The EU’s approach to migration management in ‘cooperation’ with Afghanistan narrowly focuses on short-term returns of migrants as a condition for development assistance. A more equitable and multidimensional approach is needed.
04 A complex regional neighbourhood
Critically, progress on Afghanistan’s multiple migration challenges will require increased coordination with neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, and the deepening of ‘regional connectivity’ through economic linkages and infrastructure.
As part of its efforts to address the root causes of migration, the EU not only seeks to reduce the numbers of displaced Afghans within member states but also supports returns from Pakistan and Iran, through an initiative known as the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR). The objective is to enhance capacities for voluntary returns and facilitate a stronger collective future for the region through coordinated responses. UNHCR and IOM are vital partners in this effort. The strategy is innovative in its attempts to support host and recipient communities, but there are manifold challenges. The SSAR calls for a ‘comprehensive approach’ that ties together humanitarian and development responses. Voluntary, safe, dignified repatriation remains a distant goal, yet the thorny problem of ‘shared responsibility’ filters through all regional strategies, leading to demands for Europe and the international community to do more.
The treatment of refugees is intrinsically connected to regional security and insecurity. For decades Afghanistan’s neighbours, especially Pakistan and Iran, have played a critical role in sheltering Afghans fleeing conflict. Together, Pakistan and Iran host 90 per cent of globally registered Afghan refugees: approximately 2.4 million people.62 Ironically, these same countries are simultaneously considered sources of the conflict in Afghanistan.
Islamabad remains closely involved in Afghanistan, which it views as central to its national security priorities. The situation in Afghanistan is of particular salience to Pakistan because of the implications for relations with India, and because of military and strategic considerations around the proximity of US-led NATO troops, stationed in Afghanistan since 2001. Pakistan has traditionally used Afghanistan as a buffer to achieve strategic depth against its traditional rival, India.
Although Islamabad denies responsibility for aspects of the Afghan conflict, the perception of its influence has prompted both the US and Afghan administrations to seek Islamabad’s active engagement in encouraging the Taliban to participate in the Doha peace talks.
The concept of regional connectivity remains central to migration management, though precisely what ‘connectivity’ means in practice is contested – in particular, initiatives to transfer refugees and migrants between countries present both opportunity and risk. The fact that Pakistan and Iran host large numbers of Afghan refugees means that events in both countries will remain inextricably interwoven with developments in Afghanistan. In this sense, while proxy warfare continues via covert external support for insurgent factions and warlords, governments in the region actually have a shared interest in Afghanistan’s stability. President Ghani has claimed that ‘Afghanistan is incomplete until the country has recovered over 4 million refugees abroad’.63
The fact that Pakistan and Iran host large numbers of Afghan refugees means that events in both countries will remain inextricably interwoven with developments in Afghanistan.
Behind the scenes, Afghan officials acknowledge that such a goal is unrealistic. The country’s capacity to absorb returnees is low. Annual remittances from Afghans living abroad were estimated by the World Bank at approximately $755 million in 2019.64 However, there is a lack of accurate and substantiated data on overall remittances to Afghanistan. This is largely a result of remittances being received through cash. The lack of data also reflects use of the traditional hawala money transfer system, which operates outside the conventional banking sector. It is widely acknowledged that a significant proportion of remittances are from Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, which would decline if returns increased. Consequently, Afghanistan finds itself in a delicate balancing act, obliged to manage the threats of forced returns from Pakistan and Iran while accommodating the reality of substantial socio-economic and political interdependence with its neighbours.
Pakistan
As host to the largest number of Afghan refugees, Pakistan will be critical to any peace settlement with the Taliban. It shares the longest border with Afghanistan, in the form of the disputed Durand Line, which extends almost 2,500 km. Traditionally, Islamabad has preferred a weak, malleable government in Kabul and – as mentioned – has covertly supported various Taliban factions as part of its policy of maintaining strategic depth against India.65
Pakistan is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol, and has yet to enact national legislation underpinning the assessment or granting of protection to those seeking refuge.66 In the absence of internationally binding or national provisions, anyone seeking protection is treated under the Foreigners Act 1946.67 In 1993, UNHCR and the Pakistani government agreed that UNHCR would conduct ‘refugee status determination’ on behalf of Pakistan under UNHCR’s 1950 mandate. In effect, since then UNHCR has been responsible for deciding whether displaced Afghan people in Pakistan should be classified as refugees.68 However, Pakistan retains control over the privileges and rights of refugees – for example, the authorities can limit the duration of protection granted, impose exclusion orders in relation to movement (e.g. prohibiting entry into Pakistan’s border areas and special territories, such as the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas), and restrict internal travel during curfews.
Prior to 2006, Afghan refugees in Pakistan were not subject to any mandatory registration process, either through UN agencies or the Pakistani government. In 2004, Islamabad and UNHCR signed an agreement to conduct a detailed survey and census of Afghans who had arrived in Pakistan after 1 December 1979. The aim was to devise a strategy to regulate Afghans living in the country, and eventually to facilitate their repatriation to and reintegration in Afghanistan. The subsequent 2005 census was the first attempt to do this.
In 2007 (with UNHCR assistance from 2009), Pakistan introduced a Proof of Registration (PoR) card for Afghans, which UNHCR takes as a person’s proof of registration as a refugee. This provided Afghan refugees with important protections against arbitrary deportation and harassment by the Pakistani authorities.69 As of January 2020, there were 1.4 million Afghan refugees with PoR cards in Pakistan, comprising just over 210,000 households; of this cohort, 68 per cent live in urban areas.70
The PoR scheme has given Afghan refugees a modicum of security. But uncertainties surrounding card issuance and renewal, and around validity periods and extensions, have caused concern.71 Invalid cards can mean police harassment and coercion to return to Afghanistan.72
Even as registered PoR card-holders, Afghan refugees (particularly girls) struggle to obtain education (especially higher education), buy property or access healthcare.73 Refugees are not allowed to buy mobile SIM cards or own a vehicle in their name.74 Although Pakistan’s prime minister, Imran Khan, recently announced that registered refugees would be able to open bank accounts,75 this largely seems a symbolic gesture; its actual purpose is likely that of tackling money-laundering. Afghan participation in Pakistan’s formal economy remains negligible. The above-mentioned restrictions have increased the vulnerability of all Afghans in the country, many of whom live in constant fear of harassment by security forces and/or deportation.
Separately, in July 2017, with IOM support, the Pakistani government launched the Afghan Citizen’s Card (ACC) scheme to register undocumented Afghans.76 In contrast to PoR card-holders, ACC-holders are granted ‘heavily qualified protection’, the ultimate goal of this policy being to connect them with the Afghan authorities and to encourage their ‘voluntary repatriation’.77
Despite the above schemes aimed at regularizing their status, Afghans in Pakistan remain vulnerable to maltreatment by the authorities and wider society. Reports also confirm that Afghans in Pakistan have been subject to reprisals for terrorist attacks perceived as associated with Afghanistan, particularly at times when Afghan–Pakistani state relations have been turbulent.78 A case in point was an incident in Pakistan’s Pashtun-majority province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2014. Following a terrorist attack on the Army Public School in December of that year by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, the so-called ‘Pakistani Taliban’), public opinion turned against Afghan refugees. This was despite the assurances of Pakistani officials that there was no evidence of registered Afghan refugees being involved in terrorism in Pakistan.79 In 2016, when Afghanistan signed the JWF, around 365,000 Afghan refugees were forcibly returned to Afghanistan.80
Iran
Iran shares almost 1,000 km of border with Afghanistan. In contrast to Pakistan, Iran is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.81 Based on data from the Iranian authorities, UNHCR estimates that almost 1 million Afghans live in Iran as refugees and hold temporary permits known as Amayesh cards.82 The cards must be renewed regularly and effectively offer proof of registration as a refugee. According to the Iranian government, the Amayesh scheme grants Afghans the right to residence, health insurance and free education for their children. They are also permitted to work, and enjoy limited property rights.
Iran emphasizes its close cultural, linguistic and religious ties with Afghanistan, and claims to spend $2 per day for each Afghan refugee.
Yet, as noted by human rights organizations, limited data availability and severe restrictions on access to information83 mean that it is unclear whether the Amayesh scheme has been extended to Afghan asylum seekers in recent years.84 The Iranian government estimates that around 3 million Afghan citizens reside in Iran; the number includes those who are legally resident and those without residence documents.85 In an effort to deal with the issue of undocumented Afghans, the Iranian government carried out a ‘headcount exercise’ targeting various groups of Afghans. Between 2016 and 2018, this resulted in the issuance of registration slips to 900,000 individuals who had been undocumented.86 Iran emphasizes its close cultural, linguistic and religious ties with Afghanistan, and claims to spend $2 per day for each Afghan refugee.87 The government notes that around 500,000 Afghans are in Iranian schools; the number includes 125,000 people who are undocumented but still registered to study.88
According to IOM, around 700,000 Afghans returned from Iran to Afghanistan between 2016 and 2017. The number included refugees and individuals who did not possess documentation to prove their identity. As a related organization to the UN,89 IOM has sought to create what it calls ‘robust protection’ for the undocumented. However, funding constraints mean that it can assist only a small proportion of those in need. This increases the risks for women, children, youth and those with special needs. Access to legal documentation is critical. Many of those returned in 2016–17 were actually born outside Afghanistan. Displaced people need better access to passports and visas. IOM is trying to use the e-tazkira national identity card in Afghanistan. However, weak capacity – including a lack of adequately trained personnel or reliable technological infrastructure, as well as insufficient funding – poses severe challenges.
COVID-19 has added to the difficulties. IOM estimates that more than 293,000 Afghans90 returned from Iran to Afghanistan between 1 January and 23 May 2020, driven by the pandemic and amid signs that Iran was turning into an epicentre for the disease. Given the porous borders between the two countries and poor record-keeping, this figure is probably an underestimate. Returnees have cited fear of infection, lack of access to healthcare (due to lack of documentation) and job losses as reasons for leaving Iran. Those suffering from the virus are among the most vulnerable segments of the population in Afghanistan.
Two gruesome events in 2020 highlighted the hostility Afghans face in Iran. In May, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)91 concluded that Iranian border guards had tortured and beaten a group of Afghan refugees, and had then forced them (allegedly at gunpoint)92 into the Harirud River. Several drowned. In June, three Afghan refugees were killed and others were injured when Iranian police opened fire on a vehicle. These incidents have drawn global condemnation and protests demanding humane treatment for Afghan refugees in Iran.
Any political will to improve the treatment of displaced Afghans may further be constrained by the poor state of the Iranian economy.
Any political will to improve the treatment of displaced Afghans may further be constrained by the poor state of the Iranian economy. International sanctions in relation to Iran’s nuclear activities have had a brutal impact. The Trump administration abandoned the nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)93 – in 2018 and initiated a campaign of ‘maximum pressure’ designed to intensify economic hardship. Sanctions on shipping, energy and the financial sector have been particularly damaging, hitting foreign investment and impeding the activities of companies or nations dealing with Iran. The outlook for the Iranian economy remains bleak: World Bank data indicate that Iran’s non-oil GDP growth rate was 1.1 per cent in 2019/20, and the bank forecasts a 4.5 per cent contraction in non-oil GDP for 2020/21.94
Following the agreement of the JCPOA in 2015, the EU had increased its aid to Iran,95 which it views as an important country along the migration route from Asia to Europe. The EU had pledged €12.5 million a year, with a special focus on education and health services for Afghan children.96
The US president-elect, Joe Biden, has signalled a desire to re-engage with Tehran and reinvigorate the JCPOA. Yet there is no roadmap for this complex process in the original accord. The EU spearheaded the 2015 agreement, and increased EU diplomatic support will be valuable in laying the foundations for an American return. However, the Trump administration’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA spurred a trust deficit that reinforced Iran’s conservative theocratic power base. Stringent economic sanctions crippled Iran’s financial sector. The targeted killing of General Qasem Soleimani, who headed Iran’s elite Quds Force, in a US drone strike in January 2020 further deepened the crisis between Tehran and Washington. The US must now factor in a weakened reformist agenda and Iranian presidential elections in June 2021 that could result in victory for the hardliners. An interim strategy may be a ‘freeze-for-freeze’ arrangement that could involve Tehran rolling back some elements of its nuclear programme, for example centrifuge development and testing, in exchange for a gradual lifting of sanctions on humanitarian goods and possibly on limited exports of oil.97 Iran’s strict compliance with the nuclear deal in accordance with continued UN surveillance will be vital to progress, and a sequenced approach seems most likely. Biden has also raised the prospect of a stronger JCPOA, but the way ahead is by no means straightforward.
Even before the pandemic, there was a real risk of Iran’s economic distress triggering higher levels of returns to Afghanistan. Tehran has previously threatened to deport Afghans in response to US sanctions.98 This was also an implicit threat to the EU. Hardliners in Iran have leveraged the sanctions to deflect blame for continuing socio-economic stress. Meanwhile, a new Biden administration will have a broad range of pressing priorities apart from the JCPOA, including domestic challenges, to address. These uncertainties have consequences for Afghan refugees. If Tehran enforces the deportation of Afghans, most Afghans in Iran would seek refuge in another state, in many cases with the aim of reaching Europe. Afghan refugees therefore continue to be bargaining chips in a wider geopolitical power play.
Regional connectivity
Wider efforts at ‘regional connectivity’ are vital for managing migration effectively. The rationale is that Afghans will not need to leave their country in such high numbers if political, social and economic prospects ‘at home’ create optimism. In the context of migration policy responses, the notion of regional connectivity can arguably be understood to consist of a combination of (a) coordinated policy on returns and reintegration; and (b) region-wide initiatives to increase economic linkages and opportunities. Most importantly for Afghanistan, regional economic cooperation could yield meaningful long-term infrastructural development – an existential need for the landlocked country – with the possibility of catalysing untapped economic potential for both South Asia and Central Asia. Afghanistan sits between these two regions, with which it shares long borders; its location could become its greatest asset if regional economic connectivity were to materialize. South Asia is resource-stretched: over 1.5 billion people live in India and Pakistan alone. Central Asia, meanwhile, is resource-rich, thanks to abundant mineral and hydrocarbon deposits and the region’s capacity to produce surplus electricity. It also has a significantly lower population. Ensuring regional economic connectivity between these two regions – which Afghanistan can facilitate as the shortest ‘connection’ point – will also help improve the security situation and build sustainable peace for Afghans.
Instances of existing local cross-border cooperation are instructive, with policy support for people-to-people contact helping to shift isolationist narratives and pave the way for greater solidarity between stakeholders.99 Afghanistan has also developed mechanisms for the transfer of high-value remittances to its economy, and has signed memorandums of understanding with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to enable temporary labour migration to these markets.
Leveraging these agreements has proven difficult in practice, for several reasons. For one thing, Afghanistan lacks internationally recognized certification boards: a fundamental requirement for workers competing for skilled positions overseas. In addition, the Afghan government has no clear plan for the protection of temporary labour migrants’ rights; this has been an issue of acute importance during the COVID-19 crisis, when migrant workers in many countries have been excluded from national schemes protecting health services, employment and access to accommodation. The potential loss of residence permits makes migrants especially vulnerable to exploitation.100
UNHCR UK (2020), ‘Refugee Summit marks 40 years of Afghan displacement’, 18 February 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/videos/2020/2/5e4b59134.html (accessed 6 Aug. 2020).
Radio Azadi (2018), ‘اشرف غنی تکمیل شدن افغانستان را وابسته به برگشت مهاجرین خواند’ [Ashraf Ghani considers the completion of Afghanistan dependent on the return of refugees], 17 January 2018, https://da.azadiradio.com/a/28980561.html (article in Dari/Persian) (accessed 2 Sep. 2020).
The World Bank (undated) ‘Personal transfers, receipts (BoP, current US$) Afghanistan’, https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD?end=2019&locations=AF&start=2008&view=chart (accessed 18 Oct. 2020).
Tellis, A. J. and Mukharji, A. (eds) (2010), Is a regional strategy viable in Afghanistan?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 17–26, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/regional_approach.pdf (accessed 6 Aug. 2020).
UNHCR Pakistan (undated), ‘Asylum system in Pakistan’, https://unhcrpk.org/asylum-system-in-pakistan (accessed 6 Aug. 2020).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Zetter, R. (2018), Protection for Forcibly Displaced Afghan Populations in Pakistan and Iran, Danish Refugee Council, briefing note, November 2018, https://adsp.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/DRC_Briefing_Note_Protection-for_22072019.pdf (accessed 6 Aug. 2020).
UNHCR (undated), ‘Pakistan (Islamic Republic of)’, Operational Portal Refugee Situations, https://data2.unhcr.org/ en/country/pak (accessed 6 Aug. 2020).
Siddiqui, Z. (2019), ‘For Afghan Refugees, Pakistan Is a Nightmare – but Also Home’, Foreign Policy, 9 May 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/09/for-afghan-refugees-pakistan-is-a-nightmare-but-also-home (accessed 6 Aug. 2020).
Based on the last formal notification of the Pakistani government, the expiry date for PoR cards was extended until 30 June 2020, while ACCs were extended until 31 October 2019.
Zetter (2018), Protection for Forcibly Displaced Afghan Populations in Pakistan and Iran.
Siddiqui (2019), ‘For Afghan Refugees, Pakistan Is a Nightmare – but Also Home’.
Raza, S. I. (2019), ‘Afghan refugees allowed to open bank accounts’, DAWN, 26 February 2019, https://www.dawn.com/news/1466055 (accessed 6 Aug. 2020).
IOM Pakistan (undated), ‘Documentation of Undocumented Afghans at Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) Centers, 20th July, 2017* – 9th April, 2018’, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afghanistan_sr_20170720-20180409.pdf (accessed 6 Aug. 2020).
Zetter (2018), Protection for Forcibly Displaced Afghan Populations in Pakistan and Iran.
Human Rights Watch (2017), ‘Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity: The Mass Forced Return of Afghan Refugees’, 13 February 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion-un-complicity/mass-forced-return-afghan-refugees (accessed 7 Aug. 2020).
Ibid.
Ibid.
UNHCR (2018), Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees, https://www.unhcr.org/539ab62a9.pdf (accessed 7 Aug. 2020).
UNHCR (undated), ‘Refugees in Iran’, https://www.unhcr.org/ir/refugees-in-iran (accessed 7 Aug. 2020).
Obtaining independently verified data on Afghans in Iran (and, to some extent, in Pakistan) remains a challenge. Acquiring a visa to conduct independent research on the topic is difficult. Interviewing Afghan refugees is not possible without permission and full support from the government.
Human Rights Watch (2013), Unwelcome Guests: Iran’s Violation of Afghan Refugee and Migrant Rights, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iran1113_forUpload_0.pdf (accessed 2 Sep. 2020).
Statement by the Representative of the Government of Islamic Republic of Iran (2018), ‘People on the Move – Geneva Afghanistan Conference’, UN Web TV, 27 Nov 2018, http://webtv.un.org/metings-events/watch/people-on-the-move-geneva-conference-on-afghanistan/5972203951001/?term=&lan=original.
Ibid
Ibid.
Ibid.
IOM (2016), ‘IOM Becomes a Related Organization to the UN’, press release, 25 July 2016, https://www.iom.int/news/iom-becomes-related-organization-un (accessed 15 Oct. 2020).
IOM (2020), Return of undocumented Afghans, weekly situation report, 17–23 May 2020, https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/CBRR_Doc/Report_17-23May/iom_afghanistan-return_of_undocumented_afghans-_situation_report_17-23_may_2020.pdf (accessed 7 Aug. 2020).
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) (2020), ‘Press Release on Reported Abuse and Drowning of Afghan Refugees Aiming to Cross the Border to Iran’, 4 May 2020, https://www.aihrc.org.af/home/press_release/8850 (accessed 7 Aug. 2020).
Bezhan, F. (2020), ‘‘Afghan Lives Matter’: Gruesome Deaths Of Afghan Migrants In Iran Unleash Outrage’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 June 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-afghan-lives-matter-migrants-deaths-outrage/30665907.html (accessed 7 Aug. 2020).
European Parliament (2015), ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, 14 July 2015, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf (accessed 7 Aug. 2020).
World Bank (2020), ‘Iran’s Economic Update — October 2020’, 19 October 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/publication/economic-update-o… (accessed 11 Nov. 2020)
The EU has increased aid to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and several African countries along key migration routes in the hope of deterring travel to Europe.
Baczynska, G. (2016), ‘European Union reaches out to Iran over Afghan refugees’, Reuters, 26 October 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-iran/european-union-reaches-out-to-iran-over-afghan-refugees-idUSKCN12Q27T (accessed 7 Aug. 2020).
Motamedi, M. (2020), ‘What will a Biden presidency mean for Iran?’, Al Jazeera English, 8 November 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/8/what-will-a-biden-presidency-m… (accessed 10 Nov. 2020).
Motamedi, M. (2019), ‘Could US sanctions on Iran create new migrant crisis for Europe?’, Al Jazeera, 22 May 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/sanctions-iran-create-migrant-crisis-europe-190522 193857815.html (accessed 7 Aug. 2020).
Price, G. and Hakimi, H. (2019), Reconnecting Afghanistan: Lessons from Cross-border Engagement, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://reader.chathamhouse.org/reconnecting-afghanistan-lessons-cross-border-engagement# (accessed 8 Aug. 2020).
International Labour Organization (ILO) (2020), ‘ILO warns of COVID-19 migrant “crisis within a crisis”’, 24 June 2020, https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_748992/lang—en/index.htm (accessed 8 Aug. 2020).