The EU’s approach to migration management in ‘cooperation’ with Afghanistan narrowly focuses on short-term returns of migrants as a condition for development assistance. A more equitable and multidimensional approach is needed.
06 Why synchronized policy is not happening
Obstacles to coherent migration management include a lack of solidarity among EU members, inadequate migrant protections in the EU–Turkey deal, the asymmetric nature of the JWF and regional power imbalances.
The JWF is just one facet of EU–Afghanistan cooperation on migration. It expired on 6 October 2020, but the EU is in the process of renewing the deal. Meanwhile, the situation for Afghan refugees and for returnees to Afghanistan has worsened as a consequence of the pandemic.
Like the JWF, the EU–Turkey deal was signed in 2016. It is due for renewal in 2021, but the increasingly precarious conditions for migrants and refugees in the context of the pandemic highlight the need to revisit the terms of the agreement sooner. The central goal of the EU–Turkey deal was to reduce the numbers of irregular migrants (without legal documentation) arriving in Greece. Turkey was promised €6 billion in two tranches to fortify border security, while Greece was permitted to return all new irregular migrants.122 The agreed formula entailed the resettlement of one registered asylum seeker from Turkey for each irregular migrant returned from Greece. As part of the deal, Turkey’s accession to the EU was to be accelerated and a visa liberalization plan initiated.
Turkey is a historical transit hub for Afghan migrants travelling into Europe, and since 2019 Afghans have become the largest group of new arrivals by nationality.123 Turkey’s failure to assure their legal status makes it harder for them to access safe accommodation, education, healthcare and work opportunities. Ideally, the UN’s Global Compact on Refugees offers a framework for potential revisions to the EU–Turkey deal by focusing on refugee security and emphasizing the encouragement and expansion of regular pathways to asylum and resettlement.
On 23 September 2020, the European Commission announced proposals for a ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’. The goals of this pact are to achieve manageable migration via a comprehensive rights-based framework that takes account of ‘whole-of-route’ migration pathways. Partnerships like the JWF are fundamental to this approach. Once again, the EU is prioritizing returns, readmission to country of origin, and streamlined deportation for those whose asylum applications are rejected. Yet EU member states still lack precise mechanisms to monitor post-return outcomes for those sent back to Afghanistan, which after all remains a country at war.
Critics of the European Commission’s proposals124 argue that there remains some distance to go in balancing legal migration and control of irregular migration. The delineation of legal migration for work, and of pathways for international protection and resettlement, is still inadequate. Genuine partnership necessitates recognition of the vital role of mobility for countries such as Afghanistan.
The proposals in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum are also problematic on the question of human rights and protections for asylum seekers. A core feature of the proposed pact is ‘a system of permanent, effective solidarity’125 designed to distribute asylum seekers who make it through European borders. Solidarity among EU member states is central to avoiding crises such as the recent burning of the severely overcrowded Moria refugee camp on the Greek island of Lesbos. It demands a real sharing of responsibilities. However, there is a vast gap between rhetoric and reality. At the extreme end of the spectrum, the Visegrád Group of countries (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) are reluctant to embrace the concept. Austria is also sympathetic to their position. These countries would prefer to close their borders to irregular migrants, but this would negate any right to asylum and contradict the EU’s international commitments.
Even for member states such as Germany, France and Italy, which have a degree of openness to the concept of solidarity, the European Commission’s proposals on migration and asylum simply offer a basis for negotiation. They do not provide a roadmap for the future. This situation complicates EU planning and has cascading implications for Afghanistan.
In the interim, while migration is not a focus for bilateral or multilateral programming, the EU has provided ad hoc special funding (€260 million since 2016) to support the reintegration of Afghans who return home from Europe, Pakistan and Iran. Plans for a 2021–27 programme are in the ‘pre-identification phase’,126 with the EU still studying the situation. Clearly, this is a critical moment for reflection.
At first glance, Europe’s efforts to manage migration through a multidimensional strategy that links returns with wider issues of development, peace and security appear logical. Certainly, none of these goals can be achieved without genuine regional cooperation. Coordinating policy with countries in the regional neighbourhood seems prudent, as does streamlining policy via the humanitarian–development nexus. Yet this is very much a work in progress. Stefan Lock, head of cooperation for the EU delegation to Afghanistan, characterizes the project as consisting of ‘coordinated/parallel activities which have not yet become an integrated programme’.127 Meanwhile, the Afghan government has been innovative in its conceptual designs for an integrated plan to handle returns and reintegration. Given these factors, where does synchronization fail and what lessons can be learnt?
The Afghan government has been innovative in its conceptual designs for an integrated plan to handle returns and reintegration.
There have been numerous criticisms of asymmetrical deals, such as the JWF, that incorrectly imply equal partnership. Power imbalances run through almost all of the Afghan government’s efforts to implement EU goals and projects, as is evident with the failing RADA scheme. Moreover, development aid is an existential need both for the government and for Afghan society. The RADA project has a wider context. Its malfunctions point to the weakness of government capacities and the state’s dependence on international partners. Increased autonomy would require appropriate fiduciary risk management by the authorities in Kabul. The government’s nascent discussions around the establishment of a migration fund could be promoted by the EU, as could more extensive capacity-building. However, the health and humanitarian crisis unfolding as a result of COVID-19 could make it much harder for the government to raise financial backing for a potential migration fund.
In principle, the composite structure of Afghan migration policy, which intertwines peace and security with repatriation and reintegration, is valuable. In practice, DiREC’s attempts at coordinating this synthesized vision are fraught with difficulty. Different sectors and departments within government compete both with one another and with the perspectives of international personnel. More focused EU interventions could be beneficial. Strengthening a ‘whole of government’ strategy centred on the Afghan Ministry of Finance and elaborating discussions around the establishment of a specific migration/reintegration budget code within each ministry could facilitate greater institutional cohesion and independence. Crucially, it could also strengthen financial oversight.
The Afghan government’s whole-of-community approach is constructive, as is the aspiration to treat all returnees equally. However, policy should not ignore the fact that returnees have diverse needs, experiences and expectations. Those who have lived in Europe will be accustomed to greater freedoms, opportunities and possibly higher standards of living. The EU is aligned with the Afghan authorities on equality of access in repatriation – but at what price? Dr Alema Alema, a deputy minister for the MoRR until recently, argues that returnees present opportunities for Afghanistan;128 but to make those opportunities real and avoid serious losses in human capital, deeper coordination must occur. Understanding returnees’ potential contributions to host communities and the economy requires mapping their skills and experiences in detail. One way to achieve this would be to combine such information with contextual knowledge gathered from communities via the Citizens’ Charter.
Conserving human capital also requires changes at the regional level, where the meanings of connectivity are contested. Afghan governments have consistently blamed Pakistan and Iran for fomenting conflict, mainly through proxies. Pakistan claims that it is no longer a ‘militant safe haven’,129 yet Sarwar Danesh, the Afghan second vice-president, accuses Islamabad of allowing the Taliban to recruit new fighters from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.130 For a peace deal to succeed, Pakistan’s support is imperative, and such differences need to be hammered out. This will require facilitated high-level dialogue and confidence-building between the two countries, on top of ongoing bilateral activity.
Fostering goodwill, from the bottom up, between citizens of the two countries is also a necessary component for confidence-building. In this regard, there is a need for further research and analysis to examine whether, and how, people-to-people contact can be facilitated through informal economic ties, media, technology and private television channels. Research is also needed into how populist narratives on social media contribute to negative perceptions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, increasing their vulnerability and marginality. Similarly, the prevalence of negative expressions of sentiment about Pakistan in Afghan media and on social media hinders the prospects for constructive people-to-people dialogue.
Improving regional connectivity will partly depend on carefully calibrated repatriation. Iran’s geopolitical tensions with the US and some Gulf states have, at times, heightened the propensity for hastily forced returns of Afghans.131 Now COVID-19 has introduced additional uncertainty into the socio-economic contexts of both Iran and Pakistan, creating unsustainable conditions for refugees and displaced people and further blurring any distinction between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ returns.
It is impossible to envisage any form of sustainable regional economic integration given this context. As Sarwar Danesh argues, ‘Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran or anywhere else should not become a political matter and be a tool to put pressure on Afghanistan.’132 He points to the government’s CMP and underlines the need for a joint consultative mechanism with UN oversight to facilitate control of illegal and legal immigration, economic development and growth. The main challenge involves sequencing the appropriate steps. Can Afghanistan become stable while dealing with potentially large-scale returns from neighbouring countries? How can returns be managed simultaneously with efforts to build stability and ensure sustainable development? How will the pandemic affect existing arrangements between Afghanistan and neighbouring countries?
Afghanistan’s tremendous vulnerability to COVID-19 may raise even greater obstacles. If the country becomes an epicentre for the spread of the virus, refugees will suffer additional stigmatization; it is likely that their ability to move will be hindered as a result.
Developments in border control are something of a barometer in this situation. In 2017, Pakistan began construction of a 1,600-mile barbed-wire fence along the Durand Line. Islamabad argues that the fence serves mutual security interests, but Afghan officials are critical of Pakistan’s unilateral control over it.133 Pakistan closed the border with Afghanistan at the start of the pandemic, in March 2020, causing serious humanitarian repercussions for vulnerable people on the move.
Unilateral decisions about border crossings also have implications for the lucrative political economy around people-smuggling. Networks facilitating the trade will try to circumvent border closures by using more perilous routes, further endangering those involved. Afghanistan’s tremendous vulnerability to COVID-19 may raise even greater obstacles. If the country becomes an epicentre for the spread of the virus, refugees will suffer additional stigmatization; it is likely that their ability to move will be hindered as a result.
Threats of large-scale returns from neighbouring countries make vulnerable Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan pawns in regional and international diplomacy. Symmetrical power relations and mutually beneficial regional connectivity with these two neighbours cannot be achieved while millions of Afghans reside as refugees or are undocumented in both countries.
A key policy consideration should be to focus on the risks of mass outward migration, or displacement, if Afghans deem the peace process with the Taliban to be a failure; or if the severity of violence and conflict leads to a real or perceived failure of the state. These risks could be compounded by the socio-economic challenges associated with COVID-19 and dwindling international aid. Unlike in the 1980s and 1990s, when it was easier to flee to Pakistan and Iran, Afghans at present face significant restrictions on their entry into these countries. If either blocks the entry of Afghans into its territory, even for transit, it will contribute to a worsening of humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan and could potentially create a new migration crisis. It would also likely alter the dynamics of criminality, and of the illicit economy around mobility and people-trafficking. Policies to address the drivers of migration in Afghanistan therefore need to recognize that such drivers will not dissipate on their own, and that new socio-economic, political and security realities could alter the dynamics of outward migration and displacement.
Meral, A. G. (2020), ‘Learning the lessons from the EU-Turkey deal: Europe’s renewed test’, Overseas Development Institute, 16 March 2020, https://www.odi.org/blogs/16766-learning-lessons-eu-turkey-deal-europe-… (accessed 26 Sep. 2020).
Buz, S., Memişoğlu, H., Dönmez, H. and Verduijn, S. (2020), Destination Unknown: Afghans on the move in Turkey, MMC Middle East Research Report, June 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/115_destination_unknown_research_report.pdf (accessed 27 Sep. 2020).
IOM (2020), ‘IOM Welcomes Proposals for a New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, press release, 25 September 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/iom-welcomes-proposals-new-eu-pact-migration- and-asylum (accessed 26 Sep. 2020).
Riegert, B. (2020), ‘Opinion: EU migration pact has already failed’, Deutsche Welle, 26 September 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-eu-migration-pact-has-already-failed/a-55059684 (accessed 16 Oct. 2020).
Interview with Stefan Lock, Head of Cooperation, EU Delegation to Afghanistan, 20 February 2020.
Interview with Stefan Lock.
UN Web TV (2018), ‘People on the Move’.
The News (2020), ‘Pakistan no longer a militant safe haven: PM Imran’, 18 February 2020, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/615453-pakistan-no-longer-a-militant-safe-haven-pm-imran (accessed 9 Aug. 2020).
VPO (2020), ‘Statement of H. E. Sarwar Danesh’.
In 2012, Iran threatened to expel Afghan refugees and workers if Afghanistan ratified a strategic partnership agreement with the US. This was signed two years later as the so-called Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). See Farmer, B. (2012), ‘Iran threatens to expel Afghan refugees if Kabul ratifies US strategic partnership’, The Telegraph, 10 May 2012, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9256602/Iran-threatens-to-expel-Afghan-refugees-if-Kabul-ratifies-US-strategic-partnership.html (accessed 10 Aug. 2020).
VPO (2020), ‘Statement of H. E. Sarwar Danesh’.
Farmer, B. and Mehsud, I. T. (2020), ‘Pakistan Builds Border Fence, Limiting Militants and Families Alike’, New York Times, 15 March 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/asia/pakistan-afghanistan-border-fence.html (accessed 10 Aug. 2020).