The EU’s approach to migration management in ‘cooperation’ with Afghanistan narrowly focuses on short-term returns of migrants as a condition for development assistance. A more equitable and multidimensional approach is needed.
07 Conclusion
For Afghanistan, strategic priorities should include pursuing societal reconciliation and creating jobs. For the EU, there is a potential role in facilitating capacity-building, supporting efforts to instil confidence in the ‘intra-Afghan’ dialogue, and backing progress towards peace.
Part of the rationale behind the EU’s approach to migration management is that increased development aid, essentially contingent on Afghanistan’s acceptance of returns, will address the root causes of migration. In this framing, migration is treated as a response to instability. However, the wider historical picture, the longue durée of people-to-people connections and movement across Eurasia, needs to be taken into account. Mobility is deeply embedded in, and of historic significance to, Afghanistan and the region. Sovereign borders in the region have always been porous; in some respects, this characteristic is a strength to be reinforced rather than a problem to be solved.134
Moreover, in many cases development aid strongly correlates with greater emigration rather than a fall in emigration. Although a turning point typically occurs once a country’s average annual incomes reach $7,000–10,000 per person – at which point, emigration starts to decline as domestic economic prospects improve – Afghanistan is far from achieving such income levels.135 Data from the United Nations Development Programme suggest that the average household income in Afghanistan was $145 per month, or about $1,750 per year, in 2019.136 In light of this, the government has been calling for long-term assistance to promote economic growth.
The issue of negotiating a political settlement with the Taliban remains a thorny one. Even if peace is eventually achieved, the mechanisms that exist under the Citizens’ Charter are not ready to support the reception and reintegration of former Taliban fighters. Relying on some form of ‘organic reconciliation’ for former combatants in communities traumatized by violence may be asking too much. There is a need for more than a political settlement; there must be a vision for societal reconciliation as well.137 Any peace deal arguably needs to have a transformative and tangible positive impact on the lives of Afghans, and go beyond deal-making among the elites. However, the rising violence currently seen across Afghanistan needs to abate significantly for any optimism to take root among ordinary Afghans.
In urban centres, where most returnees will find themselves, the package of basic services provided under the auspices of the Citizens’ Charter Cities seems inadequate. There is little in the way of policy to create long-term, sustainable employment. At the same time, reliance on the private sector has failed to yield tangible results. Provision of ‘security’ must mean more than establishing short-term economic programmes as a buffer against winter hunger. Efforts must focus on economic and labour market development: for instance, mapping market needs to viable skills training and meaningful investment in infrastructure and the agrarian sector. Stronger efforts to tackle the illicit economy are also a prerequisite for stability. If the illicit economy fills gaps in livelihoods, new problems are likely to be created for the reintegration process. These may persist beyond any peace agreement. Viable plans for alternative livelihoods clearly need more consideration and serious scenario-planning.
Provision of ‘security’ must mean more than establishing short-term economic programmes as a buffer against winter hunger. Efforts must focus on economic and labour market development.
In 2019, the World Bank held discussions about economic initiatives that could be activated as soon as circumstances permit. The EU has analysed potential scenarios of what the intra-Afghan dialogue could produce. But, like the Afghan government itself, the process cannot move beyond hypothetical planning. The EU is working with partners such as the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office to determine prerequisites for future engagement, without drawing red lines.
The five years of power-sharing under the NUG from September 2014 to March 2020 were profoundly turbulent, and damaged popular trust and government legitimacy. After another power-sharing deal between President Ghani and Dr Abdullah in May 2020,138 the new Afghan administration has inherited most of the challenges that bedevilled internal cohesion, governance and public trust under the NUG. The legacy of the political crisis that began in 2014 is likely to exacerbate infighting and fragmentation within the government, potentially impairing its ability to deliver progress in peace talks with the Taliban. Prospects for formulating substantive policy responses to returns, reintegration and repatriation will remain fragile.
Government cohesion in Afghanistan will be vital for fortifying the slender protections available to displaced people. However, the EU can play a constructive role too, mainly by positively engaging with civil society, retaining and using the institutional memory of EU engagement in Afghanistan, and fostering expertise among the EU’s Afghan staff. Turnover of international personnel has been a persistent issue.
Government cohesion in Afghanistan will be vital for fortifying the slender protections available to displaced people.
Key benchmarks for more effective migration policy could include (a) evidence of progress in efforts to bridge the urban–rural divide, particularly with respect to effective recognition of the developmental and humanitarian needs of Afghans in rural areas; (b) the development of more granular and analytical data on the situation in Afghanistan’s diverse urban contexts; (c) improvement of service delivery across Afghanistan; and (d) expansion of both short- and long-term employment opportunities in line with the needs of the market, which should include the promotion of appropriate training and capacity development initiatives.
The EU mission in Afghanistan states that it seeks to support the intra-Afghan dialogue, and to remain actively involved in ensuring stability in the country after any future reconciliation with the Taliban.139 With the US planning further troop withdrawals, and dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban under way at a slow pace, there is space for the EU to play a more proactive part in facilitating and supporting a political settlement. In the absence of guarantees that a settlement could lead to a long-term cessation of violence, and given uncertainty as to whether the two sides will honour any agreement, fear among Afghans about individual and national futures is palpable.
In partnership or through a shared (and impartial) platform with the UN and other international stakeholders, such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the EU could engage with the Afghan parties involved in the peace talks. The aim should be to encourage public commitments from both sides on adherence to any agreement. Such an effort, led by the EU, could help to alleviate public anxiety in Afghanistan about the implications of a settlement with the Taliban. Crucially, the use of such a platform would not violate the international commitment to non-interference in the Afghan peace process. Instilling confidence in this process could have a profoundly positive impact on Afghans’ views about their future in their country. In contrast, any scepticism over the ability of the intra-Afghan talks to end the conflict will have a negative impact on efforts to manage mobility, outward migration and internal displacement.
Peace, stability, economic growth, job creation, healthcare and basic services are all fundamental for the viability of the current – and any future – government in Afghanistan. The EU wants Afghan policies to include a financial buffer against the additional burdens imposed by potentially higher levels of returns, and by the need to resettle former fighters and increase the geographical coverage of target areas. The spread of COVID-19 has added to the policy challenges. Against the odds, the Afghan government has stepped up to address key issues around regional and European returns. It has factored the need to ensure support for IDPs into its policy programming. It has also sought to leverage the power of bottom-up integration and development through the Citizens’ Charter, and to streamline its management of and vision for displaced people. The government has sketched out the foundations for an effective approach. The next steps will entail tailored, context-led revisions, combined with consistent, carefully sequenced long-term support to realize effective implementation.
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Interview with Khyber Farahi, 18 February 2020.
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Interview with Stefan Lock.