Conclusion
This paper has provided a necessarily high-level view across the GCC, given the large scope of the cyber resilience question. Nonetheless, this analysis suggests that there are both positive conclusions to be drawn and further challenges in improving cyber resilience in the region. On the positive side, the GCC states have invested significantly in cybersecurity and have made large strides in protecting governments, businesses and individuals from cyberthreats. It is essential to keep this momentum if ambitious national strategies, heavily dependent on advanced digital technologies, are to deliver the future visions of GCC leaders and their populations. However, the uneven nature of cybersecurity protections, and shallow implementation of cybersecurity strategies and regulations, means that GCC states need to focus on the more difficult task of cyber resilience in addition to the simpler initial stages of cybersecurity capacity-building.
In addition to increasing cyber resilience overall, there is an additional challenge in striking the right balance between different approaches to cyber resilience, related to the different threats that states face in cyberspace. The GCC states have centralized their laws, government organizations and private-sector partnerships to respond strategically to information threats, including through extensive monitoring and censorship of social media, as well as targeted responses to dissidents. This centralization means that GCC states are less able to respond to critical infrastructure attacks or financial threats, as only limited resources can be allocated between the two types of threats. A sustainable approach to cyber resilience would rebalance their priorities away from social media towards more distributed strategies, providing different elements of their economies and societies the correct incentives to protect themselves.
We have three specific recommendations that help implement this suggestion. First, GCC states could work more closely in international forums aimed at cooperation on cybercrime or capacity-building in cybersecurity or both such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the Europol Cybercrime Centre, or the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise among others. Rather than detachment from international partners, these states could look to learn and share experiences internationally. Second, differences between the GCC are crucial, as uncoordinated resilience strategies could entrench vulnerabilities in a climate of political division. GCC states should therefore prioritize cooperation across borders and within the GCC organization itself. Finally, GCC countries should anticipate and prepare for the risks posed by new technologies, including 5G, IoT and AI, as these will be an essential aspect of future cyber resilience. These risks stem from both hasty societal adoption and the role these technologies play in broader geopolitical changes.
In sum, a comprehensive approach to cyber resilience distinguishes between different threats and identifies the advantages and disadvantages of different resilience strategies in response to those threats. In the GCC, this approach has the potential to preserve and amplify the momentous gains of the digital revolution to achieve a more prosperous and fulfilling future for all those within and connected to the region.