How much of this caution has to do with Merkel herself? After nearly 16 years in office, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the chancellor’s approach from broader currents in German foreign policy. But with Merkel set to step down in late 2021, it is worth asking whether changes in Germany’s approach to China can be expected under a new chancellor.
Armin Laschet, the candidate who will lead Germany’s conservatives into the September 2021 election – and a frontrunner to succeed Merkel as chancellor – is likely to bring a degree of foreign policy continuity, though perhaps with a little more of the transactional, business-first approach favoured by Schröder. Laschet, the minister-president of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Germany’s most populous state, has not shown any signs of buying into the narrative of a systemic competition between authoritarianism and liberal democracy in which Germany must choose a side. When pressed, he has described China as a ‘geostrategic challenger, a competitor within global systems’, and has spoken of the need to talk openly about human rights violations, including in Xinjiang. But Laschet has also repeatedly emphasized the importance of trade in the relationship; and he has defended his own state’s close economic ties to China – including those of the city of Duisburg, which has been criticized for its embrace of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and of telecommunications firm Huawei. In the past, Laschet has rejected the idea of excluding Huawei from Germany’s 5G network. Based on his record in NRW, and his public statements, it is difficult to envisage him insisting on a harder line towards Beijing. One might even expect more equivocation and less appetite for confrontation.
Still, the next German chancellor will not be operating in a vacuum; nor will they have Merkel’s long track record of prioritizing relations with China as part of her overall foreign policy approach. Whoever succeeds her will have the opportunity to do things differently. If the CDU/CSU alliance does come out on top in the election later this year (by the spring of 2021, opinion polls showed its lead evaporating amid a lack of enthusiasm over Laschet’s candidacy, public anger over the current government’s handling of the pandemic and a series of corruption scandals), it will need to find a coalition partner. The most likely partner is the Greens, whose leaders support a tougher, values-based approach to China. With the polls shifting months before the election, other constellations cannot be ruled out in which the Greens become the senior partner in a new government, perhaps as part of a three-way coalition that includes the centre-left SPD and either the liberal FDP or, on the far-left, Die Linke. Annalena Baerbock, the Greens’ candidate for chancellor, has been outspoken in her criticism of Merkel’s policy towards China. If she were to become Germany’s first Green head of government, a shift towards a harder line on China could be expected. As in the UK, where Conservative backbenchers have pushed Prime Minister Boris Johnson in a more hawkish direction, Germany’s next leader – regardless of party affiliation – will have to reckon with a growing cohort of China critics in the Bundestag. Some of these critics, like Norbert Röttgen, could end up playing a prominent role in the next government. External pressures are also likely to build from Germany’s most important allies outside Europe. Some German diplomats believe a firmer line may be inevitable, no matter who succeeds Merkel.
As in the UK, where Conservative backbenchers have pushed Prime Minister Boris Johnson in a more hawkish direction, Germany’s next leader – regardless of party affiliation – will have to reckon with a growing cohort of China critics in the Bundestag.
In the political realm, there are still ‘China Versteher’, or doves, resisting a tougher line. In early 2020 Hans-Peter Friedrich, the CSU vice-president of the Bundestag, announced the formation of a new group called the ‘China Brücke’ (China Bridge), which aims to foster dialogue and cooperation with China. But the space for such views in the political debate has shrunk in recent years. And a more dynamic think-tank community, led by MERICS, which was established in 2013, has helped raise awareness, particularly among politicians in Berlin, about China’s authoritarian turn and more aggressive outward posture under Xi Jinping. As noted above, MERICS was on the list of European institutions, lawmakers and academics sanctioned by China in March 2021 in response to the EU’s imposition of sanctions related to human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
