar acknowledgment of Iran’s rights, albeit by recognizing Iran’s regional security concerns (including its limited conventional defence capability compared to its neighbours).

Another criticism raised by the respondents was that the Trump administration has not prepared the negotiating terrain. It has not consulted experts, former US nuclear negotiators or transatlantic partners; nor has it mapped out scenarios and no-compromise positions for negotiations. As one US interviewee stated, ‘No one is thinking beyond the current standoff. We need to be defining the contours of what comes next.’64 This includes accounting for the complexity of a lengthier, more expansive negotiation with Iran, which would require sustained attention, energy and the help of international partners.

Figure 4: Is it realistic for Iran to agree to a zero-enrichment restriction?

Indeed, more than a year on since its withdrawal from the JCPOA, Washington has done little to repair its frayed ties with its European partners, preferring to continue with a unilateral approach. Washington dismisses and discounts the impact of deepening anger in European capitals. Meanwhile, caught between the US and Iran, Europe is struggling to keep the JCPOA alive and stave off a nuclear-related crisis. On the one hand, it is facing pressure from Washington to support increased sanctions against Iran; on the other, it is under pressure from Tehran to provide economic benefits.

Figure 5: Is there a general chance for conflict resolution with the current Trump administration?

Experts in most of the countries surveyed were highly sceptical that the Trump administration could strike a grand bargain with Iran. One reason, many argued, was that multiple countries – including China, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – were exploiting the stand-off for their own political purposes. For any negotiated outcome, and particularly a grand bargain, to come to fruition, the Trump administration must specifically prime its key regional partners: Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Yet most interviewees from Saudi Arabia and the UAE could not even fathom the prospect of negotiations with Iran. The muted reactions in both countries over the recent escalation of tensions in the Gulf provide further evidence of their limited groundwork and preparation for future policy, beyond backing the US’s maintenance of its maximum-pressure strategy. Indeed, the UAE’s July 2019 drawdown of forces from Yemen and sudden about-face and outreach to Tehran over maritime security issues suggest that Abu Dhabi is more concerned about the fallout from greater regional tensions. At the same time, Russian and Chinese interviewees indicated that Moscow and Beijing are unwilling to expend any political capital beyond continuing with their limited JCPOA preservation efforts.

Challenges in Tehran

Because of the pressure from US sanctions, and political obstacles associated with the US and Iranian leaderships, a majority of interviewees did not see a grand bargain as an easy option for Iran. Respondents principally attributed the impasse to the position of Supreme Leader Khamenei, who remains deeply anti-American and suspicious of US intentions. Although Khamenei endorsed the JCPOA negotiations and clearly supported the US–Iranian back channel set up through Oman, he also publicly expressed doubts about US intentions immediately after the JCPOA was signed.65

Khamenei’s worldview is shared by many Iranian hardliners who wish to preserve and protect the resistance- and Islamic values-based ideology of Iran’s 1979 revolution – which also sought to sever Iran’s perceived dependency on the US. The hardliners are not a homogeneous group. They are composed of various factions, including members of the IRGC. They have increased their power and influence both within the formal elected bodies of the state, such as parliament, and within unelected institutions such as the Guardian Council, a security apparatus and parastatal body appointed by Khamenei.

Buttressed by the support of Iran’s young, middle class-dominated population, which voted for Rouhani in the 2013 and 2018 elections, the pragmatist factions favour the integration of Iran into the global economy, as originally envisaged in the JCPOA.

Other factional groups are made up of pragmatist and reformist members of the political establishment. While also seeking to preserve the security and stability of the Islamic Republic, these groups differ from the conservatives in terms of their political vision. For them, it is through internal reform and gradual economic liberalization that stability can be safeguarded. Buttressed by the support of Iran’s young, middle class-dominated population, which voted for Rouhani in the 2013 and 2018 elections, the pragmatist factions favour the integration of Iran into the global economy, as originally envisaged in the JCPOA.

A key difference between the conservatives and pragmatists/reformers concerns their thinking on defence. The hardliners draw on their experiences from Iran’s isolation and encirclement during the Iran–Iraq war and from the years of US containment, and have thus relied on a policy of forward defence – a policy predicated on pushing threats away from Iran’s borders. Support for regional non-state actors is also an essential pillar of this approach. Pragmatists, on the other hand, prioritize diplomacy, although they are not opposed to the forward defence approach per se.

Several respondents suggested that Iran would be unable to enter into a grand bargain with the US while Khamenei – long rumoured to be ill – was alive. For one thing, doing so would require Iran to adjust its resistance-based anti-US ideology. For another, Iran’s perception that it had previously engaged constructively with the US to little effect would likely dampen prospects for progress. The authorities in Tehran will be acutely aware that Iran had offered a grand bargain in 2003, only for its proposals to be discounted by the Bush administration; that it had come to the negotiating table in 2012; and that it had remained compliant with the JCPOA until 2019. Many respondents suggested that Khamenei would be unwilling to trust President Trump or the US political establishment to adhere to a wider settlement.

That said, other respondents alluded to a history of competition between Iran’s conservative and reformist factions over outreach to the US as evidence that the political establishment is debating the path forward. Respondents stated that Iranian elites are cognizant of the fact that their country’s stability and security are ultimately tied to resolving tensions with the US. Iranian respondents in particular pointed out that all former Iranian presidents had attempted outreach to the US – from Ali Khamenei himself, who was president during the 1985 Iran–Contra negotiations; to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who pursued tentative engagement; to Mohammad Khatami, who oversaw cooperation with the US in 2001 against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and whose government in 2003 had faxed a letter outlining a grand bargain to the Americans; to Ahmadinejad, who had sent multiple letters to George W. Bush and Obama. The same respondents who underlined the above history of bilateral contact now believe that consensus within the Iranian establishment is being built today over the timeline, terms and process for potential new negotiations.

Scenario 2: The ‘JCPOA+’ model

The largest percentage of respondents supported an enhanced JCPOA scenario that we refer to as ‘JCPOA+’. This model (sometimes also referred to as JCPOA 2.0) can be defined as a new agreement that would maintain the contours of the JCPOA, add a number of new provisions to improve on the previous deal, but would not achieve complete resolution of the outstanding issues listed by the Trump administration. A majority of survey participants in the US, Iran, the UAE and China thought such a deal the most likely outcome. One UK interviewee summarized the approach in terms of requiring ‘patient convergence … and being able to shepherd change over time’.66

Figure 6: Most likely concessions regarding nuclear issues (most mentions per country)

— Note: Germany is unshaded because respondents’ answers were equally divided between ‘none’, ‘extended sunset clauses’ and ‘improved monitoring’. The UAE is unshaded because respondents’ answers were equally divided between ‘none’, ‘extended sunset clauses’, ‘improved monitoring’ and ‘stop enrichment’ (the latter not shown in the key because no country’s respondents listed this option as most likely).

Source: Chatham house interviews.

In particular, this cohort of respondents emphasized the following points:

The first improvement that could be reached would involve extending the sunset clauses of the JCPOA beyond their current limits of 2030 and 2040. There was no consensus on what was achievable in terms of extension, however. Interviewees suggested that the period could range from five years to 10 years or even 25 years.
Improving inspection mechanisms and clarifying Section T of the JCPOA regarding dual-use activities could also be areas in which compromises could be achieved. Problems could be resolved by empowering the IAEA’s inspection and verification process. Additional nuclear and military sites mentioned in the ‘atomic archive’ could be added to the list of IAEA inspection sites.
Empowerment of the IAEA was repeatedly mentioned as a means to address the PMD of Iran’s nuclear programme. Most respondents believed that the IAEA already had this authority and that the PMD of Iran’s programme were addressed in the JCPOA. However, US and Israeli interviewees felt the PMD issue was important to understanding not only Iran’s past work but its future nuclear intentions.
A further component of a JCPOA+ deal would codify Iran’s previously stated commitment regarding ICBMs, limiting their range to 2,000 km. This would mark a major concession to US and European demands without compromising Iran’s defence posture. An agreement on range would fall in line with the statement by Chris Ford, the US assistant secretary of state for international security and non-proliferation, that ‘a negotiated solution that really handles the Iran missile problem … would presumably need to … not least … requir[e] that Iran divest itself of the range class of missiles that Iran itself has irretrievably tainted by trying to develop nuclear warheads for them’.67
In exchange for these improvements, Iran would ask for sanctions relief and look to obtain access to the US financial system. At the outset of such an arrangement and in the short run, respondents acknowledged, it is unlikely that the US would be willing or able to unravel the myriad of sanctions in place in exchange for a smaller deal than the sought-after grand bargain. However, participants suggested a potential trade mechanism that could facilitate permissible international transactions. This would serve as a tangible reward for compliance, and would be critical to sustaining and supporting a deal – in other words, it would offer concrete confidence-building measures. Over time, incremental sanctions relief could be granted in accordance with reporting on compliance, verification and trust.
The release of dual nationals from detention in Iran would be a necessary US condition for this model. It would be important for the US to obtain agreement from Iran on stopping the policy of detaining citizens.

Figure 7: Most likely concessions regarding missile issues (most mentions per country)

— Note: Germany is unshaded because respondents’ answers were equally divided between ‘stop proliferation’, ‘range limits’ and ‘none’. The UAE is unshaded because respondents’ answers were equally divided between ‘stop proliferation’, ‘none’, ‘range limits’ and ‘wider regional solution’.

Source: Chatham House interviews.

The issues of missile proliferation and regional tensions would not be included in a JCPOA+ scenario because they remain too difficult and time-consuming to resolve. This is not to say that those issues should be overlooked. Rather, respondents indicated that a JCPOA+ should prioritize more achievable compromises in order to (i) safeguard the key provisions of the current JCPOA, (ii) stave off a wider crisis, and (iii) create a platform for confidence-building measure between Iran, the US and other signatories. A commitment to begin regional discussions could be added to such an agreement. Respondents agreed that regional issues should be discussed multilaterally, with countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE also involved in the process. European respondents were particularly supportive of this option, although they acknowledged that it would not be feasible to hold discussions with Israel and Iran simultaneously.

Figure 8: Most likely concessions regarding missile issues, distribution per country

Respondents were divided on the negotiation strategy needed for this deal to come to fruition. Some indicated that European leadership would need to be instrumental in negotiating and managing differences between Tehran and Washington. Drawing from past negotiation experience, respondents suggested that the E3 countries – namely, France, Germany and the UK – would be best placed to lead the discussions. A number of interviewees indicated that the Joint Commission could be used as a mechanism to begin negotiations with Tehran. While the Joint Commission would have no authority to discuss non-nuclear issues under the current framework set out by the JCPOA, its members could alter the parameters to allow negotiations to begin.

US respondents who favoured the JCPOA+ model suggested that US leadership was essential for the success of any negotiations. As with the process pursued in 2012, any discussions should be facilitated through a back channel to build trust between Tehran and Washington before going public with the contours of a negotiation. Oman, the European Commission, Russia and Germany were most often identified as potential mediators in this respect.

Scenario 3: Individual deals

A third cohort of respondents saw the creation of three separate agreements as the best pathway to solving tensions. This approach would entail segregating the nuclear, ballistic missile and regional issues into three distinct negotiating tracks. A majority of respondents in Israel, France and Germany saw this scenario as viable.

Respondents were divided as to whether these tracks should operate simultaneously. Some interviewees suggested that most of the issues were ultimately interlinked, and that parallel discussions would thus prevent participants from moving parameters on previously agreed issues. One European interviewee stated: ‘Success here would be dependent on the connection between the issues. The nuances of these issues could draw together a bigger negotiation.’68 Other respondents stated that linking regional issues together in multiple countries would not bring about results, and that a case-by-case approach to each country should be pursued. ‘Iraq is the most optimistic arena for success where competing claims could be harmonized, and could be a blueprint for other cases,’ stated another European participant.

Figure 9: Best format for regional conflict resolution

For this scenario, respondents resoundingly agreed that regional issues would be the most difficult to resolve, due to the range of countries involved and the depth of interconnected challenges. The process would require the active participation of Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but would also have to include representatives from (or the approval of) governments and key political actors in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Lebanon – all countries where Iran has proxy relationships. Interviewees suggested that addressing the Qatar crisis would also be relevant to the regional discussion but would add another complicating layer. Iranian respondents saw recognition of Iran’s regional influence as an implicit requirement of any wider deal. This was captured by one participant who stated that ‘Iran has a strategic interest in its near abroad that must be acknowledged’.

The E3 and EU would be important interlocutors in this scenario, but their participation would require a strategy and long-term commitment. Respondents stated that one outcome of this discussion could be the creation of a wider regional security framework that could include commitments to non-aggression and non-interference.

European respondents saw individual settlements in each of the countries as the most productive likely conflict resolution strategy. ‘By empowering national governments, the hope is to be able to reduce Iran’s influence over time,’69 said one German respondent. Another Iranian respondent stated: ‘If the position is to look at areas of alignments rather than tensions, then it will be easier to arrive at solutions. Different actors have different levels of importance for Iran.’70 Interviewees identified Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Palestine as the areas in which an agreement with Iran could be ‘more easily achieved due to the commonality of issues’. In relation to Iraq and Afghanistan, respondents thought that Iran and the US shared goals of national stability that could be harnessed for a common outcome. Unravelling Iran’s ties with Hezbollah was considered the most pressing challenge, but also more difficult to achieve.

Figure 10: Most likely regional compromise in US–Iran negotiations, summed across all interviews

Scenario 4: No deal

A wide array of respondents, accounting for 27 per cent of the total, saw no diplomatic solution between Tehran and Washington as the most likely outcome. Many of these individuals have both a deep understanding of Iran’s worldview and professional experience in dealing with Tehran alongside other regional actors. The scepticism of respondents primarily reflected their recognition of the ideological inclinations of the Iranian government, as well as the history and scale of regional tensions. On the ideological front, many respondents could not see a significant deal emerging while Khamenei remained alive. Moreover, highlighting the Islamic Republic’s history of resilience, one respondent argued that ‘if Tehran knows how to do one thing, it is surviving under pressure’.71 Another sceptic pointed to the profound animosity lingering between Tehran and Washington as the principal factor inhibiting a potential deal.72 Saudi respondents were also pessimistic, deeming change in Iranian behaviour – considered unlikely – a prerequisite for meaningful negotiations.73

For most respondents, the best outcome would be to ‘muddle through’ until the US presidential election in November 2020. Respondents saw the Trump administration’s Iran strategy as inhibiting a negotiated outcome. Over 70 per cent of interviewees considered the result of the 2020 US election as a critical factor determining whether future negotiations would be possible. Only with the US election settled could a strategy be determined. Until then, interviewees did not think that Iran would invest heavily in negotiation. On the other hand, many interviewees saw negotiations as inevitable in the event of Trump being re-elected, as they expected Iran to be unable to withstand sustained economic pressure. They also believed that a second-term Trump administration might re-evaluate its pre-election position.

For most respondents, the best outcome would be to ‘muddle through’ until the US presidential election in November 2020.

It was felt that Trump, facing foreign policy challenges not only with Iran but also with China, Venezuela and North Korea, could try to use a successful outcome in any of these crises to help secure a second term. Conversely, if no deal were in prospect, Trump could try to generate political capital by saying that Iran and China, in particular, were lobbying for a Democratic president, who would be weak on any future deal.

Part of Iran’s potential waiting game is based on the hope that a Democratic candidate might be elected, and that this new president would be able either to return to the JCPOA or use the JCPOA framework to develop a JCPOA+ agreement. Interviewees repeatedly characterized this strategy as a part of Iran’s calculus, but underlined the point that it would work only if tensions with Iran remained contained and if the original JCPOA survived until after the US election.

A number of Iranian participants also pointed to Iran’s 2021 presidential election as a determining factor for the prospect of new negotiations. Iran is also holding a parliamentary election in February 2020. It is expected that the outcome of both these elections, in the context of an apathetic Iranian public, will change the domestic political alignment in favour of conservatives. As suggested by one respondent, ‘unity in Iran’s factional political system could make consensus-building in favour of a deal easier’.74 At the same time, though, conservatives could be tougher negotiators.

Human rights dimension

As part of our questions, we asked participants if the issue of Iran’s human rights had a place in any future discussion with the Trump administration. Respondents were unequivocal in observing that the Trump administration did not have the credibility to bring Iranian human rights issues into any agreement. While predominantly agreeing on the importance of addressing Iran’s human rights violations, respondents saw a number of factors as having rendered the discussion moot. These included the Trump administration’s transactional approach to international relations; US domestic issues such as the targeting of Muslim immigrants; and the lacklustre US response to the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The Iranian government would also refuse to discuss human rights, on the basis that it views this as a domestic issue. European respondents said that the EU could keep the human rights dialogue with Iran going, but that discussion of human rights would only be feasible after the JCPOA had been preserved or a follow-up agreement established.

Figure 11: Do human rights have a place in a grand bargain?

52 As mentioned, the US, Iran, France, Germany, the UK, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel.

53 Phone interview, 2 April 2019.

54 Phone interview, 7 March 2019.

55 In-person interview, 15 February 2019.

56 Phone interview, 7 February 2019.

57 Phone interview, 31 January 2019.

58 In-person interview, 4 February 2019.

59 Phone interview, 7 March 2019.

60 In-person interview, 12 February 2019.

61 In-person interview, 30 January 2019.

62 In-person interview, 7 January 2019.

63 Phone interview, 13 March 2019.

64 In-person interview, 10 January 2019.

65 In-person interview, 18 March 2019.

66 In-person interview, 17 December 2018.

67 Ford, C. A. (2018), ‘Towards a Successful, Comprehensive, and Enduring Negotiated Solution with Iran’, speech, Wilton Park, UK, 11 December 2018, https://www.iranwatch.org/library/governments/united-states/executive-branch/department-state/towards-successful-comprehensive-enduring-negotiated-solution-iran (accessed 15 Jul. 2019).

68 In-person interview, 29 March 2019.

69 Phone interview, 13 April 2019.

70 Phone interview, 15 April 2019.

71 Phone interview, 22 January 2019.

72 In-person interview, 11 January 2019.

73 In-person interviews, 23 March 2019 and 2 April 2019.

74 Phone interview, 16 February 2019.