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Class
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Typical capabilities
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Ordnance
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Class I (<150 kg)
Subcategories: micro, mini and small drones
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- Endurance: 1–3 hours
- Maximum range: approx. 80 km
- Payload capacity: 5 kg
- Top speed: 100 km/hour
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Generally unarmed and designed to carry out reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
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Class II (150–600 kg)
Tactical drones
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- Endurance: 10 hours
- Maximum range: 100–200 km
- Payload capacity: up to 70 kg
- Top speed: 200 km/hour
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Some models can be equipped with lightweight ordnance, typically air-to-ground guided missiles.
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Class III (>600 kg)
Subcategories: medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE); high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE); and strike/combat drones
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- Endurance: up to 24 hours (or more)
- Maximum range: depending on the communications equipment used, some Class III drones can be operated at a range of several thousand km
- Payload capacity: several hundred kg
- Top speed: up to 300 km/hour (or more)
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Although many of these models are capable of carrying a mix of weapons, some are designed solely for intelligence-gathering.
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In addition to the individual efforts described above, a number of European countries are also working collaboratively on programmes to develop drones. These include the European MALE Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems project (RPAS, also known as Euro MALE RPAS or Eurodrone), a development project that is integrated within the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework and in which France, Germany, Italy and Spain are participants, and the nEUROn combat drone demonstrator, an initiative launched by the French government in 2003 and jointly developed with the governments of Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
Within NATO, a group of 15 Allies, including the US, has acquired the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) System, comprising five RQ-4D Phoenix (based on the US Air Force Global Hawk) drones, along with the ground command and control stations required for conducting operations. The system is to be operated and maintained by NATO on behalf of all NATO Allies. Separately, Italy, Sweden and the UK have signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate on research, development and joint-concepting of Tempest, a Future Combat Air System (FCAS) involving manned and optionally manned modes of operation.
An Anglo-French collaboration on an FCAS demonstration programme stalled in 2018 as a result of the UK’s then pending departure from the EU; and a separate collaboration between France, Germany and Spain to develop an FCAS system comprised of connected and interoperable manned and unmanned air platforms has apparently encountered difficulties, with reports emerging in early 2021 of rifts between the partner countries.
In 2013, under the auspices of the European Defence Agency (EDA), a group of seven EU member states (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain) – some of which were already operating drones, with others having plans to do so in the future – formed a ‘drone users’ club’. The aim of the group was to share information and examine options for collaboration in the development of MALE drones.
Although different European countries have different approaches to the acquisition of Class III drones, and the debate on drone weaponization will be ongoing in the near future, a gradual increase in the number of countries seeking to acquire, expand or arm existing drone fleets has been noted in recent years. With the establishment of collaborative projects, spurred not only by individual countries but also by NATO and the EU, and in view of changing dynamics in defence and security, the European continent is likely to see the further proliferation of drones.
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Country
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Class III capability
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Planning future acquisition and/or involved in collaborative European/NATO R&D projects
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Belgium
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Unarmed
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The US State Department approved the sale of four MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones to Belgium in March 2019. The MQ-9B can be armed, but there are currently no indications that this will be the case.
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France
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Armed
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Involved in the nEUROn, Euro MALE Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) and Future Combat Air System (FCAS) projects.
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Germany
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Germany obtained a nine-year leasing agreement to operate IAI Heron TP drones in 2018. The Heron TP has capability for carrying weapons.
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Involved in the Euro MALE RPAS and FCAS projects. Involved in NATO’s acquisition of the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system.
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Greece
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Three-year lease agreement for two IAI Heron drones (unarmed) signed in 2020.
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Greece announced its decision to buy a fleet of armed drones from the US and Israel in December 2019. It was reported in May 2020 that the country signed a deal with Israel to lease IAI Heron surveillance drones for border defence. Greece is involved in the nEUROn project.
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Italy
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Armament unknown
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Italy is involved in the nEUROn, Euro MALE RPAS and Tempest projects, and is one of the Allies participating in NATO’s acquisition of the AGS system.
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Netherlands
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None
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In 2018, the Netherlands signed a deal for the purchase from the US of four unarmed MQ-9 Reaper drones, which are due to arrive at the end of 2021. Parliament is currently discussing whether to arm the fleet.
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Poland
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None
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Poland’s Armed Forces Development Program for 2013–22 included plans for acquiring a range of drones, including MALE category aircraft, but plans have been subject to delays. Poland is involved in NATO’s acquisition of the AGS system.
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Spain
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Unarmed
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The US State Department approved the sale of four MQ-5 Block 5 Reapers to Spain in 2015; two were delivered in 2019, and two at the end of 2020. Spain is involved in the nEUROn, Euro MALE RPAS and FCAS programmes.
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Sweden
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None
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Involved in the nEUROn and Tempest projects.
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Switzerland
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Unarmed
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Switzerland plans to buy a total of six Hermes 900 MALE drones from Israel’s Elbit Systems. The first of these was received in 2019. The country is a participant in the nEUROn project.
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UK
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Armed
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The UK is planning to replace its existing MQ-9 Reaper fleet with 16 MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones (renamed ‘Protector’ by the UK Ministry of Defence), with three under development and potentially another 13 to follow. The UK is collaborating with Italy and Sweden in the Tempest project.
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Ukraine
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Armed
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Ukraine purchased six Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 MALE drones in 2019, with the first deployment taking place in 2020. It was reported in July 2020 that Ukraine was seeking to further expand its drone fleet.
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Defence technologies cooperation
Shifting developments in defence, security and geopolitics – including US disengagement from Europe, Russia’s increased military assertiveness, and instability in neighbouring countries – have led to a growing sense of uncertainty and insecurity across Europe. In response, the EU is seeking to adopt a more strategic approach and to resist the notion that it is exclusively a ‘civilian power’. Set by the EU’s Global Strategy document of 2016, the vision of European strategic autonomy is centred around strengthening security and defence efforts to enable the EU ‘to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO’. This vision of autonomy is also seen by the EU as crucial in the context of its transatlantic partnership with the US.
The plan for increased strategic autonomy involves bolstering defence cooperation among EU member states, as well as providing support for European defence industries. Two of the instruments created as part of this framework that relate specifically to the development of drones are PESCO and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Whereas the EDF is the first framework in EU history to specifically offer investment in support of defence cooperation among member states, PESCO is unusual in that, unlike other forms of cooperation, it is a binding agreement ‘to invest, plan, develop and operate defence capabilities […]’. There are currently 25 participating EU member states, engaged variously in a total of 46 projects across a range of different areas. As mentioned above, one of the projects coordinated within the PESCO framework is the Euro MALE RPAS.
Launched to ‘incentivise cooperative projects among Member States’, the EDF will support collaborative research in innovative defence technologies and the joint development of prototypes. Projects in the research phase will be funded by the EDF in full, whereas the joint development of prototypes involves the pooling of national contributions and will require member states to contribute at least 80 per cent of the funding. The EU will not fund the joint acquisition of capabilities, but the European Commission will offer practical support and advice to member states on these matters. Only collaborative projects are eligible for funding, and these must involve at least three participants (eligible entities) from at least three different EU member states or associated countries.
Along with a direct allocation of €100 million in support of the Euro MALE RPAS programme, up to 8 per cent of the total EDF budget will be used to fund innovation in disruptive technologies – i.e. technologies expected to revolutionize their field of action. While the EU has not provided specific details on which technologies might be considered disruptive, the EDA has listed, among others, artificial intelligence (AI); big data analytics; robotics; autonomous defence systems, weapons, and decision-making; future advanced materials; and additive manufacturing. The development of these technologies is significant in that it could lead to applications that might be incorporated in drone systems and thus have an impact on capabilities and drone use in the future. For example, AI can be integrated with drone technology to facilitate image recognition and data analysis: efforts have already been made in this area, for example, via the US Department of Defense’s Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team (also known as Project Maven).
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Project
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Overview
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Participants
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European MALE RPAS (also known as Euro MALE RPAS and Eurodrone)
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A development project integrated within PESCO and managed by the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR). The system includes interoperability with existing and future defence systems; it will be operated worldwide in support of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, and armed ISTAR.
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France, Germany, Italy and Spain
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nEUROn
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An initiative, launched by the French government and led by Dassault Aviation, aiming to develop a technological demonstrator of an unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV). The project is aimed at knowledge-building, and the nEUROn UCAV will not perform military missions.
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France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland
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Future Combat Air System (FCAS)
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FCAS will consist of connected and interoperable manned and unmanned air platforms. This will involve next-generation fighters teaming up with remote carriers (i.e. drone swarms) as force multipliers. The full system, to be operational by 2040, also includes missiles, satellites, existing aircraft and NATO navies.
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France, Germany and Spain
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NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) System
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A group of 15 NATO Allies has acquired the AGS system, comprising five RQ-4D Phoenix high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) remotely piloted aircraft and associated ground command and control stations. The system is operated and maintained by NATO on behalf of all allies. NATO RQ-4D is aimed at providing Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability to NATO, and is being stationed at Sigonella, Italy.
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Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the US
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Tempest
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Tempest is an FCAS providing several modes of operation, combining manned, unmanned and optionally manned platforms.
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Italy, Sweden and the UK
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Controversies and risks
Several European countries have been associated with using armed drones in ways that have been controversial, including by launching or facilitating drone strikes that have prompted questions and concerns over legality, state responsibility and civilian casualties. The UK, for example, targeted and killed a British national, Reyaad Khan, in Syria in August 2015 (at the same time killing two other people, one of whom – Ruhul Amin – was also a UK national) without having first obtained parliamentary approval for conducting airstrikes in that country as part of the coalition forces fighting ISIS. Following its inquiry into the intelligence basis for the strike, the UK parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee reported that it had not been given access to key documents informing the decision to strike. In the absence of such access, parliamentary scrutiny could not be conducted in full, and questions remain over the drone strike and the decision-making process behind it. Furthermore, with the UK Ministry of Defence having confirmed in February 2020 that RAF Reaper drones were taking part in missions outside Operation Shader, while taking the decision to withhold information regarding the nature and location of those missions, concerns over secrecy and the limitations this poses to parliamentary scrutiny remain unheeded.
In Germany, US use of the Ramstein Air Base – deemed crucial as a satellite relay station that enables US-based drone operators to communicate with their remote aircraft in countries such as Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan – has prompted accusations of complicity with US drone strikes outside formal conflict zones. This resulted in legal action against the German government for the killing of three members of the bin Ali Jaber family in a strike in Yemen in 2012, as a result of which the Higher Administrative Court in Münster ruled in March 2019 that the German government must ‘take action to ensure that the US respects international law in its use of Ramstein Air Base’. However, controversy over the incident persisted, with the initial ruling being overturned, at an appeal hearing in November 2020, by the Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig.
There have also been concerns that RAF bases in the UK may be used to support US drone strikes, including through the provision of direct communication links that allow analysis of full-motion video footage to identify potential targets, as well as by the use of surveillance technology to assist in ‘capture-kill’ missions both in conventional military operations and in countries outside formal conflict. Italy, which has allowed the US to launch armed drones from Naval Air Station Sigonella, in Sicily, subject to authorization by the Italian government, has also come under scrutiny, with civil society groups requesting access to information on the legal framework covering US drone use at the airbase. As armed drones proliferate, these actions will not necessarily be restricted to the few actors outlined above.
Along with the provision of military bases and operational support, there have been reports of European countries providing the US with intelligence that has subsequently been used to locate and identify targets for drone strikes.
Along with the provision of military bases and operational support, there have been reports of European countries providing the US with intelligence that has subsequently been used to locate and identify targets for drone strikes. This has led to concerns over whether these countries (among them France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) may be assisting the US in the conduct of unlawful drone strikes. Under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, a state can be found internationally responsible for aiding or assisting another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act if (a) it does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that state.
More broadly, legal questions exist at all levels of legal rules: use of force under the UN Charter rules, international humanitarian law (IHL – the law of armed conflict), and international human rights law (IHRL). This paper’s purpose is not to outline the work done very well by others – especially Harriet Moynihan – elsewhere. However, it should be reiterated that Article 16 is an important additional obligation that attaches ancillary responsibility to those that aid or assist in the commission of a violation of one of these bodies of international law. There are similar rules to Article 16 in IHL and IHRL themselves, which in some ways are broader in scope – in IHL, Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions requires states to ‘respect and to ensure respect’ for the Conventions; and in IHRL, human rights treaties and treaty bodies have confirmed positive obligations on states to protect those within their jurisdiction from harm by others (states and non-state actors).
The controversies resulting from the use of drones remain unresolved, and pose a risk to European democracies by bringing into question some of the political values on which such democratic regimes have been built. For example, without enough information being made publicly available by governments on the use of drones or the provision of assistance to the US drone programme, criticisms abound over lack of transparency and on how this hinders democratic accountability. Such a lack of transparency also leads to doubts over whether European countries do enough to safeguard the rule of law. This issue is particularly relevant in relation to legal frameworks concerning the use of force, as well as state responsibility regarding the provision of assistance and how this could be feeding into potentially unlawful activities by the US.
The use of armed drones, or rather the operational and procedural framework supporting such use, therefore seems to weaken important democratic values. This in turn raises problems for governments with respect to ensuring democratic legitimacy, and continues to cause deep mistrust over the use of armed drones among civil society groups. As more countries within Europe and around the world acquire and begin to use armed drones in military operations, these controversies and challenges are likely to multiply. With a shared interest in supporting a rules-based international order and defending democratic values, European countries could play an important role in shaping the norms on how drones are used in the future, and should work to develop pathways for achieving this. This includes addressing long-standing calls for increasing transparency and accountability for the use of armed drones, and providing information about the processes that guide decision-making around drone strikes.
