If Central and Eastern European member states have not prioritized engagement with African countries, neither have the EU institutions made sufficient efforts to foster this engagement.
The ambitious reset of EU–Africa relations has thus proceeded more slowly than anticipated, and the Cotonou Agreement will be extended once again. Meanwhile, the progress of the post-Cotonou negotiations says much about the dynamics of the EU and its leadership. Difficulties in the adoption of the EU negotiating mandate; the contradiction inherent in calling for a different kind of partnership while using approaches little changed from those in the past; the initial hesitation over announcing a united EU response to the consequences of COVID-19, both internally and in support of African countries; and a confused response to the increasingly important role played by China in Africa have all been evident in the course of the post-Cotonou and Africa-EU Strategy negotiations. If the EU is to assert leadership at the multilateral level and engage differently with external partners, it needs to first rethink its internal dynamics.
The EU has admitted 13 new members since 2004. The presence of these states has changed the dynamic of the bloc, bringing a more significant focus both on internal cohesion and on the Eastern Neighbourhood, including the Black Sea region, as well as new perspectives and experiences pertaining to virtually every policy area, including foreign affairs, security, trade and development. While the admission of members from the former communist bloc has increased the policy relevance of Central and Eastern Europe and its neighbourhood, Brexit has impacted budgets and opened the way for greater French and German influence within the EU. Both EU enlargement and the departure of the UK have led to the prioritization of security and defence policies. The last decade has also seen a move away from consensus-based decision-making in the EU, towards contestation, politicization both at EU and national levels, and increasingly intense negotiations at institutional level.
The content of EU policies and positions towards Africa should reflect the perspectives of the 27 member states. This is not the case, however. If the newer member states have not prioritized engagement with African countries, neither have the EU institutions made sufficient efforts to bring about such engagement.
To date, representatives of the Central and Eastern European region have twice been appointed to the key European Commission post responsible for development. One of these, Andris Piebalgs of Latvia, who served as commissioner for development in 2010–14, played a role in enhancing the role of the private sector in EU development policy. Also Donald Tusk had a central role in Poland’s re-emerging relations with African countries and continued to play an important role in EU–Africa relations as president of the European Council between 2014 and 2019. Central and Eastern European member states are somewhat influential in the European Parliament, and, through their participation in the informal groups, shape the work of the Council of the EU. But, overall, the newer member states’ influence remains limited, and has not had a significant impact on current negotiations with Africa, which, rather than breaking new ground, seem instead to be replicating an older way of doing business, ingrained in previous Partnership Agreements. Moving on from this state of affairs is important not only for the unity of the EU, but also for the value that it brings to African partners and for the chances it has to withstand the challenges posed by the rise of the China and other emerging economies in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond.
Policy differences between newer and longer-established EU member states are often less significant than might be assumed. Newer EU member states do not form their own bloc within the wider union, and tend to align differently with key EU member states on specific areas of interest.
Policy differences between newer and longer-established EU member states are often less significant than might be assumed. Newer EU member states do not form their own bloc within the wider union, and tend to align differently with key EU member states on specific areas of interest. Notably, however, the newer EU member states have few current connections with Africa. Concerned over regional dynamics and the increasing assertiveness of Russia, their priority has been to direct greater EU attention and resources towards the east, and to emphasize the relevance of the Eastern Neighbourhood for the EU’s foreign, security and development policies. They are active and assertive in negotiations in Brussels, and in advocating for EU engagement in and support for the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Black Sea region. As one interviewee put it: ‘[I]t is difficult to argue against it when you have the Central and Eastern European countries who are emotionally attached to that region’. This focus has always been understood to be in competition with that on sub-Saharan Africa. Clashing intra-EU values have been further highlighted by the ongoing migration crisis – an issue that cuts well beyond the realms of foreign and defence policies and which, as already noted, has materially affected current negotiations between the EU and African partners.
Even so, the accession of Central and Eastern European states to the EU has also brought significant opportunities for the EU–Africa relationship. The newer member states bring to the table their experience as recipients of development aid from the EU and other donors. That experience is valuable in furthering a better understanding of the effects and impact of EU support for democratization and development, as well as the limitations of current instruments and practices. Such experience has the potential to influence a move away from the traditional EU approach to relations with Africa. Central and Eastern European countries could draw on their own experience to lead the way in engaging African partners in the process of developing a new, more equal partnership. In other words, Central and Eastern European countries have a chance to be ‘real facilitators in moving towards a new vision of partnership’, and to help shape a more equal partnership in practice.
Central and Eastern European member states also have considerable potential to enhance EU–Africa relations for the future. Relevant factors here are a lack of ‘colonial baggage’, significant connections dating from the Cold War era and the provision of support for liberation movements, as well as technical assistance for industrial development and scholarships for a large number of students. Nonetheless, relations between sub-Saharan African partners and Central and Eastern European EU member states – broken down across the political, economic, security and development spheres – are evolving in a volatile context. Recent events, including the financial and migration crises, have moved Africa up the foreign policy agendas of Central and Eastern European countries, but have generated a rather paradoxical approach – some Central and Eastern European leaders emphasize aspects such as migration control within the EU institutions, affecting African interests in a negative manner, while bilaterally aiming to develop closer political, defence, trade and investment relations with African countries.
