The EU’s approach to migration management in ‘cooperation’ with Afghanistan narrowly focuses on short-term returns of migrants as a condition for development assistance. A more equitable and multidimensional approach is needed.
02 EU migration management
Hardening popular attitudes towards immigration and the rise of populist narratives have encouraged restrictive EU policies that – while framed as beneficial in treating displacement holistically – are often harmful to migrants.
The migration crisis has transformed EU policy. New measures have included the reinforcement of European territorial borders; the externalization of arrangements for processing asylum claims;10 the introduction of more stringent visa requirements; the increased use of detention and deportation; and the establishment of bilateral and multilateral pacts linking development aid to migration control.11 Within Europe, such changes have proved expedient for politicians in promoting policy narratives centred around reducing migrant numbers,12 enhancing security, tackling crime, protecting a vaguely defined ‘European way of life’13 and developing interventions that purport to be responsible.
A substantial literature points to the harmful dimensions of Europe’s migration policies,14 particularly their inconsistent protection of the human rights of vulnerable people on the move. This contradicts the EU’s public position, which stresses the importance of working towards what the JWF has framed as safe, orderly and predictable migration to ensure the security of all involved. The EU underlines its commitment to using accelerated economic development, in tandem with humanitarian responses to displacement, to tackle the ‘root causes’ of migration.
The European political context has significant implications for migration policy – both as it affects Afghanistan and more widely. The global financial crisis of 2007–09 created the conditions for the ascendancy of the far right, and led to a reassessment of migration and the gradual demise of centrist politics. Certain European politicians found it convenient to blame migration for economic and political failures. As a result, migration was often intertwined in the public debate with questions around security, crime and government spending. Despite falling numbers of arrivals, immigration has had a disproportionate influence on European elections. In 2007 the then president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, claimed that France did not want immigration ‘inflicted’ upon the nation. In 2017, the French far right National Front party (since renamed Rassemblement National, or ‘National Rally’) won more than 10 million votes. Today, figures across a broad political spectrum in Europe, from Denmark’s Social Democratic prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, to Italy’s anti-immigrant former deputy prime minister, Matteo Salvini, advocate restrictive policies under the banner of a need for ‘common sense’15 cuts in migration. Racial intolerance towards migrants proliferates.
The global financial crisis of 2007–09 created the conditions for the ascendancy of the far right, and led to a reassessment of migration and the gradual demise of centrist politics.
Political attitudes are unlikely to soften in the immediate future, given pressures that include the continuing slide towards populism, conflicts among EU member states over shared responsibilities for migration, the extraordinary socio-economic challenges created by COVID-19, and the ongoing sensitivities of European electorates.
Given this set of circumstances, can constructive dimensions to the EU’s migration management framework be identified, offering solutions that could both curb the drivers of migration and enhance security, stability and development? Tailored partnerships designed to create ‘win-win relationships’ with the EU’s partners ‘to tackle the shared challenges of migration and development’ already exist.16 But how well do these arrangements, which typically feature an asymmetric balance of power between the parties, work in practice? How do participating non-EU countries17 such as Afghanistan respond to Europe’s demands? And how might greater coordination be achieved in the pursuit of shared goals?
The European Commission frames the push for increased returns as a catalyst for positive policy trajectories. In this interpretation, displacement is no longer treated as an isolated problem: rather, the humanitarian–development nexus is supposed to take centre stage. Policy on displacement is intermeshed with efforts to accomplish poverty reduction, security, peace and development.18 A priority is ensuring ‘sustainable connectivity’ between migrant source countries and regional economies. This not only involves greater international coordination of migration policies, it also emphasizes economic linkages on the basis that growth and development at a regional level will have knock-on benefits for individual migration partnership countries. In effect, the aim of EU policy is to keep migration-related problems at arm’s length by improving economic and social conditions at source. Under this idealized rubric, regional economic integration leads to better security and political relations with neighbouring countries, buttressing peace in Afghanistan. Increased connectivity facilitates knowledge-sharing and technological innovation to support economy-enhancing projects and job creation in target countries (including Afghanistan). Public and private sector initiatives combine to offer short- and long-term work opportunities. This in turn reduces the demographic pressures stemming from inadequate state capacity to fulfil the aspirations of rising numbers of young people.
In principle, this development-focused approach also offers potential benefits for security by rendering the illicit economy less viable. People-trafficking should decline as fewer people seek to leave their home country. Migration drivers such as violent conflict, climate change, environmental degradation, inequality and poverty should – at least in theory – be rendered less potent as partnership countries take ownership of sustainable development and as new economic opportunities emerge.19
The European dimension of Afghan migration is specifically addressed through the JWF,20 which aims to foster cooperation in two areas: the prevention of irregular migration; and the return (both voluntary and involuntary) to Afghanistan of irregular migrants, particularly those who do not fulfil conditions for residence in Europe. The JWF gives the Afghan authorities two weeks to verify evidence on the status of irregular migrants, and – where applicable – to issue passports or travel documents for their return.21 Once back in Afghanistan, returnees should be able to enter into reintegration programmes supported by the EU, the World Bank, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in cooperation with the Afghan government. The EU also supports the return and reintegration of migrants and internally displaced persons (IDPs) present in non-European locations, including by providing help for Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan.
The next chapter examines how Afghan policymakers have reacted to the approach outlined above, and what implementation looks like on the ground.
Externalization began before the migration crisis, as early as 1999. See Üstübici, A. (2019), ‘The impact of externalized migration governance on Turkey: technocratic migration governance and the production of differentiated legal status’, Comparative Migration Studies, 7, 46, 11 December 2019, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40878-019-0159-x#CR33 (accessed 2 Aug. 2020).
Stevis-Gridneff, M. (2019), ‘Europe Keeps Asylum Seekers at a Distance, This Time in Rwanda’, New York Times, 8 September 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/world/europe/migrants-africa-rwanda.html (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
In the Afghan case, numbers have fallen. In both 2015 and 2016, 600,000 Afghans applied for asylum in the EU. In 2017, the number of first-time asylum applications was 43,625. In 2018, there were 41,000 applications – only 7 per cent of the EU total. See Eurostat (2019), ‘Asylum in the EU Member States: 580 800 first-time asylum seekers registered in 2018, down by 11% compared with 2017’, news release, 14 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9665546/3-14032019-AP-EN.pdf/eca81dc5-89c7-4a9d-97ad-444b6bd32790 (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
Rankin, J. (2019), ‘MEPs damn “protecting European way of life” job title’, Guardian, 11 September 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/11/meps-damn-insulting-protecting-our-european-way-of-life-job-title (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
Otero-Iglesias, M. (2018), ‘Europe’s two-faced migration reality’, Politico, 21 September 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-two-faced-migration-reality-immigration-positives-negatives (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
Euractiv (2018), ‘Italy cannot be ‘Europe’s refugee camp’, Salvini says’, 4 June 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/ section/global-europe/news/italy-cannot-be-europes-refugee-camp-salvini-says (accessed 22 Sep. 2020).
European Commission (2016), ‘Migration Partnership Framework: A New Approach to Better Manage Migration’, 7 June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_format_migration_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf (accessed 7 Sep. 2020).
Partnership countries may be countries of origin or transit, or countries that host refugee populations. Ibid.
In Afghanistan, this is done through multi-annual programming. A new cycle is mandated for 2021–27.
European Commission (undated), ‘Migration and forced displacement’, https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/priorities/migration-and-mobility_en (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
European Commission (2016), ‘Commission Decision of 19.9.2016 on the signature on behalf of the European Union of a “Joint Way Forward on migration issues between Afghanistan and the EU”’, 19 September 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2016/EN/C-2016-6023-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF (accessed 4 Aug. 2020). The JWF expired on 6 October 2020. An extension is currently under discussion.
European Commission and Government of Afghanistan (2016), ‘Joint Way Forward on migration issues between Afghanistan and the EU’.