A woman passes in front of the Slaviansk sign, which is covered in bullet holes from clashes between the Ukrainian government and rebel groups, 3 April 2019. Photo by Cristopher Rogel Blanquet/Getty Images
2. The Impact of the Armed Conflict
For almost six years Ukraine has been in a state of simmering conflict. The ramifications of the military operation in parts of Donbas reverberate strongly across the rest of the country and domestic politics. The conflict has myriad effects that influence the quality of democracy, human capital, social fabric, and the level of violence in society.
Conflicting demands: Liberal democracy vs national security
Most Ukrainians, across the country, demand a more effective and accountable system of governance. At present, citizens, civil society and state institutions are experiencing heightened insecurity that jeopardizes further reforms. According to a National Democratic Institute (NDI) public opinion poll, 61 per cent of Ukrainians believe that Russian military aggression is a big threat.42 As a consequence, Ukrainian society struggles to reconcile two aspirations: strengthening homeland security and a desire for more civic and political liberties.
The conflict in Donbas complicates the consolidation of democracy. For example, many see an apparent contradiction between the need to insulate Ukraine from Russian disinformation and the need to ensure media independence. Recent attempts to pass a law on disinformation met with strong opposition from the media community. Journalists see this law as an encroachment on their freedoms and a ‘dangerous intrusion [by the] state into the media community’.43 Similarly, the need for the state to react to the rise of right-wing non-state actors – such as the National Corps, which positions itself as a CSO – challenges the commitment to create an open environment for the development of civil society.
To date, civil society efforts and Ukrainians’ innate suspicion of state authorities have helped maintain and expand freedoms during the conflict. Many CSOs are pushing for more accountability, decentralization and respect for human rights. Perhaps counterintuitively, despite the war, Ukraine has undergone a comprehensive process of decentralization with the subsequent empowerment of local authorities and amalgamated communities since 2014.44 Traditionally, a country at war would centralize most of its state functions, yet Ukraine chose to do the opposite.
Societal polarization
The war in eastern Ukraine is polarizing society. The conflict is viewed differently between regions depending on how they are directly affected by it. While the majority of Ukrainians believe that conflict resolution will require some form of compromise with Russia and the separatist regions, citizens in the south and east of the country are markedly more willing to ‘make any compromise to achieve peace’ than citizens in the centre and west of the country.45
Social polarization emerges between citizens who express strong patriotic sentiment and demand restoration of a pre-war status versus citizens who would compromise along the lines laid down by the Kremlin. Map 1 below illustrates different attitudes to reintegration of occupied territories into Ukraine. In western Ukraine, support for the reintegration of Donbas is significantly lower than in the rest of the country and is decreasing due to a lack of progress in the peace talks.
Map 1: Ukraine’s attitudes towards reintegration of Donetsk and Luhansk
— Source: USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (2018), ‘2018 Ukraine Social Cohesion & Reconciliation Index (SCORE)’, https://www.scoreforpeace.org/files/publication/pub_file//VIS_Ukr17_SCOREInfographicsUKRFinal.pdf (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
Map 1: Ukraine’s attitudes towards reintegration of Donetsk and Luhansk
The level of support for reintegration is lower in the oblasts with higher numbers of participants in the war (either direct participants or those with family members or close friends who have served in the armed forces). For instance, citizens in Volyn show less support for reintegration compared to citizens in Ternopil or Ivano-Frankivsk due to its high numbers of military personnel. In addition, some regions in the west (Zakarpattya, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn and Chernivtsi) have low levels of support for a pluralistic civic identity. Such civic identity is expressed in a belief that everyone despite their ethnic and cultural background who calls Ukraine home is an integral part of society. This could also explain divergent views within a region.
Citizens of the southeast more strongly support granting special status to the LNR and the DNR as is outlined in the constitution and back the non-alignment or international neutrality of Ukraine. They are also more willing to agree to local elections with no pre-conditions and approve of giving the Russian language official status.46 One group of citizens demands victory over an aggressive Russia, while the other would be satisfied with some form of a peace deal and an end to the current conflict. These divisions can potentially lead to wider societal schisms and entrenched distrust of a future peace deal.
There is also disagreement between those who believe it is possible to negotiate with Putin’s Russia and those who believe that only the collapse of the Putin regime will enable the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Negotiating peace with Russia is important to 48 per cent of Ukrainians.47 President Zelenskyy’s willingness to discuss peace with Putin is viewed by many as a path to capitulation. To prevent this from happening, dozens of organizations and activists created a new civic movement, Resistance to Capitulation, to put pressure on Zelenskyy to voice his red lines for negotiations with Putin. Nationwide protests across Ukraine on the eve of the Normandy meeting in December 2019 were supported by the political opposition and more radical right-wing groups such as National Corps, Vidsich and Svoboda.
The humanitarian crisis
The conflict has created a devastating humanitarian situation in eastern Ukraine. Out of 5.2 million people affected by the war in Donbas, 3.5 million – including 2.2 million in the non-government-controlled areas (NGCA) – are dependent on humanitarian assistance and protection services, mostly for physical protection, food and water security, and basic healthcare.48 Living conditions on the LoC are deteriorating, with serious issues emerging around access to medical care, vital foodstuffs and water. Prices of basic commodities and essential goods are reported to have increased to unsustainable levels.49
Military operations have also put significant strain on road and rail infrastructure, thereby limiting access to humanitarian aid, human contact and markets.50 Another often overlooked issue is the presence of abandoned coal mines and other industrial assets left unsupervised in war-affected regions, which present the risk of environmental hazards and water-supply contamination.51 This is compounded by the absence of financial resources and human capital to restore a sense of economic normality in occupied Donbas: most businesses have been de facto ‘nationalized’ by the so-called authorities and the energy and industrial sectors have been decimated.
The militarization of occupied Donbas and its spillover effects
The presence of landmines and other explosive remnants of war scattered on both sides of the LoC threaten wider human security. Demining efforts are far from sufficient, especially since Donbas is the most densely mined area per square kilometre52 – with the highest number of mine incidents – in the world.53 This is disproportionately affecting civilians and children and has led to long-term environmental concerns and limited access to mined portions of Ukraine. Recent efforts by the government aimed at establishing a legal framework to coordinate national mine action54 are welcome but should be scaled up and supported more broadly by international donors and humanitarian organizations.
Demining efforts are far from sufficient, especially since Donbas is the most densely mined area per square kilometre – with the highest number of mine incidents – in the world.
The spillover of small firearms and explosive devices from the conflict area into the rest of Ukraine is a serious cause for concern. The number of crimes committed with the use of firearms has substantially increased. About 300,000 units of small arms went missing from official storage between 2013 and 2015, most from the then Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO). Ukrainian authorities regularly confiscate large numbers of grenades, mines and various explosive devices.55 In 2019, 1,500 units of firearms were confiscated from the population.56
Conflict has increased the level of violence in Ukraine. Since 2014, one in 10 Ukrainian citizens acquired a firearm.57 The Association of Firearm Owners actively lobbies for the legalization of firearms. Since 2015, there has been a worrying increase in domestic abuse and gender-based violence perpetrated by veterans.58 This goes alongside a form of reverence for military values across society, which could have negative political consequences in the long term. These issues remain largely unaddressed by the Ukrainian government and its policy documents for governmental programmes hardly mention measures to mitigate the spike in domestic violence related to the military conflict.59
War-affected populations and pressure on social institutions
Over 1.4 million people are officially registered as IDPs in Ukraine.60 Although their integration into Ukrainian society is considered broadly a success, serious issues remain, especially when it comes to social protection, socioeconomic rights, employment and overall access to services in Ukraine.61 The relocation of citizens to neighbouring regions such as Kharkiv and other cities in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts has become a serious burden on local administrations. Their capacity to service many more people with pension payments and various subsidies is limited.
The small city of Volnovakha, which had 103,000 inhabitants before the conflict, now has 52,000 pensioners, of which almost half are IDPs. In the government-controlled areas (GCA) of Donbas, almost half the households are eligible for housing subsidies due to low incomes. Experts estimate that 30–40 per cent of residents in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are living in poverty.62
The Ukrainian Pension Fund reports that almost all pensioners from the occupied territories have registered with the Kyiv authorities.63 Access to pensions remains one of the main difficulties for IDPs attempting to settle elsewhere, as half of them need to maintain their IDP status in order to qualify for their monthly pension payments.64 Pensioners and IDPs, regardless of their residence, should not be subject to unequal and unfair treatment. This discrimination is feeding resentment against central authorities and nurturing grievances against Kyiv.
A recent study showed that over 20 per cent of IDPs have diagnosed moderately severe or severe anxiety, while less than a quarter of IDPs with clinically significant anxiety and depression have sought mental health support.
There are persisting mental health issues among IDPs that the authorities have yet to address. A recent study showed that over 20 per cent of IDPs have diagnosed moderately severe or severe anxiety, while less than a quarter of IDPs with clinically significant anxiety and depression have sought mental health support.65 This does not necessarily reflect a problem of access to psychological support but rather an issue of basic mental health awareness and stigmatization. Ukrainian authorities hardly communicate the importance of mental health to IDPs and other target groups such as veterans, and there is little done to improve access to mental health services. This in turn increases the incidents of gender-based violence.
Veterans are another key group. There are around 360,000 veterans of the war with Russia and the number will continue to grow.66 This is a new constituency for the state and civil society, which will influence Ukrainian politics and civil society for decades to come. This group will likely push for broader legalization of firearms and embody an us-vs-them attitude that will make compromise difficult. Entrenched opposition against the amnesty for residents in occupied Donbas is particularly strong among families of deceased military personnel.67
There is also a worrying prevalence of substance abuse (drugs and alcohol), domestic violence and war-induced psychological disorders among veterans and demobilized soldiers. Veterans now face reintegration issues, which are compounded by lower economic and financial prospects and the difficulty of acclimatizing to a society that does not know how to treat its war heroes. Increasing public information about such abuses could increase social stigmatization of veterans. Psychological rehabilitation and mental healthcare for veterans are not widespread in Ukraine. This is not only affecting current morale within the armed forces, but the long-term ability of the country and willingness of its people to fight. The lack of psychological support for soldiers impedes their ability to cope with battle experiences and makes them less inclined to report mental health issues and to seek help when they return to civilian life.
Zelenskyy’s approach to conflict resolution
‘Conflict resolution’ and the ‘safe reintegration’ of Donbas have become new catchphrases in domestic political discourse. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has a strong political mandate and has demonstrated a genuine will to resolve the conflict. His team is skilled in political marketing and the study of public opinion. They operate on the assumption that there is significant conflict fatigue among the majority of the population and that if they achieve a ceasefire and manage to negotiate the release of prisoners of war, this will be a sufficient political result and something that Poroshenko failed to deliver.
Zelenskyy has clearly voiced a human-centric approach to managing the conflict by prioritizing the well-being of citizens on both sides of the LoC. His aim is the integration of people regardless of the territory they live in, by facilitating the exchange of information and goods and removing barriers to human mobility. Zelenskyy also initiated development of a transitional justice framework that would serve as one of the reintegration tools both for Donbas and Crimea.
The change of leadership in Kyiv has provided an opportunity to restart international negotiations as part of the Normandy Format and to kick-off internal deliberation about the safe reintegration of Donbas. International negotiations continue around the implementation of the Minsk Protocols, especially the package of measures signed in February 2015. These stalled in 2016, partially because of irreconcilable expectations between Kyiv and Moscow.
Zelenskyy’s desire to reboot international diplomacy around Donbas prompted Russia to revisit the Steinmeier Formula, a clarification about the enactment of special status for parts of Donbas that was much criticized in Ukraine.68 At the time, Ukrainian authorities were willing to give the Kremlin the benefit of the doubt and assumed Moscow actually wanted to take some action, if not to compromise, on Donbas. Kyiv placed preconditions on discussions with the Kremlin and notably spoke against enshrining a potential special status for Donbas in the Ukrainian constitution, insisting on the primacy of the security component of negotiations over the political process.
Predictably, the last round of the Normandy Format discussions in December 2019 did not deliver a breakthrough.69 Rather, it established small steps in the security dimension – notably further exchanges of prisoners, the creation of three new priority disengagement areas by March 2020 and new crossing points for populations, as well as an updated demining plan. The recommitment to the ceasefire, however, did not last long, 11 Ukrainian servicemen were killed in the east in January 2020.70
Assessing state capacity to manage the conflict
So far, Zelenskyy has been adamant in maintaining Kyiv’s red lines in discussions to settle the conflict – primarily the implementation of security guarantees before addressing political aspects of the Minsk Protocols, rejection of the idea of ‘federalization’ of Ukraine, and insistence on better control over the Ukrainian–Russian border. Protests in Ukraine against the Steinmeier Formula and in support of the red lines helped Zelenskyy calibrate his position on the eve of the Paris meeting in December 2019.
Zelenskyy operates in a restricted environment and is gaining a better understanding of the necessity to ensure the integrity of Ukrainian interests in terms of conflict management. Sticking to the red lines has calmed domestic public opinion and political opposition but it has also weakened the chances of resolving the conflict in the mid-term. Such a scenario would require strengthening of societal resilience.
Recent endeavours aimed at increasing resilience include cooperation with NATO on the Coherent Resilience 2020 joint exercises in Odesa71 and attempts to fight disinformation.72 Senior leaders have reached out to Ukrainian citizens near the frontline, which has helped strengthen relations and convey to those regions that Kyiv cares about them. The high-level investment forum in Mariupol in October 2019 put the spotlight on pressing needs for infrastructure and human development projects in the region close to the conflict area.
Investment in essential infrastructure will be piloted through the Reconstruction and Reintegration Fund for Donbas created jointly with the World Bank.73 At this stage, the efforts of the central government resemble intent rather than a viable policy. Studies and research focusing on how to rebuild the economy of Donbas are lacking. Meanwhile, proposed initiatives aimed at restarting local businesses and revitalizing the local economy are for now too small.74
The new Ukrainian leadership has limited capacity to apply a resilience-based approach to the conflict. The main constraint is the closed nature of its conflict-related decision-making process involving the president, Head of the Office of the President Andriy Yermak, and the president’s First Aide Sehiy Shefir. This limits the prospect of diverse views, increases anxiety levels in society and fails to prepare the ground for future conflict-related measures. Lack of strategic communication with regard to the conflict plays into the hands of the Russian propaganda machine, which uses any opportunity to spread suspicion and negative messages about Kyiv.
This kind of poor communication was recently in evidence when Ukraine agreed to set up a consultative council as part of a trilateral group in Minsk that would include representatives of occupied Donbas on an equal footing with representatives of Kyiv to discuss political modalities of conflict resolution. This move was not discussed with the ruling party or leading CSOs. As a result, it provoked protests, public petitions, condemnation by CSOs and volunteers, and an open statement from a group of about 60 MPs from the ruling party opposed to the decision.75
This is consistent with the marginal inclusion of civil society in the design and implementation of the conflict-related agenda. The Office of the President, as the main policymaking unit on Donbas and Russia, has no formal consultative body that engages civil society.
This is consistent with the marginal inclusion of civil society in the design and implementation of the conflict-related agenda. The Office of the President, as the main policymaking unit on Donbas and Russia, has no formal consultative body that engages civil society. Informal off-the-record meetings are sporadic and serve as an opportunity for authorities to share ready-made solutions rather than exchange ideas and seek feedback from civil society.
The rare exchange of ideas and approaches between policymakers and CSOs takes place as part of the work of the Committee on Human Rights, De-occupation and Reintegration of the Occupied Territories in parliament and the Commission for Legal Reforms. The Commission has a Working Group on the Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, headed by Anton Korenevych, the president’s special representative for Crimea.76 Among its other tasks, the Working Group is notably responsible for the development of the transitional justice roadmap for war-affected Ukraine. The group includes leading civic experts from the National Platform for Safe Reintegration, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Dialogue Initiatives, Fabryka Dymky Donbas, and Reanimation Package of Reforms. CSOs provide feedback on regulation and legislative changes to laws on education, registration and other issues impacting populations residing in the occupied territories.
Reform of the defence sector has been another area of productive cooperation between state and non-state actors, which has resulted in institutional transformation. Most recently, the Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO), an initiative of Transparency International, managed to advocate a new national security law to strengthen the role of civic oversight in the defence sector, particularly in procurement, to improve transparency and accountability.
Ukroboronprom (UOP), a state military conglomerate, is suspected of involvement in corrupt activities. Ongoing court cases allege that in the last 10 years the company’s losses related to corruption amounted to almost £30 million – the real figure is likely to be much higher as these statistics are from open court cases only.77 In December 2019, a new Law on Defence Procurement was adopted with active encouragement from NAKO and Statewatch, a CSO that monitors civil liberties in Europe. Civic oversight of the law’s implementation will continue, particularly where NAKO, as a member of the UOP Transformation Committee, will be working to identify major gaps and corruption risks within the existing UOP governance structure and assist in developing a transformation roadmap.
Overall, conflict resolution policy currently lacks effective coordination between various state entities and the executive and legislative branches of power. There is no unified platform within the government to discuss and develop a common conflict-related policy. However, Oleksii Reznikov’s new role as deputy prime minister and minister for the reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine will likely streamline the decision-making process and implementation efforts. This is especially relevant as at present the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons is not fit for purpose.78
With the ruling party’s supermajority in parliament, it may seem like an easy road to legislative backing of conflict-related policies. However, the human-centric approach79 demands addressing myriad complex grievances from citizens on both sides of the LoC. Among the most pressing remaining concerns are:
- Resolving the pensions issue for NGCA populations. Pension payments remain a problem, especially because of the constant IDP registration process for pension access.
- Easing, if not lifting completely, the economic blockade against the NGCA. This Poroshenko-era policy is detrimental to economic and people-to-people contacts, which are the basis of safe reintegration.
- Facilitating border crossing conditions, from basic access to streamlining border control and security checks. Border crossing conditions remain horrendous for most local residents.80
- Continued disengagement in Stanytsia Luhanska and improving the border crossing there. Reconstruction of the bridge is a good step forward81 but more attention is needed here.
- Create compensation procedures for citizens on the LoC in order to address property loss and forced expropriations.
- Ensure voting rights of IDPs are properly exercised. From 1 July 2020, the new electoral code allows IDPs to participate in local elections.
Parliament is not just the place where votes are cast, it is an important chamber for deliberation of these complex issues that impact millions of constituents. The recent creation of a special commission on regaining territorial integrity is a step forward82 but members of parliament could play a better role in addressing local grievances. While liaising with other parliamentary committees, government discussions should focus on the practicalities of conflict management, the granting of special status to Donbas, security guarantees and various issues related to providing education, healthcare and documentation for citizens in the occupied areas.
Social cohesion
Ukraine’s leadership is committed to achieving peace for its citizens. But the chances of implementing a future peace deal would improve if the government prioritized social cohesion efforts. Social cohesion is a product of social change and a necessary element of resilience. The safe reintegration of Donbas into the rest of Ukraine is more likely to succeed if risks to nationwide unity diminish and mutual understanding increases between those on both sides of the LoC. The polarizing lines described above are cutting through the fabric of society. Several factors are putting pressure on social cohesion, especially the disengagement of citizens from their communities, poor integration of war-affected populations and growing isolation and indoctrination of residents in the NGCA.
Weak civic agency
Ukrainian society can be broadly divided into two groups: a minority of around 10 per cent of citizens who actively participate in civil society,83 and a passive majority. Weak links between the two groups impede sustainable behavioural changes that many CSOs and active citizens aspire to. At the city or town level, citizens are atomized and rarely united in community associations. They discuss politics and community problems mainly in private spaces such as in their homes. They have little agency to drive change. Only 1 per cent of citizens say it is their responsibility to contribute to reforms.84 According to the UN SCORE index of social cohesion for Ukraine, the lack of political and civic agency is the main driver of decreasing social cohesion in the five eastern oblasts.85
With little option but to consume narratives hostile to reform projected either by Russian disinformation channels or oligarch-owned Ukrainian TV channels, citizens feel powerless and anxious; they continue to be the victims of corrupt elites. Especially in the southeast, the idea that Ukraine owes everything to either imperial Russia or the Soviet Union prevails. The re-discovery of local history that is free of Soviet propagandistic narratives about the origins of those communities has barely started. Ignorance about the past allows the Kremlin to polarize society, spread narratives of hate and maintain the delusion that Ukraine could never succeed without Russia.
Substantial gaps in the quality of civic community among different regions leads to a disparity in the quality of overall governance. As a result, decentralization will have varying effects across Ukraine.
Research of decentralization in Italy has proven that the quality of civic community – as measured by membership in community-based organizations, readership of local newspapers and civic engagement in local decision-making – is key to good governance and resilient communities.86 Substantial gaps in the quality of civic community among different regions leads to a disparity in the calibre of overall governance. As a result, decentralization will have varying effects across Ukraine. In some places, governance will improve, but in others it may lead to disenfranchisement and polarization, especially in the regions of the southeast. Sustained attention of volunteers and activists is further complicated by volunteer burn out and lack of support infrastructure for restorative care and mental health.87
The quality of civic community and the level to which citizens feel empowered varies across Ukraine, it is particularly problematic in the southeast. For example, at present the percentage of citizens who believe they have the ability to take part in decision-making at the city level (attend public hearings, sign petitions, access data on public spending) is lowest in Uzhgorod, Mykolaiv and Severodonetsk, all below 13 per cent compared to 29 per cent in Ivano-Frankivsk in the west. In Mykolaiv, 78 per cent say they have never interacted with the local authorities.88 The situation is worse than it was in 2017. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that among Ukraine’s regions the population of Mykolaiv is least satisfied with their levels of education or ability to engage in entrepreneurship. In February 2018, the approval rating for the mayor was at 25 per cent in Mykolaiv, compared to 71 per cent in Ivano-Frankivsk.89 It matters if people believe they have a sense of civic responsibility and believe they can make a difference in their communities. In Mykolaiv oblast more than 80 per cent of residents belong to the passive citizenship category, while in Ivano-Frankisvka only 24 per cent are in that group. 90 Additionally, low levels of trust, especially in national authorities, lead to civic disempowerment.91
Most experts agree that there are no deep divisions among Ukrainians. But there are structural problems that affect nationwide cohesion, such as inadequate connectivity (roads, railways and air connections), various levels of exposure to Russian media, poor internal mobility and weak cultural exchange. For example, more than half of citizens in the cities of Severodonetsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa have never travelled to other Ukrainian cities.92 In view of this, the new initiative of the Ministry of Youth, Sport, Culture and Information to finance exchanges for 250,000 students in 2020 is a move in the right direction. This is particularly important as citizens from different regions are increasingly labelling each other in a negative way. Ukrainians in the GCA of Donbas are concerned that strident views of so-called nationalists and separatist groups will make it impossible for them to hear each other’s arguments and have a discussion.93 Similarly, people in the west of Ukraine most frequently use negative stereotypes when referring to those from the east.94 School exchanges that provide meaningful contact for young people from different regions could improve intergroup harmony.
Disenfranchised veterans
The growing veteran community is a powerful new factor in Ukrainian civic life and its reintegration is key for social cohesion. The veteran community is not homogeneous and it remains fragmented and relatively disorganized in terms of social and political representation. However, many veterans are active in their communities in pushing for reform and social justice. New veteran CSOs are flourishing, and there are around 300 officially registered groups. In many cases they provide peer support, are active in community development and engage with young people.
Veterans may be highly motivated to contribute to positive change in Ukraine but they face many difficulties when returning to civilian life. Most problems relate to difficulty in obtaining plots of land, state subsidies for transportation, housing, customs clearance for vehicles, and access to healthcare and mental health counselling.95
The lack of integration of different veteran groups has led to tensions within this community. The older generation of Second World War veterans and those with a pro-Soviet outlook are usually targeted by pro-Russia political forces, while the new generation of veterans is more vulnerable to right-wing radical political movements. Although the interests and needs of the different veteran groups are similar, there is still division. Collisions between veterans have resulted in the rest of the population viewing them with some scepticism. In addition to other factors, such as corruption in military equipment procurement, this has led to deteriorating approval ratings for the armed forces, which already fell in 2018 in cities such as Odesa, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia and Ivano-Frankivsk.96
Facing difficulty in civilian life and dissatisfied with the quality of state services, disenfranchised veterans are an easy target for recruitment by various criminal and right-wing paramilitary groups. According to some estimates, veterans constitute around 10 per cent of radical groups, such as the National Corps, which engages ex-combatants from the Azov Battalion. Veterans are easy recruits for private security companies connected with criminal and ultra-right groups.97 In the high-profile killing of the journalist Pavel Sheremet, two out of three arrested suspects have links with the armed forces.98 The horrific death of Kateryna Handziuk from Kherson following an acid attack by two ATO veterans prompted a wave of protests to demand justice. Protesters called for the identification not only of those who executed the crime, but more importantly of those who ordered it.
Increased social inclusion of veterans is indispensable for social cohesion. During a research interview, a Ukrainian expert called veterans a potential ‘politically guided bullet’ that could be instrumentalized for nefarious reasons – including by Russian disinformation campaigns and information warfare. The current presidential agenda for peace in Donbas does not resonate positively with this community, making it all the more important to ramp up social inclusion of this group.99
Ukrainians in the NGCA
The soft absorption conducted by the Kremlin in the NGCA seriously impedes prospects for the smooth reintegration of this region into Ukraine and could further risk the already fragile cohesion in the country. There is a danger of long-term alienation of DNR and LNR populations from the rest of Ukraine. Limited comprehensive data on public views in the occupied areas notwithstanding, some studies point to a level of support for Donbas to unite (on the condition of a special status) with Ukraine, however, among those in the NGCA there is more support for these occupied areas to become part of Russia.100
The government should introduce measures to ensure the NGCA’s population feel in control of their own destiny in Ukraine, regardless of the outcomes of other efforts aimed at conflict resolution. This is still a viable proposition because of a willingness among the population to more comprehensively include those in the NGCA and IDPs within society and in the political debate.101
These steps are not about indulging citizens of the DNR and the LNR, but merely ensuring that NGCA populations are treated as humanely as possible and that their concerns are heard. A genuine human dimension to conflict settlement would only strengthen Ukrainian social fabric. The wider strategy should clearly differentiate war-affected citizens from war criminals and the local so-called separatist leadership.102 Experts working on Ukraine’s transitional justice mechanisms emphasize that residents of occupied Donbas doing public service for the occupation ‘authorities’, and who are not involved in any human rights violations, will be free from criminal responsibility. This is an important message that should be clearly communicated to the population across Ukraine.
There are still obstacles to dialogue with NGCA residents. However, initiatives aimed at building confidence and increasing people-to-people contacts should be encouraged by Western donors and the Ukrainian government alike. Several initiatives exist but they remain confidential and on a small scale. Furthermore, local populations are often scared to engage with those from other regions, fearing repercussions from the ‘authorities’ of occupied areas. Recreating a sense of mutual trust should start with small steps, for instance through university linkages where students from Donetsk and Luhansk are invited for exchanges or academic fellowships in the rest of Ukraine.
Finally, socioeconomic and business linkages between the NGCA and Ukraine could benefit prospective reintegration. Local residents from the occupied territories should be empowered to believe that it is better to live and invest in Ukraine than in the DNR and the LNR. People-to-people contacts should be encouraged between business owners and entrepreneurs, especially small and medium-sized enterprises. This is particularly relevant as many IDP business owners retain commercial links with both the NGCA and the GCA.103 Local trade and business links should be understood more comprehensively as an innovative way to engage with residents of occupied Donbas and increase confidence-building measures across the LoC.
Overall, thanks to smart interventions by non-state actors, a new dynamic is emerging that contributes to social cohesion and helps bind communities together around a common future, rendering society more resilient. Social connections based on trust are indispensable at times of constant change and crisis (see the case studies in the following chapter).
42 National Democratic Institute (2019), ‘Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine’s Democratic Transition’, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI_September%202019%20survey_Public_vf.pdf (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
43 Detector Media (2020), ‘Заява медійників щодо законопроєкту про дезінформацію (ВІДКРИТА ДО ПІДПИСАННЯ)’ [‘Statement from the media community on the law on disinformation (OPEN TO SIGNING)’], 27 January 2020, https://detector.media/community/article/174234/2020-01-27-zayava-mediinikiv-shchodo-zakonoproektu-pro-dezinformatsiyu-vidkrita-do-pidpisannya/ (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
44 Romanova, V. and Umland, A. (2019), Ukraine’s Decentralization Reforms Since 2014: Initial Achievements and Future Challenges, Chatham House Report, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ukraine-s-decentralization-reforms-2014-initial-achievements-and-future-challenges (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
45 Democratic Initiatives Foundation (2019), ‘Шляхи досягнення миру на Донбасі: суспільні настрої, очікування, перестороги – загальнонаціональне опитування’ [Ways towards achieving peace in Donbas: social sentiment, expectations, caveats – a nationwide survey], 6 December 2019, https://dif.org.ua/article/shlyakhi-dosyagnennya-miru-na-donbasi-suspilni-nastroi-ochikuvannya-perestorogi-
zagalnonatsionalne-opituvannya (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
46 Democratic Initiatives Foundation (2019), ‘Ways towards achieving peace in Donbas’.
47 National Democratic Institute (2019), ‘Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine’s Democratic Transition’.
48 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2019), ‘Ukraine: 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan (January – December 2019)’, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ukraine_humanitarian_response_plan_2019_en_0.pdf (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
49 Razumkov Centre (2019), ‘The War In Donbas: Realities And Prospects Of Settlement’.
50 DRA (2019), Everyday life in the shadows of war: the security and wellbeing of civilians living near the frontlines in eastern Ukraine, Berlin: DRA, https://civicmonitoring.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ENG-web-DRA-report-shadows-of-war.pdf (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
51 Hamilton, R. E. (2019), ‘Coal Mines, Land Mines and Nuclear Bombs: The Environmental Cost of the War in Eastern Ukraine’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 26 September 2019, https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/09/coal-mines-land-mines-and-nuclear-bombs-the-environmental-
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52 Razumkov Centre (2019), ‘The War In Donbas: Realities And Prospects Of Settlement’.
53 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2019), ‘Ukraine: 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan (January – December 2019)’.
54 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2018), ‘Ukrainian parliament adopts legal framework for mine action, with OSCE advice provided’, https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-ukraine/406043 (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
55 Martyniuk, A. (2017), Дослідження Незаконних Потоків Зброї [Investigation of Illegal Streams of Weapons], Geneva: Small Arms Survey, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP3-Ukraine-UKR.pdf (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
56 Kartasheva, A. (2020), ‘В Україні за минулий рік вилучили понад 1,5 тис. одиниць вогнепальної зброї’ [‘More than 1.5 thousand units of firearms seized over the past year in Ukraine’], UNN, 13 February 2020, https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/exclusive/1852073-v-ukrayini-za-
minuliy-rik-viluchili-ponad-1-5-tis-odinits-vognepalnoyi-zbroyi (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
57 Kostiuk, A. (2020), ‘Чи хочуть українці легалізації зброї: опитування’ [‘Do Ukrainians want legalisation of weapons: a survey’], 24 Kanal, 7 February 2020, https://24tv.ua/chi_hochut_ukrayintsi_legalizatsiyi_zbroyi_opituvannya_n1271515 (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
58 Johnson, D. (2016), ‘As Ukraine’s women speak up on sexual violence, we must not ignore those affected by conflict’, Open Democracy, 25 July 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/speaking-on-sexual-violence/ (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
59 Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine (2020), ‘Стратегічний план діяльності Міністерства соціальної політики України на 2020 бюджетний рік і два бюджетні періоди, що настають за плановим (2021–2022 роки)’ [‘Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine for the 2020 budget year and the two consequent budget periods (2021-2022)’], https://www.msp.gov.ua/documents/5641.html (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
60 UNHCR (2020), ‘Ukraine: Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)’, https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/internally-displaced-persons (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
61 Likhachev, V. (2018), Reintegration or Alienation?, Berlin: DRA, https://civicmonitoring.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Reintegration-
or-Alienation-En.pdf (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
62 International Alert and Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (2017), ‘Громадяни і держава на підконтрольних територіях Донецької та Луганської області: Проблеми, виклики, бачення майбутнього’ [‘Citizens and the state in the government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhanks oblasts: problems, challenges, visions for the future’], http://www.ucipr.org.ua/publicdocs/sirazona_UK.pdf (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
63 Pension Fund of Ukraine (2014), ‘Понад 662 тис. переселенців вже звернулися до управлінь Пенсійного фонду за переведенням пенсій’ [‘More than 662 thousand IDPs have already applied to the Pension fund administrations to transfer pensions’], https://www.pfu.gov.ua/17018-
ponad-662-tys-pereselentsiv-vzhe-zvernulysya-do-upravlin-pensijnogo-fondu-za-perevedennyam-pensij/ (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
64 International Crisis Group (2018), ‘Nobody Wants Us’: The Alienated Civilians of Eastern Ukraine, Europe Report №252, 1 October 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/252-nobody-wants-us-alienated-civilians-eastern-ukraine (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
65 Kuznetsova, I., Mikheieva, O., Catling, J., Round, J. and Babenko, S. (2019), ‘The Mental Health of Internally Displaced People and the General Population in Ukraine’, https://idpukraine.com/2019/03/06/the-mental-health-of-idps-and-the-general-population-in-ukraine-briefing-paper/ (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
66 Synhayivs’ka, M. and Samokhvalova, L. (2019), ‘Ірина Фріз, міністр у справах ветеранів: Суспільство має бути готовим комунікувати з ветеранами на якісно новому рівні’ [‘Iryna Friz, minister for veteran affairs: Society needs to be ready to interact with veterans on a qualitatively new level’], Ukrinform, 13 March 2019, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/2658992-irina-friz-ministr-ministerstva-
u-spravah-veteraniv.html (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
67 ZN.UA (2018), ‘Переважна більшість родичів загиблих проти амністії ватажків, вбивць і організаторів псевдореферендума в Донбасі’ [‘Overwhelming majority of relatives of those killed are against amnesty for the leaders, murderers and organisers of the pseudo-referendum in Donbas’], 11 February 2018, https://dt.ua/UKRAINE/perevazhna-bilshist-rodichiv-zagiblih-proti-amnistiyi-vatazhkiv-vbivc-i-organizatoriv-
psevdoreferenduma-v-donbasi-268979_.html (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
68 Allan, D. and Litra, L. (2019), ‘Zelenskyy Finds That There Are No Easy Solutions in Donbas’, Chatham House Expert Comment, 23 October 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/zelenskyy-finds-there-are-no-easy-solutions-donbas (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
69 Minakov, M. (2019), ‘Results of the Normandy Format Talks for Ukraine: Hope, with Reservations’, Focus Ukraine blog of the Kennan Institute, 11 December 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/results-the-normandy-format-talks-for-ukraine-hope-reservations (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
70 Stek, L. (2020), ‘11 загиблих у січні: чому провалились домовленості Зеленського і Путіна’ [‘11 killed in January: why the arrangements of Zelenskyy and Putin failed’], Radio Svoboda, 3 February 2020, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/donbass-realii/30412995.html (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
71 Service of the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine (2020), ‘Ukraine and NATO agree on joint exercises in Odesa’, 15 January 2020, https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/spilni-navchannya-ukrayini-i-nato-v-odesi-kuleba-i-kadenbah-pidpisali-dokument (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
72 Coynash, H. (2020), ‘Ukraine proposes to fight ‘disinformation’ using dangerously undemocratic methods’, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, 24 January 2020, http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1579729272 (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
73 Slovo I Dilo (2019), ‘В Україні запустили Фонд відновлення Донбасу’ [‘Reintegration Fund for Donbas launched in Ukraine’], 29 October 2019, https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2019/10/29/novyna/polityka/ukrayini-zapustyly-fond-vidnovlennya-donbasu (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
74 Radio Svoboda (2019), ‘Зеленський розповів бізнесменам, скільки потрібно для відновлення Донбасу’ [‘Zelensky told businessmen how much is needed for the restoration of Donbas’], 20 June 2019, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zelenskyi-biznes-donbas/30010773.html (accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
75 For the civil society statement, see VOX Ukraine (2020), ‘Звернення громадських діячів про недопущення створення консультради з «представниками ОРДЛО»’ [‘Civil society statement on unacceptability of creation of consultative council with “representatives of ORDLO”’], https://voxukraine.org/uk/zvernennya-gromadskih-diyachiv-z-privodu-stvorennya-konsultativnoyi-radi-z-predstavnikami-ordlo/?fbclid=IwAR13HXLC4YVgpy9upwYSbBcC6r5TH7ye2C47GSXhxpQjUDiV29JmYmH7N6c (accessed 22 Apr. 2020); for the statement of Sluha Naroda MPs, see Den’ (2020), ‘Частина депутатів від “Слуги народу” виступила проти створення Консультативної ради з ОРДЛО’ [‘A number of Sluha Naroda MPs speak out against creation of consultative council with ORDLO’], 13 March 2020, https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/news/130320-chastyna-deputativ-vid-slugy-narodu-vystupyla-proty-stvorennya-konsultatyvnoyi-rady-z (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
76 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2019), ‘Положення про Комісію з питань правової реформи’ [On the Commission for Legal Reforms], 7 August 2019, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/584/2019/print (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
77 Shtuka, N. (2020), ‘«Укроборонпром» зазнав майже 1 млрд грн збитків через розкрадання’ [‘Ukroboronprom lost almost 1 billion UAH through theft’], The Page, 11 January 2020, https://thepage.ua/ua/news/ukroboronprom-ponis-majzhe-1-mlrd-grn-zbitkiv-cherez-rozkradannya (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
78 International Crisis Group (2018), ‘Nobody Wants Us’: The Alienated Civilians of Eastern Ukraine.
79 Marangé, C. (2019), ‘A People-Centered Approach to Conflict Resolution in Ukraine’, War on the Rocks, 3 July 2019, https://warontherocks.com/
2019/07/a-people-centered-approach-to-conflict-resolution-in-ukraine/ (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
80 DRA (2019), Everyday life in the shadows of war.
81 President of Ukraine (2019), ‘Відновлення мосту біля Станиці Луганської транслюється в онлайн-режимі’ [‘Reconstruction of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska is streamed online’], 18 September 2019, https://www.president.gov.ua/news/vidnovlennya-mostu-bilya-stanici-
luganskoyi-translyuyetsya-v-57349 (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
82 The special commission of Verkhovna Rada on the questions of restoring territorial integrity and ensuring sovereignty of Ukraine was created on 17 October 2019. It aims to ‘formulate and carry out’ government policy towards Donbas, identify potential threats in the course of de-occupation and re-integration of the occupied territories, ensure committee cooperation within the Rada, and formulate recommendations. See Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2019), ‘News’, https://rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/183014.html (accessed 22 Apr. 2020). A Rada committee on Human Rights, De-occupation and Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk, Luhansk Regions and Autonomous Republic of Crimea, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations, was also created in August 2019.
83 Golub, A. (2018), Громадянська пасивність [Civic passivity], Tyzhden.ua, 28 March 2018, http://tyzhden.ua/Society/211149 (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
84 reforms.in.ua (2017), ‘Тільки 1% Українців вважає, що відповідальність за реформи несуть громадяни держави’ [Only 1% of Ukrainians believe that citizens are to be responsible for the reforms], http://reforms.in.ua/ua/news/tilky-1-ukrayinciv-vvazhaye-shcho-vidpovidalnist-za-
reformy-nesut-gromadyany-derzhavy?fbclid=IwAR30c74l- (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
85 SCORE compiles 70 indicators from civic behaviour to intergroup relations, security, access to services, etc. in order to identify strengths and weaknesses of social cohesion in the context of the conflict across the five eastern oblasts of Ukraine. The first driver of decohesion is lack of civic empowerment, followed by locality dissatisfaction and economic security. See SCORE (2018), ‘Ukraine Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index’, https://www.scoreforpeace.org/en/ukraine/2018-General%20population%20Government%20Controlled%20Areas-0 (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
86 Putman, R. D. (1993), Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
87 Hromadske TV Dnipro (2019), ‘Дотла. Волонтерське вигорання’ [‘To ashes. Volunteer burn-out’], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-UEt
dcWVmrA (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
88 Center for Insights in Survey Research (2018), ‘Fourth Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey’, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-3-22_
ukraine_poll.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
89 Ibid.
90 SCORE (2018), ‘Constructive Citizenship in Ukraine’, https://www.scoreforpeace.org/files/publication/pub_file//PRE_UKR18_Civic_EngagementENG.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
91 United Nations Ukraine (2018), ‘UN Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index for Eastern Ukraine: Key changes from 2017 to 2018’, https://scoreforpeace.org/files/publication/pub_file/Trends2018_ENG.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
92 Center for Insights in Survey Research (2018), ‘Fourth Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey’.
93 SCORE (2019), ‘Changes in Social Cohesion, Citizens’ Satisfaction and Visions of Reintegration: Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts’, https://scoreforpeace.org/files/publication/pub_file//PUB_DGEUkr19_Preliminary%20Findings%20Presentation_ENG.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
94 Hustings, I. D., Lemishka, O. and Scheerder, A. (2019), ‘SCORE Ukraine: tracking trends’, https://www.scoreforpeace.org/files/publication/pub_file//SCORE%20Ukarine_Tracking%20Trends%20for%20Selected%20Indicators%20(2016-2018)_ENG.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
95 Yuridichna Sotnya [the Legal Hundred] (2019), ‘Статистика гарячої лінії Юридичної Сотні за травень 2019 р.’ [‘The Legal Hundred Hotline Statistics for May 2019’], 10 June 2019, https://legal100.org.ua/statistika-garyachoyi-liniyi-yuridichnoyi-sotni-za-traven-2019-r/ (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
96 Center for Insights in Survey Research (2018), ‘Fourth Annual Ukrainian Municipal Survey’, p. 174.
97 International Alert (2019), ‘Ветерани в Україні: що далі?’ [‘Veterans in Ukraine: what next?’], https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine_Whatsnextforveterans_UKR_2019.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
98 Detector Media (2020), ‘Справа Шеремета: підозрювана Юлія Кузьменко залишиться під вартою до 3 квітня’ [‘The Sheremet case: the suspect Yulia Kuzmenko remains in custody until April 3’], 4 February 2020, https://detector.media/infospace/article/174485/2020-02-04-sprava-sheremeta-pidozryuvana-yuliya-kuzmenko-zalishitsya-pid-vartoyu-do-3-kvitnya/ (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
99 Author interview with a security expert, who chose to remain anonymous, Kyiv, 17 October 2019.
100 SCORE (2019), ‘Changes in Social Cohesion, Citizens’ Satisfaction and Visions of Reintegration’.
101 School for Policy Analysis NaUKMA (2019), ‘Survey on Donbas’, https://spa.ukma.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Survey-on-Donbas-.pdf (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).
102 International Crisis Group (2018), ‘Nobody Wants Us’: The Alienated Civilians of Eastern Ukraine.
103 Mirimanova, N. (2017), Economic connectivity across the line of contact in Donbas, Ukraine, Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, https://www.hdcentre.org/publications/economic-connectivity-across-the-line-of-contact-in-donbas-ukraine/ (accessed 22 Apr. 2020).