A week of highly choreographed and carefully sequenced diplomacy in Asia culminated with a meeting of the United States Secretary of State, the US National Security Advisor and their Chinese counterparts in Anchorage, Alaska. Chatham House experts analyse the outcome.
Defining moment in global divide between democracy and autocracy
Dr Leslie Vinjamuri
The Biden administration executed the week with laser precision to draw a circle around Asia’s leading democracies, deepen its alliances, underscore its commitment to democracy and human rights, and mount a defence of the rules-based order.
It has become crystal clear the global divide between democracy and autocracy is going to define America’s relationship with China, as well as underpinning the entirety of its approach to the Indo-Pacific region. For Britain, America’s diplomacy serves as a backdrop to the announcement of the UK’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific, aligning Britain even more closely with the US security and defence agenda in Asia.
The careful balance between driving forward a positive agenda and mounting a coordinated defence of democracy, human rights and the rules-based order which defines the Biden administration’s twin-track strategy was evident throughout the trip, beginning with a multilateral meeting of the Quad – four major democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific – then bilateral meetings for the US Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense with Japan and South Korea. Only after those did the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor join forces to meet their Chinese counterparts back on American soil.
Fears that the Quad, and other groupings of democracies, might serve as little more than a façade for coordinating an anti-China strategy are allayed by the proposed three-part agenda to include a new vaccine partnership rivalling China’s ‘vaccine diplomacy’ and the announcement of new working groups on emerging technologies and climate.
Taken together, this agenda is an important step because the perception of a common threat can, and should, be carefully leveraged to drive forward an agenda defined by concrete initiatives. Fuelled by America’s technological and economic rivalry with China, competition can be productive if managed carefully, coordinated with partners and allies, and if it drives innovation infused with liberal values.
In Japan and South Korea, the US called out China’s ‘coercion and aggression’ especially its maritime expansion near the Senkaku islands and confirmed its own security commitments. But the US went further by trying to strengthen bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan – a signal to China that the US position in Asia is not only hardening but also ambitious and proactively seeks to deepen ties between democracies in the region beyond the confines of the Quad.
The most consequential part of a heavily choreographed week of diplomacy was the ratcheting up of the values divide between democracies and China, ending in Anchorage with China and the US publicly embracing alternative visions for international cooperation. China embraced the UN system and fiercely rejected the Biden administration’s focus on the rules-based order. It also lodged a scathing critique of the US human rights record.
The ground had already been laid for this confrontation when the US announced sanctions against 24 Chinese and Hong Kong officials for their assault on democracy in Hong Kong. China launched a human rights offensive against the US during a routine review in Geneva of the US human rights record while, on the same day, the European Union (EU) agreed sanctions on four Chinese individuals and one entity over alleged human rights violations against the Uyghurs.
After four years of a blustery, erratic US president, the Biden administration’s clarity of conviction and purpose is a relief for many, but America’s Asia tour is a clear-eyed reminder that cooperating with China may become more difficult and driven by sharply divergent conceptions of both international and domestic order. Increasingly, China may face a more active block of democracies opposing its vision but the key will be to harness heightened competition between these two giants for productive purposes.
US-India relations built on acceptance of differences
Dr Gareth Price
For India and its partners in the Quad the biggest foreign policy challenge has become how to manage the rise of China. Unlike its partners, India shares a long and disputed land border with China, recently the scene of an at-times deadly military stand-off.
But the disputed border is just one element of China’s rise which troubles India. China’s support for Pakistan, its rising presence both in the Indian Ocean and within India’s neighbours, and attitude towards Kashmir – to name just a few – all rile New Delhi. As a result, the Quad – which first came together meaningfully to coordinate their response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami – has become a key tool for India in managing China.
Convergence in relation to China may also lead to convergence in other fields. At the Quad summit, the four countries agreed to work together in providing Indo-Pacific countries with vaccines, pooling their manufacturing capacity, finance, and logistics. Working groups in relation to climate change and emerging technologies were established, and shared interests in cyber-space, counterterrorism, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance discussed.
But although China is India’s pre-eminent foreign policy concern, it is not the only driver of Indian foreign policy and there remain numerous areas of divergence between India and, notably, the US because two ideas still permeate Indian foreign policy discourse – non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries and strategic autonomy.
The Quad joint statement did call for the restoration of democracy in Myanmar and the need to strengthen the country’s ‘democratic resilience’ but India’s approach to Myanmar’s military is likely to be much softer than the stance adopted by the US. And any effective international response must have China on board.
More generally, the anti-imperialist, non-interfering tropes in Indian foreign policy may limit any Quad aspirations for activities in other countries beyond softer aspects of military coordination such as disaster response. As for strategic autonomy, despite a clear shift towards the US in some fields, India will not stop purchasing Russian weaponry any time soon.
The most noteworthy aspect of the US-India relationship is the acceptance of these differences. The US stresses the closeness of the relationship even as India – more often than not – votes against it in the UN Security Council. India does likewise even if it has occasional concerns regarding US strategy, such as in Afghanistan or its relationship with Pakistan.
Similarly, domestic policy differences such as the US reduction in visa availability for Indian workers, or Congressional concern in Washington regarding India’s openness to foreign investment are overlooked as regards cooperation in the Quad.
Mutual alliances welcome, concrete progress is harder
Dr John Nilsson-Wright
The two key allies of the US in Asia, Japan and South Korea – respectively the ‘cornerstone’ and ‘lynchpin’ of US policy in East Asia – will be reassured by the unambiguous commitment to both bilateral alliances by the US Secretary of State and Secretary of Defence.
Three central themes appeared from the closely choreographed visits. Political reassurance to emphasize the Biden administration’s departure from the transactional unilateralism of the Trump administration, security consolidation to shore up extended deterrence in the face of the twin North Korean and Chinese military threats, and diplomatic coordination for genuine trilateral cooperation to overcome historical acrimony hampering effective cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo.
Significantly, the US approach was not merely a static reaffirmation of the alliances, but stressed the need for change by promoting an ambitious agenda with both countries, not just on security, but also protecting democracy and cooperation on cyber security, COVID-19, and climate change.
The agenda was expansive with a sensible US focus on listening to the views of the Japanese and South Korea governments – a marked departure from the last four years – in an effort to reinvigorate and modernize the alliances.
The news that Prime Minister Suga is to be the first foreign leader to meet face-to-face with Joe Biden during his upcoming visit to Washington in April is a subtle reaffirmation for the Japanese government of its desire for ‘alliance primacy’ in Washington’s thinking.
Although bilateral defence cooperation addressed a familiar theme – offsetting the Chinese threat to the Senkaku islands – the mention of Taiwan and an explicit reference to reliance on all forms of US forces ‘including nuclear’ does reflect growing anxiety by planners in both the US and Japan that the increasing Chinese and North Korean military capacity is eroding deterrence capacity across the region.
Suga’s government will be reassured by the clear US commitment to confront North Korea not just on the nuclear issue but also its missile threat to Japan and the unresolved Japanese abduction issue. An agreement to extend a key bilateral host-nation support agreement by one year does open the door to more substantive Japanese defence contributions, but may involve difficult bilateral discussions over possible deployment of US missiles on Japanese territory.
The pending US review of its North Korea policy keeps open the door to engagement with Pyongyang, and both US and South Korean officials highlight the importance of strong bilateral security cooperation as a precondition for diplomatic progress with the North – a point underscored by South Korea agreeing to a 14 per cent increase in its defence cost-sharing with US forces via the Special Measures Agreement.
Blinken was careful to stress the key role of China in delivering progress in talks with North Korea, but his equally strong criticism of human rights violations in the North may hint at future tensions between Seoul and Washington.
In contrast to US-Japan alliance ties, the US-South Korea partnership continues to hinge on how best to address the China challenge given the Moon administration’s wish to avoid being drawn into an adversarial stand-off with Beijing. It was notable that Blinken’s remarks criticizing China’s ‘aggressive and authoritarian’ behaviour were not matched by similar language in the joint communique between the two governments.
Consequently, any idea of QUAD expansion to include South Korea remains speculative, instead US and South Korea officials focused on harmonizing the US’s Free and Open IndoPacific (FOIP) strategy with South Korea’s New Southern Policy to bolster broad bilateral security collaboration in south-east Asia.
Leaving aside the China gap, the new Biden team faces substantive challenges delivering on reassuring statements from Japanese and South Korea officials backing trilateral cooperation – such is the depth of grievance dividing public and elite opinion on both sides of the East Sea/Sea of Japan.
While assertive affirmation of mutual alliance ambitions by Blinken and Austin is a welcome first step and symbolically valuable, delivering concrete future progress will require considerable diplomatic skill and attention.
This is particularly true on the contentious issue of values and democracy. Bolstering cooperation between functioning liberal democratic states does highlight a common frame of political reference and therefore has valuable declaratory impact. But it is not absolutely clear leaders in the region are either equally committed to open and transparent democratic governance and principles of inclusivity at home, or agreed on how democratic principles should be defended and promoted abroad.