Canadian attitudes towards China have undergone a dramatic shift – from ambivalence to distrust – since the two countries became locked in a diplomatic dispute in late 2018. This paper argues that these hardened sentiments are unlikely to dissipate and Canada–China relations seem to have entered a new, warier phase.
A coordinated approach to China?
Ideally, the White House would work with Canada and other countries to devise a common approach towards China – one that sets out clear limits on harmful Chinese behaviours, such as the misappropriation of intellectual property, or the use of state-controlled Chinese companies to gain control of strategically sensitive resources and technologies – along with joint responses if China ignores these limits.31 There are some indications of increasing coordination.32 In June 2020, for example, the US, the UK, the EU, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand all issued statements critical of China’s decision to impose the new national security law in Hong Kong. But a genuinely coordinated approach among these countries would begin with their commitment to work together across a broader range of issues.
This seems unlikely while Trump remains president, given his preference for dealing with China unilaterally. Nor are America’s traditional partners of a single mind on how to handle China – divisions within Europe, for example, have been pronounced.33 Nevertheless, the strategic necessity for all of these countries to work together will only grow over time; the challenge of an emboldened China is not going away. If anything, Beijing has become more assertive during the coronavirus pandemic. In addition to the legislative blow dealt in Hong Kong, the Vietnamese government claimed in April that a Chinese surveillance ship rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands in the contested South China Sea.34 In May, China imposed import tariffs of up to 80 per cent on Australian barley, after the Australian government called for an independent investigation into the initial COVID-19 outbreak35 – the scale of which, according to some reports, China initially sought to hide.36
The strategic necessity for all of these countries to work together will only grow over time; the challenge of an emboldened China is not going away.
The COVID-19 crisis has also exposed the vulnerability of medical supply chains to disruption. While Canada has joined 41 other countries, including the UK, in calling for ‘the continued flow of vital medical supplies and other essential goods and services across borders during this health crisis’,37 many of these countries are urgently developing new sources of supply for medical equipment and pharmaceutical raw materials to reduce their current dependence on Chinese suppliers.38 As just one example of this trend, in March the Canadian government announced a C$1 billion plan to ‘build the industrial capability needed to manufacture critical supplies at scale in Canada’.39 A movement in Canada and elsewhere towards reshoring some of these supply chains seems inevitable.
On these and other issues, Canada has also sought closer cooperation with like-minded countries and, in some cases, with private actors and non-governmental organizations. Flexible plurilateralism – diverse combinations of states and non-state actors working together on specific goals – can be useful in addressing certain global problems.40 In April, for example, Trudeau joined the leaders of 19 other countries, along with US philanthropist Bill Gates, in a virtual meeting where they pledged to cooperate in developing a coronavirus vaccine and other treatments, and to provide worldwide access to these technologies.41 The US declined to attend this meeting because it was hosted by the World Health Organization (WHO), which the Trump administration has shunned, claiming that the organization has become a Chinese ‘puppet’.42 Many other democratic countries have also expressed misgivings over the WHO’s initial handling of the COVID-19 crisis, but they had implored Trump not to cut US funding to the world’s main public health agency during a global emergency.
Although plurilateral solutions are promising in terms of some issues, when it comes to dealing with China, an emerging giant, US leadership is essential. However, effective leadership will require whoever occupies the role of US president after January 2021 to rediscover the value of working with, and listening to, America’s traditional partners. It will also require these partner nations, including Canada, to acknowledge the seriousness of the China challenge that is now preoccupying Washington.
A strategically sound approach would establish clear limits on China’s problematic behaviours and uphold these restrictions. In addition to this clarity of purpose and resolve, restraint is also essential. If the US charts a reckless course with China, it should not expect its allies to follow suit. In recent months, Trump’s language has become increasingly belligerent – not unlike the rhetoric of his pugnacious trade adviser, Peter Navarro, whose published works have included titles such as The Coming China Wars and Death By China. There is too much at stake – for the global economy and, ultimately, for international peace – to abandon prudence.
Until such a coordinated approach crystallizes, Canada must continue to manage its relations with both the US and China with extreme care, for it is now exposed to the caprices of both. In the end, however, there should be no doubt about Canada’s alignment in the growing contest between these two great powers. By virtue of Canada’s history, geographical location, economic imperatives, security requirements, values and cultural connections, the US will remain Canada’s closest ally and trading partner – even if the US administration does not see Canada in precisely the same light.
31 Paris (2020), ‘Disunited Democracies Cannot Face the Challenge of China’.
32 Small, A. (2020), ‘Transatlantic Cooperation on Asia and the Trump Administration’, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 30 October 2019, https://www.gmfus.org/publications/transatlantic-cooperation-asia-and-trump-administration (accessed 8 Jun. 2020).
33 Smith, J. and Taussig, T. (2019), ‘The Old World and the Middle Kingdom: Europe Wakes Up to China’s Rise’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2019), pp. 112–124.
34 Khanh, V. (2020), ‘Vietnam protests Beijing’s sinking of South China Sea boat’, 4 April 2020, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-china-southchinasea/vietnam-protests-beijings-sinking-of-south-china-sea-boat-idUSKBN21M072 (accessed 8 Jun. 2020).
35 Smyth, J. and Sun, Y. (2020), ‘Australia threatens China with WTO challenge over barley tariffs’, Financial Times, 19 May 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/09bd2c90-9b32-4c62-b556-5a247c6de163 (accessed 8 Jun. 2020).
36 Wadhams, N. and Jacobs, J. (2020), ‘China Concealed Extent of Virus Outbreak, U.S. Intelligence Says’, Bloomberg, 1 April 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-01/china-concealed-extent-of-virus-outbreak-u-s-intelligence-says (accessed 8 Jun. 2020).
37 World Trade Organization (2020), ‘Ministerial statement on COVID-19 and the multilateral trading system’, 4 May 2020, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/212.pdf (accessed 8 Jun. 2020).
38 The UK is one example. Wright, O. and Fisher, L. (2020), ‘Boris Johnson wants self-sufficiency to end reliance on Chinese imports’, The Times, 22 May 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/boris-johnson-wants-self-sufficiency-to-end-reliance-on-chinese-imports-bmlxnl8jl (accessed 8 Jun. 2020).
39 Government of Canada (2020), ‘Prime Minister announces Canada’s Plan to Mobilize Industry to fight COVID-19’, 20 March 2020, https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2020/03/20/prime-minister-announces-canadas-plan-mobilize-industry-fight-covid (accessed 8 Jun. 2020).
40 Paris, R. (2019), Can Middle Powers Save the Liberal World Order?, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2019-06-18-MiddlePowers.pdf (accessed 19 May 2020).
41 Wintour, P. (2020), ‘US stays away as world leaders agree action on COVID-19 vaccine’, Guardian, 24 April 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/24/us-stays-away-as-world-leaders-agree-action-on-covid-19-vaccine (accessed 8 Jun. 2020).
42 Holland, S. and Nichols, M. (2020), ‘Trump cutting U.S. ties with World Health Organization over virus’, Reuters, 29 May 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-trump-who/trump-cutting-u-s-ties-with-world-health-organization-over-virus-
idUSKBN2352YJ (accessed 8 Jun. 2020).