The post-Brexit context
The UK’s departure from the EU necessitates a recalibration of the country’s foreign policy relationship with both the union and other European states. At the end of January 2020, the UK left the EU institutions, ceased direct participation in its foreign policymaking machinery and entered into a transition period that will last until the end of the year.
The 2019 Political Declaration set out ambitions for a future EU–UK foreign, security and defence policy relationship, with the goal of close cooperation but on a third-country basis.9 The UK has, however, since then, decided not to pursue negotiations on a future relationship in this area.10 Consequently, E3 cooperation takes on a greater significance in the likely absence of a formal EU–UK foreign, security and defence policy arrangement.
Alongside developing a new working relationship with the EU in foreign and security policy, the UK is undertaking a fundamental examination of its international strategy through the 2020 Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review, intended to be the most significant of its kind since the end of the Cold War.11 Currently delayed due to the coronavirus crisis, this review may well place greater emphasis on bilateral and minilateral interactions on foreign and security policy issues now that the UK is no longer an EU member state. The opportunity provided by a standing arrangement for coordination with France and Germany therefore represents an important option for the UK.
The E3 format has so far been successfully insulated from the complexity and politics of the Brexit process. If anything, the pace and intensity of E3 cooperation appears to have increased since at least 2018, primarily driven by the multiplication of security challenges, policy differences with the US and a lack of consensus at the EU level. Preserving E3 cooperation and ensuring it is unaffected by post-Brexit negotiations remains a political challenge.
Preserving E3 cooperation and ensuring it is unaffected by post-Brexit negotiations remains a political challenge.
The cooperation that evolves between the EU and UK in the realm of foreign and security policy, and the wider political relationship in which this component sits, will likely influence the future of the E3. If the direct UK–EU channels end up being loose or ineffective, as now seems probable, the E3 format is likely to be more useful for London as a mechanism to influence wider European positions. In such a context, the E3 format could also be a crucial way for France and Germany to work with the UK, and allow both countries to influence British decision-making and vice versa. Since the E3 has served both as a caucus through which to establish and transmit a diplomatic position to the wider EU and as a forum for reaching agreed positions in the absence of EU consensus, a now likely minimal EU–UK framework leaves greater space for a distinctive E3 role. Even if a closer UK–EU relationship were to develop in future, it would not necessarily reduce the value of the E3 since the logic that prompted its creation still stands: the current EU foreign policy framework is ill-suited to fast decision-making and does not tackle all issues of interest to the E3.
At the same time, with the UK outside the EU, continued use or expansion of the E3 format may attract more trenchant criticism from member states that are not part of it. The legitimacy of the E3 grouping was already questioned when the UK was inside the EU. Efforts to expand E3 cooperation would risk a counter-reaction from other European states, such as Italy or Poland, that would potentially place pressure on France and Germany to limit the format’s role. Greater E3 cooperation could also potentially hurt UK efforts to deepen bilateral cooperation with non-E3 European partners.
A lack of a comprehensive agreement between the EU and UK on their future relationship might actually boost the utility of the E3 format. Yet, conversely, in such circumstances the politics around the format may become trickier, in the short term at least. It is likely that there would be a degree of political rancour associated with any failure to reach a UK–EU agreement by the end of the transition period,12 which may make ongoing cooperation in other areas more politically sensitive for France and Germany. However, although a failure of post-Brexit negotiations could risk weakening the E3 in the short term, it is unlikely to undermine its relevance in the longer term. Brexit-related diplomatic sensitivities are likely to decrease over time, and all parties have been keen to insulate as much as possible the foreign and defence policy relationship with Britain from the effects of Brexit.
Examining how the UK works with its allies is one of the core objectives of the Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review, which should directly address the E3. The following sections assess the political dynamics around the E3, including perspectives from France and Germany, and how developments over the coming decade could shape the format, before identifying policy options for the UK with regard to the E3’s evolution.
9 HM Government (2019), Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/840656/Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_Kingdom.pdf.
10 See Whitman, R. (2020), ‘Why the UK Has Taken Foreign Policy Out of Brexit Negotiations’, Chatham House Expert Comment, 1 July 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-uk-has-taken-foreign-policy-out-brexit-negotiations.
11 UK Parliament (2020), ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy: Written statement – HCWS126’, publications and records, https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2020-02-26/HCWS126.
12 The UK government has made clear its intention to avoid an extension beyond the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020.