Again, the State of Law bloc gained a disproportionate number of ministries. It won 9 per cent of the vote but received 28 per cent of sovereign ministries and 17 per cent of general ministries. The Sairoun coalition won 18 per cent of the vote but received no senior posts or sovereign ministries. The Sadrists won 18 per cent of votes and received 17 per cent of ministries; and Fateh gained 16 per cent of votes, secured 12 per cent of ministries and control of a sovereign ministry. The Al-Hal bloc, which was formerly part of Al-Iraqiya, received three ministries, without standing in the election as a party. In contrast, Victory Alliance with 14 per cent of the vote, received no ministerial posts at all. Of the top nine alliances, only six received posts. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), with 9 per cent of the vote, received 29 per cent of senior posts and sovereign ministries.
A clear pattern of seat allocation and power-holding has emerged over the course of the 2010, 2014, and 2018 election cycles. Both the State of Law and the KDP have an established stake in government, holding senior posts and sovereign ministries regardless of the votes cast and the actual percentage of the votes they received. The same does not follow for other parties, where generally ministries are awarded on the basis of the proportion of the electorate they secure.
Protests and reforms
Protests continued in 2019 across Iraq focusing on the remote, seemingly untouchable, elite that continued to govern the country. Demonstrators demanded employment opportunities, economic reforms, effective and impartial governance, reliable public services, accountability and an end to corruption. Of particular importance were the protests’ repudiation of sectarianism and their demand for changes to the constitution and election law, which are viewed as having exacerbated sectarian divisions. Protestors have consistently called for a new election law, the abandonment of compensatory seats and the end of the sectarian allocation of posts. In addition to election law reform, demonstrators demanded that future prime ministers relinquish membership of a political party and that all party-affiliated militias be disbanded to bring the use of force back under the control of the state.
While the government’s initial tactic was to violently crack down on demonstrators, it also responded with a number of political measures, many of which echoed those taken after the 2011 protests. First, it launched a significant recruitment drive to address calls for increased employment. The 2019 budget created 56,000 new posts in the public sector, increasing the total to 2.9 million at a cost of $36 billion to the public purse. In October 2019, Prime Minister Mahdi announced a further 30 measures to boost employment, and to provide housing and social insurance. Reforms were agreed to raise the educational requirements to be a minister, to increase the role of women and youth in decision-making, and to reduce ministerial salaries. Anti-corruption measures were also adopted but the calls for Mahdi to resign as prime minister intensified. Following pressure from Ayatollah al-Sistani, he resigned in November 2019. Mustafa al-Kadhimi was nominated to the post of prime minister in April 2020 and formed a new government in May that year.
In effect, the reforms and measures taken in response to the demonstrations were a combination of appeasement and containment. The reforms did not materially change the political or government system, and effectively enabled business as usual to continue, albeit with a slightly modified governing administration.
