Of those who found corruption for the benefit of an individual’s religious community or for personal gain acceptable, around 60 per cent were located in rural areas, and 40 per cent in urban areas. There was a fairly even balance in terms of gender and socio-economic class. Notably, of all respondents who found corruption for either purpose acceptable across the seven geographical locations in the sample (see figures 4 and 5), more than 25 per cent were based in Lagos, although it only accounted for 14.4 per cent of households surveyed. The responses from Rivers and Sokoto states also stood out: in Rivers, the use of public funds for private gain was, unusually, considered acceptable by a higher number of respondents (13 per cent of the total across all states surveyed) than the use of public funds to benefit a religious community (6 per cent of all respondents). In Sokoto state the opposite was the case, with a significantly higher number of respondents believing the use of public funds for a religious group’s benefit was acceptable (making up 15 per cent of all respondents choosing this option), compared to diverting funds for private gain (10 per cent of all respondents). Such striking differences between states underscore the need for considering local context and drivers when designing anti-corruption interventions. In the context of widespread poverty in Nigeria – particularly in the north – and the obligations of zakat, combined with the difficulties encountered in determining whether contributions are earned through honest means, it is likely that norms of religious giving and beliefs in the purification of wealth through zakat explain the higher levels of acceptance for giving for religious community benefit in Sokoto, one of the country’s poorest states. In this way, the lines between public and club goods are blurred.
Additionally, the higher level of acceptance among respondents of corruption for a religious community’s use, compared with acceptance of corruption for private gain, raises an obvious question: if religion is associated with ethical and moral behaviour, why is the proportion of people who think corruption is acceptable almost twice as high when it benefits an individual’s religious community, as shown in figures 1 and 2.
One possible explanation for this greater acceptance is that, while religion in Nigeria provides the basis and language for morality and ethical behaviour, there are expectations, pressures and practices, related to norms of religious giving, in-group favouritism, communal financial obligations and material prosperity, which limit or mitigate the negative consequences for individuals of participating in corruption that benefits a religious community. At the extreme, these expectations, pressures and practices may even endorse this type of corruption. Religion also encourages and rewards ‘loyalty and a tendency towards the acceptance of authority, both of which might undermine attempts to fight corruption’. This suggests that in addition to allowances made for corrupt behaviour because of norms of giving and expectations of in-group favouritism, the power dynamics of religious institutions and the social contract between authority figures and the religious community can reinforce the acceptability, expectation and practice of diverting public funds for religious purposes.
Whether it is the everyday citizen who must dig into their own pockets to donate to their religious community, or the politician who puts a hand into government coffers for the same purpose, both practices tend to be strongly motivated by norms of religious giving. In these instances, the motivation of the politician is more socially acceptable than if they are thought to be abusing office for private gain, as the survey data show. Furthermore, religious beliefs also function within Nigeria’s cultural context, which strongly values respectability, hierarchy and deference to figures of authority. This can reinforce or provide justifications for decisions to engage in corruption, as members of religious communities may feel pressure to demonstrate their religious commitment through gifts to religious leaders or financial contributions for building projects, religious celebrations or routine fundraising.
In a 2019 study of behavioural determinants of corruption, Borlea et al. confirmed this association of corruption and power through religious authority, which was found to be present in both Islam and Christianity. The study showed that higher levels of corruption were associated with higher power distance, which leads to the supposition that in countries where there is a highly unequal power distribution in society, citizens are less likely to challenge the status quo of corruption because this also means challenging authority. In this way, corruption is sustained – and along with it, inequality in power distribution – as the control of wealth and patronage continues to rest in the hands of those in authority.
The survey data on which this study is based has shown that the acceptability of corruption increases if it is for religious purposes.
Given Nigeria’s history of identity politics and the influence of religion on political preference and clientelism, political actors are aware of the social acceptability of corruption for religious reasons and can use donations and support for religious projects to gain social capital, status and respectability. The survey data on which this study is based has shown that the acceptability of corruption increases if it is for religious purposes, and this sociability gain is very likely to play a role in the strategies of political actors and public officials with access to government resources, as well as in their relationships with religious leaders and institutions. This suggests a rather complicated perception of religious leadership and institutions, which is reflected in a 2017 Afrobarometer survey of religion in Africa. Of the Nigerian respondents to the survey, 20 per cent thought that most or all religious leaders are corrupt, while 60 per cent thought some are corrupt. Paradoxically, 64 per cent of those surveyed claimed to have some or a lot of trust in religious leaders, highlighting how beliefs about corruption can coexist with respect for religious figures and institutions.
