The E3 in the 2020s
Several factors will shape the extent to which the E3 is a useful foreign policy format in the years ahead. Two interrelated issues in particular will play central roles in the evolution of the E3: the development of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor; and the nature of transatlantic relations.
The development of the EU as a foreign, security and defence policy actor
A key factor for the future of the E3 will be the degree to which the EU becomes a more coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor. The E3 is likely to have the greatest utility if European foreign and security policy architecture is weak or fragmented. However, it will struggle for relevance if Germany and France see little added value outside the EU framework, although the E3+EU format could still be important in this latter scenario.
In recent years, EU member states have sought to create new defence and security structures to improve internal cooperation, with the hope that this will make the union a more influential and effective actor. These efforts have been particularly notable in the field of defence integration, such as the creation of the European Defence Fund (EDF), aimed at strengthening the EU defence industrial base and encouraging joint R&D and procurement, and the establishment of a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, which is designed to allow smaller groups of member states to take forward deeper defence cooperation without being blocked by the requirements of EU-wide consensus. However, despite the ambitious rhetoric, the majority of these changes are intended to increase the capacity of states to coordinate their planning, research, training and procurement as well as enhance niche capabilities, and therefore they do not represent a quantum leap towards a genuine common EU defence policy. Budget attributions for several of these new initiatives are also still unresolved. Differences in capability, political will and threat perception alongside the principle of unanimity in decision-making will likely continue to constrain the pace of development in the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) over the next decade.
The E3 is likely to have the greatest utility if European foreign and security policy architecture is weak or fragmented. However, it will struggle for relevance if Germany and France see little added value outside the EU framework.
The EU may be able to overcome some of these obstacles to achieve a more integrated foreign and defence policy if external events create political demand for a more robust framework. It is not yet clear whether the COVID-19 pandemic will have this effect, or whether the broader health and economic crisis will exacerbate existing tensions among member states.19 Other potential triggers for greater EU cohesion could be the re-election of Donald Trump as US president, a sharp deterioration in relations with Russia, or another migration crisis caused by instability in the European neighbourhood.
If member states become more united around a foreign policy agenda, the EU could potentially expand the use of qualified majority voting on external relations, strengthen the European External Action Service (EEAS), and develop further its mutual defence clause (Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union). Changes in political leadership in key member states could shift the balance of perspectives, reducing the number of states with concerns about the implications on sovereignty of deeper foreign policy and defence cooperation. A necessary but not sufficient component of this would be a shared Franco-German view on the direction of policy, which is currently limited.
However, at present, the converse looks more likely. The COVID-19 pandemic has awakened dormant tensions within the eurozone, risking a wider political rift. It also comes on the back of a lack of foreign policy cohesion in recent years, illustrated by the inability of member states to reach consensus on issues ranging from the war in Syria, Russia’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the political crisis in Venezuela and the situation in Libya.20 Meanwhile, domestic political fragmentation across the continent has made reaching consensus more difficult by increasing further the heterogeneity of EU governments. At present, the French government, which has been a key driving force behind current initiatives, is frustrated with the modest steps that have been agreed, and there is no clear alignment of ambition between France and Germany on EU foreign and security policy.
Alternative non-EU formats such as the European Intervention Initiative (E2I)21 and the proposed ESC are to a certain extent the result of these frustrations, alongside a desire to keep the UK tied into European security. Depending on the detail of the final proposal, any ESC could be either complementary or a potential alternative to the E3 format – especially if the European Commission truly becomes a more ‘geopolitical’ actor, an aspiration outlined by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
The nature of transatlantic relations
The second consideration is the role of transatlantic relations on the utility of the E3 format over the coming decade. Divisions between European governments and the Trump administration have enhanced the logic of E3 coordination. Through the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) arrangement, the EU agreed an unprecedented vehicle to bypass US sanctions and facilitate continued trade with Iran.22 More broadly, in the last four years, France, Germany and the UK have had more in common with one another – on issues ranging from Iran to Syria, climate change and China – than with the US. This makes the case for E3 cooperation stronger – as a mode of coordination between like-minded states, as a mechanism to try and influence the US through common positions, and to avoid Washington playing Europeans against one another on divisive questions.
The re-election of President Trump in November 2020 would reinforce this logic. A second Trump administration would almost certainly maintain its aggressive posture towards China and adopt a more detached role on questions of security and instability in Europe’s neighbourhood. These positions could also remain components of US policy under administrations of different political hues in the next decade. In such circumstances, the E3 could become a vehicle through which European states seek to manage increasing long-term divergences between themselves and the US and develop shared positions on different issues. It could even become an informal European core within NATO if the alliance continues to face transatlantic splits over its role and focus as well as the relative contribution of its members. While there is a risk that US pressure might lead the UK to drift from its European allies after Brexit, thus far these fears have been unrealized.
On the other hand, a significant change in US policy under a new Democratic administration from 2021 could lead to greater alignment with Europe. This could lower the utility of the E3 format on issues where the US will play a decisive role and reduce the instances of collective European effort to influence or resist US policy. A change in US administration could create the circumstances for boosting the informal quadrilateral security dialogue (Quad) between the E3 and the US, which holds discussions, for example, on the margins of NATO meetings. Washington may still support the E3 format if it leads Europeans to take greater responsibility for regional challenges and if it proves itself better at making and implementing decisions than the EU. If the Quad takes on a more permanent nature, this may help the UK retain its parallel role of helping explain US perspectives to its European partners and vice versa, much as it has done for the past three or four decades.
Figure 1: Four scenarios for the 2020s
— Source: Compiled by the authors.
Figure 1: Four scenarios for the 2020s
19 See Billon-Galland, A. (2020), ‘COVID-19 Strengthens the Case for EU Defence’, Chatham House Expert Comment, 17 June 2020,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/06/covid-19-strengthens-case-eu-defen….
20 Emmott, R. and Baczynska, G. (2019), ‘Engine trouble: EU struggles to attune diplomacy in Brussels’, Reuters, 6 February 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-foreignpolicy/engine-trouble-eu-struggles-to-attune-diplomacy-in-brussels-idUSKCN1PV286.
21 Zandee, D. and Kruijver, K. (2019), The European Intervention Initiative: Developing a shared strategic culture for European deefence, Clingendael, September 2019, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/The_European_Intervention_2019.pdf.
22 UK government (2019), ‘New mechanism to facilitate trade with Iran: joint statement’, press release, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-new-mechanism-to-facilitate-trade-with-iran.