Although there is engagement in areas of shared interest, a common perception in both Africa and Central and Eastern Europe is that each region is to some degree neglecting the other.
Bilateral political relations between Central and Eastern European member states and sub-Saharan African countries have seen a revival since the early 2000s, driven by different factors. The newer EU member states had to put in place development assistance policies – including, in a few instances, assistance towards sub-Saharan African countries – when they joined the EU, which many Central and Eastern European countries perceived as a burden. Competition for the non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council has prompted visits by presidents of Central and Eastern European countries to sub-Saharan Africa; and, while holding the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, each country has sat at the centre of the EU policy-making process, including with regard to relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, that the first external visit of the recently appointed College of Commissioners to Addis Ababa was perceived by some of the newer Central and Eastern European EU member states as sending a strong political message with regard to the need to strengthen their own focus on African countries.
Collaboration also takes place at global forums, such as at the UN – an example being the UN Group of Friends on Security Sector Reform, co-chaired by Slovakia and South Africa. The Visegrád Four countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) have a special focus on connecting with African regional organizations, notably with the East African Community. Estonia and Lithuania are pursuing an engagement strategy in the field of digitalization. Multilateral forums such as the UN General Assembly and the EU-Africa Summit are increasingly used as venues for meetings. And Central and Eastern European countries are providing greater assistance in areas related to education, migration, security and defence, and refugee management.
Central and Eastern European leaders retain an almost exclusive focus on the EU itself and on the NATO alliance, while sub-Saharan African states have many more external partners competing for their attention.
However, there are significant challenges that limit the breadth and depth of relations between Central and Eastern European and sub-Saharan African countries. First and foremost, high-level officials in both regions have often failed to fully engage in their own country’s efforts to strengthen Central and Eastern Europe-sub-Saharan African relations. Central and Eastern European leaders retain an almost exclusive focus on the EU itself and on the NATO alliance, while sub-Saharan African states have many more external partners competing for their attention. In research interviews, a common perception among participants from both regions was that each was to some degree neglecting the other, arising primarily from low levels of mutual knowledge and understanding.
In reality, several Central and Eastern European countries maintain embassies that cover more than one sub-Saharan African country (indeed, some cover more than 10 countries) with limited resources – including staff resources – and, by many accounts, little support from their national governments. This leaves diplomatic missions with little capacity to monitor and engage fully with each of the countries to which they are accredited. Furthermore, some Central and Eastern European countries do not have any embassies in sub-Saharan Africa. Under the new EU development policies that make trade and investment a top priority, it is likely that Central and Eastern European ministries of finance and development banks will begin to increase their engagement on sub-Saharan Africa. Even so, their ability to engage effectively is likely to be hindered by their inexperience and lack of awareness of the context in which they will be operating. EU delegations can, however, often play a constructive role by sharing information with relevant Central and Eastern European institutions.
Relations in general remain inconsistent, and dependent on the political will and priorities of each country’s leadership. In the case of Poland, for example, there was a significant opening-up towards sub-Saharan African countries in 2007–14, under the premiership of Donald Tusk, but relations were scaled back after he left office. A lack of consistency has also been evident on the part of sub-Saharan African countries. As one African diplomat commented: ‘We have not developed a very strategic and coordinated thinking on our relations with Central and Eastern European countries. I think this will be developed over the years.’
Migration is a key point of contention, with the approach of some Central and Eastern European countries described by one interview subject as ‘upsetting’ to African partners. A recent degree of falling back in relations may be connected to Central and Eastern European countries’ focus on migration. Although not directly connected to differences over migration, a high-level visit to Angola by representatives of Hungary was cancelled by the Angolan government, while Poland’s long-standing involvement in the development of Angola’s Academy of Fisheries and Marine Sciences has come to an abrupt end.
Economic relations
Economic relations constitute a key area of interest for countries in both regions, and previous research suggests considerable potential for cooperation on trade and investment. But trade is an EU competence, which makes bilateral engagement in dialogue with specific Central and Eastern European countries less attractive for sub-Saharan African states.
Overall volumes of trade and investment have seen an upward trend in the last decade, and specific areas of engagement have been identified. Estonia is leading the way on digitalization, which is an area of interest for several Central and Eastern European and sub-Saharan African countries. Bulgaria and Poland have engaged in agro-industry in East Africa. Hungarian and Slovenian companies are implementing projects for sub-Saharan African partners involving biometric passports and other documents requiring embedded security features. Several Central and Eastern European countries are engaged in trade in arms and military equipment with sub-Saharan African partners. At the same time, South African investments are significant in Central and Eastern European countries in areas such as real estate, online platforms, shopping malls, and beer and plastics manufacturing.
However, while South African investments are perceived to thrive in the newer EU member states, Central and Eastern European institutions and businesses are struggling to expand trade and investment in South Africa and other African markets. As one interviewee put it: ‘Some of the investment projects are not doing well, they are not rising to the initial expectations.’ A number of these challenges stem from dynamics internal to Central and Eastern Europe, while others are driven by the particular nature of sub-Saharan African markets. In South Africa, for instance, the regulation structure of the private sector is perceived to favour investments and trade by BRIC countries, to the detriment of European partners.
In 2018 the Hungarian government announced that it was to close some of its state-owned foreign trade offices (the so-called ‘trading houses’) in sub-Saharan Africa. The decision, ascribed by some observers to mismanagement, underscores that certain strategies for penetrating sub-Saharan African markets have been less successful than others.
Central and Eastern European countries have been less bold than other investors in approaching African markets.
From a Central and Eastern European perspective, several states have found it difficult to mobilize their private sector to trade with and invest in sub-Saharan African partner countries, reflecting both a low level of mutual awareness and contact between Central and Eastern European and sub-Saharan African countries, and limited infrastructure for promoting trade and investment. Central and Eastern European countries have been less bold than other investors in approaching African markets. A lack of relevant local contacts, coupled with insufficient presence on the ground, have put Central and Eastern European countries at a disadvantage compared with more established investors. Thus, Central and Eastern European trade with Africa is often mediated through Western European or Middle Eastern companies. This may prove an effective strategy in terms of finding an entry point into African markets and identifying reliable local contacts, but it also limits the scope of engagement. Central and Eastern European countries also encounter protective measures on the part of competitors, including Western European EU member states that are already present in sub-Saharan African markets, which may put pressure on African partner countries to restrict their own engagement with Central and Eastern European countries.
Security and military relations
The security and military dimensions of relations between Central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan African have a long history, and remain important at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Most Central and Eastern European countries produce and export arms and military equipment, and can also offer training for African military personnel. At multilateral level, Central and Eastern European countries have been active in EU and UN missions in African countries. Most recently, the Czech Republic assumed the leadership of the EU mission in Mali, to which several Central and Eastern European countries are contributing military personnel.
However, the proximity of Russia dominates the security thinking of Central and Eastern European states – which perceive a threat from an assertive Russia that, in their view, the EU does not take seriously enough, according to an interview conducted for this study – and significantly limits Central and Eastern European countries’ engagement on priorities other than the Eastern Neighbourhood.
Nevertheless, Central and Eastern European countries aim to act as pillars of security in their region and within the EU. They are willing to contribute to peacekeeping missions, including in African countries. Such participation is also linked to concerns about migration into Europe, and, notably, to the commitment of some Central and Eastern European countries to address the drivers of migration.
Development and humanitarian assistance relations
A key characteristic of the newer EU member states is that their development assistance approach is based on building relationships of equals. All of the Central and Eastern European countries studied as part of the research for this paper were themselves recipients of development assistance before they joined the EU. As a consequence, they have experienced the unequal nature of traditional donor–recipient relations, and do not want to replicate this in their own position as donors.
Central and Eastern European countries see their development policies as serving foreign policy and trade objectives. As Africa is not a key focus of foreign policy for Central and Eastern European countries, African countries have not been prioritized as development partners until relatively recently, and through the 2000s, in the early years of their bilateral engagement on development policies, Central and Eastern European countries mostly focused on countries in their neighbourhood. Today, however, most Central and Eastern European donors also include sub-Saharan Africa, and Africa in general, among their priorities. The focus on stemming migration has also driven development spending. An example is Hungary’s support for Uganda in the field of refugee management, which, with a programme value amounting to €16.1 million, constitutes the largest development project yet to be offered by Hungary.
The commitment to equality in development relations that is evident in Central and Eastern Europe’s engagement with partner countries (in both the Eastern Neighbourhood and sub-Saharan Africa) seems to override trade and investment objectives, which may position Central and Eastern European countries as less assertive than their Western European and BRICS counterparts in these fields. At the same time, such a commitment appears subordinate to security concerns, which may also explain why the migration crisis triggered increased engagement in sub-Saharan Africa from 2015.
While budgets are rather limited, a further key asset of Central and Eastern European countries in development cooperation is their transition experience. Such experience includes the transformation of centralized Central and Eastern European economies into functional market economies, the creation and implementation of democratic political institutions, and the transformation of a totalitarian state bureaucracy into a more democratic institutional apparatus, strengthening the independence of the judiciary and civil society, and protecting individual freedoms.
However, after more than 15 years as bilateral donors, some Central and Eastern European countries have come to feel that their development contributions are not leading to a strengthening of business ties, which has been their initial objective. Some voices also question the relevance of the Central and Eastern European transition experience to Africa, with expertise being concentrated among specific individuals (who are often no longer in office), not institutions, and in light of a transformed global environment that may no longer value such transition experiences, which makes the sharing of lessons learned more difficult.A further challenge for the efficacy of Central and Eastern European countries as donors stems from the lack of coherence between their foreign and development policies, notably around migration.
