Through the adoption of district-based constituencies and the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system, the new law aims to address calls from the electorate for greater transparency and to counter sectarian divisions of power that have worsened with the political bloc system.
First, the law creates district-based, as opposed to province-based, constituencies, with a total of 329 seats. Post-occupation, Iraq’s initial province-based multi-seat constituency system would have been in line with a proportional representation parliamentary model, but the compensatory seat system and the bloc system that evolved led to factional interests overriding the popular vote. The 2020 law also lowers the minimum age for standing as a candidate from 30 to 28, in an attempt to appease calls from young people in Iraq. Under the law, provinces will be divided into multi-seat districts, with one seat per 100,000 residents, which is in line with the earlier 2007 Supreme Court ruling. The lack of an accurate census is unlikely to be a stumbling block in drawing electoral boundaries as population data is taken from the public rationing system, which has proven to be accurate. Each multi-seat district will contain three to five seats. These will include separate provisions where one seat is guaranteed for candidates that are women within a constituency; this should result in no fewer than 25 per cent of seats being awarded to women in each province. Should the number of women elected represent less than 25 per cent of the seats in a province, the law contains a provision for adding a ‘virtual’ seat to be won by any woman in the province who is the next highest vote-receiving female candidate.
Should the number of women elected represent less than 25 per cent of the seats in a province, the law contains a provision for adding a ‘virtual’ seat to be won by any woman in the province who is the next highest vote-receiving female candidate.
Second, the law also introduces the SNTV voting system. A proportional representation system, SNTV functions within each multi-seat district as a first-past-the-post system bringing simplicity and transparency to voting and seat allocation. The candidates with the highest number of votes win the seats in each district and there is no longer the need for a seat allocation system. As such, the SNTV system gives voters absolute control over who is elected, putting their choice above party preference and addressing a core demand of protesters.
However, the SNTV system is a controversial choice given that it is said to fracture party bases. The greater the number of seats in a constituency, the more proportional the system can become. No vote cast for a candidate can be redistributed to others on party lists as a ‘surplus’, as was the case in the open or closed list proportional representation system. This has two outcomes. One, a significant number of votes for winning candidates are wasted as ‘surplus’ and votes cast for losing candidates are discarded. Two, it creates an incentive structure that is almost exclusively focused on individual attainment. A given candidate is not only competing against other parties, but is also competing with members from their own parties should more than one candidate be fielded per district. Thus, success is based on political individualism and ‘everyone for themselves’ strategies.
Parties also have to calculate carefully how best to maximize their own winning capacity across districts. A party or alliance can only win representation in line with its voter support if it manages to satisfy three conditions: anticipating accurately what its support level will be in a constituency, nominating the correct number of candidates to run given that level, and persuading its supporters to distribute their votes equally among these candidates. Nominating too many candidates runs the risk of diffusing the votes of supporters among them and not securing any seats or fewer seats as votes cannot be shared collectively by a party. Under the open list system these calculations would not have been so critical; a party could field any number of candidates and use this to test the popularity of a range of options and ideological approaches with the electorate. The SNTV system removes the incentive for parties to field a range of candidates who appeal to a broader spectrum of political views, as would be the case in an open list where marginal candidates within a popular party can secure a seat through the redistribution of excess votes. As each candidate will have to secure a unique and specific mandate within a district, the potential range of political views will become narrower.
The issue of vote wastage is also extremely significant, as illustrated by electoral outcomes in Afghanistan where the SNTV system was also used. In 2005, only 32 per cent of votes cast were received by winning candidates. This pattern was repeated in 2010, when 37 per cent of votes were cast for winning candidates, with 63 per cent of votes effectively wasted. According to one study, ‘as many as three-quarters of valid ballots cast in Afghan elections [did] not contribute to the election of any representative… In comparison, in the first Iraqi general elections of January 2005, only five per cent of votes were wasted.’
