The 2020 election law leaves the provisions for voter registration, the election campaign and electoral crimes largely unchanged from the 2013 law. However, significant changes have been made to the counting process. Previously, there was a manual count in each polling station, observed by party agents who were provided with copies of the results. In the new system, the count will be conducted electronically, along with a sample manual count in one polling station per polling centre. Should there be an anomaly of more than 5 per cent between electronic and manual tallies, there will be a manual recount for the whole polling centre. In the event of an appeal, the Independent High Electoral Commission can also order a manual count of the whole polling centre. The change to an electronic count in the manner adopted is likely to result in less transparency, as the vote counting will be harder to observe in the first instance. While the requirement to undertake a sample count provides some oversight, the opaque nature of electronic tallying is likely to make this process highly contested.
The law also contains a new clause that prohibits parties from changing declared coalition partners until after the elections, ensuring that votes cast are received by a bloc as it is declared on the ballot. However, as the provision does not address the period after the election, at that point the bloc can dissolve or amalgamate with other blocs. As such, the provision is likely to have little effect, if any, on government formation as the coalition formation process is unchanged. That said, SNTV will affect government formation in one crucial way, through its potential to fracture party bases. Any fracturing of the party base will result in individual members of parliament having their own mandates from voters and therefore not being necessarily beholden, or even answerable, to a party. This will create stronger links between individual elected politicians and voters.
Having more individually elected politicians in parliament, however, makes it harder to win support when forming coalitions. They can operate independently, more akin to a consultant than a party ‘employee’ and can join whatever faction is acceptable to them. The cost of securing their allegiance, either politically or fiscally, is broadly indeterminate. Their allegiance is not necessarily ever completely secured – in other words their continued loyalty will come at a perpetual price. The SNTV system will undoubtedly increase participation of smaller parties in government; it will also increase the bargaining power of individual representatives who have entered parliament on their own terms.
Reforms have also been made to the composition of the Independent High Electoral Commission, establishing a nine-member commission of which seven are members of the judiciary. Previously, while commissioners were required to be politically independent, they did not need any professional qualifications, and they were proposed by political factions and appointed by the Council of Representatives. Under the reforms, members of the judiciary will be appointed to the commission by ballot from nominations prepared by the bench, avoiding political influence and providing technocratic expertise. However, a quota for Kurdish judges has been adopted, compromising the non-sectarian principles demanded by demonstrators.
Media coverage of the law reform has depicted as apparently ‘new’ the fact that independent candidates can stand for election and voters can select specific candidates. In fact, independent candidates have been able to run for election since 2005 and voters have been able to vote directly for a preferred candidate since 2009. Altogether, 27 of 50 clauses in the election law were present in the previous law and have not been altered.
