|
|
---|
China
|
To achieve peak CO₂ emissions around 2030 and make best efforts to peak early. To lower CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP by between 60% and 65% by 2030 from the 2005 level.
(Carbon-neutral policy (not included in the current NDC): to be carbon-neutral by 2060.)
|
India
|
To reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by between 33% and 35% by 2030 from the 2005 level.
|
Japan
|
A 26% reduction CO₂ emissions by fiscal year (FY) 2030, compared to FY2013 (25.4% reduction compared to FY2005).
(Carbon-neutral policy (not included in the current NDC): To be carbon-neutral by 2050.)
|
South Korea
|
A 24.4% reduction from the total national GHG emissions in 2017 by 2030.
(Carbon-neutral policy: To be carbon-neutral by 2050.)
|
Source: Compiled by the author from individual countries’ NDCs, see Appendix for full list.
|
|
---|
Indonesia
|
Unconditional
|
29% reduction from business as usual (BAU) level by 2030.
|
Conditional
|
41% reduction from BAU level by 2030 with additional 12% reduction compared to unconditional target.
|
Malaysia
|
Unconditional
|
To reduce the emissions intensity of GDP by 35% by 2030 from the 2005 level.
|
Conditional
|
45% reduction of emissions intensity of GDP by 2030 with additional 10% reduction compared to unconditional target.
|
Philippines
|
Unconditional
|
–
|
Conditional
|
Approximately 70% reduction from the BAU level by 2030.
|
Thailand
|
Unconditional
|
20% reduction from the BAU level by 2030.
|
Conditional
|
25% reduction from the BAU level by 2030 with additional 5% reduction compared to unconditional target.
|
Vietnam
|
Unconditional
|
9% reduction from the BAU level by 2030.
|
Conditional
|
27% reduction from the BAU level by 2030 with additional 18% reduction compared to unconditional target.
|
Source: Compiled by the author from individual countries’ NDCs, see Appendix for full list.
As Table 3 shows, the ASEAN5 have adopted a two-fold approach to meet their emissions goals through a combination of unconditional and conditional targets. The five countries insist that they can achieve these ambitious targets so long as there is international support, including finance, technology transfer and capacity-building.
China, the largest generator of GHG emissions in the world, intends to achieve peak CO₂ emissions by 2030. But it has also expressed intentions to try to reach the peak earlier and has implemented coal-targeting measures including a coal consumption cap for coal-fired generation capacity. Furthermore, new efficiency standards have forced a number of its old plants to shut down. However, critics remain concerned that China continues to build new coal-fired power plants.
Amid such concern, President Xi Jinping announced during an address to the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2020 that China would aim to become carbon-neutral by 2060. Although there is a need for a more concrete roadmap, the declaration at least demonstrates that the Chinese leadership is mindful of climate action as one of its national agenda priorities. The global community will carefully watch China’s next move to see how it incorporates carbon-neutral targets in the country’s new five-year plan for the period 2021–25.
Although it is among the world’s top 10 highest emitters (see Table 4), Japan is in a position to reduce its GHG emissions in part because of its mature economy and also due to its relatively declining population. In alignment with the global joint action, new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga in October 2020 declared Japan’s ambition to reach carbon neutrality by 2050. In light of their respective declarations, Japan and China could find common ground – both countries recognize their responsibility for global joint collaboration on climate action and have expressed their intention to promote international cooperation.
|
|
|
|
|
---|
China
|
5,448.9
|
9,570.8
|
75.6%
|
28.6%
|
US
|
5,703.2
|
4,921.1
|
-13.7%
|
14.7%
|
European Union 27
|
3,390.5
|
2,798.5
|
-17.5%
|
8.4%
|
India
|
1,075.0
|
2,307.8
|
114.7%
|
6.9%
|
Russian Federation
|
1,481.9
|
1,587.0
|
7.1%
|
4.7%
|
Japan
|
1,181.5
|
1,080.7
|
-8.5%
|
3.2%
|
South Korea
|
457.7
|
605.8
|
32.4%
|
1.8%
|
Iran
|
417.8
|
579.6
|
38.7%
|
1.7%
|
Canada
|
538.9
|
565.2
|
4.9%
|
1.7%
|
Indonesia
|
317.6
|
542.9
|
71.0%
|
1.6%
|
World total
|
27,078.0
|
33,513.3
|
23.8%
|
100.0%
|
Source: IEA (2020), ‘CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion, 2020’.
South Korea dramatically shifted its position in 2020 from previously showing reluctance to reduce GHG emissions by 2030 to presenting an ambitious reduction policy to achieve its long-term target of carbon neutrality by 2050, which was announced in October 2020 by the South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
Conversely, India has not committed to reducing GHG emissions in the foreseeable future. India intends to reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP; however, it sees difficulty in peaking the level of GHG emissions by 2030.
At the country level across the region, the breakdown of policy actions aimed at achieving these targets includes a move to diversify the energy mix (a shift to renewable energy), promotion of eco-friendly vehicles and other measures to improve energy efficiency. Nevertheless, many of these countries are still expanding economically. A quick shift away from fossil fuels is unrealistic, given the limited range of technologies currently available and the fact that economic activities depend on conventional infrastructure. Although green growth is desirable across all the community, limited financial resources and the higher costs often associated with advanced technologies can also be problematic.
As such, policymakers are struggling to solve the trade-off between economic stimulus policies and a green transition. So far, they are not succeeding, as the progress report by UNESCAP shows. But the carbon-neutral commitments by China, Japan and South Korea may yet change the direction of progress on this, given the scale of impacts of such large emitters. The challenge is how the momentum from these three countries can prevail more widely across the region. As the NDCs of the ASEAN5 indicate, technology transfer, financial resource allocation and capacity-building through international support are key to progress.
Regional initiatives and efforts
In addition to the respective efforts by each government, differing regional networks in Asia have tried to address the concern of climate change and sustainability.
Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting
One of the long-standing forums on environmental issues is the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM) where China, Japan and South Korea have held a continued dialogue since 1999. This activity includes knowledge-sharing, joint research or workshops on priority areas such as air pollution, biodiversity, climate change, the circular economy and waste management. TEMM is currently working closely under a five-year joint action plan (2020–24), which stresses that parties should adhere to global and regional agreements such as the SDGs, the Paris Agreement and the G20 consensus, including the Osaka Blue Ocean Vision.
The action plan stresses that the countries should explore activities with the ‘3+x’ modality to promote sustainable development through multilateral frameworks, including the G20, ASEAN+3 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Doing so would show their intention to reach out to much broader global forums to contribute to global joint actions. TEMM has effectively drawn the attention of policymakers to the challenges of controlling air pollution, and dust and sandstorm (DSS) control; these are urgent, cross-border common challenges for the three countries. TEMM has devoted scientific research to DSS prevention and control including a joint research project on long-range transboundary air pollutants in Northeast Asia, and regularly shares DSS monitoring data and assessments. The work also includes technical countermeasures and management approaches to restore vegetation in areas affected by desertification so as to reduce DSS hazard. TEMM is also active in the transboundary movement of e-waste, another urgent problem in the region.
ASEAN
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a key regional body with a long history. From its original focus on economic partnership and facilitating trade across member countries, ASEAN’s remit has expanded to include challenges common to member countries, including sustainable development. In June 2019, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Leaders’ Vision Statement on Partnership for Sustainability at the 34th ASEAN Summit, which covers a broad range of sustainability issues including the SDGs, national security, cybersecurity and the green economy. As a follow-up, the ASEAN Centre for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue was launched in Bangkok, Thailand, in November 2019.
Through these approaches, the regional body is keen to promote and ensure ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture and also seeks to bolster ASEAN-led frameworks such as ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit (EAS). In November 2019, the EAS announced its leaders’ statement on partnership for sustainability. ASEAN-led outreach to the EAS platform on the green and sustainability agenda is a new development, which aims to engage with the US, India and Russia. It remains to be seen whether ASEAN can lead more action-based initiatives across the members of the EAS. The challenge for ASEAN is how to develop a more concrete strategy for the region to lead regional sustainable development beyond rhetoric, public statements and agreements.
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a trade partnership signed between ASEAN+3, Australia and New Zealand, could potentially become an influential arena for discussing regional cooperation. However, the decision of India to opt out of the RCEP makes it difficult to assess how this could work in practice. Furthermore, the RCEP has limited provisions on service, investment and standards; no labour provision, no environmental provision and no discipline of state-owned enterprises in competition provisions. As a result, it has been regarded as a lower trade standard framework compared to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Although the RCEP will become the largest trading bloc in the world and an influential body, it is hard to imagine how it could proactively deal with regional common agendas like green growth and sustainable development. Having said that, both the CPTPP and RCEP could move Asia closer to economic integration and an expansion of its free-trade area. In theory, at least, such groupings could make it easier to coordinate joint action beyond national borders.
Belt and Road Initiative
The other influential project in Asia is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is part of Beijing’s campaign to promote Chinese investment around the world while at the same time better connecting China with Africa and Europe, through a series of maritime and land routes. Given the degree of investment in new infrastructure linked to the BRI, it will have significant climate change implications. One analysis concluded that if the 126 countries involved in the BRI, excluding China, follow the most carbon-intensive growth path observed in history, this could result in a 2.7°C temperature increase above pre-industrial levels, even if the rest of the world adheres to the 2°C path agreed under the Paris Agreement.
At the opening ceremony of the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation on 26 April 2019, Chinese President Xi stated, ‘We need to pursue open, green and clean cooperation. The Belt and Road is not an exclusive club. We may launch green infrastructure projects, make green investment and provide green financing.’ Nevertheless, there are concerns over the lack of green or sustainable policies and guidelines for the BRI projects. Critics call for the BRI to shift away from funding polluting projects; they are convinced that the BRI includes projects that will increase climate change as well as affect local ecology.
The Green Investment Principles for the BRI, established in 2018, are a set of voluntary principles to promote green finance and green investments along the Belt and Road. Having received official sign-ups from 37 global institutions, mostly large financial institutions, by the end of March 2020, the finance community is expected to take the lead in applying high standards on green investment principles. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s recent change in coal policy, whereby its president expressed the intention to cease financing any project functionally related to coal, is a signal that the finance community might further be able to help change the trajectory.
Japan’s approach
Japan has undertaken a project-oriented approach through bilateral cooperation. At the regional level, it has proposed developing a new liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply chain across the Indo-Pacific region to secure a sustainable energy source to meet an increase in electricity demand. Japan has undertaken this approach in collaboration with the US, a big gas supplier, under the Japan–US Energy Partnership (JUSEP), an important collaboration that aligns with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative that both countries are advancing. One concrete example of engagement is the Trilateral Vietnam–US–Japan Commercial LNG Forum held on 2 December 2020. The LNG solution provides a realistic alternative to balance the sustainable supply of electricity and the mitigation of GHG emissions for countries that are heavily dependent on coal. The challenge is the initial cost and time frame required to develop a full package of infrastructure from the LNG-receiving terminal to the pipeline for domestic transfer and gas-fired plant. Furthermore, without a clear replacement plan to move from coal to gas, the gas deployment just increases dependency on a fossil fuel, making it difficult to map out the path to carbon reduction.
If the major regional projects and infrastructure initiatives led by China and Japan can be married to broader regional green growth strategies, these could be a game changer for Asia. However, a great deal of distance remains between current practice and that goal.