The EU’s approach to migration management in ‘cooperation’ with Afghanistan narrowly focuses on short-term returns of migrants as a condition for development assistance. A more equitable and multidimensional approach is needed.
03 The Afghan national picture
The government has attempted to establish wide-ranging policies that might reduce migration-related pressures. But absorbing returnees remains highly challenging because of war, political and economic problems and capacity constraints.
After more than four decades of war, Afghanistan is riven by ethnic hostilities and ravaged by the effects of a weak state, a predatory political economy, ideological fragmentation, high levels of crime, poor infrastructure and services, inadequate institutional capacity and environmental degradation. The authorities’ lack of control over large swathes of the country is a particular challenge. Parallel governance structures directed by insurgent groups, combined with a burgeoning illicit economy, weaken the state’s capacity to tackle migration.
In 2016, given a domestic context of ongoing war, state fragility and high dependence on foreign aid,22 political leaders in Kabul had little choice but to accept the JWF on unfavourable terms.23 However, the power asymmetries built into the agreement belie any notion of genuine ‘partnership’ between Afghanistan and the EU.24 A country is considered aid-dependent when the value of aid is equivalent to around 10 per cent of GDP.25 The World Bank estimates that international aid amounts to about 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s GDP,26 although aid levels are expected to halve by 2030.
Before the signing of the JWF in October 2016, Afghanistan’s then finance minister, Eklil Hakimi, was quoted as telling the Afghan parliament, ‘If Afghanistan does not cooperate with EU countries on the refugee crisis, this will negatively impact the amount of aid allocated to Afghanistan.’27 The rhetoric of Afghan ‘ownership’ of migration and development – a narrative deployed by the Afghan government, the EU and international donors alike – sits uncomfortably with the realities of aid dependency and low state resilience, and with the uncertainties surrounding continued American-led NATO military support. Since 2016, returns and reintegration have been a highly contentious issue both inside and outside Afghanistan. Critics of EU policy, particularly human rights groups, argue that no area of the country can be deemed ‘safe’;28 they maintain that return therefore amounts to refoulement, contravening the Geneva Conventions.29
Afghan policy responses
The total flow of Afghan returnees has fallen by almost half since 2016, but it remains substantial despite ongoing insecurity in Afghanistan (see Table 1).30
Table 1. Number of Afghan returnees by source location, 2016–19
|
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Pakistan |
618,156 |
154,699 |
46,336 |
31,594 |
|
Iran |
445,817 |
442,668 |
775,089 |
476,471 |
|
European countries |
2,323 |
3,847 |
2,805 |
1,445 |
|
Other |
445 |
32,954 |
43,334 |
39,097 |
|
Total |
1,066,741 |
634,168 |
867,564 |
548,607 |
Note: ‘Other’ mostly refers to returns from Turkey.
Source: Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation.
Following agreement of the JWF, the Afghan government was compelled to formulate rapid, creative policy responses to fulfil its new obligations. At a conceptual level, these responses have been impressive and instructive. Nonetheless, important gaps in scope and implementation have undermined their efficacy, as outlined in the sections below.
At the heart of the government’s response is its Comprehensive Migration Policy (CMP).31 The CMP took two years to develop with European technical assistance, and was officially launched in June 2019. It addresses returns and reintegration, regular migration, the prevention of irregular migration, and development. It is designed to combine short-term humanitarian and long-term development responses, and its aim is durable reintegration for all categories of displaced people.
In late 2016, the Afghan government also established the High Migration Commission, along with the high-level Displacement and Return Executive Committee (DiREC). DiREC was constituted by the Council of Ministers to provide policy coordination across national and international efforts. The EU earmarked €203 million of support for refugees in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.32 A national steering committee was set up to ensure policy coherence and coordination under DiREC. The President’s Office, the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, UNHCR and UN Habitat were also involved.33
DiREC helped to develop a policy framework and action plan for returnees and IDPs, covering community development projects, livelihoods and jobs, vocational training, land allocation, housing support, polio vaccination and other health campaigns. Despite limitations in state capacity, this marked an incisive attempt to streamline Afghanistan’s managerial responses to the demands of international donors, including the EU. Subsequent failures in implementation have largely been a function of continued political fragmentation within the administration, and have also reflected the underlying patronage-based system of politics that dominates day-to-day government.
The Citizens’ Charter
The Afghan government also leverages the highly ambitious Citizens’ Charter 34 – a society-wide development initiative – to address displacement, returns and reintegration. Conceived as a partnership between government and communities, it promises to provide each community with basic services. The charter’s wider remit is to facilitate community-based development and bottom-up democracy, linking communities with local, provincial and national levels of government. Consultation is facilitated through Community Development Councils (CDCs), which allow for budgeting and financial reporting. The Citizens’ Charter aims to interlink public and private sector support, in line with the UN’s Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).35 The rationale is that government cannot do everything, and that community participation facilitates solidarity and a sense of ownership. CDCs are instrumental in fostering social cohesion between all categories of returnees. Integration and participation are incentivized through the ‘whole of community’ approach (see below for details); this is, in turn, designed to enable citizens to articulate and prioritize their interests, and to oversee the development needs of their communities.
The government’s broad plan of action was designed to unfold under the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF), which theoretically allows for a composite intermeshing of peace, development and migration goals. It has recently been revised to incorporate 24 deliverables under the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF).36 These goals intersect with those of the National Priority Programs,37 including the Citizens’ Charter. The charter has been extended to areas with high levels of returns and displacement, particularly the informal urban settlements – so-called Citizens’ Charter Cities – where most displaced people end up.
On paper, the commitment of the charter to a comprehensive, egalitarian strategy towards returnees is appealing. Yet it does have shortcomings. The problem of returns is multidimensional. There is no ‘one size fits all’ solution. Location, conditions, timing and the extent of formal or informal support networks all affect the charter’s sustainability. Individual experiences are complex, with returnees often having been displaced multiple times. Many Afghans have been classified at different points as ‘refugees’, ‘IDPs’ and ‘returnees’, highlighting the drawbacks of such labels. Cutting across these artificial categories is the reality of marginalization, with many returned Afghans suffering the effects of ‘loss of assets, lack of legal rights, absence of opportunities and a short planning horizon’.38
Complicating the picture is the fact that returnees’ differences often eclipse their commonalities. Returnees have varied expectations, adaptation capacities and potential to contribute to host communities. Failure by policymakers to respond to these differences may catalyse the ‘circularity of return’, wherein those disillusioned by the conditions they encounter in Afghanistan seek to leave again.
When displaced people return after a protracted time away, realities on the ground can generate new grievances that may jeopardize fragile stability. Land and property rights are often at the heart of the reintegration challenge. Such rights, and access to land, are considered by the poor to be among the most significant assets.39 However, as less than 34 per cent of Afghanistan’s land has been surveyed and legally registered, much of the country is vulnerable to land grabs.40 Land disputes are a primary driver of violent conflict, while formal and informal resolution mechanisms in Afghanistan are weak.41 The government has tried to develop clear mechanisms for land distribution, but efforts to allocate land for returnees have taken several years.
According to UNHCR and IOM, 40 per cent of returnees are unable to return to their original communities.42 Some were born abroad and have never lived in Afghanistan, rendering the concept of ‘return’ a fallacy. For those who have spent long periods in Europe or on protracted migration journeys, the traditional safety nets of family and community may be unavailable. Acceptance into wider society is uncertain: the perception among host communities that arrivals have ‘foreign’ characteristics43 may be a source of stigmatization and exclusion.44 Preventing gender discrimination in the treatment of returnees is also a challenge: the Citizens’ Charter aims for gender equality and reserves gendered positions on the CDCs for returnees; but these kinds of integration mechanisms may be insufficient.
The complexity of post-conflict migration and returns is still underestimated.45 Intricate issues around compensation for lost assets are often neglected.46 Extensive literature connects the collapse of peace settlements to local resentments at the presence of ‘refugee spoilers’. Peace negotiations rarely integrate returning refugees into strategic programming. This omission is problematic in terms of the critical gaps in peacebuilders’ commitments to understanding refugee needs and claims, and the implications these pose for stability and security following repatriation. Moreover, the prevalence of prejudices and negative perceptions towards refugees at home emphasizes the challenges that the inclusion of returnees may present.47 Equally, peace agreements that integrate former enemies into local communities can be unacceptable to those migrants and refugees who are forced to return.
The Citizens’ Charter is intended to connect with wider efforts to tackle displacement, but liaison between different authorities remains weak. There is a general lack of understanding and information about what is happening in other areas of policy, such as the peace negotiations with the Taliban and potential efforts to reintegrate former fighters. This seriously harms delivery of the charter’s objectives on the ground. The challenge remains to bridge humanitarian and development initiatives, and to achieve cohesive planning and alignment between diverse stakeholders, donors and the ANPDF.
Sophisticated mapping and data collected from CDCs are used to ensure the effectiveness of programmes targeting the poor. Cash grants and short-term work projects lasting up to around 40 days are designed to provide recipients with a buffer against seasonal hunger. A related objective is to reduce tensions between communities and newcomers. The job programmes are therefore designed to be beneficial to entire communities, and focus on building, education, school expansion, health and infrastructure maintenance.
That said, employment per se is not the charter’s central remit. Instead, its support for basic infrastructure is intended to lay the foundations for economic growth more broadly. The Citizens’ Charter envisages long-term work projects supported by the private sector, though little progress has been made on this front or in vocational training. There remains a serious mismatch between the vision for employment solutions and actual market needs. In a context of profound insecurity, personal connections and place of origin are still highly significant, undermining the employment and economic chances of returnees and those who have been displaced.
The Displacement and Return Executive Committee (DiREC)
The creation of DiREC in 2016 was an important step forward. Yet as the coordination hub for migration management, it struggled from the start. It is particularly reliant on international partners for project funding and implementation. Outreach to the provinces is weak. Disputes over leadership roles within the government are likely to exacerbate the problem, reflected in a pervasive ‘psychological safety deficit’ that makes personnel feel their jobs are insecure. This hinders motivation and good management.48 According to Khyber Farahi, a state of ‘fractured government’ since 2014 has meant that politicians have been unable to implement the broader vision in the National Action Plan.49 These barriers have led important personnel to leave their posts without being replaced: the Citizens’ Charter was without an executive director for more than a year.
More broadly, the politicized policymaking environment has exacerbated a range of problems. During the tenure of the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) between 2014 and early 2020, for instance, the presence of opposing political camps within the NUG leadership resulted in senior staff being questioned over where their loyalties lay. Ministries in which the chain of command was fragmented by infighting required high-level approval to respond to DiREC’s requests; this was not always forthcoming.50 Government officials used political divisions to mask their inability to deliver on migration goals. Various departments, ministries and officials sought to seize the migration and returns agenda, so as to make use of the political – and, occasionally, financial – capital associated with it. Rival political camps inserted their own appointees into different government structures working on migration policy. Timetables were not adhered to, creating difficulties in scheduling meetings and implementing high-impact actions such as land allocation by the Afghanistan Land Authority, Arazi.51 Not all of the promised EU funding was received. However, lack of capacity across the government compounded the problem, because of failures to meet the EU benchmarks necessary for receipt of the funding that was made available. Donor funds were also lost to corruption. It is unclear whether the newly formed High Council of Governance will be better able to monitor and address these weaknesses.
Various departments, ministries and officials sought to seize the migration and returns agenda, so as to make use of the political – and, occasionally, financial – capital associated with it.
Political advisers in DiREC52 observe that implementation problems were not unique to the Afghan side. International personnel sent to support the migration management agenda arrived with preconceived ideas and incongruent objectives. Synthesizing humanitarian and development interventions proved troublesome because of differences in organizational cultures and aims. The challenges were exacerbated by burdensome security requirements, which limited foreign advisers’ contact in the field and their familiarity with the relevant implementation contexts. Although international organizations were aware of the presence of corruption in Afghan ministries supporting migration programming, DiREC advisers claim that there was little political will to confront the issue systematically. In addition, the brevity of international staff deployments has continued to impede the transfer of institutional memory and limit the scope for building meaningful relationships with local stakeholders.
Dysfunction and poor coordination have generally resulted in weak policy implementation and the misuse of resources. President Ghani has long been critical of the overhead costs of international organizations. He regularly points out that EU funding is wasted,53 especially due to bureaucratic costs. The EU acknowledges that the international organizations funded by it have higher running costs than local partners, due in part to security provision. Yet while concerns about the cost-effectiveness of EU-led intervention clearly resonate widely, it is far from clear that a sufficiently robust alternative to Afghanistan’s dependence on international facilitating partners exists.
Afghan advisers to the MoRR criticize ineffective international support for capacity-building. In the case of the Reintegration and Development Assistance in Afghanistan (RADA)54 project, which IOM developed with financing from the EU, the intention was to draw on support from national and subnational Afghan government authorities to strengthen management, planning and implementation of reintegration. However, at a meeting in October 2019 with the deputy head of IOM in Geneva, the Afghan minister for the MoRR at the time, Sayed Hussain Alemi Balkhi, said that RADA’s implementation was ‘incredibly slow, bordering on failure’.55 He further noted IOM’s failure to share its concept notes and priorities with his ministry, making it impossible to ensure cooperation and successful monitoring.56 Balkhi’s critique highlights a lack of synchronization between Afghan and international partners in implementing return and reintegration initiatives.
The strain of return
For the Afghan government, the guiding principle of displacement programming is to treat returnees as a ‘social and economic resource rather than a burden’.57 Policy is designed through a ‘whole of community’ approach that includes both returnees and host communities, drawing on experiences of marginalization and exclusion. Incentivizing entire communities helps to safeguard against resentment in host populations and to change local residents’ perceptions of newcomers.58 Such programming notionally extends to all areas with high numbers of returnees, and is intended to provide a basic set of services through community planning, management and development.
Urban areas attract the most displaced people, accounting for about half of all IDPs and returnees. Kabul is among the fastest-growing cities in the world, with an estimated population of around 6 million.59 Informal settlements proliferate, with basic services inaccessible for many neighbourhoods. The city’s infrastructure is particularly unprepared to respond to growing environmental challenges (see below). Another problem is that the urban job market does not match the demands of newcomers.
The focus of Citizens’ Charter Cities is on the needs of urban populations, including service delivery to informal settlements. Programmes have already started in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad. They are designed to cover all provincial capitals, including Kabul, in the first phase. Beyond these initiatives, however, there remains a striking lack of urban development. A fundamental dilemma is how to manage planning and expectations amid the ongoing challenges of poverty, urbanization, weak government capacity and poor security. Development projects are impeded by local resistance over the use of valuable land, especially in urban contexts. Reductions in government revenues and dwindling international donor assistance are further complicating all of these issues.
Despite the government’s rhetoric surrounding environmental protection, safeguards for the environment are deficient. Afghanistan has inadequate defences against climate change. It has endured extreme weather, drought, flooding, avalanches and landslides, all of which contribute to displacement. The United Nations Environment Programme estimates that 80 per cent of conflict – particularly among farmers – in Afghanistan revolves around water, land and resources.60 Depletion and degradation of natural resources can spark new grievances and exacerbate existing ones, such as over ethnic differences. This is especially problematic as Afghanistan lacks effective mechanisms to resolve disputes.61
Higher population levels combined with displacement, poor sanitation and industrial pollution lead to a further degradation of air quality, water supply, and land and soil quality in urban areas. This area of migration research is underdeveloped. There is a need for more precise data and comprehensive research methods to make sense of the environmental challenges and their relationship with displacement and migration in Afghanistan, so that new solutions can be developed.
UK Department for International Development (2018), ‘Aid Dependency and Political Settlements in Afghanistan’, 14 September 2018, https://www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/aid-dependency-and-political-settlements-in-afghanistan (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
Quie, M. and Hakimi, H. (2017/18), ‘EU pays to stop migrants’, The World Today, December 2017/January 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/system/files/publications/twt/EU%20pays%20to%20stop%20migrants%20Quie%20Hakimi.pdf (accessed 4 Aug. 2020).
The JWF was not voted on in the Afghan parliament. It sets an unenforceable cap of 80,000 returns.
Cooper, R. (2018), Aid dependency and political settlements in Afghanistan, K4D Helpdesk Report, 14 September 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5d0ced7ae5274a065e721702/428_Aid_Dependency_and_Political_Settlements_in_Afghanistan.pdf (accessed 4 Aug. 2020).
Quie and Hakimi (2017/18), ‘EU pays to stop migrants’.
Amnesty International (2019), ‘Afghanistan’s refugees: forty years of dispossession’, 20 June 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/afghanistan-refugees-forty-years (accessed 4 Aug. 2020).
In contrast, the EU views Afghanistan as an unsafe country with ‘safe areas’.
Amnesty International (2017), ‘European governments return nearly 10,000 Afghans to risk of death and torture’, 5 October 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/european-governments-return-nearly-10000-afghans-to-risk-of-death-and-torture (accessed 4 Aug. 2020).
These figures were provided to the authors in February 2020 in response to a request made to the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) through the government’s Displacement and Return Executive Committee (DiREC).
International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Budapest Process Secretariat (undated), ‘Comprehensive migration policy for Afghanistan presented’, https://www.budapestprocess.org/about/news/161-comprehensive-migration-policy-presented-in-kabul-afghanistan (accessed 4 Aug. 2020).
Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) (undated), Return and Reintegration Response Plan – 2018, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5b2a46f74.pdf (accessed 22 Sep. 2020).
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR (2018), Returns to Afghanistan, Joint IOM-UNHCR Summary Report, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/iom_unhcr_2018_joint_return_report_final_24jun_2019english.pdf (accessed 2 Sep. 2020).
Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2016), Citizen’s [sic] Charter National Priority Program, December 2016, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b28f2ed4.html (accessed 4 Aug. 2020).
The CRRF was approved in one of the two key annexes to the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which was adopted in September 2016 at the UN General Assembly. Among other things, the CRRF aims to enhance protection of refugees and host communities, promotes engagement of government and non-government stakeholders, encourages long-term policy horizons, and proposes tailored and contextualized responses to the movement of refugees. See UNHCR UK (undated), ‘Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework’, https://www.unhcr.org/uk/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf.html (accessed 26 Sep. 2020).
After coming to power in September 2014, the NUG presented the SMAF as its plan for reform and accountability at the London Conference on Afghanistan in December of that year. Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2015), Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF), 5 September 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ mofaj/files/000102254.pdf (accessed 4 Aug. 2020).
Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (undated), ‘National Priority Programs’, http://policymof.gov.af/home/national-priority-programs (accessed 4 Aug. 2020).
World Bank (2016), ‘Forced Displacement: A Developing World Crisis’, press release, 15 September 2016, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/09/15/forced-displacement-a-developing-world-crisis (accessed 4 Aug. 2020).
World Bank (undated), ‘Land’, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/land (accessed 4 Aug. 2020).
Ariana News (2016), ‘Ghani says land grabbing reaches new peak in Afghanistan’, 28 August 2016, https://ariananews.af/ghani-says-land-grabbing-reaches-new-peak-in-afghanistan (accessed 5 Aug. 2020).
Gaston, E. and Dang, L. (2015), Addressing Land Conflict in Afghanistan, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 372, https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/addressing-land-conflict-afghanistan (accessed 26 Aug. 2020).
Samuel Hall Consulting (2014), Evaluating IOM’s return and reintegration activities for returnees and other displaced populations, Kabul: International Organization for Migration, https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/ files/migrated_files/2013/04/Evaluating-IOMs-Return-and-Reintegration-Activities-for-Returnees-and-Other-Displaced-Populations-in-Afghanistan_Full-Report.pdf (accessed 5 Aug. 2020).
For example: speaking a specific dialect; lifestyle choices; and norms affected by circumstances outside Afghanistan.
Kuschminder, K., Siegel, M. and Majidi, N. (2014), ‘The changing nature of return migration to Afghanistan’, Forced Migration Review, issue 46, May 2014, https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/afghanistan/kuschminder-siegel-majidi.pdf (accessed 5 Aug. 2020).
IOM and UN Migration (2019), World Migration Report 2020, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr_2020.pdf (accessed 12 Aug. 2020).
To use an example outside Afghanistan as an illustration of the challenges of integration, following the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi in 2000, UNHCR and the Burundian and Tanzanian governments facilitated the return of Burundians to the country. The agreement encoded returnees’ rights to property restitution or compensation. Yet two decades later, the vast majority of returnees remain landless and without compensation. Fransen, S. and Kuschminder, K. (2012), Back to the land: the long-term challenges of refugee return and reintegration in Burundi, UNHCR, ‘New Issues in Refugee Research’, research paper no. 242, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263714120_Back_to_the_land_the_long-term_challenges_of_refugee_return_and_reintegration_in_Burundi (accessed 3 Sep. 2020).
‘Spoilers’ are understood as ‘groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement’. See Newman, E. and Richmond, O. (2006), The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes and Peacebuilding, United Nations University Press, https://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:3095 (accessed 7 Sep. 2020).
Interview with Khyber Farahi, former senior presidential adviser on migration and reintegration, 15 February 2020.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Human Rights and Women’s International Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2015), ‘Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security’, June 2015, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/wps-afghanistan_national_action_plan_1325_0.pdf (accessed 7 Sep. 2020).
Interview with Basir Mohamadi, former policy adviser at DiREC, 12 February 2020.
Afghanistan Land Authority – ARAZI (undated), https://directory.ooyta.com/about/afghanistan-land-authority-arazi.html (accessed 5 Aug. 2020).
Interviews with DiREC advisers, 12 February 2020.
Interview with Basir Mohamadi, 9 February 2020.
IOM Afghanistan (2019), ‘Reintegration and Development Assistance in Afghanistan (RADA)’, 5 November 2019, https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/Reports/rada_-_factsheet_-_month19_-_endari.pdf (accessed 5 Aug. 2020).
MoRR (2019), ‘وزیر امور مهاجرین خواهان همکاری بیشتر سازمان بینالمللی مهاجرت در افغانستان گردید’ [The Minister of Refugees and Repatriation asks for further cooperation of IOM in Afghanistan], 12 October 2019, https://morr.gov.af/en/nodcoe/1138 (article in Dari/Persian) (accessed 14 Feb. 2020).
Ibid.
UN Web TV (2018), ‘People on the Move – Geneva Conference on Afghanistan’, 27 November 2018, http://webtv.un.org/search/people-on-the-move-geneva-conference-on-afghanistan/5972203951001/ ?term=Afghanistan%20Geneva%20Conference&sort=date&page=31 (accessed 5 Apr. 2020).
A similar strategy was used by the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP), which leveraged the precursor to the Citizens’ Charter, the National Solidarity Programme, to reintegrate former combatants.
City Mayors (undated), ‘The world’s fastest growing cities and urban areas from 2006 to 2020’, www.citymayors.com/statistics/urban_growth1.html (accessed 6 Aug. 2020).
Jones, S. (2020), ‘In Afghanistan, climate change complicates future prospects for peace’, National Geographic, 3 February 2020, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/02/afghan-struggles-to-rebuild-climate-change-complicates (accessed 6 Aug. 2020).
Ibid.