The EU’s approach to migration management in ‘cooperation’ with Afghanistan narrowly focuses on short-term returns of migrants as a condition for development assistance. A more equitable and multidimensional approach is needed.
05 Intra-Afghan peace talks: outlook and implications
For development-oriented migration policies to be effective, there needs to be peace with the Taliban. ‘Intra-Afghan’ talks could hold the key to progress, but reconciliation and reintegration are no straightforward tasks.
As this paper has elaborated, a fundamental component of the EU strategy for managing migration is to address its root causes. Critically, this includes supporting peace with the Taliban and an end to the conflict, which has long destabilized Afghanistan and driven migration. The quest for peace is muddied by the issue of policy ‘ownership’, resulting in uncertainty as to which stakeholders are responsible for which elements of strategy.101 For example, while the US concluded a deal with the Taliban on 29 February 2020 in Doha, the Afghan government was excluded from those negotiations.
The Trump administration later emphasized that the deal was simply the first phase of a comprehensive reconciliation process that will include dialogue with the Afghan government. However, the path ahead is fraught with difficulties. The Taliban have not recognized the Afghan government since December 2001,102 depicting it as a puppet of the US.
The so-called ‘intra-Afghan’ dialogue that began in Doha on 12 September 2020 has been hampered by political baggage from the acrimonious wrangling over the results of the 2019 election (including the bizarre spectacle of parallel inaugurations in March 2020). That crisis prompted the US to slash $1 billion in aid.103 As a response, in May 2020 senior Afghan leaders forged a brittle power-sharing agreement between President Ghani and his rival, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, who now directs the High Council for National Reconciliation. The agreement stipulates that Dr Abdullah can nominate half of the cabinet, including core ministerial posts. However, political stability and cooperation are likely to remain fragile.104
The COVID-19 pandemic has further hampered peace negotiations. Violence has not diminished, and no viable ceasefire has been achieved. After initial sporadic progress on both sides regarding the release of prisoners, the peace talks between the Taliban and the government ran into difficulty for several months beginning in March 2020. A Loya Jirga – a grand consultative assembly of ‘elders’ and representatives from across Afghanistan’s 34 provinces – was hastily convened in Kabul between 7 and 9 August 2020. The government sought approval from the Jirga delegates for the release of 400 remaining prisoners, from an original list of 5,000 whom the Taliban had wanted freed as a precondition for starting the talks.105 A final six Taliban prisoners accused of involvement in the killings of US, French and Australian nationals were moved to Doha, where they will be kept under supervision until the end of November pending transfer to Kabul or an extension of their detention in Doha.106 The US, France and Australia had lobbied against their release.107
At the time of writing, a contact group representing both the Afghan government and the Taliban was meeting in Doha to finalize the agenda for the peace talks. Several sticking points have emerged.108 These include the interpretation and role of Sharia, the nature of the state (whether Afghanistan should be an Islamic republic or a kind of ‘emirate’), the role of women and minorities, the future of the country’s regional and international relations, constitutional reform, and decisions on the mechanisms for power-sharing more generally.
On a more technical level, the Afghan government and Taliban representatives face challenges in reaching consensus on terminology and the question of inclusivity. Both sides will have to exercise patience and restraint amid rising levels of violence – including attacks by the Taliban on Afghan government forces – and demonstrate that they possess the capacity to undertake peace talks without external facilitators and mediators.109
Although the COVID-19 crisis has made the situation more challenging in many respects, in other ways it could help to catalyse cooperation. As various non-state actors have done, the Taliban have sought to boost their legitimacy by launching public health awareness campaigns and supporting national and international interventions (including those led by the World Health Organization and the Red Cross) in areas they control. They have used social media to reinforce messaging on hygiene and social distancing, have distributed medical equipment and have set up quarantine facilities.
All of this activity has spurred hope for wider-reaching engagement. The government’s chief negotiator, Masoom Stanekzai, has called for all parties to relinquish the lexicon of war – for instance, the distinction between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ – that has featured in previous peace initiatives. He has called for interlocutors to tap into a potential ‘culture of peace’ and to explore inclusive options,110 on the grounds that all Afghans, regardless of political persuasion, are vulnerable to the virus or victims of it. President Ghani has described the pandemic as a ‘hyper event’ likely to change geopolitics and Afghanistan itself. The challenge is to capitalize on the current window of opportunity for cooperation and reform.
Even if a political settlement is achieved, it is unclear whether the proposed reintegration of Taliban fighters into local communities will be effective.
Even if a political settlement is achieved, it is unclear whether the proposed reintegration of Taliban fighters into local communities will be effective. Khyber Farahi, a former senior presidential adviser on migration and reintegration, comments: ‘Unfortunately, there has not been a lot of discussion around the Taliban. If a political deal is concluded, we don’t know what will happen with reintegration and if there are compromises to be made.’111 He refers to the Taliban’s de facto control of large parts of Afghanistan. Drawing on his experience of prior peace programmes, Farahi notes the complexity of reintegrating former combatants into local communities and, again, the government’s lack of capacity to do this.
Senior advisers for the Citizens’ Charter argue that workable relations have already developed. Tailored solutions are particularly evident at local-community level. Caveats include the fragmentation and fluidity of the Taliban as a movement, and the diversity of contexts and personalities. At times, the government and its implementing partners pay members of the Taliban to ensure the delivery of services such as healthcare and development projects in contested villages; such basic cooperation during the pandemic offers space for cautious optimism. The Taliban also have a modus operandi with NGOs and the government’s implementing partners. For instance, the Taliban may intervene in the hiring and firing of personnel connected with development projects, even though such decisions are normally taken by project coordinators. The Taliban collect ushr,112 a traditional Islamic tithe of 10 per cent on agricultural produce, in at least 10 per cent of all villages in Afghanistan.113 Village elders and maliks114 often act as mediators, establishing informal channels of communication to resolve disputes over public services and their delivery.
While these ‘shadow’ governance mechanisms may not offer a viable blueprint for government, such accommodations do give some insight into potentially constructive post-peace deal scenarios. The obvious difficulty at present is the omnipresence of coercion and violence, along with the Taliban’s involvement in the illicit economy. In 2018, almost 93 per cent of villages cultivated opium poppies in the country’s southern region.115 In Helmand province, all village headmen reported opium poppy cultivation.116 With the unemployment rate estimated to be nearly 40 per cent (over 53 per cent if underemployment is taken into account), poverty is a major problem and a driver of the illicit economy.117 Opium cultivation provides desperately needed employment and attractive wages: for example, the wages of opium poppy ‘lancers’ are, at a minimum, double those of many other agricultural workers and also higher than those of construction workers.118
The Taliban also profit from illegal mining, racketeering and extortion of legitimate businesses (notably in construction).119 Yet the illicit economy is not their unique preserve. It is also a source of revenue for other non-state armed groups, warlords, government officials and criminal groups.120 Logically, such activity is bound to fill income gaps for returnees where government programming fails – potentially generating new layers of conflict and instability, and further impairing efforts to strengthen governance. This problem extends beyond national boundaries. The region’s porous borders are conducive to trade in illicit goods, including weapons and narcotics; people-smuggling is widespread.
Any peace deal that incorporates the Taliban into organized political life will raise many unknowns. Advances in women’s rights and freedoms that have been achieved over the past 19 years would be in grave doubt. How well would former combatants reintegrate into communities where they may have been a source of violence in the past? How would a formal Taliban presence in government impact on efforts to integrate refugees and IDPs?121 And how would the delicate balance with neighbouring countries that are home to large numbers of Afghan refugees be affected?
Perhaps the greatest source of uncertainty for policy formulation and implementation is how to incorporate Taliban leadership into state structures. Significant anxieties remain about the fate of potentially tens of thousands of armed Taliban combatants, even if Taliban leaders find some form of accommodation within governance mechanisms or are given official roles as part of a political settlement. It is also unclear whether already weak government capacity and a political system undermined by infighting can withstand the additional strain of managing migration and returns.
Afghanistan has several features of a rentier state whose very existence is predicated on aid. This undermines any real notion of ‘ownership’.
In December 2001 Hamid Karzai was chosen as head of Afghanistan’s interim government. On 9 October 2004 he became the country’s first democratically elected president.
Roughly one-fifth of the total security budget.
Tolo News (2020), ‘Exclusive: Details of Ghani-Abdullah’s Proposed Agreement’, 15 May 2020, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/exclusive-details-ghani-abdullah-political-agreement (accessed 24 Sep. 2020).
Shams, S. (2020), ‘Loya Jirga: Afghans remove major hurdle to usher in new era’, Deutsche Welle, 9 August 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/loya-jirga-afghans-remove-major-hurdle-to-usher-in-new-era/a-54504001 (accessed 25 Sep. 2020).
George, S. (2020), ‘Talks between Taliban, Afghan government to begin this weekend after 6 high-value prisoners released from Afghan custody’, Washington Post, 10 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks-prisoner-release/2020/09/10/195c7f5e-f183-11ea-8025-5d3489768ac8_story.html (accessed 25 Sep. 2020).
Mashal, M. and Faizi, F. (2020), ‘Afghan Peace Talks Set to Begin as Prisoner Swap Is Nearly Done’, New York Times, 3 September 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/03/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-prisoners.html (accessed 25 Sep. 2020).
Bin Javaid, O. (2020), ‘Exclusive: Jurisprudence, inclusivity slow down Afghan talks’, Al Jazeera, 23 September 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/23/why-are-afghan-talks-stuck (accessed 25 Sep. 2020).
Ibid.
United States Institute of Peace (2020), ‘The Path to Intra-Afghan Talks’, online event, 22 April 2020, https://www.usip.org/events/path-intra-afghan-talks (accessed 8 Aug. 2020).
Interview with Khyber Farahi, 14 February 2020.
Ushr (also ushur) is a 10 per cent tax on the harvests of irrigated land; its basis is in Islamic Sharia, with some variations. The tradition of collecting ushr has a long-standing history in Afghanistan; although intended to support the poor and those without harvests, ushr has been demanded by rulers, governments and armed groups at different periods in history.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2019), Afghanistan opium survey 2018: Challenges to sustainable development, peace and security, p. 47, https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2018_socioeconomic_report.pdf (accessed 8 Aug. 2020).
Maliks (tribal or village elders) may hold authority in local government either through election or selection through consultation and mutual agreement in a community jirga or shura. Each malik then represents village interests to external actors and also deals with internal matters.
UNODC (2019), Afghanistan opium survey 2018: Challenges to sustainable development, peace and security (accessed 24 Sep. 2020).
Ibid.
Biruni Institute (2020), Afghanistan Economic Outlook, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 25 July 2020, http://biruni.af/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Biruni_Institute_AFG_Economic_Outlook_Issue2_July2020.pdf (accessed 24 Sep. 2020).
UNODC (2019), Afghanistan opium survey 2018: Challenges to sustainable development, peace and security.
Ibid.
World Bank (undated), ‘The World Bank in Afghanistan’, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview.
Second Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (VPO) (2020), ‘Statement of H.E. Sarwar Danesh, Second Vice President of Afghanistan, in the conference on “Forty years hosting of Afghan refugees in Pakistan: New Participation for Solidarity”’, 17 February 2020, https://www.vpo.gov.af/en/2020/02/17/tatement-of-h-e-sarwar-danesh-second-vice-president-of-afghanistan-in-the-conference-on-forty-years-hosting-of-afghan-refugees-in-pakistan-new-participation-for-solidarity-islamabad (accessed 9 Aug. 2020).