The future of the E3: Options for a post-Brexit UK
The events of 2020 will be significant in shaping the future foreign policy environment facing the UK, with the COVID-19 pandemic causing a global health and economic crisis, a crucial US presidential election in November and the Brexit transition period set to end in December. These developments could have an important bearing in making one or other of the scenarios set out in Figure 1 more likely. It is in this context that the UK government is undertaking its Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review. This makes it all the more timely for it to consider the role of the E3 and its potential in UK foreign policy. As indicated, the importance and role of the E3 could vary considerably depending on which future emerges. However, in all scenarios, the E3 will retain utility as a flexible trilateral diplomatic platform. A range of options for the E3’s future is explored below, followed by recommendations for how the UK government could make best use of the format in the coming years.
Options for the E3
Downgrade or deprioritize
One option would be to downgrade the degree and intensity of E3 cooperation. If the focus of UK policy in the coming decade turns to developing relations with emerging powers and deepening cooperation with the US and the other Five Eyes partners, this could hamper further E3 cooperation. In this context, it is notable that in May the UK released a statement about the Hong Kong protests in coordination with Australia, Canada and the US rather than with its European partners.23 E3 cooperation could also become obsolete under certain scenarios in which the UK repeatedly takes a different position to France or Germany on key issues.
However, given the strengths of the format and the current policy alignment of the three countries, downgrading the E3 would not be in the UK’s interests. The government’s latest approach to the Brexit negotiations, in which plans to develop a formalized and ambitious foreign and security policy relationship with the EU have been scrapped, strengthens the justification for the E3 and E3+EU formats. It is therefore not the right time to downgrade or deprioritize E3 cooperation.
Widen participation
The UK could work with France and Germany to broaden the composition of the format. As discussed, there is already a degree of flexibility with the frequent inclusion of the EU, via the HR/VP, in certain E3 dialogues and statements. The format could expand to include one or two additional EU states (with Italy, Poland and Spain as potential candidates), possibly on an ad hoc basis depending on the issue being discussed.
Another option would be to include a small number of non-European powers. The obvious candidates would be Australia, Canada or Japan. This would see the E3 evolve into a format that brings together democratic middle powers, although it would mean losing the focus on coordinated European action, which is a principal interest for France and Germany. Alternatively, the E3 format could be folded into a broader initiative like the so-called ‘D10’ of democratic states, which has been considered as a format to address issues like 5G technology.24
These options could add political and economic weight as well as, on some issues, increased legitimacy to the E3 process. But each would involve losing the distinctive character of the current format and the balance of relationships within it. A larger format would inevitably lead to more compromise and may dilute the political alignment between members. Any expansion would also lead to difficulties in explaining exclusions. There is also a risk that some of the above changes would duplicate aspects of existing formats, such as the G7. Widening E3 participation is therefore not the best way forward for the moment.
Institutionalize the E3
A third option is to try to institutionalize the E3. This could involve organizing regular official dialogues at the ministerial or even head-of-government level, creating a secretariat for the E3 composed of officials from each country or creating dedicated units within each foreign ministry to develop it. It could involve additional components such as exchange programmes and expand beyond foreign ministries to incorporate dialogue in other areas (such as defence, international development, climate or financial regulation).
Such an approach might enhance the E3’s value as a venue not simply for responding to crises or current developments, or for managing a diplomatic process, but for holding a dialogue about long-term challenges and strategic planning. This would also potentially insulate the E3 from political change or difficult personal relationships between heads of government.
However, institutionalization could also create excessive demands on government time and resources that outweigh any benefits. It also risks generating duplication and diplomatic activity for its own sake rather than being issue-led or agenda-led, which is one of the main strengths of the E3. It would also increase the perception among other European states that they are being excluded, or that EU foreign policy processes are being bypassed.
Recommendation for the UK: Flexi3
None of the options above is optimal for the UK. Instead, it should seek to engage the E3 in more areas, while maintaining a flexible and adaptable mode of cooperation. To get the most from the E3 and create a format that is resilient to future developments, as well as acceptable to France and Germany, the UK should take a twin-track approach. On content, this would aim to create new areas of E3 coordination (expand the focus), and on process this would aim to prioritize adaptability, informality and responsiveness among the three countries (maintain the flexibility and European character of the format). This would build on the existing strengths of the format, give space for evolution and be adaptable to future scenarios.
Given the dynamic political environment, the E3 will need to evolve to be most effective. Simply maintaining the status quo risks it losing relevance as the JCPOA process potentially unravels further, while the Brexit context requires additional diplomatic investment from the UK to demonstrate commitment and leadership. A ‘Flexi3’ arrangement as described above therefore makes the most sense in the short term for the UK to pursue.
Expanded focus
The UK should seek agreement with Germany and France to expand the scope and focus of the issues that the E3 addresses beyond the Iran negotiations. This would seek to embed the format more closely into the working patterns between the three countries’ foreign and defence ministries on issues that have not yet been addressed in an E3 mode. It would also avoid political and institutional drift, which could occur if cooperation is not anchored in a particular goal or process. The agenda might be broadened in the four following ways.
- Regional focus: The E3 could collectively identify regions where they would seek to act on the basis of a shared set of objectives. This might include a focus on the broader European neighbourhood, including collective action on the Balkans, Ukraine or the Israel–Palestine conflict. Relations with Russia could be a focus, though the degree of existing policy differences among them on this issue may make the E3 unsuitable.
- Thematic focus: Drawing on the E3’s experience dealing with the risk of Iran’s nuclear proliferation, a continued focus on non-proliferation and arms control could provide a signature theme for E3 cooperation. Other thematic areas for cooperation might include cybersecurity, management of the global commons through issues like maritime security and climate-change-related issues.
- Multilateral focus: E3 activity could be developed with a focus on cooperation in international institutions. Franco-British cooperation within the UNSC is already well-developed and this could be broadened into a collective approach towards UN reform. Cooperation on NATO-related issues might also be pursued further, especially in areas where the E3 are developing significant experience in collectively managing divergences of views with the current US administration. More broadly, the E3 might consider areas where there is a consensus on a reform agenda for multilateral institutions or international law.
- Crisis focus: The E3 could also represent a ready-made arrangement for coordinating a European collective response to international crises. The different diplomatic phases in the approach to Iran, which included crisis management, have already demonstrated the utility of the E3 arrangement as an appropriate basis for coordination in crisis response.
E3 cooperation in a new area is most likely to be successful when the following three conditions apply:
- There is a broad alignment in strategic objectives between the UK, France and Germany.
- Wider EU consensus has been hard to reach or the topic is one not usually discussed at the EU level.
- The US position is different or in opposition to that of the E3, or there is relatively little US interest or attention on the issue.
Therefore, these tests could be applied to new issues to help prioritize E3 cooperation.
Flexible process
In terms of process, the UK should prioritize flexibility and adaptability in E3 cooperation, to reflect the format’s strengths and the uncertainty of the wider environment. In the first instance, this means seeking to preserve the current mode and depth of cooperation without worrying about developing a fixed vision for its future role.
This approach would avoid the downsides of institutionalization but still require a clear and regular political commitment to the format. It would place a premium on informal relations and working patterns between officials to supplement ministerial relationships, rather than formalized processes. The E3 would remain a mechanism for political coordination and also develop into a platform to respond to crises or as a venue for strategic-level dialogue on new challenges. It would continue its role in negotiations with Iran while potentially being used to coordinate other diplomatic processes, as discussed above.
Overall, this Flexi3 model has many advantages. It offers the UK a good and easy way to remain plugged into European thinking without explicitly committing to an EU-branded policy framework.
This flexibility would require a willingness on the UK’s part to incorporate a role for the EU’s HR/VP, as appropriate. This takes on added value and significance in the absence of a post-Brexit UK–EU foreign and security agreement. In addition, as noted above, one issue to be navigated is the perception that the E3 bypasses the EU or excludes other European states. Remaining open to an E3+EU format can help manage these concerns and reduce the risk that broader E3 cooperation could open the UK, France and Germany to increased criticism and resistance. Germany may be unwilling to start discussing an expansion of the E3 format before the end of the transition phase, but there may be more political space to do so from 2021 onwards.
Overall, this Flexi3 model has many advantages. It offers the UK a good and easy way to remain plugged into European thinking without explicitly committing to an EU-branded policy framework. It would also keep the format’s European focus, preferred by France and Germany, while remaining open to wider engagement with the EU through the HR/VP. Broadening the E3 agenda when relevant simply means making better use of a good format while committing little resources beyond diplomatic investment and political will. Moreover, adopting a Flexi3 approach would not preclude the expansion of the format into new areas at a later stage, or its further institutionalization, were that in the interests of the three countries.
23 UK government (2020), ‘China’s proposed new security law for Hong Kong: joint statement’.
24 Fisher, L. (2020), ‘Downing Street plans new 5G club of democracies’, The Times, 29 May 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/downing-street-plans-new-5g-club-of-democracies-bfnd5wj57.