Political dynamics and future developments
French and German perspectives
France and Germany see the E3 as a valuable intergovernmental tool for coordinating European policy positions on international security issues. In the past decade, the format has become an important component of their European diplomacy and both countries would like it to remain so.13
Regardless of Brexit, Germany and France share the view that the grouping – sitting outside the EU and NATO – works well and should be preserved. They consider the UK a crucial partner without which they cannot deliver credible European action on international security issues. Moreover, through its position alongside France as a permanent member of the UNSC, the UK brings added weight and credibility to the E3 and Europe on global issues (see Table 1).
Despite some questions in Paris and particularly in Berlin about the mode of E3+EU coordination after Brexit, no serious doubt has been raised about the relevance of the E3 model or the inclusion of the UK in it. For Berlin, non-institutionalized multilateralism (such as the E3) may not be as good as the institutionalized variant (such as in the EU) but is still better than no multilateralism at all. There is currently no obvious European alternative to the E3 as a mechanism for enhancing European foreign and security policy influence beyond EU processes.
In the short term, Brexit may strengthen the trend in European foreign policy away from the EU framework and towards minilateral formats such as the E3 or issue-specific arrangements like the Normandy Format for resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
Although the European Commission that took office in December 2019 aims to address strategic challenges to the EU in a more coordinated and ‘geopolitical’ manner, significant impediments remain to the union becoming a strong security actor. Neither France nor Germany credibly envisage that EU unity will render the E3 obsolete in the coming years. Indeed, in the short term, Brexit may strengthen the trend in European foreign policy away from the EU framework and towards minilateral formats such as the E3 or issue-specific arrangements like the Normandy Format for resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine.14 Given ongoing intra-European tensions, the EU’s poor track record on joint and ambitious foreign policy action and the need to keep the UK engaged, the E3 is likely to remain a valuable framework for France and Germany for the foreseeable future.
Table 1: Key facts about the E3 countries
UK | France | Germany | |
|---|---|---|---|
Membership of major international organizations | |||
| • | • | |
| • | • | • |
| • | • | • |
| • | • | • |
| • | • | |
Diplomatic network Total of embassies, high representations, consulates, permanent missions, others in 2019 | 208 | 267 | 224 |
Development aid ODA as % of GNI in 2019 | 0.70% | 0.44% | 0.60% |
Defence spending 2019 | $54.8bn | $52.3bn | $48.5bn |
Active military personnel 2019 | 148,450 | 203,750 | 181,400 |
Estimated number of nuclear warheads 2019 | 200 | 300 | 0 |
Sources: Lowy Institute (2019), Global Diplomacy Index; OECD (2020), Aid by DAC members increases in 2019 with more aid to the poorest countries; IISS (2019), The Military Balance; Arms Control Association (2019), ‘Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance’.
Political dynamics between the three countries
The E3 states share many interests and perspectives. However, there are differences among them, particularly in the approach to security and defence between Germany on the one hand and France and Britain on the other. These constrain the degree of ambition between the E3 on security issues. The challenge is to identify the areas in which cooperation adds the most value for all three countries.
Given the complicated state of Franco-German relations, and the general lack of consensus between the two countries on many strategic issues, both have benefited from the inclusion of the UK in the E3. The British presence changes the balance, giving France an ally in pressuring Germany to think and act more strategically, while offering Germany a way to counterbalance France’s proactive approach and claims to European leadership. Due to the current political landscape in France and Germany, both countries are likely to see value in the UK playing such a balancing role in the future. While the UK was an EU member, France and Germany considered its presence in the E3 as a useful way to rally support from other European countries potentially sceptical of Franco-German leadership, such as some Central, Eastern, and Northern European states, as well as, to a certain extent, the US. With the UK now on the outside, the conundrum for France and Germany is how to justify their continued engagement with the UK on European security issues. Moreover, France and Germany are wary about giving the post-Brexit UK too big a role in shaping the European, and possibly EU, agenda. They are also cautious about overly relying on the E3 format at the expense of EU formats.
As argued above, Paris and Berlin worry about the short-term impact of the potentially acrimonious Brexit negotiations. There is a risk that the format could become collateral damage of a difficult divorce, as E3 cooperation might not send the right political signals, both domestically and to other EU member states, amid Brexit-driven disagreements.
More fundamentally, if the foreign policy objectives or approach of the UK were to diverge significantly from those of France, Germany and the EU in the coming decade, the relevance and suitability of the E3 would diminish. There is concern in France and Germany that the UK may prioritize relations with emerging markets and Commonwealth or Five Eyes countries over established European partners, that trade could become a disproportionate focus of its foreign policy or that it could end up acting in lockstep with a US that has drifted from Europe. These fears have been somewhat diminished by the degree to which the UK has stayed close to many European foreign policy positions post-Brexit rather than moved closer to the US, including on Iran and climate change. However, there is still a concern that it may stray from other European positions over time, prioritizing relationships beyond Europe and taking an approach driven by national interest, including more prominent cooperation with its Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partners collectively or individually, as recently demonstrated in relation to developments in Hong Kong.15
An alternative European diplomatic and security architecture
The French and German governments recognize the necessity of post-Brexit cooperation with the UK, and believe there is value in an additional security forum alongside the EU and NATO. Alternative propositions for cooperation with the UK have been floated beyond the E3. In particular, French and German leaders have proposed creating a European Security Council (ESC), which would bring together the EU member states (but not the EU institutions through the HR/VP).16
The ESC idea has been broadly proposed in two variants. The first as an arrangement to include only member states and to address weaknesses in the existing EU foreign policymaking architecture.17 The second would include the UK and provide a space for coordination on foreign, security and defence policy issues.18 At this stage Germany and France disagree on the exact institutional shape of a possible ESC. For Paris it should be a flexible grouping with little decision-making power, closer to the format of a European Council+UK; Berlin wishes for a more formal structure.
13 See, for example, comments by German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer in Reuters (2019), ‘After Brexit, let’s formalise the ‘E3’ European security trio – German minister’, 7 November 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-defence/after-brexit-lets-formalise-the-e3-european-security-trio-german-minister-idUSKBN1XH15X; and remarks by Amélie de Montchalin, French minister of state in charge of European affairs, in Chatham House (2020), ‘France, the UK and Europe: New Partnerships and Common Challenges’, Members Event,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/france-uk-and-europe-new-partnerships-and-common-challenges.
14 Bassiri Tabrizi, A. and Kienzle, B. (2020), ‘Legitimation strategies of informal groups of states: The case of the E3 directoire in the nuclear negotiations with Iran’, Cooperation and Conflict, 55(3): pp. 388–405, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836720907630.
15 The UK, Australia, Canada, and the US gave a joint statement in response to China’s proposed new security law for Hong Kong. See UK government (2020), ‘China’s proposed new security law for Hong Kong: joint statement’, press release, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-the-uk-australia-canada-and-united-states-on-hong-kong.
16 President Macron gave impetus to this idea in his speech ‘For European renewal’ (4 March 2019) supporting a European Security Council with the UK ‘on board’, see Elysée (2019), ‘For European renewal’, news, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/04/for-european-renewal.en; Wientzek, O. and Rieck, C. (2018), Brussels’ new telephone number? – How a European Security Council could strengthen EU foreign policy, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, August 2018, https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=64e1e0a6-0460-ee78-904d-8cddd4913dc2&groupId=252038; Novaky, N. (2019), EU It Yourself: A Blueprint for a European Security Council, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, March 2019, https://martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publication-files/european-security-council-blueprint.pdf.
17 Kaim, M. and Kempin, R. (2019), ‘A European Security Council: Added Value for EU Foreign and Security Policy?’, SWP Comment, January 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C02_kim_kmp.pdf.
18 Whineray, D. (2020), ‘The Pros and Cons of a European Security Council’, Carnegie Europe, 23 January 2020, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80869; Scazzieri, L. (2019), ‘Towards a European Security Council?’, CER Insight, 27 November 2019, https://www.cer.eu/insights/towards-european-security-council.