Mozambique and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights

Incentives for engagement and implementation

Research paper Updated 24 February 2023 ISBN: 978 1 78413 497 6

A woman carrying different items walks with her child on an unpaved suburban road

Christopher Vandome

Senior Research Fellow, Africa Programme

Dr Alex Vines OBE

Research Director; Director, Africa Programme

Email Alex

In recent years, Mozambique has become the focus of increasing international investment in the exploration and exploitation of its abundant mineral resources, but ongoing instability creates challenges for the security of operating companies and their workers.

State and private security providers have been deployed to safeguard operational security in Mozambique’s extractive sector for several decades. However, in the last 20 years there has been a growing focus on the need to manage security operations so as to reduce the risk of human rights abuses.

In 2021 the government signalled its intent to engage with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, or VPs, developed in 2002 as a set of international standards that serves as a regulatory framework for security relationships between extractive companies, state and private security actors, and local communities.

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive resource on the VPs and their potential utility in promoting best practice in human rights across the extractive industry in Mozambique.

The paper is also available as a PDF download in Portuguese: this includes a copy of the VPs translated into Swahili, which appears as Annex 5.

Security, business and human rights in Mozambique

Respect for human rights is a cornerstone for the kind of country we are building, a country where each and every citizen should feel free and protected as a citizen.28

President Filipe Nyusi, address to the nation marking National Women’s Day, 7 April 2021.

Box 5. Mozambique’s diverse security risks: social protest, armed violence and insurgency

The government of Mozambique faces a variety of security threats. Since October 2017 an armed insurgency has gained momentum in Cabo Delgado, in the extreme northeast of the country close to the Tanzanian border, threatening the future of the fledgling liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector and creating a humanitarian crisis. Although a peace deal in 2019 brought an end to armed violence perpetrated by RENAMO (the Mozambican National Resistance) – the losing party in Mozambique’s civil war (1977–2002) which had resumed limited armed operations in 2013 – a splinter group, the RENAMO Military Junta (RMJ), continued to commit sporadic armed attacks until the death of its leader in October 2021.

Organized crime and the illicit trade in drugs, minerals, gemstones, timber and illegal wildlife products are prevalent throughout the country, particularly in the less developed north, and all provinces have been affected by violent protests focusing on socio-economic issues. The state has an uneven presence across the country. In many locations it has minimal capacity and is severely weakened by corruption. There is a high risk of human rights abuses occurring when public or private security forces are weak, inexperienced or not adequately trained to counter these diverse and varied risks.

Figure 1. Social protest and armed violence in Mozambique, October 2017–July 2021

Source: Chatham House Africa Programme.

The government of Mozambique faces several peace and security challenges. While progress has been made on disarming and demobilizing former RENAMO combatants, the ongoing insurgency in northern Cabo Delgado has had a significant humanitarian impact on the local communities, and has alarmed the international operators of the recently established LNG projects, as well as those operators’ partners. External intervention, including a rapid deployment force from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) – and a 1,000-strong contingent sent by Rwanda in July 2021, has made progress in pushing back insurgent gains, but there is recognition both within and outside the country that a reliance on externally provided security will not resolve the issue in Cabo Delgado.

Events in Cabo Delgado have increased attention and debate on how security can be provided by Mozambique’s Defence and Security Forces (FDS); how they can collaborate with other actors on the ground; and what frameworks exist to govern these security relationships. The relationship between business and human rights had already come under scrutiny in response to a surge in investment in the coal and ruby mining sectors between 2006 and 2011. Many challenges persist on the provision and implementation of security and protection of human rights around resource sites, especially with regard to the resettlement of people displaced by mining activities. In 2013, a Human Rights Watch report alleged that the Mozambican government’s speed in both approving mining licences and inviting billions of dollars in investment outstripped the pace of the creation of adequate safeguards to protect directly affected populations, disrupting communities’ access to food, water and work.29

Since then, the government of Mozambique has committed itself to protecting and promoting human rights, and has taken several steps in support of this aim. As mentioned above, in 2013 Mozambique became the first country in Africa to begin work on an NAP on Business and Human Rights as a joint initiative between the government and CSOs.30 In the same year, deputy justice minister Alberto Nkutumula highlighted the growing recognition of the responsibility of companies in protecting human rights, stating that ‘this climate is indispensable for the balance between economic growth and the welfare of citizens, thus contributing to the harmonious development of the country’.31 In 2014, Albachir Macassar, the then national director for human rights and citizenship within the justice ministry, spoke at the UN-convened African Regional Forum on Business and Human Rights in Addis Ababa on the importance of NAPs. The justice ministry published a report in 2016 on business and human rights, and in November 2017 the Mozambique Bar Association’s Human Rights Commission, with support from the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, held three days of training and multi-stakeholder consultations across government, parliament, business and civil society to build capacity on business and human rights, including drafting NAPs. The efforts of national champions within ministries and departments must now translate into wider government support.

Box 6. Key pillars of consideration for the National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights

Raise citizens’ awareness of the links between business and human rights, and of VP violations and available remedies;
Publicize existing norms and legislation, and invest in their improvement and development by exchanging best practices with other countries; and
Build the technical, human, material and financial capacity of administrative and judicial institutions, including the office of the ombudsman and independent human rights bodies.

Source: Authors’ compilation.

The expanding role of mining and extractives as a key contributor to the national economy means that there is an urgent need for codes of conduct to be adopted and for rules to be established concerning the duties and rights of government institutions, businesses and citizens. High-level commitments need to be turned into action on the ground, and it is in this context that the VPs can offer a way forward. Initial steps to launch discussions have already been taken by Mozambique’s international partners, including the UK, US and the UN Development Programme.32 At the 38th session of the UN’s Universal Periodic Review of Mozambique’s human rights record, held in Geneva in May 2021, the Mozambican government was asked (by the US) to detail the steps it is taking to implement the VPs, and was also asked whether it had considered joining the VPI.33

Several companies present in Mozambique have independently noted that their in-country security arrangements are in compliance with their VP commitments. These include Rio Tinto and Gemfields, an engaged corporate member. The energy companies TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil and Eni34 have also conducted workshops and training that include coverage of the VPs.35

Box 7. Private sector commitments to the VPs in Mozambique

Many commercial operators in Mozambique are already implementing the VPs in their security protocols. A total of 12 VPI signatory companies or aspiring members currently operate in the country, or have previously done so: Anglo American, BHP Billiton, BP, Eni, Equinor, ExxonMobil, Galp Energia, Gemfields, Rio Tinto, Shell, TotalEnergies and Vale. These companies are already reporting on human rights abuses on their sites, and most are already supporting third parties to conduct human rights training for security forces.

TotalEnergies reported in 2020 that it does not use private armed security companies in Mozambique.36 A company spokesperson was cited in January 2021 as having stated: ‘Each Mozambican military or police officer assigned to the protection of the [Afungi-based Mozambique LNG] facility receives VPSHR (Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights) training. [TotalEnergies] is particularly vigilant about the proper application of these principles, and this subject is regularly raised with the authorities.’37

Likewise, ExxonMobil has reported that ‘in some instances, host governments require ExxonMobil to engage their security forces. In these cases, we have signed agreements with governments that include expectations for respecting human rights consistent with the Voluntary Principles, as well as compliance with relevant local, [UN] and other security-related frameworks. We have agreements in place in […] Mozambique.’38

In 2019, Eni submitted a company application and action plan to the VPI. The VPs were already included in two of the company’s main human rights documents, Eni’s Statement on Respect for Human Rights and its Code of Ethics.39 In 2021, the company achieved the top score among extractive companies on the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark index, having been assessed against a number of indicators focusing on key areas of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.40 In Mozambique, Eni and its local subsidiary Eni Rovuma Basin have engaged with the Danish Institute of Human Rights, which produced a report of observations and recommendations for their in-country operations. The company’s human rights action plan for 2019–22, approved at group level in 2019, is being implemented, though some activities have been postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2020, Gemfields became the first gemstone company in the world to be recognized as an engaged corporate member by the VPI.41 The company operates the Montepuez ruby mine in Cabo Delgado, owning a 75 per cent stake, with Mozambican mining firm Mwiriti Limitada owning the remaining 25 per cent. Gemfields also has four exploration projects in the country. The firm had previously faced legal action over accusations of abuse by public and private security forces at the concession. Unlike VPI member companies involved in the Tete coal boom – Anglo American, Rio Tinto and Vale – Gemfields faces the additional issue of the infiltration of very high numbers of informal artisanal miners at its site. It was seen as imperative that the company’s security arrangements place the VPs at their core to address such security issues, including in its incident reporting mechanisms. The company’s director of sustainability, policy and risk has commented that ‘[the] VPSHR represents an important space for governments, NGOs and corporates to share and challenge each other on how to improve security and human rights best practice and we welcome the opportunity to learn from these knowledgeable peers, as well as share our own experiences’.42

There is growing support for the VPs from Mozambique’s civil society. In 2021 the national NGO Centro para Democracia e Desenvolvimento (CDD) conducted a series of webinars on business security and human rights, focusing on Cabo Delgado. During these discussions – which were attended by representatives of the justice and defence ministries, the CDD and the National Human Rights Commission, delegates from provincial governments, businesses and CSOs, and researchers – a consensus was reached on the importance of the VPs for Mozambique at this phase of its economic development. A large portfolio of investments in the mining and extractive sectors is threatened by the intensification of insurgent attacks in Cabo Delgado and allegations of human rights abuses against public and private security providers.

In the context of persistent reports from among the population of extortion, theft and abuses by the FDS, leaders of Mozambique’s security forces have likewise acknowledged the importance of the VPs in offering a guide for the behaviour of its personnel, in addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other norms of public international and humanitarian law.43 In addition, the Mozambican government has used the VPs to frame engagements that it has reached with the private sector, notably the memorandum of understanding it signed jointly with TotalEnergies on 24 August 2020, which stated that: ‘The Government of Mozambique is committed that the Joint Task Force personnel shall act according to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR).’44 However, it is important to note that citizen engagement and participation is largely restricted to those communities around sites, and there is no wider platform for national engagement on these issues.

On 14 July 2021, an agreement was concluded which established a national working group on the effective implementation of the VPs in Mozambique.45 Speaking at the launch event – which was hosted jointly by the justice ministry and the CDD – Jorge Ferreira, the ministry’s inspector general, stressed the importance of establishing a national VP working group that brought together state institutions, private sector actors and CSOs,46 and emphasized that adherence by Mozambique to the VPs should be complemented by adherence to other, related, instruments, in particular the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. A partnership with CDD and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) has been established to promote the implementation of the VPs in Mozambique through the creation of two VP working groups, one at national level and one in Cabo Delgado. CDD plans to lead the initiatives in-country, while DCAF will provide technical advice, project management expertise and international donor coordination.47

In addition to the implementation of the VPs, membership of the VPI would also greatly enhance the opportunities within Mozambique for information sharing and dissemination. There is significant benefit to being able to engage with business and CSOs to identify problems and grievances before they escalate. This includes working with VP signatory governments’ diplomatic missions, both in Maputo and in neighbouring states accredited to Mozambique. VPI membership also provides a platform to cooperate with signatory companies responsible for providing protection to their Mozambican employees and facilities.

Challenges to the implementation of the VPs in Mozambique

Adherence to the VPs would benefit investments in the mining and extractive sectors in Mozambique, minimize the possibility of conflict, and help support the state in its duty to protect human rights. But there are several important challenges to formal adherence and consistent use of the VPs in Mozambique.

First, there is a need for education at a national, state, commercial and community level. Citizens are largely unaware of their human rights, especially within a context of conflict and big business. Most citizens – and many working within state institutions – have never heard of the VPs or the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Most have no access to information on the rights of the communities, the duties of the state and businesses, how to identify violations or what legal remedies might be available.

There is a need for education at a national, state, commercial and community level. Citizens are largely unaware of their human rights, especially within a context of conflict and big business.

Second, both the country’s parliament and its judiciary must be involved in any national commitment to improving the human rights environment. Mozambique has recent and untested legislation governing business, mining and extractives. It needs to be consolidated, disseminated and tested in practice. On the rare occasions when there have been attempts to enforce such legislation, the weak material, human and financial capacity of legal, administrative and judicial institutions has proved inadequate to effectively address the complex challenges of enforcing human rights protections.

Box 8. Key Mozambican national institutions and their responsibilities on business and human rights

Parliament: the key institution in the development of Mozambique’s legislation on business and human rights, which is still in its early stages;
Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy: responsible for issuing investment authorizations for the mining and extractive sector;
Ministry of Land and the Environment: commissions environmental impact studies;
Ministry of National Defence: coordinates security in areas where major private investment projects are implemented;48
Ministry of the Interior: authorizes and regulates the entry of private security companies into national territory; and
Ministry of Justice and Constitutional and Religious Affairs: coordinates the entire justice sector, including all organs that ensure the application of the law – courts, the Office of the Attorney-General, the Mozambican Bar Association, and the Office of the Ombudsman.

Third, any credible attempt to implement the VPs and other frameworks to protect human rights must be buttressed by proper investigations leading to prosecutions of perpetrators, including non-state armed combatants, and public and private security forces. Alongside this, improved transparency and press reporting on security issues is necessary, including permitting media organizations to report freely from Cabo Delgado. Independent institutions for the promotion, monitoring and protection of human rights (such as the National Commission on Human Rights, the Mozambican League of Human Rights, and others) face the same challenges as state institutions in terms of their ability to intervene and their weak technical, material, human and financial capacities. The government must also confront several important debates regarding legacy human rights issues: for example, how to balance the trade-off between amnesty and accountability for offences committed in Cabo Delgado in the period since 2017. How it engages with stakeholders, interest groups and Mozambican citizens in making these decisions will be important signals of the government’s future intent for adherence to global norms on business and human rights.

Finally, an important factor for creating credible auditing and monitoring processes is the separation of powers and responsibilities between ‘players’ and ‘referee’. In Mozambique the oil and gas industry regulator sits within the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy, exposing the minister to pressure and to potential conflicts of interest between industry, the state-owned hydrocarbons company, the regulatory body, the government, and the interests of the current party of government, FRELIMO (the Liberation Front of Mozambique), and of individuals within it. A monitoring and audit system for the VPs – and other regulations protecting human rights at the interface of companies and communities – could be better placed within the justice ministry, the National Commission on Human Rights or an independent body.

The ministry of national defence is aware of the complexity of the relationship between security and human rights and the implementation of human rights within the scope of the constitution of the republic of Mozambique and within the scope of the policy on security.

[President Filipe Nyusi] talked on his visit to Tanzania on the relevance of implementing the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights in the country, in particular in Cabo Delgado.49

Colonel Omar Saranga, spokesman, Ministry of Defence, Mozambique.

Case study 3: Indonesia

Box 9. Indonesia: Without government buy-in, company implementation is inconsistent and citizens are at risk

Indonesia was one of the initial targets of the VPs, owing to the prevailing security situation in the country, issues of corruption and human rights concerns. Several multinationals with operational subsidiaries in Indonesia, including BP, ExxonMobil, Freeport-McMoRan Inc., Rio Tinto and Vale, have joined the VPI, but the Indonesian government has remained hesitant and is not itself a signatory to the initiative. Without genuine buy-in from both the government and multinationals, corruption and human rights abuses in Indonesia’s mining sector are likely to continue.

Indonesia is a major player in the global mining industry and has abundant natural resource reserves, including coal, copper and gold. In 2019, the country was the world’s largest coal exporter (in terms of weight), exporting 455 million tonnes of coal and providing 41 per cent of globally traded thermal coal.50 Indonesia is also home to the Grasberg mine, operated by PT Freeport Indonesia, which contains one of the largest reserves of gold and copper in the world. The mining sector has been central to Indonesia’s economic growth, contributing approximately 5 per cent of the country’s GDP in 2018.51 For the economies of resource-rich provinces, such as East Kalimantan and Papua, the economic contribution of mining is much greater.

However, the country’s mining sector has been mired in corruption and human rights abuses, with both the government and multinational companies at the centre of controversy. Continued conflict between security forces and separatist movements in resource-rich provinces makes building trust between the government and local communities extremely challenging. Indonesian civil society has long been campaigning for greater transparency and accountability in the sector, as well as demanding that mining companies recognize community rights. Of paramount importance for the protection and promotion of local community rights is the establishment of effective reporting and grievance mechanisms, a commitment to transparency and accountability, and continued external monitoring.

Government commitment to the VPI could go some way to restoring this relationship. Despite hesitance from the government, many large multinationals have made commitments under the VPs. For instance, BP implemented a community-based security programme for operations in Tangguh LNG (a development of gas fields in West Papua), and used external monitors to check that human rights commitments were being upheld.52 Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, BP worked with government agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Papua Chapter of Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM) and local NGOs to train local police and military units, as well as private security guards, on the VPs.

However, ongoing accusations of corruption and corporate human rights abuses bring the integrity and commitment of these multinationals into question.53 In resource-rich regions such as Papua, where separatist movements seeking political independence have been in long-standing conflict with security forces, multinational companies have been accused of, and in some cases proved to be, supporting the Indonesian police and military, both materially and financially, raising tensions with local communities.54 Incidents of land-grabbing, forcible eviction and the denial of customary land have also triggered conflict between local communities and the Indonesian security sector, working for or on behalf of mining multinationals.55

Moreover, the Indonesian government has recently faced criticism for amendments it has made to the country’s 2009 Mining Law. Of particular concern is the removal of the limit on the size of mining operations under a single permit: removing this limit will allow mining areas to expand, leading to forcible evictions and deforestation, and opening up the mining sector to further social and environmental exploitation.56

See NewsHawks.com (2021), ‘President Nyusi Sadc double Troika Summit speech’, 10 April 2021,  https://thenewshawks.com/president-nyusi-sadc-double-troika-summit-speech (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

Human Rights Watch (2013), ‘Mozambique: Mining Resettlements Disrupt Food, Water’, 23 May 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/23/mozambique-mining-resettlements-disrupt-food-water (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

It was structured into several phases, beginning with awareness-raising for all stakeholders including government institutions; and second, development of the baseline study analysis that formed the basis for the report.

AllAfrica.com (2013), ‘Mozambique: Role of Business in Human Rights Discussed’, 17 September 2013, https://allafrica.com/stories/201309180276.html (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

A number of events have taken place: the UN Development Programme has held a series of workshops; the UK lobbied the Mozambican government on the VPs in 2015; and round-table discussions on the topic of business and human rights for UK-affiliated companies working in the extractive sector were hosted by the British High Commission in 2019. The round-table talks served as an opportunity to exchange information on how companies can do more on the VPs, including boosting compliance. One of the UK companies in attendance gave a presentation on its experience of safeguarding human rights and developing an operational grievance mechanism in Mozambique. The US has also been encouraging the government’s engagement.

UN Human Rights Council (undated), ‘Universal Periodic Review – Mozambique’, Third Cycle, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/MZindex.aspx (accessed 25 Jun. 2021).

Eni (also an engaged corporate member) held human rights training sessions in Mozambique in 2014 and 2018 that included discussion of the VPs.

In 2014, Eni commissioned the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) to conduct a scoping exercise for a human rights impact assessment (HRIA) of its activities in Mozambique. Priority impact areas were identified including conflict and security. In May 2018, DIHR also conducted a human rights assessment (HRA) related to the activities carried out by Eni’s subsidiaries operating in Mozambique (Eni Rovuma Basin and Eni Mozambico) and Coral FLNG SA, including reference to the VPs. Eni Rovuma Basin (2020), Area 4 Human Rights Action Plan: Interim Report, Maputo: Eni Rovuma Basin, https://www.eni.com/assets/documents/eng/just-transition/human-rights/HRAP-Area-4-Interim-Report-rev_20210308.pdf (accessed 25 Jun. 2021).

In January 2021, the TotalEnergies group was reported to have contracts in Mozambique with the British security consultancy firms Blue Mountain and Control Risks, as well as with the global security giants GardaWorld (Canada), G4S (UK) and the Mozambican Arkhe Risk Solutions. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (2021), ‘Mozambique: Total keen on continuing with gas project despite insurgency’, 7 January 2021, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/mozambique-total-keen-on-continuing-with-gas-project-despite-insurgency (accessed 25 Jun. 2021).

Ibid.

ExxonMobil (2021), ‘Human Rights’, 5 January 2021, https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/Sustainability/Sustainability-Report/Social/Human-Rights#Securityandhumanrights (accessed 25 Jun. 2021).

Eni SpA (2020), Eni SpA: Annual Report on Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, Voluntary Principles Initiative, https://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Eni-Spa-ANNUAL-REPORT-2020-.pdf (accessed 13 Aug. 2021); see also Eni SpA (undated), Eni’s Statement on Respect for Human Rights, https://www.eni.com/en_CH/attachments/pdf/Enis-Statement-on-respect-for-Human-Rights.pdf, and Eni SpA (undated), Code of Ethics, https://www.eni.com/assets/documents/governance/eni-code-of-ethics.pdf (accessed 13 Aug. 2021).

See World Benchmarking Alliance (2020), ‘Corporate Human Rights Benchmark’, https://www.worldbenchmarkingalliance.org/corporate-human-rights-benchmark (accessed 27 Sep. 2021).

An overview of the company’s policies, processes and experience with the VPI can be found in its 2020 engaged company report to the initiative: Gemfields (2020), Gemfields: Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. 2020 Engaged Company Report, https://www.gemfieldsgroup.com/sustainability/?upf=dl&id=11696 (accessed 13 Aug. 2021).

Bulbulia, T. (2020), ‘Gemfields accepted as corporate member of voluntary human rights initiative’, Engineering News, 26 May 2020, https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/gemfields-accepted-as-corporate-member-of-voluntary-human-rights-initiative-2020-05-26 (accessed 14 Aug. 2021).

Colonel Omar Saranga, speaking on behalf of the defence ministry, was quoted in February 2021 as stating that the VPs are ‘one of the tools of reference in the operation of the [Mozambique armed forces]’. Cronje, J. (2021), ‘Feature: Centre for Democracy and Development pushes human rights in Mozambique’, DefenceWeb, 17 February 2021, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/feature-centre-for-democracy-and-development-pushes-human-rights-in-mozambique (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

Mozambique LNG (2020), ‘Total signs agreement with the Government of Mozambique regarding the security of Mozambique LNG project’, Press release, 24 August 2020, https://mzlng.totalenergies.co.mz/en/press-releases/total-signs-agreement-government-mozambique-regarding-security-mozambique-lng-project (accessed 28 Sep. 2021).

CDD (2021), ‘Roundtable Endorses Creation of National Working Group on Voluntary Principles for Mozambique’, VPSHR in Mozambique Bulletin, 1(17), https://cddmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Roundtable-Endorses-Creation-of-National-Working-Group-on-Voluntary-Principles-for-Mozambique.pdf (accessed 13 Aug. 2021).

CDD (2021), ‘Princípios Voluntários sobre Negócios, Segurança e Direitos Humanos em Moçambique’ [Voluntary Principles on Business, Security and Human Rights in Mozambique], CDD Mozambique, YouTube, streamed live on 14 July 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9yd2ML6ke7U (accessed 13 Aug. 2021).

The programme will be underpinned by financial support provided – at this initial stage – by the UK and Switzerland through DCAF’s Security and Human Rights Implementation Mechanism.

For example, in March 2019, TEPMA1, the division of Total that is developing and operating the Mozambique LNG project in Palma district (Area 1) and Mozambique Rovuma Venture, the operator in Area 4 – the offshore Rovuma Basin – signed a security memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the defence and interior ministries. (The MoU was subsequently amended in July 2020.)

Colonel Omar Saranga, spokesman, Ministry of National Defence: CDD Moçambique (2021), ‘Plataforma de Diálogo: Negócios, Segurança e Direitos Humanos (25/03/2021)’, Youtube, 29 March 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mezilD9yZbc (accessed 13 Aug. 2021).

International Energy Agency (2020), Coal 2020: Analysis and forecast to 2025, Paris: IEA, https://www.iea.org/reports/coal-2020/trade (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

PwC (2019), Mining in Indonesia: Investment and Taxation Guide, 11th edition, Jakarta: PwC, https://www.pwc.com/id/en/pwc-publications/industries-publications/energy—utilities–mining-publications/mining-guide-2019.html (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

Bader, C. (2013), ‘Security for oil & gas projects can’t ignore human rights’, Al Jazeera, 25 January 2013, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/1/25/security-for-oil-gas-projects-cant-ignore-human-rights (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

Gillard, M. (2018), ‘Special Investigation: BP In West Papua – Slow Motion Genocide, High Speed Profit’, New Matilda, 5 November 2018, https://newmatilda.com/2018/11/05/special-investigation-bp-west-papua-slow-motion-genocide-high-speed-profit (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

Global Witness (2007), Oil and Mining in Violent Places: Why voluntary codes for companies don’t guarantee human rights, Washington, DC: Global Witness, https://cdn2.globalwitness.org/archive/files/pdfs/oil_and_mining_in_violent_places.pdf (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

White, N. D., Footer, M. E., Senior, K. et al. (2018), ‘Blurring Public and Private Security in Indonesia: Corporate Interests and Human Rights in a Fragile Environment’, Netherlands International Law Review, 65: pp. 217–25, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-018-0107-8 (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

Jong, H. N. (2020), ‘With new law, Indonesia gives miners more power and fewer obligations’, Mongabay, 13 May 2020, https://news.mongabay.com/2020/05/indonesia-mining-law-minerba-environment-pollution-coal (accessed 12 Aug. 2021).

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