5. National Positions on Negotiations and Issues
Drawing on our interviews, this chapter lays out the potential strategies and negotiating priorities of each of the 10 countries covered. The analysis reflects the interpretations of interviewees towards their respective government positions and also their own personally held views, rather than an official view.
Figure 12: National interests in the US–Iran conflict
— Source: Chatham House interviews.
Figure 12: National interests in the US–Iran conflict
United States
While there has been much uncertainty over the Trump administration’s Iran policy, the principal US objective is to guarantee that Iran will never obtain nuclear weapons. All of the US interviewees pointed to nuclear issues as the priority for the US, and 36 per cent saw the JCPOA+ model as the most viable scenario in terms of protecting American interests. As such, strengthening the nuclear provisions of any follow-up agreement will be a priority for the Trump administration and for its closest regional partner, Israel. Seventy-one per cent of US respondents saw an extension of the sunset provisions in the JCPOA as the most viable way to achieve this aim. An extension per se would not prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, but respondents implied that by building trust and ensuring regular verification, the threat could be mitigated.
Iran’s missile programme is of concern for US security because of its potential in terms of future nuclear weapons delivery capability. Closing off that pathway is critical. Interviewees overwhelmingly agreed that a declaration on ICBMs was an achievable goal of any negotiation. Respondents were divided over priorities and solutions in respect of any missile deal, with 25 per cent supporting a regional solution, 25 per cent advocating curbs on proliferation, 20 per cent calling for limits on the range of missiles, and a further 25 per cent advocating a ban on ICBMs. The remaining 5 per cent thought no solution likely.
A majority of interviewees considered a wider regional dialogue to be important for a regional agreement. These interviewees did not see the US under President Trump, who has declared his ‘America first’ intentions, as being able to lead this initiative. A wider resolution of US–Iran tensions was not perceived to be very likely, due to their endemic nature and the fact that bipartisan agreement on confronting Iran has remained a durable feature of US politics for four decades.
Iran
Iran’s strategy is multifaceted and evolving, predicated above all on maintaining regime security and stability. This goal has guided Iranian decision-making since the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. In the first year following that decision, Iran maintained compliance with the agreement to obtain leverage and support from the remaining JCPOA signatories. By maintaining its commitments, Iran benefited from international sympathy and from symbolic efforts to protect the JCPOA, and thus succeeded in driving a wedge between the transatlantic partners. However, Tehran also became increasingly frustrated by European efforts that it perceived as providing an insufficient buffer against the impact of US sanctions.
While repeatedly advocating a return to the JCPOA as a necessary first step for solving bilateral differences, Tehran interpreted Washington’s non-renewal of oil waivers in May 2019 as an escalatory action. Moreover, Tehran has been frustrated by Europe’s inability to stand up to Washington or provide financial support that could adequately mitigate US sanctions. As a result, there has been a strategic shift in Iran away from conciliation towards a confrontational posture. Tehran has calculated that calibrated provocations can enable it to elevate the ‘Iran issue’ to a higher level of importance, thus forcing European and international powers to address the tensions. This calculation has also taken into account Trump’s disinclination for direct military conflict with Tehran, a reluctance heightened by the president’s pre-election manoeuvring. Because of the US political calendar, Iranian respondents did not see meaningful negotiations as likely until after the 2020 US presidential election.
What has also become clear is that the choke on Iran’s oil exports fundamentally changes the geopolitical calculus. Hence Tehran’s more confrontational approach in seeking to protect its market share and export modest volumes of oil. Before Trump revoked the waivers, Iran’s export volume amounted to 2.1 million b/d – an amount that Tehran has indicated could be acceptable. In recent months, it has demonstrated its willingness to disrupt others’ oil exports in the Persian Gulf to assert its interests.
Another important Iranian objective is to pressure the Trump administration into providing sanctions relief. Indeed, President Rouhani has stated that only with some form of sanctions relief will the Iranian government be able to justify negotiations to its own population. Here respondents stressed that the Trump administration should understand that Iran’s decision-making is not predicated solely on economic growth. As one interviewee stated: ‘Despite what people think, the economy can survive, but it might not achieve its goals.’75 Another interviewee emphasized that ‘regime survival even at the expense of the impoverishment of the population is the principal calculation for the leadership’.76 At the same time, the Iranian leadership seeks to avoid a Venezuela- or Syria-like scenario of internal dissent.
Fifty-five per cent of Iranian interviewees found resolution of the nuclear issue to be more important than addressing missiles or regional issues, whereas 36 per cent and 9 per cent respectively identified one of the latter two areas as the priority. Interestingly, 78 per cent of Iranian participants considered zero enrichment unattainable. However, 67 per cent suggested that an extension of the sunset provisions would be achievable.
Iranian respondents maintained that Iran’s regional role and defensive posture had been informed by its wartime military experience. Because of the military and defence asymmetry it has relative to its neighbours, Tehran’s ballistic missile programme and proxy relationships are defining features of its forward defence policy – for this reason, it will be hard for Iran’s interlocutors to obtain compromises in these areas without the offer of substantial incentives in return. One analyst captured this with the following observation: ‘Iran has two military assets, its asymmetric capability and missiles. It has no motivation to voluntarily give up on the only instruments that are working for it.’77 As a result, 42 per cent of Iranian respondents did not think any solution on missiles likely.
Figure 13: Negotiating priorities, distribution by country
— Source: Chatham House interviews.
Figure 13: Negotiating priorities, distribution by country
For compromise to be reached, respondents stated, the Trump administration would have to understand what Iran does and does not want. Security guarantees and sanctions relief were repeatedly mentioned by participants as critical factors. Recognition of Iran’s relevance as a regional actor would also be an essential concession. Such acknowledgment could pave the way for flexibility on regional tensions. Because US sanctions are referred to as ‘economic warfare’ in Tehran, Iran would also seek compensation for the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. Finally, participants stressed that secret negotiations, where there is ‘plausible deniability’,78 would be the best means of beginning the process while protecting the interests of both the US and Iran.
France
French interviewees were strongly of the view that the JCPOA has been working well, and that any return to negotiations should therefore take the form of a JCPOA+ approach. Most French respondents identified the pursuit of national interests as the primary driver in the US–Iran conflict. While they noted that the current US position on uranium enrichment remains unclear, they argued that the goal of zero enrichment is now unattainable. Furthermore, they argued that the commitment on plutonium production has been achieved already, and that there should be no requirement to reopen the file as part of future negotiations. Therefore, the focus of fresh negotiations should be on the 2025 benchmark. All conversations should focus on the future, rather than the past. In other words, French interviewees felt that considering PMD was a waste of energy.
It was made clear during the course of the interviews that France is intent on pursuing an issue-centred approach, entailing consideration of wider diplomatic engagement rather than focusing on the nuclear issue per se. Nonetheless, the negotiating priorities identified by all interviewees started with nuclear proliferation, ahead of the issues of missiles and regional stability.
Respondents believed that the issues of sunset clauses, inspections and monitoring had all been adequately addressed, and that there was no need to push Iran for further concessions in these areas. One interviewee argued that, at most, the signatories could begin to consider extending the sunset deadlines and perhaps revisiting inspection modalities marginally, but that this ‘is not the crux of the matter’.79
It was made clear during the course of the interviews that France is intent on pursuing an issue-centred approach, entailing consideration of wider diplomatic engagement rather than focusing on the nuclear issue per se.
Interviewees were asked where they thought concessions on the nuclear issue were most likely to be agreed: 67 per cent believed that an extension of the sunset clauses could be achieved, while 33 per cent believed there to be scope for improved monitoring. However, as noted above, most respondents did not believe these concessions were necessary.
Two-thirds of French interviewees thought individual deals the most likely means of resolving the many different issues, while the remaining third saw the JCPOA+ approach as the most viable mechanism for doing so. When discussions focused on the missile issue, respondents unanimously advocated a regional missile arrangement. Moreover, they made clear that neither a regional transfer of missiles nor autonomous missile production would be an acceptable solution. Most French interviewees (67 per cent) stated that the most likely concessions achievable on missiles would be through a wider regional solution, while 33 per cent believed this would be possible via non-proliferation. However, French interviewees stressed that ‘a respectful dialogue rather than a monologue on ballistic missiles is necessary’,80 and that this would mean working with partners ‘step by step and file by file’.81
French interviewees differed in their views on other aspects of regional issues. The crisis in Syria was a sticking point: some interviewees argued that discussions on Syria should be avoided to assist compromise elsewhere; others insisted that all support for Assad must stop, and that Iran withdraw all forces under its command in Syria before a wider dialogue on other regional matters could begin in earnest. There was almost full agreement on the need for Iran to cease transfers of military equipment to Hezbollah and the Houthis – with some respondents considering this to be a more important issue than Syria. At the same time, irrespective of their viewpoint on the centrality of Syria to regional issues, there was consensus that the complex of security issues could be addressed in one go. However, it was noted that it would be important to ‘dial down the risk of direct military engagement’ and pursue individual deals.
Germany
Most German interviewees thought that, while no diplomatic solution was achievable, individual deals could offer progress in the short term. They did concede that a grand bargain was possible over the longer term. ‘Both US and Iran stance is too uncompromising – we are back at square one.’82 One interviewee noted that Khamenei will not come to the negotiating table with Trump – the US president has gifted the Iranian supreme leader an advantage by pulling out of the JCPOA; this has justified Khamenei’s strong anti-US position and further boosted his domestic legitimacy. ‘It doesn’t make sense for Iran to enter into negotiations if primary sanctions are not on the table,’83 said one respondent. The Iranians will wait for the next US presidential election and, in the meantime, acquire as much additional leverage as possible. This will take many forms – for example, testing new missiles with the goal of improving precision and weight-bearing capacity. Similarly, Iran will continue to embed itself deeper into Syria in preparation for negotiations with Trump in a second term, or with a Democratic Party president.
Although Germany is very keen to press forward with a solution, talks are hostage to domestic politics in both the US and Iran. At the same time, EU efforts – driven by Germany – are compromised by the UK’s distraction with Brexit and unwillingness to invest resources to resolve the crisis, while Iranian-sponsored terrorism undermines all goodwill. There was consensus among interviewees that nothing will happen until the next US election, and that although tensions may spike, Iran is unlikely to place the original JCPOA at risk. One respondent argued that, should Trump be re-elected, there would be no chance of a diplomatic solution. Were a Democrat to be elected as president, the JCPOA could be reconstituted with US participation, but the EU would insist on opening additional dossiers, including on regional issues.
The majority of German interviewees (67 per cent) thought it possible to conclude individual deals, while a third believed that a JCPOA+ plus was still viable. Their view was that the JCPOA itself was a compromise and had taken many years to reach. There is therefore very little room for manoeuvre on its actual terms. Moreover, although the presence of sunset clauses is less than ideal, this is the package that all parties agreed upon and it should therefore stand. Zero enrichment should be possible, and can be a starting point for further discussions. A number of respondents said that it was difficult to imagine a better deal being reached. The E3 are fatigued with the US position, and there is no appetite for reopening negotiations.
It was noted that the current JCPOA addresses all of the major nuclear issues, and that signatories should respect that. Access to Iran’s nuclear sites is important to Germany, but it was felt there was no real cause for concern as Iran has been compliant. The timeline and sunset provisions issue should be addressed, but this should occur closer to the end of the current process and should not be attempted by means of signatories’ withdrawal from the deal.
Respondents were equally split in their perception of the most likely concessions to be won on nuclear issues, with around 33 per cent identifying the extension of sunset clauses as the area in which a breakthrough seemed most achievable and 33 per cent identifying improved monitoring as the more promising option. A similar number of respondents thought no concessions likely.
Negotiating priorities identified by German interviewees were missiles (67 per cent of respondents) and regional stability (33 per cent). The proliferation of missiles is addressed in UNSCR 2231 and is not part of the JCPOA. The issue of range does need to be addressed, and agreement can be reached at a 2,000-km limit given that Iran – unlike its Gulf Arab neighbours – has limited conventional forces and an effective air force. Further discussions are required on the proliferation of ballistic missiles; though difficult, the issue demands a regional approach. According to one interviewee, the parties need to adopt a holistic approach to proliferation. Iran is in a stronger bargaining position than it was 10 years ago. Neither the US nor the EU can offer Iran sufficient incentive to end its proliferation of ballistic missiles. A major change in position, combined with creative diplomacy, is required to persuade Iran to make concessions on an issue so vital to its national security. There was no agreement among respondents on the most likely concessions regarding missiles: one-third saw non-proliferation as the most likely area for progress, another third identified range limits as most promising, and another third did not see any concessions as possible.
Germany’s key national interest in the US–Iran conflict is ensuring regional stability. Germany is very displeased with the role that Iran plays in the region. It sees Iran as a destabilizing force that has added to instability in Saudi Arabia. Regional issues need to be addressed, but the JCPOA was the start of a wider dialogue that should have led to another diplomatic process. Germany has invested considerable time and effort in trying to bridge the gap between Iran and Saudi Arabia; this has taken the form of ministerial visits, dialogue, and government-funded Track 2 and Track 1.5 endeavours. The most suitable solution to regional issues would be a security arrangement that broadly resembled the Helsinki Accords. The Iranians have proven more willing to engage in regional dialogue than the Saudis. Since the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, emerged as a prominent leader, the prospects for talks have diminished.
Respondents seemed to agree that a grand bargain is the best approach in theory, but that in practice this will not happen and that issues will need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. There is unlikely to be much success with Syria and Lebanon. It is very unlikely that tensions between Iran and Israel can be resolved, though Russia has acquired a more significant political and diplomatic role in the region and could use its influence to manage tensions more effectively. According to interviewees, there are some easy wins in the region – with Yemen offering some of the most potential for progress. A compromise could be reached because Iran is hardly invested in Yemen while Saudi Arabia is overly committed to Yemen. Iraq is another regional issue on which compromise could be reached, as all parties share a common interest in its stability and success, though agreeing terms will require significant diplomatic capital. Regional security is important to all parties; however, Iran seeks recognition of its role within the region and its legitimate right to forward self-defence. The EU can play an important bridging role between Iran and its Gulf Arab neighbours, helping to reconcile their differences and working towards a common security framework.
United Kingdom
Half of UK respondents believed no diplomatic solution is possible in the current climate, while 33 per cent believed it possible to conclude individual deals and 17 per cent considered a grand bargain achievable. As far as the overall UK position is concerned, most respondents believed that the preservation of the JCPOA was the best outcome.
Most UK interviewees attributed the low likelihood of a diplomatic breakthrough to the roles played by President Trump and Supreme Leader Khamenei. One interviewee with considerable experience of Iran noted the depth of animosity that runs between the two systems, and how Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the JCPOA had caused irreparable damage and deepened distrust between Tehran and Washington.84 Another interviewee argued that it had been difficult to ‘get the deal going in the first place’, and that it would be near impossible in the current environment to persuade Iran to come back to the table. The respondent said that ‘it’s very hard to imagine Iran taking another risk again’ and that ‘the best bet for Iran is narrow negotiations’.85 Another interviewee developed this point separately, arguing that the US (as well as the West more generally) does not understand how Iran sees itself. Because of this, even if the US offered a security guarantee as part of a grand bargain, such an overture would never be taken seriously by Tehran.
Most UK interviewees attributed the low likelihood of a diplomatic breakthrough to the roles played by President Trump and Supreme Leader Khamenei.
A number of British respondents commented that a deal was inconceivable until Khamenei dies. As such, the opportunity for negotiation had passed in the short term, and – as noted above – any residue of trust built up through the JCPOA process had all but gone. Furthermore, there was a common view that Iranians have passed through difficult times before, most notably during the eight-year war with Iraq, and that they have always shown great resourcefulness and resilience. Therefore, the US approach of ‘maximum pressure’ simply will not work. According to one UK interviewee: ‘Trump does not understand the Iranian approach and thinks that pressure will push Iran to the table. At the same time, it doesn’t seem that Iran can make any meaningful changes while Khamenei is alive. He cannot compromise on his legacy.’86
At best, most UK respondents said, the only realistic approach would be to manage the problem until circumstances change. This ultimately requires a generational change. With a gradual convergence of interests, Iran could decide to return to negotiations, but not before 2021. Therefore, the principle tactical objective of the Iranian leadership is to sit and wait until the next US presidential election. Should a Democrat win, he or she would still have to renegotiate terms, as the JCPOA would be quite redundant by then – the longer the US remains outside the agreement, the more it will have to renegotiate.
All UK respondents prioritized the issue of nuclear proliferation over ballistic missiles and regional stability. Sixty per cent of UK interviewees responded that concessions could not be reached on nuclear issues, while equal proportions – 20 per cent respectively – believed extending sunset provisions or stopping enrichment to be attainable. One interviewee noted that ‘dealing with the sunset issue is the important thing here and extending the deal beyond 2025 is critical and could buy everyone time’.87 Unqualified access to all sites, on the other hand, was not considered an important issue. Interviewees felt that this had been resolved under the original JCPOA and that Iran had been amenable to all inspections, as verified by the IAEA. UK interviewees argued that a goal of zero enrichment is impossible, though limited enrichment for research and development only might be a point for negotiation. One interviewee suggested that multilateralizing enrichment under a consortium of international powers would be the best way to allow enrichment in Iran.
One interviewee with intimate knowledge of previous negotiations argued that the JCPOA had been about ‘building up trust on the deal and to see if all sides kept to their sides of the bargain’.88 The interviewee noted that success on that track should have led to negotiations on ballistic missiles and the wider region. For the reasons noted above, the same interviewee said that now Iran will ‘only negotiate about what it will negotiate about. It will be either JCPOA or missiles, not both.’89
UK respondents shared a common perspective on the issue of ballistic missiles, noting that this is closely tied to the EU security agenda. During the interviews, the issue of range was discussed at length and considered critical by nearly all interviewees. However, only 33 per cent of UK interviewees believed that concessions on range could be achieved. Fifty per cent argued that concessions would be not be possible, as Iran would insist on an unfeasible region-wide solution. The remaining 17 per cent of UK interviewees shared some optimism that a regional solution could be reached, but only after the next US presidential election.
Although UK respondents differed in emphasis, most shared similar views to the effect that Iran has regional security interests that must be recognized, and that it has a direct and ‘legitimate’ interest in its near abroad. One interviewee noted: ‘There is no grand Khamenei plan to dominate the region and be responsible for it. In fact, Iran does not want to own anything; its method for projecting influence is being defensive.’90 Most interviewees believed that Iran’s national interest was served neither in Syria nor in Yemen, and that there is therefore some room for negotiation on regional issues. In any bargain, one interviewee noted, Iran would have to give up interests in Syria to reinforce itself in Iraq. However, Hezbollah remains the most important group for Iran. While Iran will not give up supporting the organization, it could be persuaded to stop endorsing Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks and ‘providing it with training and military equipment’.91 Given that Iran’s interests in the region are mostly defensive, and uneven in terms of priority, several respondents argued that an individual deal could be reached as part of a JCPOA+. However, this would need to be pursued through a regional security conference, with the best model to employ being one similar in structure to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Russia
Russian interviewees made it clear that Moscow does not want a nuclear-capable Iran. One respondent said: ‘Iran with a nuclear bomb is not an option for Russia – not for the purpose of the international community, but for its own sake.’ Another interviewee commented that ‘Russia does not want Iran to set a precedent and witness a ‘domino’ effect’.92 All interviewees mentioned non-proliferation as the negotiating priority.
According to the majority of Russian interviewees (63 per cent), there can be no diplomatic solution under current circumstances. Twenty-five per cent of Russian interviewees saw a possibility of individual deals, while 12 per cent thought a grand bargain possible. None of the interviewees believed the JCPOA+ model was viable. One interviewee argued that the US has lost credibility as a negotiating partner and that this makes future negotiations nearly impossible. ‘One president agreed, one president withdrew, so there is a trust deficit.’93 The consensus was that no negotiations will happen under Trump – but that progress might be possible in 2021 with a different president. The message from Russian respondents was unequivocal that the current ‘stand-off will continue until the next US president comes into office’ and that ‘there can be no “grand bargain” as Trump’s demands are unacceptable for Tehran’.94 One interviewee noted that Pompeo’s 12 demands cannot be part of one deal, stating that ‘Iran will not make a grand bargain, though negotiations on individual issues are possible’.95 Most Russian respondents said they believe a grand bargain to be impossible. According to one interviewee: ‘Iran and the West can only agree on a few aspects of a grand bargain. Consent on a range of issues between the US and Iran is practically impossible.’96
Most Russian respondents believed that concessions on Iran’s missile programme could not be agreed. They argued that it is difficult to ask Iran to make concessions given its weak air force capability and without addressing wider regional issues.
Half of the respondents believed that the most likely concessions on nuclear issues would involve improved monitoring of nuclear sites. Twenty-five per cent believed extending the sunset clauses to be attainable, while another 25 per cent believed that no nuclear concessions could be achieved. All respondents argued that Moscow wants the JCPOA to stay in place and its terms to be extended. Several respondents said that while the uranium enrichment process ‘is not so important to Russia’,97 it is possible to limit enrichment so long as some concession is offered in exchange. Tehran will not desist from enriching uranium unilaterally; it will need to receive some kind of benefit, such as security guarantees, either from the US or the P5+1.
Although only 25 per cent of Russian respondents, as mentioned, believed that Iran would make concessions on sunset clauses, most argued that Russia would support efforts to extend the provisions and would work with its international partners to help achieve that goal. As also noted above, 50 per cent of respondents considered greater margin for manoeuvre to exist on securing more access to nuclear facilities. However, getting Iran’s agreement on unqualified access to all sites across the entire country, as suggested in Pompeo’s 12 conditions, would be very difficult.
Most Russian respondents believed that concessions on Iran’s missile programme could not be agreed. They argued that it is difficult to ask Iran to make concessions given its weak air force capability and without addressing wider regional issues. They shared a similar perspective to Chinese interviewees (see below) in assessing that Iran does not have natural allies in the region and is therefore dependent upon a ballistic missile capability for its security, especially when its Gulf Arab neighbours possess such sophisticated air power. A number of interviewees made a similar point that ‘Tehran will never open discussions on its ballistic missile programme – as it is considered to be a pillar of its national security’.98 Furthermore, one interviewee noted that Iran does not believe that the US is serious in addressing this issue, given that Saudi Arabia is developing its own missile programme.
Another interviewee commented that an end to Iran’s ballistic missile programme would only be possible in the event of regime change. The respondent said that Tehran had learned from North Korea, rather than the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya, and that this meant retaining and further enhancing its missile capabilities. As such, Iran believes that its missile programme is a guarantee of national security ‘[although] it might be willing to negotiate limitations on range’.99
Some interviewees made it clear that Iran’s ballistic missile programme is not a concern for Russia, while others argued that the range of Iranian missiles is important as Moscow is theoretically within reach. While several interviewees argued that missile proliferation is a concern to Moscow, they were confident that Russia and Israel have the capacity and will to manage the issue. As one respondent said, ‘Russian relations with Israel are critical; and it relies upon Israel to keep Iran in check.’100
The perspective of Russian interviewees on Iran’s role in the region was almost universal – they are not troubled by Iran’s activities. Most characterized Russia’s perspective as ‘realistic’, as it considers many of the problems to be intractable, and therefore believes that each crisis should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Interviewees attributed different values to Tehran’s relations with actors in the region. For example, one interviewee argued that PIJ is not that important to Iran; Iran can limit its contacts with Hamas, but not cut them. Several Russian interviewees suggested that Iran is likely to compromise on Yemen and that its level of support to the Houthis is highly exaggerated. As such, Tehran is content to capitalize upon the myth of its influence. One respondent noted that Russia can accept a divided Yemen – Iran’s activities there are inconsequential to Russian interests. Ties with Hezbollah, on the other hand, were described as strategic by one respondent, not only in terms of Iran’s presence in the region, but also in terms of its networks outside the region. As a consequence, there is very limited room for negotiation in recalibrating that relationship.
All respondents observed that Russia and Iran are on the same side in Syria. One former official noted that neither wants ‘the Alawis’ to fall and that both have used military intervention to support that goal. Russia and Iran have complementary interests. Iran will not withdraw from Syria, nor will it draw down its assets. One interviewee highlighted the fact that Tehran may have decreased its support for the National Defence Forces (NDF) but has substantially increased the support and assistance it provides to the Local Defence Forces. In other words, Iran is creating covert and indirect schemes of support through local businesses and communities that will guarantee it a long-term presence in Syria well beyond the duration of the military conflict. It is possible, however, that these stated views are disingenuous and that Russia is content to let Israel target Iranian assets in Syria, so long as Russian and Syrian troops are not killed. An important test will be when Iran takes over the Latakia container terminal in late 2019; Russia intends to develop the Tartous terminal as an alternative, and it is highly likely that Israel will seek to disrupt Iran’s operations in Latakia.
China
Chinese respondents noted that China’s national interests in the US–Iran conflict are predominantly economic, and that these take priority over regional stability, national security and geopolitical interests.
The majority of Chinese interviewees (75 per cent) mentioned that the most likely outcome of future negotiations is a JCPOA+ agreement, while 25 per cent expected individual deals. No respondents believed a grand bargain to be possible. All respondents stressed the importance of the JCPOA, and noted that this is considered in Beijing to be the pathway to integrating Iran into the global economy. It is seen as important for regional stability too. However, all interviewees believed that the current deadlock will continue until at least the next US presidential election. If a Democratic candidate wins, then the US could come back to the JCPOA, said a number of respondents, also pointing out that a further delay would be expected as Iran held parliamentary elections. In the event that Trump were re-elected, several respondents noted, Iran would have to negotiate with him, as this was the only way to mitigate his inflexibility and desire for regime change.
Chinese respondents made it clear that they held the US responsible for the current crisis. One commented that the US had left the JCPOA unilaterally, had broken the rules, and is now isolated. Another interviewee pointed out that US–Iranian confrontation serves China’s interests, and that, short of war, will continue to benefit China. The interviewee added: ‘China is flexible – it will never say no or yes – to Iran’s nuclear programme. As long as its commercial interests are protected, then China will be fine.’101
All interviewees agreed that the most likely concession on nuclear proliferation involves controlling levels of uranium enrichment. If Iran restarts enrichment to 20 per cent, it was noted, then all countries would oppose this move. This is the ‘red line’ for all members of the P5+1, including China, although Beijing is convinced that Iran has no motive to establish a nuclear weapons programme. One interviewee argued that the US and EU use the issue to create fear among other countries, and in turn use that fear as leverage against Iran. Furthermore, Chinese interviewees claimed that it is impossible for Iran to acquire the technology to develop a nuclear weapons programme.
Chinese interviewees confirmed that China does not want to see instability in the region, but that it will not play an active role in conflict prevention or management. While recognizing that ballistic missiles pose a threat to stability, most respondents said that it is not a major issue for China. As with the Russian interviewees, Chinese respondents observed that Iran has no natural allies in the region and is dependent upon its missile system for national security. China does not have a clear position on missiles and considers Iran’s ballistic missile programme to be defensive in nature. Nonetheless, 67 per cent of those interviewed believed that the most likely concessions on missiles would be achieved through a wider regional solution, while 33 per cent thought no concessions possible.
Proliferation will not harm China’s commercial interests, though it could cause an arms race. China is comfortable with a certain level of tensions, but does not want military escalation between any of the countries. China is not concerned about missile range – even ICBMs would not pose a threat to China.
Interviewees were keen to stress China’s mercantilist approach to Iran and the wider set of issues. They commented that Iran itself is not that relevant to China’s national interests. In fact, they noted that China is both preoccupied with its trade dispute with the US and, at the same time, frustrated with Iran. One respondent commented that many Chinese companies are ‘punishing’ Iran, as they believe that Iran has prioritized its relations with Europe over those with China. Many Chinese businesses do not believe that it is worth doing business with Iran, given the difficulties involved. Consequently, China will not assist the EU with negotiations or with keeping the JCPOA alive.
China’s negotiating priority is regional stability rather than addressing nuclear proliferation or missiles. China sees Iran as destabilizing, but will be unable to stop any escalation.
In the view of all the Chinese interviewees, China’s negotiating priority is regional stability rather than addressing nuclear proliferation or missiles. China sees Iran as destabilizing, but will be unable to stop any escalation. It also sees Iran’s behaviour as defensive-offensive: the Iranian regime is threatened not only by the US, but also by its neighbours. Its actions are rooted in insecurity. China believes that collective security could be reached through a wider Middle East peace and security conference. However, this would require a firm commitment from the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel to set aside the option of pursuing regime change in Tehran. Collective security, some of the respondents argued, could be achieved. Moreover, it would reduce the dependency of states in the region on external powers to provide their security. However, respondents were unequivocal in stating that China would not play a role in bringing all the parties to the table: ‘China can only offer advice and encourage all sides to refrain from resorting to military action. China is happy to mediate but that’s it.’102
Saudi Arabia
In assessing the US–Iran conflict, Saudi interviewees gave a higher priority to geopolitical interests than to economic interests, regional stability or national security. Sixty-seven per cent of respondents cited regional stability as a negotiating priority, while 33 per cent identified missiles as the most important issue; curbing Iran’s nuclear activities did not feature in the responses. Saudi respondents believed that regional dialogue – rather than multilateral negotiations – and a case-by-case approach offer the only means of resolving the broader crisis. Almost two-thirds thought that there would be no diplomatic solution under current circumstances, and only a third believed that the JCPOA+ option was viable.
Fifty per cent of the Saudi interviewees believed that the US and Iran could not reach a deal at the present time. In fact, one interviewee doubted that either side is really interested in talks: ‘Neither Trump nor Khamenei wants or needs a breakthrough.’103 As with so many other interviewees for this project, Saudi respondents believed that while the security environment may deteriorate, nothing will change the status quo until the next US presidential election. One interviewee was adamant that even if a new president comes into office in 2021, it will still be very difficult to agree a JCPOA+ deal. Indeed, the same interviewee opined that it does not matter whether a Republican or Democrat occupies the White House, because the moment that gave rise to the original JCPOA has passed. At best, a new president could bring the US back into the JCPOA and no more.
A number of respondents speculated that if Trump is re-elected, the status quo will persist. They said that the president has no desire to secure a ‘real’ deal and does not have a team in place that could work towards a grand bargain. The White House, one respondent noted, lacks the capacity to reach a grand bargain. The same interviewee argued that getting to a deal would be practically impossible because the conditions are too tough. For example, getting Iran back to the negotiating table would require the following: the guaranteed lifting of sanctions; a scaling back of the US adversarial position; the drawdown of US forces in Iraq; recognition of Iran’s role in the region; and the diminution or removal of US military bases. None of the Saudi respondents thought these conditions would ever be met under a Trump presidency, or even under a Democratic president. However, should the US work towards such a deal, all Saudi respondents argued that lessons from the JCPOA had been learned. They observed that Iran’s ‘neighbours should have been involved in the last deal and that if anything happens in the future, then Saudi Arabia must be involved next time’.104
When asked which concessions were most likely to be agreed on nuclear issues, 67 per cent of respondents said none; 33 per cent said that there was scope to improve monitoring. None of the respondents thought it possible to reach concessions on stopping enrichment or extending sunset clauses.
All Saudi interviewees said that, in the unlikely event that a new deal were reached, it should be permanent and contain no sunset provisions. If a Democratic president is elected, then the next administration should renegotiate the terms of the JCPOA before re-integrating the US into the deal. Ideally, the new terms should include two key points: (a) zero enrichment – though Iran would never agree to this, because ‘these are the issues of national pride and the country has cultivated these capabilities in spite of sanctions and Israeli/US mischief-making’;105 and (b) the development of more robust inspections. On the latter point, the interviewees did not believe that Iran would grant unqualified access to all sites. One commented that Tehran might agree to ‘access to some sites, yes, [but] not military or sensitive sites and certainly not anytime anywhere’.106
As for missile issues, all Saudi respondents thought that concessions were most likely on the issue of non-proliferation. Interviewees believed that Iran must end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launches of nuclear-capable missiles or the development of nuclear-capable systems. The sharing of ballistic-missile technology with the Houthis in Yemen and with Hezbollah is categorically unacceptable to Riyadh, as this poses a direct security threat to the kingdom. However, several interviewees recognized scope for negotiation, with one stating: ‘Proliferation is an area that the Iranians might entertain in some theatres, such as Yemen, Iraq, Syria, but not Lebanon.’107
All Saudi respondents characterized Iran’s support for non-state actors across the region as malign. None believed that Iran will end its support of groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and PIJ, as these provide Tehran not only with leverage, but also with an important depth of assets with which to secure its territorial sovereignty and maintain a forward-leaning strategic posture. However, the Saudi interviewees identified Iraq and Yemen as two theatres in which an agreement could potentially be reached within a wider regional context. In Iraq, one Saudi interviewee observed, Iran may permit the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Shia militias. However, it would want to maintain influence within the system and would continue to support Shia militias, resisting their full integration into a national force. Another interviewee suggested that Iran is more likely to be willing to lessen its support for the Houthis in Yemen if it can secure concessions from the US and regional states in other areas. The respondent further suggested that Iran needs to be encouraged to withdraw its support for Houthis, stop missile technology transfers, respect the sovereignty of states in the region, and support all UNSC resolutions. As such, potential policy changes on Yemen were seen by Saudi respondents as a quick win for all countries concerned. Saudi Arabia and Iran are invested asymmetrically in the country, but reduced Iranian intervention in Yemen would require a quid pro quo elsewhere in the region.
United Arab Emirates
UAE interviewees identified their primary national interests in the US–Iran conflict as best served by regional stability rather than economic, national security or geopolitical gains. UAE respondents did not believe a deal likely before the US presidential election. One interviewee argued that if Trump gets re-elected, Iran will be compelled to engage with the US. ‘Trump is a deal-maker – and with the US playing bad cop to the EU’s good cop. It is a good division of labour between the two with the EU offering incentives.’108 The same interviewee expected a further round of sanctions to be placed on Iran, with the goal of forcing it back to the negotiating table in 2021. According to the UAE interviewees, Iran only responds to heavy pressure.
However, the next deal needs to include ballistic missiles and regional issues, and the UAE has to be part of the negotiations, said one of the interviewees. Another interviewee argued that the US must begin to address wider regional security issues before returning to negotiations. For this to take place, common ground must be established among regional actors and the leading members of the international community. UAE respondents reported that the US’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign had the best chance of compelling Iran to negotiate on issues such as ICBMs, water problems, pollution and the environment – though, interestingly, no other respondents in the survey raised these issues. UAE respondents considered a grand bargain to be the most effective approach for addressing all key issues, but one that would only be feasible during a second-term Trump presidency.
Most UAE respondents argued that a revised deal should either stipulate zero enrichment or allow any country to have an unrestricted civilian nuclear fuel programme. They argued that, if Iran is exempted, other countries in the region should be exempted too. One interviewee suggested that Iran follow the pathway of the UAE nuclear programme, which entails the UAE leasing rather than enriching fuel (in its nuclear cooperation agreement with the US, the UAE agreed to forego uranium enrichment altogether). Sunset provisions were noted as important, as well as the terms of inspections; however, the JCPOA’s shortcomings in respect of these issues were attributed to technical faults with the deal itself and to the narrow focus of previous talks. One interviewee argued that these issues need to be addressed post-2021, and that a longer and broader deal offered the only way forward.
For UAE respondents, the proliferation of short-range missiles poses the greatest threat to the region, followed by the destabilizing activities of Iran-backed non-state actors. The nuclear issue itself is not a major concern. To mitigate these threats, the Gulf Arab states should be allowed to establish an indigenous missile defence system; establishing a nuclear-free zone is also an option, suggested one respondent. Thus, the key negotiating priorities for the majority of UAE respondents were missiles (75 per cent) followed by regional stability (25 per cent), while none of the respondents identified nuclear proliferation as a national priority. Respondents were divided equally in terms of which concessions could most likely be achieved on nuclear issues, variously citing extended sunset clauses, improved monitoring and a halt to enrichment. At the same time, an equal number of interviewees thought no concessions could be achieved. All respondents thought that concessions on missile issues could probably be achieved through a wider regional solution.
According to Emirati respondents, the UAE went to war in Yemen in order to prevent a Hezbollah model from developing close to its border. There was consensus among all interviewees that sectarianism fuelled by Iran needs to stop. ‘Iran is the spoiler in Yemen … However, the UAE is betting on Russia’s role in Yemen and utilizing its [Russia’s] influence over the Houthis.’109
Israel
Israeli respondents identified national security as their primary interest in the US–Iran conflict, ahead of economics, regional stability and any geopolitical agenda. Almost a third (29 per cent) of Israeli interviewees believed there to be no diplomatic solution, while 43 per cent thought that individual deals might be reached. On the other hand, equal proportions – 14 per cent respectively – thought a JCPOA+ deal or grand bargain possible.
One interviewee stated: ‘Trump has the wherewithal to make a deal and he should keep some sanctions alive to use as further leverage. Sanctions are the most important element to keep Iran under control.’110 Another asserted confidently that Iran will want to negotiate because ‘it is scared about a repeat of [the] 2009 and 2018 protests, where students shouted death to Khamenei’.111 In other words, some respondents believed that the campaign of maximum pressure is working.
Others discounted the likelihood of Iran and the US reaching a deal. To them, Trump does not have the capacity to reach a deal; moreover, Tehran will not trust the US president. As indicated elsewhere, there is some expectation that negotiations will be renewed after 2020. One interviewee opined that if Trump is re-elected, then direct US–Iran talks will begin – and Trump, unlike Obama, will keep Israel informed each step of the way. Other Israeli interlocutors disagreed with this analysis. They argued that while talks may begin, a revised deal is highly unlikely, as Khamenei will be unwilling to make any further concessions beyond those previously agreed in the JCPOA. In fact, other interviewees observed that as long as Khamenei is in power, direct negotiations are off the table.
While all Israeli interviewees believed that Iran has to stop enrichment and never pursue any part of the path to plutonium weapons (including construction of a heavy-water reactor), there is a consensus that Iran would never agree to zero enrichment. Iran has not given up its aspirations to develop nuclear weapons; in fact, Iran has been discussing renewing enrichment above 20 per cent. Some interviewees noted that it is totally unrealistic to imagine zero enrichment: ‘No Iranian is going to give up enrichment. One has to understand who the Iranians are and their pride, their history and culture.’112
One interviewee argued that better proof is needed that Iran has given up its nuclear operations. This can only be achieved through inspections and access to Parchin and other military sites. At the same time, Iran must give the IAEA a full account of the PMD issue, and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity. Other interviewees said that Iran must also provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country. Said one respondent: ‘[t]here are holes in the inspection programme. The IAEA is not strong enough … inspectors should be allowed to enter more sites than currently permitted … the leadership and mandate of the IAEA to blame … and the agreement needs extending with no time limitation.’113
Sixty-seven per cent of Israeli interviewees said they believe that concessions on extending the sunset clauses can be achieved, while 33 per cent considered new deal provisions possible via improved monitoring. ‘Sunset is a pressing issue for Israel from the right and left … Extending sunsets is the most achievable goal, but more access to sites is important. As long as Iran retains its regional policies, it is impossible to see a scenario where sunsets expire. Israel cannot see a country talking about annihilating it and having a nuclear weapon to do so.’114
For Israeli respondents, the negotiating priorities, in descending order of importance, were missiles (57 per cent), non-proliferation (29 per cent) and regional stability (14 per cent). With 100,000 rockets targeting Israel from Lebanon, it is unsurprising that missiles are the major issue. Fifty per cent of interviewees cited the imposition of range limits as the most likely concession on missiles. Thirty-three per cent indicated that no concessions were likely, and 17 per cent identified non-proliferation as likely.
It is unsurprising that Israel also considers the threat from Iran’s regional activities – beyond missile proliferation, which is substantive in Lebanon – to be a pressing concern. For the most part, Israel remains confident in its ability to undermine Iran’s military activities in countries other than Lebanon, such as Syria and Iraq. Israeli interviewees concluded that it is very difficult to have one overall negotiation to address the concerns of the Middle East states.
75 Phone interview, 22 March 2019.
76 Phone interview, 23 February 2019.
77 Phone interview, 17 December 2018.
78 In-person interview, 24 February 2019.
79 In-person interview, 20 December 2018.
80 In-person interview, 17 December 2018.
81 In-person interview, 20 December 2018.
82 Phone interview, 4 April 2019.
83 Phone interview, 14 April 2019.
84 In-person interview, 12 January 2019.
85 In-person interview, 13 February 2019.
86 In-person interview, 19 February 2019.
87 In-person interview, 22 February 2019.
88 In-person interview, 31 January 2019.
89 Ibid.
90 In-person interview, 28 January 2019.
91 In-person interview, 28 February 2019.
92 In-person interview, 25 May 2019.
93 In-person interview, 12 May 2019.
94 In-person interview, 14 May 2019.
95 In-person interview, 17 May 2019.
96 In-person interview, 23 January 2019.
97 In-person interview, 3 May 2019.
98 In-person interview, 17 May 2019.
99 In-person interview, 7 May 2019.
100 In-person interview, 22 May 2019.
101 In-person interview, 11 May 2019.
102 In-person interview, 31 March 2019.
103 In-person interview, 7 April 2019.
104 In-person interview, 28 April 2019.
105 Phone interview, 12 April 2019.
106 In-person interview, 18 March 2019.
107 Phone interview, 7 March 2019.
108 Phone interview, 18 March 2019.
109 In-person interview, 20 February 2019.
110 In-person interview, 10 February 2019.
111 In-person interview, 12 February 2019.
112 In-person interview, 13 February 2019.
113 In-person interview, 11 February 2019.
114 In-person interview, 11 February 2019.