The EU’s approach to migration management in ‘cooperation’ with Afghanistan narrowly focuses on short-term returns of migrants as a condition for development assistance. A more equitable and multidimensional approach is needed.
01 Introduction
The EU’s approach to migration management in ‘cooperation’ with Afghanistan narrowly focuses on short-term returns of migrants as a condition for development assistance. A more equitable and multidimensional approach is needed.
Since 2015, Europe has moved in new directions to tackle what it perceives as a ‘migration crisis’ – in fact, just one of several intersecting crises of political economy, public health, governance and democratic legitimacy. At the same time, populism has become more potent, weakening the capacities of the European Union to deal with these challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic, a global crisis without precedent in recent times, presents further difficulties. A robust stance from the EU on migration can be expected to persist, along with a focus on national and regional solutions.
This paper considers the outcomes of Europe’s pivot towards ‘migration management’1 for Afghanistan, which is the largest recipient of EU development assistance. Since 2015, the EU has sought to control irregular migration more closely. It has used wide-ranging agreements to tackle the so-called ‘root causes’ of irregular migration, and to deter migrants who arrive in Europe through unofficial channels. Critics of this approach argue that it blurs the lines between aid and development, and that balancing European migration objectives against those of countries of origin is difficult. The EU’s increasing focus on repatriation and returns is especially contentious.
In 2016, the EU concluded an agreement on migration and returns with Afghanistan’s National Unity Government (NUG).2 Known as the ‘Joint Way Forward on Migration Issues’ (JWF),3 this was one of the EU’s first such partnerships with another country. It essentially made continued development assistance contingent upon the return to Afghanistan of Afghans refused protection or settlement in the EU. The JWF required the incumbent Afghan administration at that time, under President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah, to develop a detailed policy framework on displacement, returns, reintegration, security, peace and development. Similar challenges face the new administration, in office since May 2020 and also led by President Ghani. However, the policy challenges are now more acute in light not only of the pandemic but also of political uncertainties associated with the pursuit of peace talks with the Taliban, the anticipated departure of American troops from Afghanistan without clarity on a timetable for their withdrawal, and an anticipated further decrease in international assistance.
As of 2020, Afghans constitute the second-largest group of asylum seekers arriving in Europe.
As a case study on migration, Afghanistan is instructive because of its enduring history as a principle country of origin for refugees migrating to Europe.4 As of 2020, Afghans constitute the second-largest group of asylum seekers arriving in Europe.5 Afghanistan is among the world’s poorest nations, and its people suffer widespread deprivation. In a recent report, the Institute for Economics & Peace6 stated that Afghanistan has replaced Syria as the world’s ‘least peaceful country’. In recent decades, Afghanistan’s environmental fragility has also increased. Urbanization has compounded environmental degradation and has placed extreme pressure on public services, especially in densely populated areas. COVID-19 is amplifying these struggles. On the other hand, the pandemic arguably creates a point of policy convergence for Afghanistan, its regional neighbours and the EU, and a rare window of opportunity for these stakeholders to develop more collaborative pathways on development, peace and migration.
This paper draws attention both to the positive trends in European and Afghan migration policies, and to the disconnects between the European and Afghan approaches. The paper makes policy recommendations for the EU, Afghanistan’s government, civil society organizations and international donors working with displaced people from Afghanistan.7 It examines the EU’s support for wider regional responses incorporating Pakistan and Iran, and signals the importance of more nuanced, context-based policy capable of delivering tailored assistance. The paper also implicitly offers lessons for the increasing number of countries involved in similar migration partnership agreements with the EU.8
The paper deploys a political economy-based approach to reveal areas of weakness in policymaking. Notably, it finds that policy deficits derive from failures by stakeholders to consistently factor in the multifaceted, interconnected characteristics of displacement, security, development and conflict. Neglect of international, regional and national dynamics is particularly destructive, while truncated European time horizons linked with electoral politics make it harder to address the root causes of migration effectively. Moreover, the EU’s very focus on root causes is in some ways misdirected: it ignores Afghanistan’s position as a historic ‘roundabout’9 for regional trade and the movement of people, and thus the profound importance of migration to the country’s economy. The EU narrowly emphasizes initial (rather than sustained) returns. The implications for migration policy of a potential peace deal with the Taliban also receive insufficient attention. Divisions at the heart of the Afghan government compound the problems, with the lingering effects of two bitterly contested elections (in 2014 and 2019 respectively) impeding progress.
Above all, prospects for peace and security are undermined by the sheer numbers of displaced people returning to communities and overburdened urban areas, which lack capacity for durable reintegration. The COVID-19 pandemic could intensify this problem. Many Afghans have already been forced to leave Iran, and a similar phenomenon is evident to some extent in Pakistan. The spread of infection is magnifying the practical and logistical challenges of dealing with arrivals. Instead of a holistic vision of ‘whole of community’ development, policy is increasingly fragmented. This is resulting in the marginalization and stigmatization of newcomers, and the emergence of new sources of conflict and destabilization.
The aid conundrum is a crucial dimension that needs to be taken into account in policy development. Afghanistan is heavily aid-dependent. Current policy visions for Afghanistan’s self-reliance insufficiently acknowledge the need to develop mechanisms for long-term economic growth. In the absence of such mechanisms – which, among other things, would need to provide alternative livelihoods to replace activities in the illicit economy – outward migration remains both a vital option for the local population and an essential contributor (i.e. via remittances) to the economy in the short term. With the Afghan state’s very existence predicated upon the receipt of international aid, the continued provision of which is looking less assured, European goals for managing migration will be that much harder to achieve.
European Commission (2015), ‘A European Agenda on Migration’, 13 May 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf (accessed 31 Jul. 2020).
The NUG was created in September 2014 after a contentious presidential election, and lasted until March 2020.
European Commission and Government of Afghanistan (2016), ‘Joint Way Forward on migration issues between Afghanistan and the EU’, 2 October 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_migration_issues.pdf (accessed 31 Jul. 2020).
After Syrians, Afghans are the nationality with the second-largest number of applicants for asylum in the EU. See Eurostat (2020), ‘Asylum statistics’, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Citizenship_of_first-time_applicants:_largest_numbers_from_Syria.2C_Afghanistan_and_Venezuela (accessed 24 Sep. 2020).
Reardon, C. (2020), ‘World must act and deliver for Afghan refugees, says UN chief’, UNHCR UK, 17 February 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/stories/2020/2/5e4b57e14.html (accessed 1 Aug. 2020).
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2019), ‘Study ranks Afghanistan as world’s least peaceful country, points to “de-escalation” in Ukraine’, 12 June 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/study-ranks-afghanistan-as-world-s-least-peaceful-country-points-to-de-escalation-in-ukraine/29995060.html (accessed 1 Aug. 2020).
By ‘displaced people’, this paper means refugees, returnees, ‘economic migrants’, deportees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
The EU now has formal readmission agreements with 23 countries of origin and transit. See European Commission (2019), ‘Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration’, 16 October 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/ 20191016_com-2019-481-report_en.pdf (accessed 2 Aug. 2020).
US Library of Congress (undated), ‘Afghanistan: History’, http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/2.htm (accessed 2 Aug. 2020).