Dealing with a bitter and belligerent Russia will be a long process demanding both resources and resolve. Accepting this fact is an essential precondition for crafting effective deterrence policy.
Outlook
Since the seizure of Crimea provided a vivid reminder of the danger of Russian military assertiveness in 2014, slow but steady progress has been made in measures to ensure the security of the US’ most vulnerable allies and partners. Nevertheless, some European leaders continue to signal that their greatest concern is not defeat, but war itself. By broadcasting this fear, and repeatedly announcing what they will not do to protect allies instead of what they will, they invite President Putin to manipulate their fears and thus sow the seeds of further aggression and armed conflict in the future. The US therefore continues to play a crucial role in contributing to European defence not only in military but also in moral terms by supporting those Western allies that do adopt a robust posture towards Russia. As put by former Estonian defence minister Sven Mikser, ‘We believe that our allies will come to our help. We need Vladimir Putin to believe that too.’ The West as a whole, led by the US, must be willing to demonstrate that it has the resolve to resist Russia – up to and including the point of open conflict. If this demonstration is made – and made in a manner and on a scale that are recognized as meaningful in Moscow – a remarkable consistency of precedents suggests Russia will back down, just as it always has done throughout Soviet and Russian history.
However, Russia’s ability to exercise what leverage it has to reshape the world as it would wish to see it has been facilitated by the state of US domestic politics for the majority of the Putin era. The unwillingness of the Obama administration to practise deterrence emboldened Russia to take ever more egregious and blatantly hostile steps in every domain except direct military confrontation with the US, realizing that in every other contest of will, the US was simply not showing up. Conciliatory policies and resets, if they take the form of offering incentives with no demand in exchange, for the sake of better relations with Moscow, will always be a mistake. During the Trump presidency, Russia could still rely on strong resistance from the White House to any initiative to contain or restrain its actions, but with the added challenge of unpredictability resulting both from the mood swings of the president himself and from his interactions with his advisers and the executive. Addressing the legacy of this extended period of uncertainty is one of the urgent tasks facing the Biden administration.
Former US Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter has argued that ‘U.S. grand strategy toward the European continent from April 1917 onward can be summarized as preventing the domination of Europe by a hostile hegemon or, at a minimum, by any country or empire that would seek to deny to the United States the prosecution of its own national interests’. To truly deter Russia from more aggressive actions, the US needs to maintain a clear set of national security priorities, and demonstrate strong political will to enforce associated limits (the notorious ‘red lines’). If Russia’s belief that the boundaries set by the US will be defended starts to erode, they will be tested by ever more assertive grey-zone means, exploiting any ambiguity in policy, and probing until it is made clear where the hard limits are. Early clarity will render this process less costly and unpleasant for the United States itself, and even more so for those allies and partners it is seeking to defend.
Recognition that confrontation with Russia cannot be avoided because it is already happening, and acceptance that resolving this conflict will be a long, costly and potentially painful process, will underpin and augment the effect of any deterrent measures put in place. Understanding and accepting this basic clash of interests and world views inevitably means that alongside the concurrent challenge from China, the West must continue to invest heavily and for the long term in deterring Russia from aggressive and hostile actions. This deterrence must include willingness to impose costs and consequences on Russia in response to military adventurism, cyber and information assaults, or any of the other ways in which Russia endangers the integrity of Western states or the lives and livelihoods of their citizens. The process will inevitably be costly and damaging for both sides – but it has to be remembered that a failure to deter Moscow invites consequences that are far more costly and far more damaging.
It is axiomatic, and has been demonstrated repeatedly over history, that Russia respects strength and despises compromise and accommodation. This strength must necessarily include military power, present and ready for use, to provide a visible counter to Russia’s own new capabilities. Some European nations continue to act on the belief that maintaining strong standing armies and investing in hardware and manpower is an outmoded metric of national security. But Russia’s traditional and persistent respect for brute military force as the key determinant of national status and the right to assert national interests means that Western states must respond in kind, because the maintenance of at least comparable conventional military capability is essential to ensuring that Russia does not perceive opportunities to further its interests – or to remove notional threats to itself – by military means.
Deterrence cannot stop Russia from wishing to damage the US and the West more broadly, and finding ways to do so where it thinks actions will remain either undetected or unpunished. This desire is based on attitude, convictions and world view, rather than on temporary or reactive policy. The best remaining option is to deter Moscow from intervention against members of NATO or the EU by causing it to believe that the costs will be too high because other members of the organizations will respond appropriately, as opposed to seeking a diplomatic solution or a back-door deal to evade their responsibilities and treaty obligations. This requires continuing demonstrations both of resolve and of global military capability that outweighs Russia’s and can be brought to bear swiftly to inflict deterrence by punishment if deterrence by denial has failed. Critically, overall military superiority matters to Russia, as opposed solely to those assets and capabilities present in Europe. What Russia fears most is large-scale and protracted war with the US or with NATO as a whole, where all of this military power can be brought to bear, since the result of such a conflict is in no doubt. It follows that any measure by the US that gives rise to any doubt as to its military superiority – or as to the will to employ it – is highly damaging for its own national security and that of its allies.
A further consequence of Russia’s historical consistency is that it is a profound mistake to identify the current confrontation with President Putin as an individual. According to Matt Rojansky of the Kennan Institute, ‘Putin is a reflection of Russia … This weird notion that Putin will go away and there will suddenly be a pliant Russia is false.’ Indeed, ‘Putin is not the reckless, unorthodox, swaggering Kremlin chief usually depicted in the West, but rather one operating in the mainstream of Russian policy for the last 100 years and more.’ The direct implication is that any strategy that will successfully deter Russia cannot be a short-term one. It must instead be designed to be sustainable over the long term.
For the nearer future, it should be recalled that events in Ukraine and Syria have emboldened Russia and once again demonstrated to Moscow the utility of military force for achieving strategic aims. The US and its allies need to have policies and plans in place for responding to the next use of that force.
Policy recommendations
In addition to the broad conclusions reached throughout this paper, the case studies and precedents lead to the following recommended principles for effective deterrence of Russia:
- Recognize the limits of agreement: It is a fundamental miscalculation to assume that Russia is interested in cooperation on Western terms, or that the West can improve the relationship through unilateral efforts. Conversely, a certain number of Russian attitudes are unshakeable. One is that the essential aim of Western policy is to expand its space of influence or bring about regime change in Russia. While Russia’s actions can be influenced through deterrence or dissuasion, basic assumptions of this kind cannot.
- Engage, but do not appease: Calls for ‘dialogue’ in Western discourse often suggest that policymakers should empathize with Russia, concede to its demands, or at the very least offer conciliation. There is, however, a clear difference between engaging with Russia productively and sacrificing interests and values to accommodate the Kremlin or cooperate on Russia’s terms. While dialogue is essential, what is said is even more crucial. Policy should not focus on appeasement, but should be about signalling determination and resilience to safeguard these values and interests.
- Avoid rewarding provocation: Russia has clear incentives to continue on its path of military provocation and non-military hostile activity. These incentives should be removed by establishing clear boundaries and parameters of acceptable behaviour, none of which impinges on the sovereignty or vital interests of the US or its allies. Defining red lines with regard to Russian actions will require coherence and unity among Western partners, and patience and resilience, with a realization that once a boundary has been set and recognized, Russia will start probing elsewhere along the full spectrum of warfare and activities below the threshold of war. Emphasis should continue to be placed on the certainty that NATO allies will be defended under Article 5 if attacked and that they do have the capacity to respond; but greater clarity is needed on responses to encounters at a lower level, of the kind described in this paper.
- Avoid self-deterrence: It is routinely suggested that clashes and close encounters may be the fault of the US or its allies for engaging in provocative behaviour. Russia does not necessarily consider deterrence to be provocative but the West needs to respond assertively in order to set boundaries and discourage, rather than encourage, further Russian brinkmanship. In particular, it is critical to recognize that an armed clash with Russia need not necessarily lead to escalation. As has been repeatedly demonstrated in the cases described in this paper, Russia accepts the loss of personnel, including aircraft and crew, as a normal and natural part of the messy process of establishing and defining inter-state relations.
- Assess the full spectrum of threat: NATO allies differ among themselves over where, and how, Russia presents a threat, in part because of differing attitudes within Europe to Russia as a whole. This lack of coherence – for instance on whether Russian activity in the economic domain, such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, is in itself undesirable because it harms NATO partners – leaves gaps for exploitation by Russia and will increase its willingness to test resolve. As the line between peacetime and wartime activities is increasingly blurred, allies should clearly identify Russian actions through the lens of full-spectrum warfare, namely as a continuum between military and non-military probing. The risk of cross-domain and cross-regional escalation, including in cyber warfare, should be considered systematically and by default.
- Name and shame: Despite apparent reluctance on the part of US and allied armed services to detail the level and potential dangers of Russian activity run against them, this paper and others have described precedents showing the clear benefits of transparency. Concealing the true nature, volume and intent of Russia’s irresponsible behaviour cedes the information space to Moscow instead of properly educating Western publics about the brinkmanship practised by Russia and the restraint required from NATO partners. In particular, it allows Russia to further the narrative that it is behaving responsibly and that NATO is the provocative actor. But most importantly, the lack of transparency over Russia’s hostile actions leads to an inadequate perception of threat among Western populations, and among those political leaders who receive the same information flows as them and are sensitive to public opinion. The result is that NATO members continue to compete with limited authorities, while Russia believes it is already at war.
- Avoid trade-offs: Policy commentators who argue for de-escalation by the West sometimes propose the use of geographical dividing lines around sensitive areas, unrelated to the strict legal position on sovereignty, with the intention of separating Russian and US/NATO activities. This would be a concession to Russia that met key Russian ambitions and rewarded irresponsible behaviour, and should be avoided.
- Communicate and deconflict: At the same time, although the Syria deconfliction agreement was unique to that conflict, aspects of the agreement may be applicable elsewhere. In particular, ensuring routinely and continuously open contact lines covering areas of high military activity, such as the Baltic and the Black Sea, would reduce the danger of unintended escalation and provide greater clarity as to Russian intentions – especially if, as in Deir ez-Zor, the Russian side denies something is happening when it plainly is.
- Plan for contingencies: Above all, contingency planning is critical, working from the basis that if current trends continue, it is a matter of when, not if, a serious incident will occur: an aircraft brought down, or a vessel damaged or sunk, or personnel on the ground suffering losses. For a whole variety of reasons, including escalation management, the calibration and careful planning of responses to these situations is essential. It is just as essential to clearly outline the ‘rules of the road’ – what is acceptable and unacceptable in Russian behaviour, including by measurement against international agreements to which Russia has already committed itself – for both sides to minimize the risk of miscalculation for mutual benefit and security.
