Elections in their basic form are a representative appointment mechanism. As such, reforming the election law will only affect who can stand for election and therefore who can participate in the bargaining process but not the eventual outcome. The recent demonstrations in Iraq demanded the delivery of services, the creation of a culture of responsible governance within the political elite and the appointment of candidates voted for by the public in key government positions. The response to these demands consists of adaptations to the electoral processes. The reforms have been praised by some politicians, including Shia leader al-Sadr. The new election law will remove the focus on political parties, however, candidates will have to enter coalition blocs after an election in order to form a government. The reform therefore simply moves the parameters of engagement rather than overhaul the whole system. This is illustrated by the large numbers of so-called independent candidates being put forward by parties, in effect overriding the system and retaining focus on the elite bargaining system operating separately from the election process. Any further reform focusing on the electoral system alone would result in the same limited outcome. Real structural change to the political and government formation system in Iraq requires three things.
First, a review of the constitution’s federal make-up and sectarian framing, with the aim of producing a new constitution that is inclusive and adhered to. Such a review should address the pattern that has developed of pushing aside the constitution, when expedient, in the process of forming governments. This has had a corrosive effect on the rule of law and inhibited the development of a governance system.
Second, the introduction of a governance structure that can meet public expectations. A professional civil service plays a vital role in realizing this goal, by downplaying the current division of ministries along sectarian lines and instead engaging on a technocratic level, making the governance of the state a central objective, as opposed to the basic acquisition of power. Another option is to increase the role of provincial councils as governance mechanisms, decreasing the centralization of power as it relates to revenue allocation and service delivery, and creating more direct accountability between the polity and the electorate. This would require the significant development of local governance structures, in order to ensure both representation and accountability, which to date has not taken place, but it remains an option.
Third, a process that results in the formation of a government that reflects the choice of voters. The bloc with the largest number of seats at the point of election should be invited as a matter of course to form a government. Whether it succeeds or fails in this should not take precedence over the principle that it has a public mandate to try, which should be honoured. This would overturn the Supreme Court decision of 2010 and reaffirm the link between elections and the formation of government. The process of distributing senior government posts and ministries should be subject to review and the development of an agreed system, which is both transparent and based on the rule of law. The culture that is developing whereby sovereign ministries are viewed as ‘belonging’ to specific blocs needs to be eradicated as a priority. The electorate have a right to assume that their choice at the ballot box is honoured; at present this is only partly the case and this is eroding voter trust and engagement.
These three objectives are not easily addressed, but they are what demonstrators demand. Tinkering with the voting and seat allocation systems will not bring about the necessary far-reaching changes that would satisfy protestors and enable the formation of a more representative government.
