Advanced military technology in Russia

Capabilities, limitations and challenges

Research paper Updated 2 November 2021 ISBN: 978 1 78413 494 5

Photo shows an armed drone on a plinth in an exhibition setting

Samuel Bendett

Analyst, Adversary Analysis Group, and Member of the Russia Studies Program, CNA, and Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security

Mathieu Boulègue

Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Dr Richard Connolly

Director, Eastern Advisory Group

Dr Margarita Konaev

Deputy Director of Analysis and Research Fellow, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University

Dr Pavel Podvig

Researcher, Russian Nuclear Forces Project

Prof. Dr. Katarzyna Zysk

Professor of International Relations and Contemporary History, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

Military technology innovation enables Russia’s way of war and informs new concepts of operation and military thought around future warfare, especially asymmetric advantages against more powerful competitors.

New weapons systems, dubbed Putin’s superoruzhie (‘super weapons’) and first unveiled in 2018, signal Russia’s intent to innovate in the defence-industrial field to counter the perceived conventional military superiority of great power competitors such as the US and its NATO allies.

Russia is pursuing the incremental integration of asymmetric force-multiplier technologies into its established and legacy weapons systems. Meanwhile, the defence industry is developing new systems and capabilities in military robotics and has successfully integrated unmanned vehicles, particularly aerial drones, into its military operations. In the space sector, Russia is pursuing the development of capabilities able to potentially counter and disrupt an adversary’s satellite operations. Finally, AI technologies are being developed with a view to the disruption of Western command and control systems and communication facilities, as well as the establishment of information superiority.

This research paper offers an overview of Russia’s modern military capabilities and advanced technologies in key sectors. It also discusses the effects of military innovation on Russian military thinking and its impact for the US, NATO, and their partners.

05 Military robotics development

Samuel Bendett

Analyst, Adversary Analysis Group, and Member of the Russia Studies Program, CNA, and Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security

Russia is pursuing the development and fielding of aerial, ground and maritime autonomous and robotic systems as force multipliers, while determining their utility in the fast-changing pace of today’s and future combat.

Over the past two decades, the Russian military has undergone a significant modernization in its warfighting capabilities and doctrine. A major effort undertaken by the defence ministry has involved the adoption and continued development of autonomous and robotic military systems. Today, such technology is becoming a key part of the Russian concept of operations (CONOPS) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). This technology is viewed as a mission multiplier, while removing and safeguarding military personnel from harm.138 Starting from 2021, the ministry and its military-industrial community will be building on their armed forces’ experience in using such systems, while formulating the theory of how such technology will influence the way the Russian armed forces fight. This chapter will explore Russian thinking and discussion on military autonomy, followed by specific examples of Russian developments of such systems for the air, land and maritime domains. The chapter will conclude with a summary of what these developments mean for the future of warfare in Europe and on a global scale.

Framing the need for autonomous systems and military robotics

Despite the Russian military establishment often using the words ‘robotic’, ‘unmanned’ and ‘autonomous’ to denote the different platforms discussed in this paper, the overarching technical reality today is that practically all the systems are controlled remotely by a human operator. At the same time, Russian military planners and the defence establishment are actively discussing fully autonomous operation as the eventual concept for air, land and maritime systems.139

These debates indicate that the Russian military’s future threat analysis points to it potentially facing a technologically advanced adversary that is capable of fielding a vast array of defensive and offensive systems, including robotic and precision-guided weapons. The Russian military has identified the need to invest in high-tech systems that include different types of autonomous vehicles in order to counter this potential threat.140 At the same time, the defence ministry is discussing the widespread use of such technology in all manner of conflicts that also involve low-tech adversaries and, especially, urban combat operations.141

This debate on future war is being driven by key Russian military institutions such as the Advanced Research Foundation (ARF), Russia’s equivalent of the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Both ARF and DARPA are tasked by their respective country’s militaries with developing breakthrough concepts and technologies. In 2016, ARF General Director Andrey Grigoryev noted that future combat will be a war of robotic vehicles, while soldiers will gradually become their operators and move away from direct combat.142 In 2020, ARF Deputy General Director Vitaly Davydov echoed Grigoryev by saying that the eventual mass use of military robotics is inevitable if armies do not want human soldiers dying in combat, as human fighters will be gradually supplanted by robotic and autonomous systems that can act faster, more accurately and more selectively than people.143 While recognizing that the ability of these systems to conduct military operations is growing increasingly sophisticated, the Russian defence ministry nonetheless repeatedly emphasizes the need for human control over these weapons for now.144 At the same time, the defence ministry recognizes that fully autonomous systems may be inevitable, both in terms of concepts being developed currently and of future real weapons.145

The defence ministry began to formulate specific requirements for this technology after extensive testing of its aerial, ground and maritime remote-controlled systems, especially in Syrian combat, and following extensive reviews of other countries’ use of such technology.146 The list that guides current research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) includes greater autonomy for faster decision-making, especially in the rapidly changing urban combat environment.147 Additional requirements include modularity, multifunctionality, assured command and control, the ability to withstand significant electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures, the ability to cooperate with different manned and unmanned platforms in multiple domains, and the ability to integrate into existing and future military formations in teams and swarms.148 For urban-type warfare, Russian future plans envisage teams of light and heavy combat unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) working with aerial drones in identifying and attacking targets, while cooperating with manned units and formations for extended periods of time.149

These operations are envisaged outside an urban combat setting, in potentially countering a peer adversary’s forces and attriting their capabilities, especially in disrupting enemy reconnaissance, information exchange and EW systems.150 In these scenarios, the Russian military envisages units equipped with robotics for a continuous long-term impact to force the adversary to expend and expose human, military and material resources.151 For the maritime domain, the Russian defence-industrial establishment envisages a global network of underwater, aerial and surface autonomous and unmanned vehicles integrated with submarines, surface vessels and logistics ships for a single common operating picture.152

To many ministry officials and scientists, the autonomy and cooperative engagement they want to see in military robotics is not possible without integrating artificial intelligence (AI) elements such as machine vision, image recognition and natural language processing into the systems’ command and control. Therefore, the use and application of AI can also be traced throughout the Russian debate on robotics CONOPS and TTPs. Recently, President Vladimir Putin identified the development of weapons with elements of AI as one of the defence ministry’s five major priorities for the near future, in order to counter perceived US and NATO threats.153 Specifically, Colonel-General Vladimir Zarudnitsky, head of the Military Academy of the Armed Forces General Staff, noted that the development and use of unmanned and autonomous military systems, the ‘robotization’ of all spheres of armed conflict, and the development of AI for robotics will have the greatest medium-term effect on the Russian armed forces’ ability to meet their future challenges.154 What remains unresolved in the defence ministry’s public statements and deliberations is the discrepancy between current assurances of human control over such systems, and the aspiration for them to operate with full autonomy in the future, presumably after a human operator has approved targeting designations.155

Current and future robotic aerial vehicle development

Currently, practically all the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) Russia has in service are remote-controlled, with several vehicles aspiring to greater operational autonomy. Russian defence officials note that small UAVs are key to current and future operational success.156 They point out the growing evolution of UAVs from reconnaissance roles to EW, relaying communications, delivering supplies and providing target designations to ultimately conducting autonomous strikes.157 Looking ahead, the priorities for military UAV development include introducing elements of AI into the drone control system, and integrating UAVs into a common airspace with manned aircraft, along with the development of UAV swarms.158

Drones like Eleron-3, Orlan-10 and Forpost are now integrated into the defence ministry’s reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire contours, which ensures that data on the ground, surface and aerial environment is acquired in real time, most notably in Russian operations in Syria.159 In particular, EW has become one of the key areas for UAV use. Most notable in this field is the Leer-3 complex, which incorporates an Orlan-10 UAV with a range of up to 120 km for cell tower hijacking and mobile communications jamming. This drone-borne system was sighted in Ukraine,160 was used in Syria161 and today is widely involved in EW training in the Russian armed forces.162

Table 2. Principal UAV systems deployed by the Russian armed forces

Name	Function	Range	Manufacturer
Eleron-3	UAV – ISR	30 km	Eniks
Orlan-10	UAV – ISR	120 km	Special Technology Center (STC)
Forpost	UAV – ISR	250 km	Uzga
Molniya	UAV swarm concept	To be determined	Kronstadt
Orion	UAV – ISR and combat	250 km	Kronstadt
S-70 Okhotnik	UCAV	6,000 km	Sukhoi (Rostec)
Altius	UCAV	10,000 km	Uzga
Grom	UCAV – ‘loyal wingman’ concept	To be determined	Kronstadt
Kub	Loitering munition	30 mins at 100 km/h	Rostec
Lancet	Loitering munition	40 mins at 100 km/h	Rostec

Note: The table displays all UAV systems mentioned in this chapter. ISR stands for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; UCAV for unmanned combat aerial vehicle.

Source: Edmonds, J., Bendett, S. et al. (eds) (2021), AI and Autonomy in Russia, Arlington, VA: CNA, https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/rsp/russia-ai.

In Syria, Moscow used UAVs around the clock for the first time in 2015, convincing the defence ministry that drones constitute an essential element of modern combat.163 Today, military UAVs are present across the entire Russian military force structure, with drone companies embedded in motorized rifle and tank brigades and divisions and separate reconnaissance brigades.164 There are unmanned units in the artillery, engineer-sapper, missile, reconnaissance and railway brigades, with UAV squadrons also having been formed in the Aerospace Forces.165 Each combined-arms army, brigade and division has two drone platoons for every UAV company, equipped with several drones with ranges between 10 km and 120 km.166 This structure is replicated across the Airborne Forces and Naval Infantry, with UAV companies present in the Northern and Pacific Fleets.167 The defence ministry plans to organize long-range heavy drone units into individual reconnaissance aviation squadrons.168

While Syria became a massive testing ground for Russia’s short-range drone fleet, the lack of unmanned aerial vehicles capable of striking targets at long range was acutely felt, as the military had to scramble crewed aviation for attack missions, potentially putting pilot lives in danger.

To meet the growing military demand, Russian UAV developers are actively pursuing multiple projects that involve quadcopter, multi-rotor, helicopter-type, fixed-wing and other designs. In line with the overarching theme that military autonomy is supposed to save human lives, concept intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) drones are being developed to replace the crewed ISR aircraft in service today.169 Swarming and AI RDT&E are being actively pursued170 – for example, within the Molniya concept, which involves launching multiple jet-powered stealth drones from crewed and uncrewed platforms to conduct aerial and ground strikes and to provide EW and reconnaissance capabilities.171

While Syria became a massive testing ground for Russia’s short-range drone fleet, the lack of UAVs capable of striking targets at long range was acutely felt, as the military had to scramble crewed aviation for attack missions, potentially putting pilot lives in danger. This recognition is now driving the defence ministry’s RDT&E of longer-range combat drones. One such significant development is the medium-altitude, long-endurance Orion UAV, with a 250-km range, which was finally acquired by the Russian military in late 2020, becoming the first official combat UAV in service.172 Another combat UAV project is the Altius, which has a range of up to 10,000 km and took to the air in 2019,173 with a manufacturing and supply contract finally signed by the state in 2021.174

No other drone has received as much global attention as the heavy S-70 Okhotnik. First flown in 2019, it is designed as an interceptor and a ground-attack platform to overcome adversary air defence systems, radar stations and possibly military aircraft. Its key feature is integration with Su-57 fifth-generation manned fighters in ‘loyal wingman’ formations.175 The Russian defence ministry envisages the Su-57 pilot controlling multiple S-70 drones, with the Okhtonik potentially being armed with hypersonic missiles for greater striking range.176 According to current deliberations across the defence ministry and its expert community, such teaming could potentially replace entire squadrons of piloted aircraft for reconnaissance and combat missions in the near future.177 The ministry also plans for the Altius and Okhtonik to have on-board AI for autonomous operations.178 Additionally, the Kronstadt Bureau – the maker of Orion drones – has unveiled several unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) projects, including the Grom [Thunder] ‘loyal wingman’ concept, which is capable of launching its own drone swarms, and the Sirius, a long-range UCAV that is already slated for acquisition starting in 2023.179 The defence ministry’s thinking and aspirations for future crewed and uncrewed combat can be summarized by the recently-unveiled Su-75 ‘Checkmate’ light fighter jet concept.180 Its developer, the state corporation Rostec, envisions this aircraft in both crewed and uncrewed versions, with on-board AI for situational awareness and command and control, and capable of flying with UAVs in a coordinated group.181

Finally, the Nagorny Karabakh war of 2020 was a striking demonstration of the potential of a conventional military that acts in concert with UCAVs and loitering munition (or ‘kamikaze’) drones. Like the Syrian conflict, it also laid bare Russia’s lack of either UAV class in active service. Following the conclusion of the war, the Russian defence ministry asked the defence-industrial sector to accelerate the development and testing of these drones. Rostec responded by officially announcing in February 2021 that two of its ‘kamikaze’ drones – the Kub and the Lancet – had been tested in Syria, with the Russian military having priority on their eventual acquisition.182 Rostec is also planning to incorporate these drones into the new ‘aerial mining’ concept for both ground and aerial targeting. To do this, loitering munitions like the Lancet fly in an aerial ‘net’, forming a ‘minefield’. When detecting an intruder, these drones then fly at the target, supposedly increasing the chances of success by their sheer numbers.183

Current and future robotic ground vehicle development

Russian development of UGVs is driven by the defence ministry’s evaluation of the changing nature of ground combat, by the desire to save soldiers’ lives, and to make operations more effective. The Russian defence leadership thinks that introducing combat robotic vehicles with troops while developing their combat employment CONOPS will change how military formations accomplish their tactical tasks in battle.184 By 2021, Russian defence enterprises had manufactured, tested and fielded multiple models such as Platforma-M, Nerehta, Soratnik, Kungas, Scarab, Sphera, Shturm, Udar, Uran-6, Uran-9 and Uran-14, to name but a few.185 Numerous smaller tracked and wheeled models for ISR and logistics are also being developed for both the military and the security services.186

Table 3. Principal UGV systems deployed by the Russian armed forces

Name	Function	Manufacturer
Platforma-M	Combat UGV	NITI Progress
Nerehta	Combat UGV	Degtyaryov plant and ARF
Soratnik	Combat UGV	Rostec
Kungas	UGV swarm concept	Special Engineering Design Bureau
Scarab	Demining UGV (short-range)	CET-1
Sphera	Demining UGV (short-range)	CET-1
Marker	UGV RDT&E concept	ARF
Uran-6	Demining UGV (short-range)	JSC 766 UPTK (Kalashnikov-Rostec)
Uran-9	Combat UGV (operator is located at up to 4 km from the vehicle)	JSC 766 UPTK (Kalashnikov-Rostec)
Uran-14	Firefighting UGV	JSC 766 UPTK (Kalashnikov-Rostec)
Udar	Combat UGV	Rostec
Prohod -1	Heavy demining UGV	High Precision Weapons JSC
Shturm	Heavy UGV for urban combat	Uralvagonozavod
T-14 Armata	Next-generation main battle tank	Rostec

Note: All systems are mentioned in this chapter.

Source: Edmonds, J., Bendett, S. et al. (eds) (2021), AI and Autonomy in Russia, Arlington, VA: CNA, https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/rsp/russia-ai.

Broadly speaking, there are two main UGV development pathways in Russia today. One features new vehicles developed from scratch, like the demining Uran-6 and combat Uran-9, along with the Soratnik, Nerehta and Marker concepts. The remote-controlled demining Uran-6 UGV took part in operations in Syria to identify and clear unexploded ordnance, improvised explosive devices and other obstacles harmful to military and civilians,187 and this vehicle is starting to enter Russian service with engineer battalions and demining units.188 The Marker has a special role as a testing and evaluation platform for further UGV development. ARF, the Marker project lead, is discussing the vehicle as a test bed for computer vision, fully autonomous movement, and swarm control, while testing deep neural networks on the vehicle to assist in decision-making and to perform tasks independently.189 The Marker is built to interact with existing and future UAVs, and the ARF team is testing voice control technology for a MUM-T (manned-unmanned teaming) application.190 Another key design is the Uran-9 that was tested in Syria in a ‘near-combat setting’. There, the vehicle experienced multiple failures in transportation, communication, firing and the operator’s situational awareness capabilities.191 These failures guided defence ministry thinking about future combat UGV development, and influenced the current debate among military experts and developers on the utility of ground robotics in combat – such as using Uran-9-type vehicles in single engagements as part of mixed formations to identify adversary positions, hard points and to draw enemy fire. Today, the Uran-9 is acquired by the Russian military in combat and engineering battalions.192

The second UGV development initiative has multiple UGV projects, like the Udar, Prohod-1 and Shturm, which are built on the chassis of tanks and other combat vehicles already in service with the Russian military.193 For example, the Udar’s developer chose the BMP-3 armoured vehicle as the basis for this UGV, based on the BMP-3’s already long service and soldiers’ familiarity with it. Specifically, the developer, Rostec, noted that creating a UGV like this from scratch would take many years, while vehicle models are already available for redevelopment and experimentation.194 As planned, Udar is envisaged as part of the ground forces’ combat and support units, used both independently and as part of UAV and UGV formations.195 Another concept, the Shturm heavy unmanned combat vehicle, is based on a T-72 tank chassis, one of the most widespread across the Russian military. The defence ministry took over the Shturm’s development in 2019 in order to turn it into an urban combat vehicle, and in August 2021 signed the first acquisition contract.196

A further example of a UGV based on an existing platform is the Prohod-1 heavy demining vehicle, based on a T-90 tank chassis.197 This type of UGV RDT&E also includes ongoing tests of the T-14 Armata main battle tank, along with self-propelled combat systems, for potential autonomous and semi-autonomous operations. Recently, the Uralvagonozavod enterprise, which builds the majority of Russian tanks, announced work on unmanned armoured vehicle concepts based on tank platforms, highlighting the utility of working with available and proven technology to create next-generation fighting systems.198

In arguing for using existing vehicle platforms over newly created ones, Russian military commentators note that such platforms are both larger and better protected.199 UGV logistics play another role in this debate, with experts arguing that smaller vehicles need to be delivered and unloaded for combat, while the likes of the Udar are fully-fledged armoured vehicles that can already operate in conventional motorized rifle units.200 Other Russian military analysts debate whether the current UGV crop should be used in combat in the first place. Some analysts argue that UGVs like the Uran-9 should be used only in a limited capacity, such as in low-intensity conflict or reconnaissance missions,201 since Uran-9-like systems would be ‘annihilated by heavy artillery fire’ in battles where a significant amount of armoured vehicles are used by both sides, given that this UGV’s dexterity and manoeuvrability would be inferior to those of specialized crewed units.202

With the imagined clash of Russian military robots against enemy counterparts potentially still many years away, the Russian defence ministry has time to further formulate concepts for its growing unmanned ground vehicle combat force requirements.

Despite the development of multiple UGV types, the defence ministry and the Russian military expert community conceptualize their eventual autonomous use in combat, with the vehicles navigating in an unstructured environment and performing tasks in accordance with targets they have been assigned, without direct human participation.203 This would presumably be accomplished with the help of AI, as the ongoing Marker RDT&E demonstrates. The next logical step for the defence ministry is to test the combination of these and other unmanned vehicles in combined formations to evaluate their capabilities. To that end, the ministry recently announced it would be standing up a unit of 20 Uran-9 UGVs to study their application in combat over the next few years. The lessons from this testing and evaluation will inform the ministry’s drafting of concepts for the applications of military robotics, adding to the data acquired via other UGV and UAV projects discussed in this section.204 With the imagined clash of Russian military robots against enemy counterparts potentially still many years away, the Russian defence ministry has time to further formulate concepts for its growing UGV combat force requirements.

Current and future maritime robotic vehicle development

For the Russian military, maritime unmanned and autonomous technology today has an overarching ISR scope – to obtain data on the undersea environment and to inform related surface, aerial, undersea or land-based components. Future envisioned roles involve situational awareness as part of anti-submarine (ASW) and counter-mine (CMW) warfare operations, along with the protection of key naval assets such as port facilities.205 A growing share of Russian unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) may acquire combat roles to identify, track and engage adversary assets below and above the surface. Ultimately, the Russian navy has plans to equip its vessels with surface and subsurface (along with aerial) robotic complements, making each ship a potential carrier and user of unmanned and autonomous technology.206 Another key principle that guides Russia’s unmanned naval RDT&E is the increasing general automation in the maritime domain.207 The latest Russian development proposals highlight equipping vessels and carriers with a high degree of automation and the use of robotic systems.208

Russia’s proposals for combat maritime autonomy include the much-discussed Poseidon nuclear-capable UUV (see Chapter Three for more details).209 Another potential combat design is the supposedly anti-submarine Cephalopod UUV,210 which is possibly intended for escort and guard duties.211 Finally, the Surrogat UUV can reproduce an acoustic and electromagnetic signature that either mimics an adversary or a Russian submarine, to draw enemy assets out or hide Russian vessels from detection.212

Russia’s multiple ISR UUV projects point to the desire to acquire data and information across the undersea domain. This includes the Vityaz deep-water autonomous vehicle, which reached the bottom of the Mariana Trench in 2020.213 ARF, one of its developers, highlighted that Vityaz’s complete autonomy via AI allowed the vehicle to carry out undersea tasks.214 Another AI-enabled project is the Galtel underwater vehicle, which was tested by the military in Syria in late 2017 and early 2018215 in order to map out the Tartus port area.216 Another deep-water ISR project is the Klavesin-2R-PM, designed to reach a depth of 6,000 metres.217 There are multiple smaller UUV models undergoing different stages of RDT&E for mid- to long-term operation.218

Table 4. Principal UUV systems deployed by the Russian armed forces

Name	Function	Manufacturer
Poseidon	Long-range combat underwater vehicle	Rubin and Malahit design bureaux
Cephalopod	Combat UUV	Rubin Design Bureau
Surrogat	Combat UUV	Rubin Design Bureau
Vityaz	ISR UUV	ARF and Rubin Design Bureau
Galtel	ISR UUV	Institute of Marine Technology Problems (RAS)
Klavesin-2R-PM	ISR UUV	Rubin Design Bureau
Sarma	Long-range ISR UUV	ARF and Lazurit
Inspektor MK-2	Mine countermeasures USV	ECA Group (France)
Iskatel	Mine countermeasures and ISR USV	Research and Production Enterprise ‘Aviation and Marine Electronics’
Skanda	Mine countermeasures and ISR USV	Mnev and Co. Shipbuilding
Buk-600	Mine countermeasures and ISR USV	Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University

Note: All systems are mentioned in this chapter.

Source: Edmonds, J., Bendett, S. et al. (eds) (2021), AI and Autonomy in Russia, Arlington, VA: CNA, https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/rsp/russia-ai.

The exploration and securing of multiple natural assets in the Arctic region likewise guides defence ministry development of autonomous maritime systems. In 2019, the ARF unveiled the long-range Sarma UUV project for the Northern Sea Route, designed to cover long distances without surfacing and without external communication with satellites in order to conduct situational awareness and ISR duties.219 Recently, the Rubin Design Bureau and the ARF unveiled the ‘Iceberg’ concept, which includes crewed and uncrewed vehicles for seismic prospecting, drilling, energy and hydrocarbon production in the Arctic in the near future.220 Envisaged as a civilian project to give Russia the advantage in the Arctic hydrocarbons race, it could provide the military with additional ISR capabilities on this region. Finally, the defence ministry is designing an underwater microbot swarm that can work in Arctic conditions for hours at a time.221

The exploration and securing of multiple natural assets in the Arctic region guides defence ministry development of autonomous maritime systems.

At the same time, Russia’s debate about unmanned surface vehicle development is dominated by divisions over the utility of foreign imports and domestic technical capabilities.222 Russian naval end-users were supposedly unhappy with the French Inspektor Mk 2 unmanned surface vehicle (USV) acquired for the Project 12700 minesweeper, citing manufacturer’s defects.223 The Russian defence industry has since unveiled domestic USV prototypes.224 Since 2017, the Russian navy has tested several USVs designed for minesweeper vessels, such as the Iskatel,225 Skanda,226 and Buk-600 models,227 which have various degrees of autonomy, for C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).228 It should be noted that among Russia’s many ongoing UUV and USV projects, only the Galtel maritime robotic system has been used in a combat environment, in stark contrast to the multiple Russian UAVs and UGVs that were tested in Syria for further evaluation and development.

Conclusions

In the immediate future, the Russian military will continue to build out its UAV fleet capabilities, incorporating and increasing swarm and ‘loyal wingman’ abilities that tie together piloted and uncrewed systems for greater striking range and better situational awareness. Russia’s reconnaissance-fire and reconnaissance-strike contours pose the greatest challenge to adversary forces, given Russia’s continuing efforts to refine UAV use in practically all major units and formations. As the Russian long-range UCAV capabilities will grow, so will Russia’s ability to deliver strikes against ground and aerial targets at greater distances, increasing the defence ministry’s combat reach. Just as important is the impending proliferation of Russian combat and ISR drones, giving the Russian industry access to new markets and new data on their potential use against US assets and allies.229 The Russian defence ministry will also continue to experiment with UAV–UGV teaming for more effective battlefield management. In the near term, the UGV testing space will help define how Russian ground forces could fight future wars, and whether such systems can function effectively with manned formations. This trend is exemplified by the use of UGVs and UAVs in September 2021 during the Zapad-2021 military exercises, with the Russian military using Uran-9 UGVs for combat reconnaissance and fire support, Uran-6s for demining operations, Nerehta UGVs for reconnaissance and fire support, and Platforma-M for urban combat missions and passing through minefields.230 Specifically, Uran-9 and Nerehta UGVs were used in the combat formations of combined arms units. Additionally, the Russian military used Orlan-10 and Forpost UAVs for ISR and target acquisition missions, while Forpost and Orlan-10 combat versions, together with an Orion UCAV, were used for the first time in support of ground attacks.231

Russia’s ability to manufacture and test deep-diving UUVs presents one of the growing challenges to Western and NATO forces, as the defence ministry will seek to gain better situational awareness below the waves, while crafting an unmanned systems doctrine that could challenge Western surface and sub-surface assets. At the same time, the Russian navy is far from the mass use of such systems, in contrast to the nearly-ubiquitous aerial drone use. If the Russian military succeeds in designing a multi-domain robotic swarm, it could potentially challenge current Western military superiority by forcing NATO to expend its assets on low-cost Russian robotic systems.

At the same time, unmanned and autonomous technologies were not used in a true peer conflict until the Nagorny Karabakh war of 2020. Today, the US, NATO and Russian forces are testing and using their autonomous technologies against mostly militarily inferior and low-tech adversaries. In the future, the Russian military will continue to refine its robotics technologies and will upgrade its proposed plans for integrating these systems with manned formations to train for a conflict against a peer adversary. On 21 May 2021 Russian defence minister Sergey Shoigu announced that his country had commenced mass production of military robots with AI that can fight autonomously.232 He did not specify which vehicles he was referring to, and the military expert community debated which of the systems described in this chapter may have been implied in Shoigu’s statement.233 Regardless of which vehicles may eventually fit Shoigu’s definition, this chapter has discussed multiple projects undertaken by the defence ministry in order to develop technologies that could give Russian forces a battlefield advantage. Should such efforts prove successful, the defence ministry’s investments may result in a force structure that would be better positioned to engage its adversary via a range of unmanned and autonomous systems that are first to the fight, do not carry a human cost in case of a failed mission, and can provide a better situational awareness of the adversary’s forces and intentions.

These developments are not a foregone conclusion, given the Russian military industry’s ongoing struggles with key manufacturing components for autonomous systems, such as microelectronics and engines.234 Nonetheless, Russia’s mass manufacturing of, and experimentation with, different types of military autonomous systems signals a readiness to change how it conducts military operations, with speed, effectiveness, precision and massed use as the ultimate goals. To address these impending changes to military CONOPS, the US and its European allies should continue to experiment with, and conduct an ongoing analysis of, robotic technologies for gaining a key edge in this emerging technological race. Just as important in the future will be the ability to develop training against adversarial capabilities that is part of an objective evaluation of Russian military robotics CONOPS and TTPs.

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Bendett, S. (2019), ‘Russia’s Military Is Writing an Armed-Robot Playbook’, DefenseOne, 26 November 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/11/russias-military-writing-armed-robot-playbook/161549 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

RIA Novosti (2016), ‘Фонд перспективных исследований считает, что войны будущего поведут роботы’[Advanced Research Foundation believes robots will lead the future wars], 6 July 2016,  https://ria.ru/20160706/1459555281.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

RIA Novosti (2020), ‘Виталий Давыдов: живых бойцов заменят терминаторы’ [Vitaly Davydov: terminators will replace human soldiers], 21 April 2020, https://ria.ru/20200421/1570298909.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

RIA Novosti (2020), ‘Виталий Давыдов: живых бойцов заменят терминаторы’ [Vitaly Davydov: terminators will replace human soldiers]; For more detailed description of the defence ministry’s human-in-the-loop approach, please see CNA (2020), AI in Russia, Newsletter No. 10, September 2020, https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/rsp.

For more details, please see Edmonds, J., Bendett, S. et al. (eds) (2021), ‘Military AI and Autonomy in Russia’ in AI and Autonomy in Russia, Arlington, VA: CNA, https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/rsp/russia-ai (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

This paper distinguishes between Russia’s public discussions of its military forces in Syria and the Russian political establishment’s official denials regarding participation in Eastern Ukraine conflict.

TASS (2019), ‘Российские боевые роботы в будущем смогут сами распознавать и поражать цели’  [In the future, Russian combat robots will be able to recognize and hit targets on their own], 5 February 2019, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6081210 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021); RIA Novosti (2020), ‘Источник: в РФ разработают тактику применения роботов в уличных боях’ [Source: Russia will develop tactics for using robots in street battles], 3 March 2020, https://ria.ru/20191124/1561522690.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Dulnev, P. A. (2017), ‘Применение Робототехнических Комплексов При Штурме Города (Укрепленного Района’ [Employment Of Robotic Complexes During Assault Of A City], Вестник Академии военных наук [Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences], 3(60): pp. 26–32.

Ibid.

Dulnev, P. A. and Sychev, S. A. (2019), ‘Актуальные Вопросы Построения Боевого Порядка Робототехнических Подразделений’ [Key Issues In Developing The Robotic System’s Combat Formation], Вестник Академии военных наук [Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences], 3(68): pp. 48–53.

Ibid.

D-Russia.ru (2020), ‘Глава «Рубина» сообщил об идее создания глобальной сети из подводных, надводных и воздушных беспилотников’ [Rubin design bureau chief announced the development of a global network of underwater, surface and aerial unmanned systems], 10 June 2020, http://d-russia.ru/glava-rubina-soobshhil-ob-idee-sozdanija-globalnoj-seti-iz-podvodnyh-nadvodnyh-i-vozdushnyh-bespilotnikov.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Kretsup, R. and Ramm, A. (2020), ‘Идут «Авангарды»: президент определил пять задач для Минобороны’ [‘Avangards’ are on the march: the Russian president has identified five tasks for the Ministry of Defence], Iz.ru, 21 December 2020, https://iz.ru/1102784/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/idut-avangardy-prezidentopredelil-piat-zadach-dlia-minoborony (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Zarudnitsky, V. B. (2021), ‘Характер и содержание военных конфликтов в современных условиях и обозримой перспективе’ [The nature and content of military conflicts today and in the foreseeable future], Военная мысль [Military Thought], No. 1, January 2021, pp. 34–44.

For more details, please see Edmonds, Bendett et al. (eds) (2021), ‘Military AI and Autonomy in Russia’.

Biryulin, R. (2020), ‘Оружие России опережает время’ [Russia’s weapons are ahead of their time], Interview with Alexey Krivoruchko, Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Красная звезда [Red Star], 30 December 2020, http://redstar.ru/oruzhie-rossii-operezhaet-vremya (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ibid.

Biryulin (2020), ‘Оружие России опережает время’ [Russia’s weapons are ahead of their time]; TASS (2020), ‘Long-range UAVs of enhanced endurance to be provided for Russian army by end of 2021’, 23 December 2020, https://tass.com/defense/1241331 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Biryulin (2020), ‘Оружие России опережает время’ [Russia’s weapons are ahead of their time]; Milenin, O. V. and Sinnikov, A. A. (2019), ‘О роли авиации воздушно-космических сил в современной войне. Беспилотные летательные аппараты как тенденция развития военной авиации’ [On the role of air-space forces aviation in modern war. Unmanned aircraft as a trend in the development of military aviation], Военная мысль [Military Thought], No. 11, November 2019: pp. 50–7 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Bellingcat.com (2018), ‘Новые российские системы радиоэлектронной борьбы на востоке Украины’ [New Russian electronic warfare systems in eastern Ukraine], 10 September 2018, https://ru.bellingcat.com/novosti/russia/2018/09/10/new-russian-ew-donbas (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Military-informant.com (2016), ‘В Сирии обнаружили российские комплексы подавления мобильной связи «Леер-3»’ [Leer-3 mobile communications suppressor identified in Syria], 14 March 2016, https://military-informant.com/army/v-sirii-obnaruzhili-rossiyskie-kompleksyi-podavleniya-mobilnoy-svyazi-leer-3.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021); Aex.ru (2020), ‘Россия отправила в Карабах проверенные в Сирии беспилотники’ [Russia sent Syria-tested UAVs to Karabakh], 26 November 2020, https://www.aex.ru/news/2020/11/26/219839 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (2020), ‘Специалисты РЭБ подавили связь условного противника в ходе учения под Самарой’ [EW specialists suppressed adversary communications during Samara exercise], 20 July 2020, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12303064@egNews (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Baranets, V. (2017), ‘Начальник Генштаба Вооруженных сил России генерал армии Валерий Герасимов: «Мы переломили хребет ударным силам терроризма»’ [Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, Army General Valery Gerasimov: ‘We have broken the spine of the shock forces of terrorism’], 26 December 2017, KP.ru, https://www.kp.ru/daily/26775/3808693 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ramm, A. (2021), ‘Куда летит беспилотная авиация’ [Where unmanned aircraft are flying], Iz.ru, 21 January 2021, https://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2021-01-21/1_1125_aviation.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ibid.

Bendett, S. (2021), ‘Strength in Numbers: Russia and the Future of Drone Swarms’, Modern War Institute, 20 April 2021, https://mwi.usma.edu/strength-in-numbers-russia-and-the-future-of-drone-swarms (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

RIA Novosti (2021), ‘Источник: для ВКС создают работающие в стае реактивные беспилотники’ [Source: Swarming jet-propelled drones in development for videoconferencing], 1 March 2021, https://ria.ru/20210301/bespilotniki-1599368302.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ramm (2021), ‘Куда летит беспилотная авиация’ [Where unmanned aircraft are flying].

Ibid.

Galeeva, D. (2021), ‘Подписан госконтракт на поставку беспилотников «Альтиус-РУ», созданных в Казани’ [A state contract was signed for the supply of ‘Altius-RU’ drones created in Kazan], Tatar-inform.ru, 20 February 2021, https://www.tatar-inform.ru/news/business/20-02-2021/podpisan-goskontrakt-na-postavku-bespilotnikov-altius-ru-sozdannyh-v-kazani-5808072 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ramm (2021), ‘Куда летит беспилотная авиация’ [Where unmanned aircraft are flying].

Lavrov, A. (2021), ‘Закрытое небо: в России создается инновационная система воздушных  боев’ [Closed sky: Russia is developing an innovative aerial combat], Iz.ru, 24 February 2021,  https://iz.ru/1127710/anton-lavrov/zakrytoe-nebo-v-rossii-sozdaetsia-innovatcionnaia-sistema- vozdushnykh-boev (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Iz.ru (2020), ‘Стратегический ракетоносец Ту-95МС отработал управление беспилотником’ [Strategic missile carrier Tu-95MS completed drone control tests], 23 December 2020, https://iz.ru/1103388/2020-12-23/strategicheskii-raketonosetc-tu-95ms-otrabotal-upravlenie-bespilotnikom (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

TASS (2020), ‘Минобороны решило сделать тяжелый беспилотник ‘Охотник’ дальним перехватчиком’ [The Ministry of Defence decided to make the heavy drone Okhotnik an interceptor], 26 August 2020,  https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/9299951 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021); Tadviser (2020), ‘2020: Ударный дрон «Охотник» будет оснащен ИИ’ [2020: ‘Okhotnik’ UCAV will employ AI], 27 August 2020, https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/Продукт:Охотник_(ударный_дрон) (accessed 9 Jul. 2021); Yuferev, S. (2020), ‘«Альтиус». Тяжёлый российский беспилотник с искусственным интеллектом’ [‘Altius’. Heavy Russian drone with artificial intelligence], TopWar.ru, 27 March 2020,  https://topwar.ru/169438-altius-tjazhelyjrossijskij-bespilotnik-s-iskusstvennym-intellektom.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

BMPD Military Blog (2020), ‘Беспилотный летательный аппарат «Гром» в экспозиции форума «Армия-2020»’ [‘Grom’ UAV displayed at ‘ARMY-2020’ forum], 25 August 2020, https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4122894.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021); TASS (2021), ‘Ударный беспилотник ‘Гром’ сможет управлять роем из десяти дронов ‘Молния’’ [‘Grom’ attack drone will direct a swam of ten Molniya drones], 11 March 2021, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/10876259 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021); Российская газета  [Russian Newspaper] (2021), ‘Новые ударные беспилотники “Иноходец-РУ” поступят в войска  в 2023 году’ [New ‘Inokhodets-RU’ attack drones will enter service troops in 2023], 26 August 2021,  https://rg.ru/2021/08/26/reg-cfo/novye-udarnye-bespilotniki-inohodec-ru-postupiat-v-vojska-v-2023-godu.html (accessed 11 Sep. 2021).

Cenciotti, D. (2021), ‘Let’s Have a Look At All The Latest Claims About ‘Checkmate’, Russia’s New Light Tactical Fighter’, TheAviationist.com, 23 July 2021, https://theaviationist.com/2021/07/23/checkmate-latest-claims (accessed 28 Jul. 2021).

Ibid.

Ramm, A. (2021), ‘« У России есть своя линейка беспилотников-камикадзе»’ [‘Russia has its own lineup of kamikaze drones’], Iz.ru, 19 February 2021, https://iz.ru/1126653/aleksei-ramm/u-rossii-est-svoia-lineika-bespilotnikov-kamikadze (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Tuchkov. V. (2021), ‘Барражирующий «Ланцет»’ [Loitering ‘Lancet’], VPK-news.ru, 22 June 2021,  https://vpk-news.ru/articles/62626 (accessed 11 Sep. 2021).

TASS (2019), ‘Russia launches work on combat robotic vehicle’, 24 December 2019, https://tass.com/defense/1103393 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021) (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Zubov, V. (2018), ‘Отечественные Вооруженные Робототехнические Комплексы’ [Domestic military robotic complexes], Обозрение Армии И Флота [Army & Navy Review], no. 3.

Ibid.

Novosti VPK (2018), ‘Роботы ‘Уран-6’, ‘Скарабей’ и ‘Сфера’ будут приняты на вооружение в 2018 году’ [‘Uran-6’, ‘Scarab’ and ‘Sphera’ robots will be put into service in 2018], 23 May 2018, https://vpk.name/news/216049_roboty_uran-6_skarabei_i_sfera_budut_prinyaty_na_vooruzhenie_v_2018_godu.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ramm, A. (2021), ‘Война людей-роботов’ [Robo-human combat], NVO.NG.ru, 28 January 2021,  https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2021-01-28/1_1126_war.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

TASS (2020), ‘Олег Мартьянов: в будущем будет не армия терминаторов, а армия умных ‘Маркеров’’ [Oleg Martyanov: there won’t be an army of terminators. There will be an army of ‘Markers’], 29 June 2020, https://tass.ru/interviews/8831445 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ibid.

BMPD Military Blog (2018), ‘Проблемные вопросы развития робототехнических комплексов военного назначения’ [Problematic issues of the development of military robotic systems], 16 June 2018, https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3239351.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ramm, A. (2021), ‘Война людей-роботов’ [Robo-human combat].

CNA (2021), Artificial Intelligence in Russia, newsletter: issue 21, 26 February 2021, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2021-U-029296-Final.pdf (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Latyshev, A. and Komarova, E. (2021), ‘«Гарантирует сохранность жизни людей»: что представляет собой созданный на базе БМП-3 российский боевой робот «Удар»’ [‘Guarantees the safety of people’s lives’: Russian ‘Udar’ combat robot created on the basis of the BMP-3], RT, 12 February 2021, https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/831267-rossiya-armiya-udar-robot (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ibid.

TASS (2019), ‘Russia launches work on combat robotic vehicle’; TASS (2021), ‘Минобороны РФ заключило первый контракт на робототехнический комплекс “Штурм”’ [The Russian Ministry of Defence signed the first contract for the Shturm robotic complex], 24 August 2021, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/12205511 (accessed 11 Sep. 2021).

CNA (2021), Artificial Intelligence in Russia newsletters.

TASS (2021), ‘‘Уралвагонзавод’ работает над созданием беспилотной бронетехники’ [‘Uralvagonozavod’ is working on unmanned armored vehicles], 21 February 2021, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/10755979 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Latyshev and Komarova (2021), ‘«Гарантирует сохранность жизни людей»: что представляет собой созданный на базе БМП-3 российский боевой робот «Удар»’ [‘Guarantees the safety of people’s lives’: Russian ‘Udar’ combat robot created on the basis of the BMP-3].

Ibid.

Tuchkov, V. (2021), ‘Искусственный интеллект за рычагами танка’ [AI behind the controls of a tank], VPK-news.ru, 11 January 2021, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/60333 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ibid.

Murakhovsky, V. (2021), Telegram post, 28 May 2021, https://t.me/Viktor_Murakhovskiy/93 (accessed 28 Jul. 2021).

TASS (2021), ‘Russian Army to set up first military unit armed with strike robots’, 9 April 2021,  https://tass.com/defense/1276039 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Gizitdinova, M. R. and Cherkasov, S. M. (2008), ‘Роль Мобильных Подводных Роботов В Решении Задач Военно-Морского Флота’ [Role Of Mobile Submarine Robots In Solving The Tasks Of The Navy], Военная мысль [Military Thought], no. 1, January 2008: pp. 16–21; RIA Novosti (2018), ‘В ФПИ оценили перспективы использования роботов для охраны морских границ’ [ARF reviewed the possibility of using robots to defend nation’s borders], 17 January 2018, https://ria.ru/science/20180117/1512760432.html?inj=1 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

TASS (2019), ‘Седьмой тральщик проекта 12700 заложат в Петербурге в июле’ [7th Project 12700 trawler will be laid in St Petersburg in July], 10 April 2019, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/6318333 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021); Valchenko, S. and Surkov, N. (2018), ‘«Горшковы» получат роботов-помощников’  [‘Gorshkovs’ will receive robotic assistants], Iz.ru, 7 February 2018, https://iz.ru/697285/sergei-valchenko-nikolai-surkov/gorshkovy-poluchat-robotov-pomoshchnikov (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Flot.com (2021), ‘Главком ВМФ рассказал о подготовке экипажей новых кораблей’ [The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy spoke about the crew training], 14 January 2021, https://flot.com/2021/Вмф1 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

TASS (2021), ‘Невское ПКБ представило проект универсального морского корабля ‘Варан’’ [Nevsky Design Bureau unveils unique ‘Varan’ ship concept], 18 January 2021, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/10488643 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Vesti.ru (2018), ‘Подводные беспилотники ‘Посейдон’ поступят в ВМФ России до 2027 года’ [‘Poseidon’ underwater drones will enter service before 2027], 12 May 2018, https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=3016466 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Sutton, H. I. (2019), ‘Cephalopod’, H.I. Sutton website, 27 July 2018, http://www.hisutton.com/Cephalopod.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ivanin, A. (2020). ‘Цефалоподы атакуют косаток’ [Cephalopods are attacking killer whales], NVO.NG.ru, 17 September 2020, https://nvo.ng.ru/nvo/2020-09-17/1_1109_robots.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Yudina, A. (2018), ‘Гид по самым секретным подводным роботам России’ [Guide to the most secret Russian underwater robots], TASS, 26 July 2018, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5402375 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

RIA Novosti (2020), ‘Аппарат ‘Витязь’ стал первым ‘роботом’, достигшим дна Марианской впадины’ [Vityaz is the first robot to descend to the bottom of the Mariana Trench], 9 May 2020,  https://ria.ru/20200509/1571206567.html?in=t (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ibid.

Interfax AVN (2018), ‘Подводный робот ‘Галтель’ успешно выполнил боевую задачу в Сирии – член коллегии ВПК’ [Galtel UUV successfully completed its mission in Syria – member of the Military-Industrial Commission], 22 February 2018, http://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=474342 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Российская газета [Russian Newspaper] (2018), ‘Российский подводный робот выполнил боевую  задачу в Сирии’ [Russian underwater robot completed its military mission in Syria], 22 February 2018,  https://rg.ru/2018/02/22/rossijskij-podvodnyj-robot-vypolnil-boevuiu-zadachu-v-sirii.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Yudina (2018), ‘Гид по самым секретным подводным роботам России’ [Guide to the most secret Russian underwater robots].

Yudina (2018), ‘Гид по самым секретным подводным роботам России’ [Guide to the most secret Russian underwater robots]; Moiseev, A. and Surkov, N. (2016), ‘Минобороны получит сверхавтономный подводный планер’ [MOD will get a super-autonomous underwater glider], Iz.ru, 19 December 2016, http://izvestia.ru/news/651540 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

RIA Novosti (2018), ‘В России началось строительство сверхдальнего морского беспилотника ‘Сарма’’ [Russia started the construction of Sarma long-range UUV], 24 October 2018, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20181024/1531327404.html (accessed July 2021).

Yudina, A. (2017), ‘Главный конструктор ЦКБ ‘Рубин’: мы создаем подводный город для освоения богатств Арктики’ [Rubin’s Chief Designer: we are creating an underwater city in order to get to Arctic riches], TASS, 20 September 2017, https://tass.ru/interviews/4572997 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Yudina, A. (2017), ‘Центр робототехники Минобороны РФ: в Арктике появятся микророботы ‘карманного’ формата’ [MOD’s Robotics Center: ‘pocket’-sized drones will appear in the Arctic], TASS, 24 August 2017, https://tass.ru/interviews/4502372 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

ECA Group (undated), ‘Inspector 90/USV/Unmanned Surface Vehicle’, http://www.ecagroup.com/en/solutions/unmanned-surface-vehicle-inspector-mk2 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Valagin, A. (2019), ‘Беспилотный катер для ВМФ испытают в Черном море’ [A USV will be tested in the Black Sea for the Russian Navy], Российская газета [Russian Newspaper], 27 February 2019, https://rg.ru/2019/02/27/reg-ufo/bespilotnyj-kater-dlia-vmf-ispytaiut-v-chernom-moreispytaniia.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ibid.

BMPD Military Blog (2017), ‘Безэкипажный катер ‘Искатель’ на испытаниях в Кронштадте’ [‘Iskatel’ USV tested in Kronstadt], 12 July 2017, https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2725709.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

BMPD Military Blog (2018), ‘Безэкипажный катер ‘Сканда’ российской разработки’ [Russian ‘Skanda’ USV], 5 August 2018, https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3294327.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Flotprom.ru (2018), ‘Безэкипажный катер ‘Бук-600’ представят на МВМС-2019’ [‘Buk-600’ USV will be presented at the MVMS-2019], 28 September 2018, https://flotprom.ru/2018/Мвмс3 (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ibid.

RIA Novosti (2021), ‘Компания “Кронштадт” рассказала об экспортных контрактах по ударным дронам’ [The Kronstadt company discussed export contracts for attack drones], 1 September 2021, https://ria.ru/20210901/kontrakty-1748141698.html (accessed 11 Sep. 2021).

Finance.Rambler.ru (2021), ‘“ Запад-2021”: Россия впервые применила два новых ударных робота’ [‘Zapad-2021’: Russia used new combat robots for the first time], 14 September 2021,  https://finance.rambler.ru/other/47196990/-zapad-2021-rossiya-vpervye-primenila-dva-novyh-udarnyh-robota (accessed 14 Sep. 2021).

RIA Novosti (2021), ‘Ударные беспилотники “Иноходец” и “Форпост” впервые применили на практике’ [‘Inokhodets’ and ‘Forpost’ strike drones were first used in practice], 13 September 2021,  https://ria.ru/20210913/bespilotniki-1749891464.html (accessed 14 Sept. 2021); Voennoe (2021), ‘Беспилотник “Ласточка” вооружили управляемой миной “Грань”’ [UAV ‘Swallow’ armed with a guided mine ‘Gran’], 13 September 2021, https://xn—b1aga5aadd.xn—p1ai/2021/%D0%A3%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F5 (accessed 14 Sep. 2021).

RIA Novosti (2021), ‘Шойгу заявил о производстве в России серийных боевых роботов’ [Shoigu announced mass military robot production in Russia], 21 May 2021, https://ria.ru/20210521/robot-1733352974.html (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

Ibid.

Hodarenok, M. (2020), ‘Впереди даже Турция: Россия проспала беспилотную революцию’ [Even Turkey is ahead: Russia slept through the drone revolution], Iz.ru, 1 November 2020,  https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2020/10/31/13340929.shtml (accessed 9 Jul. 2021).

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Advanced military technology in Russia

Samuel Bendett

Mathieu Boulègue

Dr Richard Connolly

Dr Margarita Konaev

Dr Pavel Podvig

Prof. Dr. Katarzyna Zysk

05 Military robotics development

Samuel Bendett

Framing the need for autonomous systems and military robotics

Current and future robotic aerial vehicle development

Table 2. Principal UAV systems deployed by the Russian armed forces

Current and future robotic ground vehicle development

Table 3. Principal UGV systems deployed by the Russian armed forces

Current and future maritime robotic vehicle development

Table 4. Principal UUV systems deployed by the Russian armed forces

Conclusions

Advanced military technology in Russia

Show authors

05 Military robotics development

Samuel Bendett

Framing the need for autonomous systems and military robotics

Current and future robotic aerial vehicle development

Table 2. Principal UAV systems deployed by the Russian armed forces

Current and future robotic ground vehicle development

Table 3. Principal UGV systems deployed by the Russian armed forces

Current and future maritime robotic vehicle development

Table 4. Principal UUV systems deployed by the Russian armed forces

Conclusions