When UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer recently met German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron in separate summits, much of the conversation was about solving European challenges, from irregular migration to defence.
But amid the many European issues discussed, the UK also agreed to expand the scope of its Indo-Pacific cooperation with both Germany and France. This was an important, nascent step toward the kind of integrated network of cooperation that, as we argue in a new Chatham House paper, the UK must build if it is to become an effective player in the Indo-Pacific.
Since coming to power, the current UK government has begun to intensify its focus on the region, despite some Labour figures having expressed scepticism while in opposition over the previous government’s Indo-Pacific ‘tilt.’ The Indo-Pacific – a region broadly encompassing South, Southeast, and East Asia including China, as well as Australia and New Zealand and the Pacific Island nations – is recognised as home to both worrying security flashpoints and opportunities for the UK government to advance its wider interests.
With the UK’s resources so constrained, partners and allies will be critical when it comes to achieving its foreign policy goals. This is especially the case for tackling climate change, promoting economic growth and upholding international stability in the face of a more assertive China and a more volatile US.
Climate change cooperation
The Indo-Pacific is crucial for the UK’s goal to be a global leader on climate change. The government has been clear that it wants to work more closely with China on climate, despite wariness on other issues, given China now ranks as the world’s biggest carbon emitter.
But China is not the only important climate partner in the wider Indo-Pacific region. The fast-growing economies of Southeast Asia are also particularly critical. Many of these, such as Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, are especially exposed to the effects of climate change – with low-lying regions and islands vulnerable to sea-level rise and extreme weather.
But they are also at a decisive point in their economic development where they may start contributing more to climate change because they will consume more energy as they grow – by some projections energy demand in ASEAN will more than double by 2050. Enabling the region’s economies to grow and contribute to global prosperity without becoming locked into fossil fuel dependencies will be core to global climate progress.
Several countries in the region also share similar challenges to the UK as they work out the energy mix required to achieve their ambitious climate transition goals. The UK has made positive steps to work with them to jointly address these challenges. For example, the UK and South Korea have signed a partnership to cooperate on clean energy.
The UK has also signed up to support Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) – deals to facilitate investment in the energy transition – with Vietnam and Indonesia. However, further momentum is needed to ensure these initiatives do not stall. There is no addressing climate change globally without addressing it in – and in cooperation with – Asia.
Economic incentives
Beyond climate, the Indo-Pacific is a crucial part of the global economy. The UK government’s own forecasts suggest that between 2021 and 2050, the region will account for more than half of global GDP growth. Southeast Asia, in particular, is one of the few regions in the world with broad political stability and relatively strong growth projections.
This offers considerable potential for expanding British trade and investment. The UK has already taken steps to engage with the region through its accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which includes four Southeast Asian economies (Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam) alongside other key Indo-Pacific countries. But this move should be seen as a foundation, not an end point. UK businesses need practical support to benefit from the initial promise of these kinds of trade links.
Wider regional growth is at risk from the Trump administration’s erratic trade and tariff policy, which have particularly impacted some key Southeast Asian economies, such as Vietnam. Other countries in the region that depend on China for their economic links but rely on the US as a security partner, such as South Korea and Japan, find themselves in a tough spot as the Washington becomes more unpredictable and Beijing more liable to weaponize its dominance of key supply chains.
As a member of the CPTPP with close links to the EU, the UK is in a unique position to connect these important networks on trade, and work with them to navigate the effects of US–China rivalry. Both CPTPP and EU members have an interest in upholding more predictable trade and strong economic governance. Indeed, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently expressed a desire to work more closely with the CPTPP on trade issues in the face of US unpredictability.
Working with other middle powers
The UK’s foreign policy strategy increasingly involves managing relations and overlapping priorities between three influential poles – the US, Europe and China. But to do so – and particularly to mitigate and manage the effects of US–China rivalry – it needs to build strong relations with middle powers and emerging economies outside of these three.
Many of these middle powers are growing more prosperous and influential in the world – and many of them are in the Indo-Pacific. While these states won’t share all of the UK’s interests and values, many do seek a predictable trade order, progress on the energy transition, and stability and security in international relations.